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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon 
in the United States widely known as 9/11 undeniably produced a profound impact on 
a multitude sectors across the globe. The events became a turning point in the 
WUHDWPHQWRIPDULWLPH VHFXULW\ HVWDEOLVKLQJ D ³EHIRUH´ DQG DIWHU´GLYLGLQJ OLQe. One 
element that emerged in response to that attack was the change of attitude to security. 
This change, led to changes in behaviour and practices since it prompted a raft of 
measures, rules, and regulations to prevent such occurrences in the future. This thesis 
examines how security in the maritime sphere in respect of ports was given a new 
impetus by virtue of their inherent weaknesses as a potential target. In the past, port 
security was primarily focused on cargo theft and pilferage as well as denying access 
to those seeking to enter the country to improve their political or economic condition 
or to engage in smuggling activities. While the international regulation of shipping 
had increased substantially through the efforts of the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) in the second half of the 20th century, ports had remained largely 
unaffected by this regulation. However, the 9/11 changed this situation.  
 
As the main focus turned towards dual objectives: to secure ports from any kinds of 
unlawful acts and concurrently fulfil the international security requirements, 
implementing and complying with a host of security regimes imposed by a range of 
parties was seen by some commentators as a particular challenge for the developing 
nations, due to higher costs and the implications for port policy and administration.   
 
This study examines this generalisation using the Port Klang and Malaysian port 
system as a case study. It analyses security measures and management before and 
after 9/11, considering the impact not only of international regulations, especially the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, but also of bi-lateral 
security measures required by the United States as a trading partner and regional 
organisations.  Its findings are based on in-depth interviews conducted with the key 
Malaysian governmental and private stakeholders, supplemented by other primary and 
secondary sources. The study concludes that, partly as a result of previous colonial 
and post-colonial anti-terrorist measures, Malaysia generally had a well managed port 
security system prior to 9/11. This meant that though some minor internal and 
external problems were identified, Malaysia managed to handle effectively the post 
9/11 port security regimes with minimal cost implications. Any presumption that, as a 
developing country, it would have problems with implementation proved to be 
unfounded. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis explores from a policy perspective the impact on, and challenges to, port 
security brought about by the terrorist attacks on 11 th September 2001 on the World 
Trade Centre and Pentagon in the United States (US), in the case of a developing 
country, Malaysia. The events, widely known as 9/11, undeniably produced a 
profound impact on a multitude of sectors across the globe. One notable element that 
emerged in response to those attacks was the change of attitude to security. This 
change led to changes in behaviour and practices since it prompted a raft of measures, 
rules, and regulations to prevent such occurrences in the future, and in the maritime 
sphere culminated in the quick introduction of the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS) at the international level by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), the specialised maritime agency under the United Nations (UN). 
Security in respect of ports was given a new impetus by virtue of their inherent 
weaknesses since they tended to be seen as potential targets.   
 
Traditionally, port security has always been a matter of local concern for 
governments, port managers, owners and other stakeholders. In the past, port security 
was focused primarily on preventing cargo theft, pilferages, smuggling and access by 
those seeking to enter the country to improve their political or economic condition. 
After 9/11 however, the issue of security turned out to be a hot topic and a prime 
agenda of debate that drew an enormous amount of attention from policy makers, 
security analysts, scholars, educationalists and maritime stakeholders. The effect of 
9/11 was to alter the treatment of maritime security generally and of ports in 
particular. Hence the international community regarded that incident as a turning 
point (Tschirgi, 2007) WKDW ³FKDQJHG HYHU\WKLQJ´ DQG HVWDEOLVKHG D GLYLGLQJ OLQH
³EHIRUH´ DQG ³DIWHU´  LQ WKH JOREDO PDULWLPH VHFWRU *RLQJ D VWHS IXUWKHU
Christopher (2009: 3) claims 9/11 as a paradigm-shifting event for the whole 
WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ V\VWHP¶V security in general. The whole event, in fact, made the US 
UHFRJQLVH³DQHZNLQGRIZDU´WKDWXUJHGLWWRULJRURXVDFWLRQ'XG]LDN-3). 
Reflecting a decade later on the 10th anniversary of 9/11, a Malaysian journal 
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FRPPHQWHG³WHQ\HDUVDIWHU6HSWDWWDFNVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWes has altered the 
balance between freedom and security, turning an open casual society into an ever-
YLJLODQW RQH´ 7KH 6WDU 2QOLQH  6HSWHPEHU  7KLV ZDV RQH RI WKH GLVWLQFW
impacts of 9/11. 
 
The international regulation of shipping had been increased substantially through the 
efforts of the IMO in the second half of the 20th century in response to certain events 
especially some high profile maritime accidents or disasters. Usually, the effect of any 
particular major event was pressure for change through the provision of new rules and 
regimes. The event then categorically was set as a reference point for similar 
measures. For instance, the sinking of Titanic in 1912 drew attention to the safety 
aspect of ships and brought in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS 74) (Li and Wonham, 2001); the massive pollution as result of the oil 
spill by Torrey Canyon in 1967 resulted in major changes to international regulation 
in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 
73). Similarly, another major oil spill, this time by Exxon Valdez in 1989, amplified 
concern about the potential effect on the environment and hence the double hull 
requirement was imposed, phasing out single hull tankers. While, all these incidents 
reflected safety and environmental aspects, the Achille Lauro incident in 1985 drew 
attention to the threat of maritime terrorism affecting the shipping sector and led to 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
1DYLJDWLRQ68$&RQYHQWLRQLQ2¶1HLO 
 
Ports had remained largely unaffected by these developments in international 
regulation. However, 9/11 led to the introduction of new port security regimes. As 
already noted previously, as far as security was concerned, ports were largely treated  
in a local, national context in comparison to shipping and rarely as the context for a 
terrorist attack or as potentially high risk for an unwanted incident. Exploiting the 
inherent weaknesses of port security was central to petty crimes. But then, the change 
of attitude as a result of 9/11 placed the port in the category of a high risk target.  
 
This can be viewed from two perspectives. First, the difficulty of states in controlling 
the sea. AccorGLQJ WR*HUPRQG  WKLV LV FKLHIO\EHFDXVH³VHD UHSUHVHQWVD
space of liberty for criminal non-State actors, which can operate in a vast space 
ZLWKRXWIDFLQJPDQ\SROLFHFRQVWUDLQWV´6HFRQGO\DVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIDSRUW¶VFORVH
 3 
proximity to the sea and also often to an urban centre, it is potentially vulnerable as an 
easy target. As a port plays a pivotal role in trade facilitation, any small incident is 
expected to have an effect on a national economy. Hence 9/11 altered the perception 
of port security by drawing considerable attention to risks within a port and its 
hinterland, as well as the waterfront area that interfaces with the ship. 
 
As the victim of 9/11 attacks, the US government moved decisively towards filling 
ZKDWZDVDVVHVVHGWREHDµVHFXULW\JDS¶LQWKHPDULWLPHVHFWRULGHQWLI\LQJWKHSRUWDV
D µVRIW VSRW¶, and introduced the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) in 
November 2002 and a wide range of unilateral measures. Concurrently, the US took a 
step further by pressuring the IMO for harsher measures. Pursuant to this, the IMO 
amended the SOLAS 74 and introduced the ISPS Code on 1 July 2004 ± so creating a 
port security regime at the global level. The Code became a mandatory requirement to 
all the SOLAS 74 contracting parties as a security measure to safeguard the port and 
shipping sector from any form of threats particularly the act of terrorism. (A detailed 
explanation of the ISPS Code is provided in Chapter Four). Crucially the incident for 
the first time diverted the IMO from its central attention on shipping to ports, with 
special attention to port security measures.  
 
Generally, the subject of security is complex in nature. This is primarily because 
security has been understood and regarded in different ways by different parties. This 
is particularly the case for port security as it is not a stand-alone entity but has many 
dimensions, as discussed in detail in Chapter Three. The 9/11 incident further 
amplified the notion of port security by translating it into various measures at 
different levels, which was not the case before. Port security was now perceived in a 
new dimension, broadening its spectrum from a local into a regional and international 
context.  
 
Against this backdrop, the maritime world rapidly made adjustments to bolster the 
VHFXULW\ RI WKH SRUW VHFWRU LQ YLHZ RI LWV µVRIW¶ QDWXUH QRW RQO\ UHVSRQGLQJ WR WKH
existing IMO regulations but also additional unilateral measures imposed by the US 
on its trading partners. The security focus for ports turned to dual objectives: to secure 
ports from any kinds of unlawful acts and to fulfil the new international security 
requirements. Compliance posed challenges and it has been argued in some studies 
such as Azuh (2007), UNCTAD (2007) and Ng and Gujar (2008) that these were 
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particularly strong in the case of developing nations. It was assumed that developing 
countries would find it difficult to respond to new port security requirements in the 
post 9/11 period. Notably in certain cases, as will be discussed Chapter Seven, the 
notion of a high risk to ports, through terrorism particularly, is perceived as slight and 
therefore created some resistance in accepting certain security regimes. This is 
especially seen in developing nations where these countries consider terrorist threats 
are chiefly directed at the US and its allies and do not very much concern or affect 
them. 
 
1.2 An overview of key literature  
 
The concept of governance, which refers to the systems, structures, processes, rules 
and regulations adopted and imposed by the government or shared with the related 
stakeholders for the purpose of achieving certain goals (Brooks and Cullinane, 2007: 
10), provides a platform for the examination of the management of port security 
before and after 9/11. There are vast numbers of scholarly studies on the port sector in 
general and this thesis necessarily draws on some of these.1 Much of the literature 
focuses on port governance, in particular questions related to privatisation and port 
management (Goss, 1979, Baudelaire, 1986, Frankel, 1987, World Bank, 2000, 
Coltof, 2000, Baird, 2002, Cullinane and Song, 2002, Tongzon and Heng, 2005, 
Brooks and Cullinane, 2007, Alderton, 2008). But these studies on governance still do 
not include developments in security, even though these are among the key elements 
that go along with other developments. In this connection, although the port authority 
plays an important role in port governance, the primary focus of separating its role 
from the private entities that take charge of operational activities on a commercial 
basis once privatised, was directed towards various strategies to strengthen the port 
performance and develop efficient organisation (Van der lugt and De langen, 2007). 
 
The dominant interest in other aspects of the port management created a paucity of 
literature on matters concerning port security before 9/11. There are indeed few 
references in the literature in relation to practical features of security in the era before 
9/11. A study conducted in Port of Miami, United States by Hawkes and Martin 
(1996) under the heading Seaport Security to some extent gives a broader overview 
                                                 
1
 While an extensive review of the relevant literature goes hand in hand within the discussion 
throughout the chapters in this thesis, the summary of the key literature here provides an overview 
about the key points in the existing main stream scholarship on ports and security issues.  
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concerning the practical application of security in the port environment. The study is a 
compilation of papers presented by various experts in port related activities sharing 
their views in securing the port from threats emanated from cargo theft, smuggling of 
drugs and stowaways apart from safety matters. In this study, Hawkes and Martin 
(1996) conclude that seaport security is to protect life and property and therefore the 
port management needs to consider various measures to protect the port. In another 
dimension, Ellen (1993) provides a list of traditional port crimes commonly took 
place before 9/11 and sheds light on some practical measures in UK ports under the 
heading Ports at Risk.    
 
Menefee (1993) on the other hand, looked at port security before 9/11 especially in 
post World War Two period from a different perspective. He observed that in the 
global war and regional conflicts, a port was targeted to cause consequential damages 
in addition to other external threats from piracy, armed robbery and terrorism, but 
such prescience was exceptional. 
 
As compared to the paucity of literature on port security before 9/11, the post 9/11 era 
produced a considerable amount of literature on maritime security, including port 
security and the host of protective measures adopted particularly the ISPS Code. Port 
Security Management by Christopher (2009), for example, explains the practical 
application of the Code in terms of planning, coordinating and managing it in the port. 
This includes the risk assessment process as well as the application of safety aspect in 
port facilities. Some studies demonstrated the effect of the ISPS Code on shipping and 
crews (Burmerster, 2005, Mejia, 2005 and Suppiah, 2009). However, with regard to 
port security, the focus was chiefly on the cost implication for the compliance parties. 
Several global studies were conducted (OECD, 2003, IAPH, 2006 and UNCTAD, 
2007) for this purpose. The same matter was analysed by Dekker and Stevens (2007) 
at European Union (EU) level. Scholars like Bichou (2004) and Cook (2008) 
expanded consideration of such cost implications beyond the port by integrating into 
logistics and the supply chain. From the same perspective, UNCTAD (2003) studied 
the importance of multimodal transport in trade facilitation in order to improve the 
GHYHORSLQJQDWLRQV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQJOREDOWUDGH7KLVVWXG\VXJJHVWHGWKDWJLYHQWKDW
compliance with the new security measures was unavoidable, this would undoubtedly 
provide a major challenge for most developing countries.  
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Notably however, such studies deal with global impact, rather than the practical 
impact of the required measures on port governance. As this study is related to port 
governance, it is of interest that within the scope of recent port authority studies, the 
SDSHU RQ ³3RUW $XWKRULW\ 6WUDWHJ\ EH\RQG WKH ODQGORUG D FRQFHSWXDO DSSURDFK´ E\
Van der Lugt and De Langen, (2007) does not discuss at all how port authority 
strategy might be affected by new security requirements. Thus, there is a clear 
missing component in the treatment of port governance on port security, despite the 
fact that assurance of port security is now (2011) regarded as one of the central ways 
of strengthening a pRUW¶VFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV0F.LQQRQ(YHQZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[W
of port authority functions, the landlord and regulatory function of a port authority, 
that goes along with fulfilling the security needs particularly in post 9/11 period, is 
given less attention than its changing role in facilitating and entrepreneurial 
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDVLQ9HUKRHYHQ¶VSDSHU 
 
There are relatively few studies of the effect of the introduction of post 9/11 port 
security regimes on particular ports, whether in developed or less developed 
countries. Those published include Harrald, Stephens and vanDrop (2004) and Pinto, 
Rabadi and Talley (2008) on US ports. These studies generally discuss on the 
LPSHQGLQJWKUHDWV¶RUULVNVWR86SRUWVIROORZLQJWKHLQFLGHQWVDQGWKH security 
measures taken to protect them. Wengelin (2006) and Mazaheri and Ekwall, D (2009) 
examine security issues in Swedish ports. These studies highlight the impact of the 
implementation of the ISPS Code on Swedish ports. The same issue is analysed by Ng 
and Vaggelas (2012) in a comparative study of Hong Kong and Greece. Kent (2005) 
and Azuh (2007) consider the case of African ports. While Kent (2005) broadly points 
out the challenges and difficulties faced by African ports in implementing several 
security measures particularly the US initiatives, Azuh (2007) discusses specifically 
the practical process and problems of realising the ISPS Code in Nigerian ports. 
 
While these studies relate to port security at a national level for their respective ports, 
Ng and Gujar (2008) contribute a general understanding of port security practices at 
supra-national level by considering these from an Asian perspective, providing some 
empirical evidence of the experience of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) member economies and identify some of the difficulties of the Asian 
countries (where many developing countries are located) in complying with the ISPS 
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Code requirement. In the same vein, Pallis and Vaggelas (2008) approach the subject 
from the perspective of the EU ports7KH\H[SODLQWKH(8¶VDSSURDFKWRUHDOLVLQJQRW
only the ISPS Code but also the US measures.  
 
Studies of port security in the context of Malaysian ports, including Port Klang, have 
been very selective and piece-meal. One such study analysing the financial 
implications of the ISPS Code for shipping and port sector in general is by Osnin 
(2005). Osnin later (2009) again analysed the same Code, this time looking at the 
implementation process with the cost implications for the related stakeholders. Even 
within the scope of modernising the Malaysian ports through port privatisation 
especially in the case of Port Klang, studies from Jamaluddin (2002) and Khalid 
(2007) conspicuously missed out the element of security. Hussin Shah (2006) 
conducted a study on terrorism in Malaysia by examining the Islamic militant 
movement Jemaah Islamiah (JI) which intends to establish Islamic hegemony in the 
Southeast Asia region. It is a study centred purely on land-based terrorism ± an 
external threat - but never indicates any form of potential maritime terrorism or 
insecurity affecting the port sector. 
 
The significance of this research on the Malaysian case is that it goes some way 
towards filling the gap in understanding of the impact on port governance of 9/11 
beyond the cost implication which is missing in the numerous studies quoted above, 
as well as extending detailed knowledge of the impact of post 9/11 port security 
measures beyond the few national and supra-national studies, most of which do not 
deal with less developed economies, mentioned above. Port governance is not 
restricted to awareness of the applicable regulations. It also applies to those 
organisations and individuals responsible and accountable for the outcome of those 
activities. In the Malaysian case it is not limited to the Ministry of Transport (MOT) 
and the port authority but also includes the Marine Department, terminal operators 
and other interested players. By exploring the interrelated issues on port security, the 
study contributes to, as well as expands, knowledge of the Malaysian maritime sector 
in particular, as also issues of port governance in general. 
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1.3 Aim and scope of study 
 
In its most general context, this research focuses on the impact of port security 
measures in response to 9/11. On the basis that 9/11 established a dividing line in 
differentiating the perceived threats and regimes imposed, the study endeavours to 
uncover how the impact of 9/11 was translated into rules and regulatory arrangements 
at different levels. It aims to establish how far there was a change in attitude which 
was subsequently reflected in policies and practices.  
 
The study contextualises Port Klang within the Malaysian maritime system in a case 
study approach. Located in a close proximity to the Straits of Malacca (SOM), 
Malaysia has a long maritime historical background. In this sense, Port Klang 
particularly has undergone a tremendous change since the colonial era until this 
moment (2011). Its importance in terms of its impressive growth over the years and 
its capacity for handling a significant amount of domestic and international trade, 
HVWDEOLVKHG WKHSRUWDV0DOD\VLD¶VSUHPLHUSRUWDQGRQHRI WKHIDVWHVWJURZLQJSRUWV
among the developing economies.  Such importance places Malaysia, especially Port 
Klang, in such a significant position that it could not simply escape from 
implementing the new security regimes. However, by virtue of its economic growth 
and national interest, the government and other interested players have to tackle a 
number of parallel challenges in order to realise the required policy measures.  
 
7KHVWXG\KDVLGHQWLILHGDQGVHHNVWRDQVZHUWKHNH\TXHVWLRQRI³KRZKDVWKHHYHQW
RIDIIHFWHGSRUWJRYHUQDQFH´ IRFXVVLQJRQ WKHFDVHRI3RUW.ODQJ LQSDUWLFXODU
and the Malaysian port system in general. In connection with answering the main 
question, several other subsidiary questions were formulated: (i) what were the 
perceived threats in Port Klang before and after 9/11, (ii) what were the security 
aspects and practices before and after 9/11, (iii) what were the changes in the 
institutional and legal arrangements for protecting the port and (iv) what were the 
implications and challenges of implementing various initiatives in safeguarding the 
port? Although the focus is primarily on Port Klang and the Malaysian port sector, the 
scope of the investigation begins with an examination of the international and supra-
national/regional regulatory context in order to gain a broad overview of port security 
measures and an overview of how those measures were localised and impacted on 
related stakeholders. Central to the investigation is an examination of 0DOD\VLD¶V
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ability to respond to the new port security requirements in the post 9/11 era, leading to 
the significant conclusion that the Malaysian experience undermines assumptions that 
developing countries would necessarily face difficulty here. 
 
1.4 Structure of thesis 
 
The thesis is organised into eight further chapters.  
 
Chapter Two outlines the methodological approach. It deals with the choice of a 
qualitative and case study investigation and the process of collecting and analysing 
GDWD 7KH GLVFXVVLRQ DOVR LQFOXGHV WKH DXWKRU¶V HWKLFDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DQG KLV
evaluation of the limitations encountered in the process of conducting this research.   
 
Chapter Three provides an introduction to various concepts and definitions in relation 
to ports and the significance to trade and economy. This includes developments in 
shipping and the changing trend of port modernisation. The explanation of the 
relevant concepts is considered essential to provide a clear understanding of how port 
security is perceived in the maritime sphere. In relation to this, the chapter elaborates 
the situation of port security before 9/11 and considers several security regimes 
practised during this era. 
 
Chapter Four deals with port security measures in post 9/11. It explains the 
consequential effect of 9/11 on the global maritime industry. This prompted the 
introduction of a number of security regimes at different spatial levels. The chapter 
also highlights the prominent role of the US in influencing international organisations 
to adopt harsher measures as well as undertaking unilateral initiatives to further 
strengthen its own security protection. The discussion brings to light how some of the 
key regimes were then translated to fit in the local context, as described in subsequent 
chapters.  
 
Chapter Five provides a broad understanding of Malaysian maritime sector and its 
port system. It explains the contribution of the key sub-sectors within the maritime 
sector which also includes the ports and shipping sector in the Malaysian economy. 
More importantly, the chapter provides an understanding of the development of the 
port sector and its related policies. By doing so it takes us to the next chapter for 
further expansion.  
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Chapter Six is devoted specifically to Port Klang. It explains the port governance and 
HDUO\VHFXULW\LVVXHV,QWKLVUHVSHFWWKHFKDSWHUH[SORUHVWKHSRUW¶VHDUO\GHYHORSPHQW
in a brief historical background so as to provide a solid basis to comprehend its 
evolution over time. It then explains a number of security measures implemented and 
WKH SHUFHLYHG WKUHDW EHIRUH  6HHPLQJO\ WKH 3RUW .ODQJ¶V SURDFWLYH VHFXULW\
setting way before 9/11 set a good foundation to adopt and adapt the post 9/11 
regimes with less difficulty.  
 
Chapter Seven focuses on security governance in Port Klang in particular and 
Malaysia in general after 9/11. It explores the various port security regimes, mainly 
RULJLQDWLQJ IURP µFRPSHWHQW¶ LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV OLNH WKH ,02 WR ZKLFK
Malaysia is a party and has had to implement in the national/local context. The 
chapter considers how the ISPS Code was implemented according to the local needs 
and environment, which in some cases went beyond the international practice. The 
chapter further examines the impact of other US regimes such the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) and the Megaport Initiative that were brought also into effect.  
 
Chapter Eight focuses particularly on the operational impact of the post 9/11 security 
regime. It presents the research findings from various interview responses, which 
include the practical problems and challenges as a result of realising certain policy 
decisions. The chapter highlights the consequences for government and other players 
of the post 9/11 measures.  
 
Chapter Nine highlights the wider implications of the results presented in Chapter 
Seven and Eight and concludes the thesis by presenting the multi-directional and 
multi-dimensional challenges following on the change of attitudes and practices to 
port security in the Malaysian port system that resulted from 9/11. By examining the 
empirical evidence from the practical aspect of policy measures, the study stands as a 
good testimony of the Malaysian port governance success in maintaining a robust port 
security system among the developing nations. Nonetheless the thesis also observes 
certain shortcomings in the existing security system that can maybe anticipated for 
further improvements.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to present the philosophical approach as well as the 
methods employed in this research. In order to give a clear picture of the methodology 
applied to the study, this chapter first of all sets out the rationale for the philosophical 
approach, a case study strategy and the qualitative methods used. There follows a 
detailed account of the process of interview covering ethical issues and the manner it 
was conducted. Other forms of data collection and the process of data analysis are 
presented subsequently before concluding the chapter. 
 
2.2 Philosophical approach 
 
In undertaking any research, the question of a paradigm or world view is considered 
essential in finding answers for what we are researching on and meeting the objective. 
This is because a paradigm is a basic set of beliefs that guide action for this purpose. 
Wisker (2001:123) argues that a research paradigm or perspective is an underlying set 
of beliefs about how the elements of the research area fit together and how we can 
investigate it and make sense of our discoveries through logical conclusion. With this 
in mind, Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009: 106) states that the question of 
research method is of secondary importance. Instead the appropriate method is 
determined first by the question of a paradigm. Guba and Lincoln (1994) cited in 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009: 106) note: 
  
Both qualitative and quantitative methods may be used appropriately with 
any research paradigm. Questions of method are secondary to questions of 
paradigm, which we define as the basic belief system or world view that 
guide the investigation, not only in choice of method but in ontologically 
and epistemologically fundamental ways.  
 
 
Holding to this view, the research philosophy adopted determines our world view or 
paradigm, thus underpins the research strategy and the method we choose in 
conducting research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009: 108). On this basis, 
Maykut and Morehouse (2000: 2) emphasise that without any philosophic 
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background, a qualitative researcher may be left without the conceptual tools to think 
through problems and issues as they arise.    
 
There are two main research philosophies underpinning any research. One is ontology 
and the other is epistemology. The former relates to the nature of reality. It explains 
the assumptions researchers have about the way the world operates and the 
commitment held to particular views (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009: 110). In 
other words, ontology¶V concerned with what we know about the world or social 
reality and whether social reality exists independently of human conceptions and 
interpretations or not (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 11-13). The latter narrates the 
acceptable knowledge in a particular field of research and its relationship between the 
researcher and the matter being researched (Creswell, 2007 and Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2009). In other words, it is a question of what represents knowledge or 
evidence of entities in the social world that is being investigated (Mason, 1997:13).   
 
Both these philosophies will ultimately decide and influence the subject being 
researched. And this influence translates into four different world views which will be 
considered before deciding the appropriate method employed for any research 
(Creswell, 2009). The four paradigms are positivism, constructivism/interpretivism, 
advocacy/participatory and pragmatism. Positivism is applicable to quantitative 
research where the research needs to be objective in proving the theory or hypothesis. 
This type of research is categorised as deductive. For this, a theoretical or conceptual 
framework is developed, followed by a test using data to verify the hypothesis or 
theory and finally construct a specific conclusion (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 
2009: 61 and Silverman, 2005a: 4). Constructivism is focused on qualitative research 
in which a researcher is required to interpret the meaning. This type of research is 
subjective in nature and categorised as inductive. The inductive approach does not 
start with any predetermined theories, hypotheses or conceptual frameworks although 
the research has a clearly defined purpose with research question(s) and objectives 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009: 61 and Silverman, 2005a: 4). With an 
inductive approach (as oppose to deductive), the researcher explores data or collects 
data prior to developing theories or hypotheses as conclusions (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2009: 61). The advocacy/participatory paradigm emphasises action 
research which is more like applied research. This type of research is carried out by 
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the practitioners who themselves identified a need for a change or improvement 
within the system they have engaged in (Bell, 2006: 8). Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(1998), and Creswell (2009) believe pragmatism is another set of paradigms utilising 
a mixed method approach. Creswell (2009:10) contends that pragmatism is not 
committed to any one system of philosophy and reality but applies mixed methods 
which comprise both quantitative and qualitative approaches.  
 
According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003: 15) there is no definite answer as to which 
world views are the most appropriate, instead it depends upon how the researcher 
conducts the research effectively within the chosen world view.  
 
Taking the ontological position, my research fits in the context of realism where there 
exists a distinction between beliefs about the world and the way the world functions 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 16), by looking at security threats before and after the 9/11 
events. In reality, threats in port often differ due to various factors. However, any 
damage leads to numerous repercussions to many interrelated parties. The 
epistemological stance indicates that, the knowledge is acquired through inductive 
approach where interpretation plays a crucial role by taking cognizance that the 
³VRFLDO ZRUOG LV QRW JRYHUQHG E\ ODZ-like regularities but is mediated through 
meaning and human agency; consequently the social researcher is concerned to 
explore and understand the social world using both the participant's and the 
UHVHDUFKHU
VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´5LWFKLHDQG/HZLV 
 
The study of port security has been handled within different philosophical approaches 
by different researchers depending upon the core issues researched. Burmester (2005) 
researched the ISPS Code with a positivism approach by employing quantitative 
method by using questionnaire, while Wengelin (2006) employed an interpretivist 
approach by using interviews as a primary method for the Swedish port security 
study. A similar approach is adopted by Azuh (2007) in Nigerian ports and Ng and 
Vaggelas (2012) in Hong Kong and Greece ports. However, Mazaheri and Ekwall 
(2009) who studied the impact of the ISPS Code on Swedish ports adopted a mixed 
approach characterised by both positivism and interpretivism by using questionnaire 
and interviews.  
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This study adopted the interpretative paradigm similar to some researchers above 
ZKLFK LV PRUH DSSURSULDWH LQ WKH H[DPLQDWLRQ RI SHRSOHV¶ ZRrds and actions in a 
narrative or descriptive way (Maykut and Morehouse, 2000: 2). Such a paradigm was 
appropriate for this research needs. Since the study deals with the change of attitude 
and practices that have impact on policy measures, the approach provided a good 
ground to analyse the responses and reactions of the respondent. In line with this 
view, a case study strategy has been adopted using a range of qualitative methods. 
This will be discussed in the following section. 
 
2.3 Methodological strategy  
 
This section discusses two dominant strategies in this research project. These are a 
case study approach and a qualitative method. The following explanation touches 
briefly on the understanding of these two approaches, their relevance and how they 
have been applied throughout the research.  
 
2.3.1 Case study approach 
 
According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill DFDVHVWXG\LVGHILQHGDV³D
strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of 
HYLGHQFH´ ,QDGGLWLRQ WKHFDVH VWXG\ LQHIIHFWFDQEHDXQLWRIDQDO\VLV 0LOHVDQG
Huberman, 1994: 25).  
 
Gerring (2007: 17) suggests that the characteristics of a case study are:   
 
(a) that its method is qualitative, small-N (b) that the research is holistic, 
thick (a more or less comprehensive examination of a phenomenon), (c) that 
it utilizes a particular type of evidence (e.g., ethnographic, clinical, 
nonexperimental, non-survey-based, participant-observation, process-
tracing, historical, textual, or field research), (d) that its method of evidence 
JDWKHULQJ LV QDWXUDOLVWLF D ³UHDO-OLIH FRQWH[W´ H WKDW WKH WRSLF LV GLIIXVH
(case and context are difficult to distinguish),  (f) that it employs 
trLDQJXODWLRQ ³PXOWLSOH VRXUFHV RI HYLGHQFH´ J WKDW WKH UHVHDUFK
investigates the properties of a single observation, or (h) that the research 
investigates the properties of a single phenomenon, instance, or example. 
 
In the same vein, Creswell (2009: 13) argues that under the case study strategy the 
researcher explores in-depth a program, event, activity, process or the actions of one 
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or more individuals. In this instance, the researcher is bounded by time and activity 
and collects detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures over a 
sustained period of time. McNabb (2004: 359) and Miles and Huberman (1994: 26) 
pointed out that the case study approach can be used for identifying a previous 
condition or conditions that lead or contribute to a phenomenon or events or processes 
occurring over a specified period. According to Yin (1994: 3-4) this approach can 
involve an exploratory, descriptive or explanatory strategy depending upon the type of 
research question, the degree of control over actual behavioural events and the degree 
of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. This type of research 
VWUDWHJ\XVXDOO\IRUPXODWHVTXHVWLRQVRQµKRZ¶µZK\¶DQGµZKDW¶WRJHQHUDWHDQVZHUV 
 
The brief explanation above suggests that a case study approach can be used as a 
strategy to explore events or phenomenon of the past or processes occurring over a 
specified period of time. For this reason, this research employs a case study as the 
main research strategy, investigating Port Klang in Malaysia.  
 
According to Silverman (2007³YHU\RIWHQDFDVHZLOOEHFKRVHQVLPSO\EHFDXVH
LW DOORZV DFFHVV´ 7KH FKRLFH RI 0DOD\VLD ZDV FOHDUO\ LQIOXHQFHG E\ P\ QDWLRQDO
background and fluency in the Malay language. As a former official of the MOT, I 
found that access to Port Klang was made easier with the support of the MOT and the 
contacts that I had. It would be difficult for outsiders to get access and conduct 
research in this port, especially since it touches on the sensitive subject of port 
security.  At the same time, it must be recognised that my official identity posed a 
potential problem for the conduct of research; an issue which is discussed later in this 
chapter.  
 
Ease of access was not, however, the prime reason for selecting the Malaysian Port 
Klang as the subject for study. As a developing country with strong foreign trade 
interests, Malaysia was an appropriate choice for an investigation into the impact of 
9/11 on national maritime security policy. As the detailed picture of the Port Klang 
provided in Chapter Six shows, on the basis of its premier position this port was the 
obvious candidate within this country for an in-depth study of port security. 
 
A case study is predominantly used in relation to discovery of information using an 
inductive logic and less in testing of theory which is deductive logic (Denscombe, 
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2008, 38-39).  On this premise, the case study approach employed here attempts to 
explore port security issues before and after 9/11. It is therefore an exploratory study 
where the method requires discovering, understanding and describing new issues 
rather than just finding explanations. This type of exploratory study that goes along 
with qualitative method (as explained below) is also appropriate in studies dealing 
with an understanding of policy in a dynamic and complex environment such as the 
impact of 9/11 on port security. Correspondingly, Rist (2003: 632) approves this by 
noting: 
 
The contributions of qualitative research can be pivotal in assessing the 
consequences of the SROLF\ DQG SURJUDP LQLWLDWLYH«4XDOLWDWLYH UHVHDUFK
allows for the study of both anticipated and unanticipated outcomes, 
changes in understandings and perceptions as a result of the efforts of the 
program or policy, the direction and intensity of any social change that 
results from the program, and the strengths and weaknesses of the 
administrative /organizational structure that was used to operationalize the 
program.  
 
As one of the objectives of this study is to analyse the impact of various security 
regimes on government maritime policies, thus the selected strategy would be able to 
handle this effectively. Since policy issues are not simple and straightforward, they 
demand an in-depth understanding. The required findings could best be obtained 
through relatively a free flow of discussion and interaction with key informants.  
 
By adopting a case study approach, this research does not attempt to make 
generalisations. Each port has it own features because of its geographical location, 
type of cargo handled and support received from the authority or government which 
often differs from one port to another. To some extent, variations in the physical 
structure of ports also determine the exposure to and the causes of security threat 
which is obviously not consistent from one port to another. In view of these 
considerations, the findings or conclusions are therefore best applicable to this case 
only, although in some instances they may be relevant to situations where there exist 
common characteristics. According to Denscombe (2008: 299) there are fewer 
tendencies to generalize the findings of the qualitative study in another instance or 
FDVH QRQHWKHOHVV WKLV FDQ EH RYHUFRPH WKURXJK µWUDQVIHUDELOLW\¶ 7KLV PHDQV WKH
reader makes his or her own judgment through an imaginative process to apply these 
in other comparable instances. Denscombe (2008: 299) stresses that it is a question of 
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³WRZKDWH[WHQWcould the findings be transferred to other instances rather than to what 
extent are the findings likely to exist in other instances´. 
 
2.3.2 Qualitative method 
 
Essentially methods are techniques adopted in conducting research, such as statistical 
analysis for quantitative method and observation and interview for qualitative method 
(Silverman, 2005a). According to Flick (2006: 27) and Denscombe (2008: 38) a case 
study approach can be conducted both qualitatively and quantitatively. This flexibility 
allows more than one research method. However Flick (2006) and Denscombe (2008) 
suggest that a case study approach is nevertheless more aligned with qualitative 
research methods than quantitative research methods. It is worth noting that there is 
no right or wrong methodology. It all depends upon what we are trying to find out 
through the method used. This investigation is more suitable for a qualitative 
approach as it requires an in-depth understanding of a complex process where 
VWDNHKROGHUV¶LQGLYLGXDOVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVYLHZVFDQEHREWDLQHGHIIHFWLYHO\WKURXJK
observation and interviews.  
 
Qualitative study inherently requires a wide range of understanding. For Silverman 
(2010: 389) qualitative research is µWR VD\ D ORW DERXW D OLWWOH¶ %XW D JHQHULF DQG
acceptable definition of qualitative method is posited by Denzin and Lincoln (2003: 4-
5):  
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the 
world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the 
world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into 
a series of representations including field notes, interviews, conversations, 
photographs, recordings and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative 
research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This 
means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them. 
 
In another context, Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1996: 71) define qualitative 
PHWKRGV DV µDQ DUUD\ RI LQWHUSUHWLYH WHFKQLTXHV ZKLFK VHHN WR GHVFULEH GHFRGH
translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain 
PRUHRU OHVVQDWXUDOO\RFFXUULQJSKHQRPHQD LQ WKHVRFLDOZRUOG¶  ,QDVLPLODU WRQH
Ritchie and Lewis (2003: 3) pointed out that qualitative research relates to a 
naturalistic and interpretative approach concerned with understanding the meanings 
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which people attach to phenomena within their social world by noting ³Whe way in 
which people being studied understands and interprets their social reality is one of the 
central motifs of qualitative research´.  
 
In line with this, Creswell (2009:4) also observed that qualitative is more than 
exploring data. He asserts that it is: 
 
A means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups 
ascribe to a social or human problem. The process of research involves 
emerging questions and procedures, data typically collected in the 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶V VHWWLQJ GDWD DQDO\VLV LQGXFWLYHO\ EXLOGLQJ IURP SDUWLFXODUV WR
general themes, and the researcher making interpretations of the meaning of 
the data. The final written report has a flexible structure. Those who engage 
in this form of inquiry support a way of looking at research that honours an 
inductive style, a focus on individual meaning and the importance of 
rendering the complexity of a situation. 
 
7KHXQGHUO\LQJSKLORVRSK\RITXDOLWDWLYH UHVHDUFK LV µµLQWHUSUHWLYH¶ ,W LQYROYHVGDWD
generation rather than producing data in a rigid and restricted form of experimental 
method. This approach aims to produce rounded understandings on the basis of rich, 
FRQWH[WXDODQGGHWDLOHGGDWD7KHUHLVPRUHHPSKDVLVRQµKROLVWLF¶IRUPVRIDQDO\VLV
and explanation than on charting surface patterns, trends, and correlations. Qualitative 
research usually does use some form of quantification, but statistical forms of analysis 
are not seen as central (Mason 1997:4). Notably the qualitative method is very 
subjective in nature. Hence it employs numerous means such as case study, personal 
experience, interview and observation and the researchers deploy a wide range of 
interconnected interpretive practices to gain a better understanding of the subject 
matter. 
 
This study does not employ questionnaires or aims at making predictions based on 
hypotheses or theory testing as commonly adopted in quantitative study. No statistical 
instruments are used to analyse data as well. Instead it utilises the published statistical 
information obtained from various secondary sources that include web sites of the 
agency concerned, bulletins and other printed material. More attention and focus will 
be given to interpret and understand the meaning of the situation and issues concerned 
rather than to measure the changes in figures.  
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The qualitative approach deals with three components which include (i) perceptions 
or meanings, (ii) attitudes and beliefs, (iii) feelings and emotions. The process of this 
approach focuses its effort on extracting human experiences that are pure, basic and 
raw (Denscombe, 2008: 75-77)6XFK³SXUHEDVLF DQG UDZ´KXPDQH[SHULHQFHV DUH
exactly what this research needs. Interviews, discussions and observations were the 
PHWKRGV HPSOR\HG IRU WKLV VWXG\ 7KH LQWHUYLHZ FRQGXFWHG LQ WKH ³ILHOG´ KDV ZHOO
served the purpose designed for this investigation as it gathered personal perspectives, 
thoughts and experiences and observations from number of stakeholders.     
 
Furthermore, as the core subject of this study pertains to security which involves some 
³SKHQRPHQRQ´VRPHWKLQJH[SHULHQFHGGLUHFWO\UDWKHUWKDQEHLQJFRQFHLYHGDVVRPH
form of abstract concept or theory (Denscombe, 2008: 77), it is therefore more 
appropriate that this research is conducted primarily by using a qualitative 
methodology.  Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1996: 71) assert that this type of 
qualitative method involves in-depth interviews. They suggest that interviews help to 
understand how individuals construct the meaning and significance of their situations 
from the complex personal framework of beliefs and values which they have 
developed over their lives in order to help explain and predict events in their world. In 
other words, the primary purpose of the interview is to understand the meanings 
interviewees attach to the issues and situations in contexts. An interview is not merely 
a component of discussion but as Mason (1997: 38) notes, it iVDµFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWKD
SXUSRVH¶(DVWHUE\-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1996: 73) accentuate that such kind of 
µFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWK DSXUSRVH¶SURYLGHV ³WKHRSSRUWXQLW\ IRU WKH UHVHDUFKHU WRSUREH
deeply to uncover new clues, open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure 
YLYLGDFFXUDWHLQFOXVLYHDFFRXQWVWKDWDUHEDVHGRQSHUVRQDOH[SHULHQFH´ 
 
Any research method has its own strengths and weaknesses. No single method 
essentially possesses just one distinctive quality. The discussion thus far has given an 
insight into the positive aspects of the qualitative method. Nevertheless this method 
has some weaknesses. It has been criticised on the grounds that since interpretation is 
ERXQGXSZLWKWKHµVHOI¶RI WKHUHVHDUFKHU WKHUHLVDSRVVLELOLW\RIGHFRQWH[WXDOLzing 
the meaning. There is also a danger of oversimplifying the explanation. Other 
potential problems are the longer analysis time period, the difficulty of cross-checking 
together with the possibility of selective reporting and the resulting risk of distortion 
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(Bell, 2006: 11 and Denscombe, 2008: 312).  Considering all these views, the strength 
of this approach nonetheless stands out for itself. This has been pointed out by 
scholars such as Yin (1994), Mason (1997), Silverman (2005a) and Flick (2006), and 
is also borne out by the successful experience of this research.  
 
However, this type of study can possibly be approached in different ways as 
alternatives to the one adopted here. For example as mentioned earlier, some other 
researchers have employed quantitative or mixed method approach. Thus, this study 
can also be approached through questionnaires that can be achieved by distributing 
them in person, by post, via email or through web-based format (Denscombe, 2008: 8-
9) in order to collect WKH UHVSRQGHQW¶s views, experiences or observations on threat 
level, security practices and policy measures as well as statistical data.  
 
However, due to the constrained resources including time and funding, I found that 
the alternative strategy would not be appropriate. Instead, the employment of a 
qualitative approach provided an additional advantage for interviewing personally the 
key informants and getting their actual reactions towards certain measures. Further, as 
most of the selected informants held key positions in their respective agency, getting a 
fair amount of feedback through questionnaires would not be feasible due to their 
busy engagements in official duties. As Denscombe (2008: 170-171) succinctly points 
out, questionnaires can be frustrating for respondents and thus, deter them from 
answering. It offers a little opportunity for the researcher to check the truthfulness of 
the answers given by the respondents. Furthermore, WKH³SUH-coded questions can bias 
WKH ILQGLQJV WRZDUGV WKH UHVHDUFKHU¶V UDWKHU WKDQ WKH UHVSRQGHQW¶V ZD\ RI VHHLQJ
WKLQJV´Denscombe (2008: 170).  
 
2.4 The process of data collection   
 
This section provides an account of the process of data collection for this research 
project. The investigation employed several methods in gathering both primary and 
secondary data as noted in detail below.  
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2.4.1 Primary research   
 
2.4.1.1 Observation  
 
Primary data for a qualitative approach can be obtained through interviews, 
conversations, photographs, recordings, memos, documents, visual aids and so on 
(Mason, 1997 and Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 4). Primary data for this research 
project was predominantly collected through interviews with key informants from 
various organisations that had been identified as pertinent stakeholders, but 
observation DOVR KDG D UROH ZKHUH LW LQYROYHV LQ LQWHUSUHWLQJ SHRSOH¶V EHKDYLRXU RU
practices in security measures (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009: 288). 
 
The Field work was conducted in Malaysia over a period of two and half months, 
from 21st May to 5th August 2010. Map 2.1 below shows the main locations covered 
during the field trip, included Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya, Port Klang, Kuantan Port and 
Johor Port. Putrajaya is the Federal Government Administrative Centre located 
approximately 40 kilometres south of Kuala Lumpur. Kuala Lumpur is the capital city 
of Malaysia. Port Klang on the other hand is located 38 kilometres southwest of Kuala 
Lumpur and 40 kilometres from Putrajaya. A significant amount of field work was 
covered within the circle of Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Port Klang in the 
Peninsular Malaysia as most of the institutions/organisations are located here. Apart 
from this, additional visits were conducted to Johor and Kuantan Port, outside of the 
focus areas as shown in two arrows in the map. Other Federal ports in the Peninsular 
as well as in Sarawak (West Malaysia) were unable to be covered due to limitations of 
funding and time.  
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Map 2.1: Locations Visited During the Field Trip 
 
 
Source: The National Maritime Portal, 2009 
Note: The point which refers to Port Klang also covers Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya 
as they are closely located within the region of 40 kilometres. The land distance from 
Kuala Lumpur to Kuantan Port is approximately 300 kilometres whereas from Kuala 
Lumpur to Johor Port it is about 400 kilometres.  
 
 
The main focus of this field trip was to conduct interviews with informants, but it was 
also an opportunity to receive briefings and to observe the situation in the ports. Two 
terminal operators of Port Klang, Northport and Westport, provided briefing on port 
security operations and also allowed my direct observation of the practical security 
measures which built upon other information. The briefing provided a good 
understanding on how the security system works in the port. However, the direct 
observation of practical applications provided some insight into the whole mechanism 
and assisted preparation for interviews. It also provided a good ground to interpret 
how the policy measures were then translated into practice. Nonetheless permission 
was not given for taking any photographs due to security reasons. This however, did 
not affect the quality of research in any manner, as the study primarily focused on the 
process of measures rather than technical aspects that needed to be demonstrated by 
static images.  
 
Furthermore during the field trip, I was given an opportunity to participate as an 
observer in a port security programme entitled CAPEX 2010 organised by the Johor 
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Port Authority which was held at their premise on 15 th to 17th June 2010. This was a 
two-day intensive ISPS exercise programme mandated by the IMO as part of the ISPS 
Code mandatory requirements. The main participants were seven port terminals from 
the State of Johor operating under the licence of Johor Port Authority. A large number 
of port security officers from different ports in Malaysia were also invited as 
observers. The programme was basically a simulation exercise in dealing with 
terrorist attacks in the port. This was another avenue that provided first hand 
information on how a situation would be handled in the event of a terrorist attack in 
Malaysian ports. The information was useful for eliciting answers on security 
awareness and perception of threat level during the interview process.    
 
My visit to CAPEX 2010 programme also provided an opportunity to observe the 
Johor Port in Pasir Gudang which locates in the southern part of Peninsular Malaysia. 
This is another major port on the Federal port list. I also made a visit to Kuantan Port 
hence another opportunity to obtain a short briefing and subsequently observed its 
security system. Located in the eastern region of Peninsular Malaysia, this is another 
port under the same purview of the Federal government.  
 
The purpose of visiting other Federal ports in addition to Port Klang was essentially to 
gain greater background knowledge about security implementation in the country and 
to increase my understanding of the implications and perceptions of security threats in 
the port environment during the period covered by this study.   
 
2.4.1.2 Selection of institutions and organisations 
 
The selection of various institutions as a sample for this research was given much 
thought. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009: 243) suggest that the choice of 
sampling technique depends upon the feasibility of addressing the objective of the 
study. As the study aims to look into the impact of 9/11 on port governance in terms 
of implementation and implication of various security measures from a policy 
perspective, the key stakeholders were identified on the basis of non-probability 
sampling by adopting a purposive or judgemental sampling technique. Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill (2009: 233-239) claim that this type of sampling is suitable for a 
case study investigation to explore and gain theoretical insights. A range of 
institutions and organisations were identified as key stakeholders in port security for 
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the Malaysian case. The actors within the identified institutions play significant roles 
in the formation and implementation of port security measures and policies. Their 
opinions and behaviours have a profound influence on both policies and practices 
with regards to port security.  
 
Table 2.1 sets out the institutions or organisations selected and briefly highlight their 
primary roles. These are segregated into categories of policy making, 
implementing/enforcing policy, port regulatory, terminal operator, port/shipping user, 
maritime interested player and port workers. Respondents are categorised according 
to their roles as well as their participation, either directly or indirectly, in port 
security. The MOT is the highest level of body in policy drafting with implementation 
subsequently passed down to other relevant agencies for enforcement. Similarly, the 
National Security Council (NSC) XQGHU WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V 'HSDUWPHQW LV WKH
authority for national level security matters. The port authority is the agency that 
regulates port policies as instructed by the Ministry and supervises the port operators 
who are the private players. The Malaysian International Shipping Corporation  
(MISC), the Federation of Malaysian Freight Forwarders and the Malaysia 
Shipowners Association (MASA) are the stakeholders use the facility for trade 
purpose. The Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) and International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB) are other maritime interested players who contribute policy advice and 
input at various levels. Port workers are human capital who is involved in day-to-day 
port operations.  
 
Table 2.1:  The Institutions and Organisations Participating in this Study 
 
Institution 
 
Main function  Specific roles 
Ministry of Transport 
(MOT) 
Policy making x Formulate policies relating to 
navigation safety, as well as 
development and operation of sea 
transport, ports and shipping. 
x Study, review and draft laws 
relating to ports and shipping and 
to ratify related maritime 
international conventions. 
x Coordinate intersectoral maritime 
activities towards the creation of an 
integrated ocean management. 
National Security 
Council (NSC) 
Policy making x Formulate polices and directives 
for national disaster. 
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x Coordinate with leading agencies 
in mitigating any national crisis 
including terrorist attacks 
x Secretariat for the national level 
ISPS Code committee.   
Marine Department Policy 
implementation and 
enforcement 
x Appointed as the Designated 
Authority for the ISPS Code 
implementation. 
x Enforce safety of navigation 
measures. 
Selangor Royal 
Malaysian Customs  
Policy 
implementation and 
enforcement 
x Enforce Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) 
x Enforce Megaport initiative  
x Implement cargo security measures  
Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency 
(MMEA)  
Policy 
implementation and 
enforcement 
x Carry out air and coastal 
surveillance 
x Enforce law and order under any 
federal law 
x Prevent and suppress all forms of 
illicit activities at sea. 
Port Klang Authority Port regulating  x Issue license to terminal operators 
in operating the port 
x Implement and enforce all 
government policies with regards 
to port matters 
x Appointed as Maritime Transport 
Security Officer (MTSO) under the 
ISPS Code 
Kuantan Port Authority  Port regulating x Issue license to terminal operators 
in operating the port 
x Implement and enforce all 
government policies with regards 
to port matters 
x Appointed as Maritime Transport 
Security Officer (MTSO) under the 
ISPS Code 
Johor Port Authority  Port regulating x Issue license to terminal operators 
in operating the port 
x Implement and enforce all 
government policies with regards 
to port matters 
x Appointed as Maritime Transport 
Security Officer (MTSO) under the 
ISPS Code 
Northport (Port Klang) Terminal operator x Operate port in capacity of a 
private entity 
x Implement all security measures as 
required by the port authority 
x Appointed as Maritime Facility 
Security Officer (MFSO) 
Westport (Port Klang) Terminal operator x Operate port in capacity of a 
private entity 
x Implement all security measures as 
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required by the port authority 
x Appointed as Maritime Facility 
Security Officer (MFSO) 
0DOD\VLD 6KLSRZQHUV¶
Association (MASA) 
Shipowners 
Association 
(port/shipping user) 
x Protect and promote the common 
interests of Malaysian ship owners. 
x Express any issues relating to ship 
owners interest to the government 
agencies 
Federation of Malaysian 
Freight 
Forwarders/Selangor 
Freight Forwarders 
Freight Forwarders 
Association 
(port/shipping user) 
x Promote and protect the common 
interests of members of the 
association to work closely with 
the private and government 
agencies 
x Provide a forum for discussion of 
all matters and questions affecting 
the interests of the members. 
x Provide commercial, industrial, 
business and trade services to the 
members. 
Malaysian International 
Shipping Corporation 
(MISC) 
Shipping line 
(port/shipping user) 
x Operate shipping services around 
the world 
Maritime Institute of 
Malaysia (MIMA) 
Policy adviser and 
think-tank for 
government 
(Maritime-
interested players) 
x Look into matters relating to 
Malaysia's interest  
x Serve as a national focal point for 
research in the maritime sector. 
x Deal with national, regional and 
global maritime matters affecting 
Malaysia. 
x Complement the efforts of the 
various government agencies 
involved in the maritime sector by 
mobilising expertise to assist and 
support them in national maritime 
policy planning and 
implementation. 
International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB) 
International Piracy 
Reporting Centre 
(Maritime 
interested players) 
x Report piracy incidents around the 
world 
x Act as the first point of contact for 
the shipmaster to report an actual 
or attempted attack or even 
suspicious movements of piracy 
thus initiates the process of 
response. 
x Work closely with various 
governments and law enforcement 
agencies and share information 
about piracy.  
Westport and Northport 
workers 
Port workers x Work in day-to-day port operations 
Source: constructed by the author with data collected from the field work  
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2.4.1.3 Selection of informants  
 
According to Denscombe (2008: 174) not all cases of qualitative research require the 
interview method, but this method would be more appropriate for exploring complex 
DQG VXEWOH SKHQRPHQRQ +H FRQVLGHUV WKDW ³LI WKH UHVHDUFKHU ZDQWV WR FROOHFW
information on simple and uncontroversial facts, then questionnaires might prove to 
be a more cost-effective method. But when the researcher needs to gain insight into 
tKLQJVOLNHSHRSOH¶VRSLQLRQVIHHOLQJVHPRWLRQVDQGH[SHULHQFHVWKHQLQWHUYLHZZLOO
DOPRVWFHUWDLQO\SURYLGHDPRUHVXLWDEOHPHWKRG´Considering this research requires 
an understanding of the background to and effects of various port security measures 
dXULQJWKHWZRWDUJHWHGSHULRGVJHWWLQJSHRSOH¶VRSLQLRQVIHHOLQJVDQGH[SHULHQFHV
in this respect are certainly needed. Therefore, I decided to use the interview as a key 
method for data gathering.  
 
As with the selection of institutions and organisations discussed above, the selection 
of key informants attached to these was on the basis of non-probability sampling as 
stated earlier where the choice of those to be included is not a random selection. In 
this context, the feature of purposive sampling technique provides a space to look for 
LVVXHVRI LQWHUHVW DQG VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH VDPSOH FDQEH µKDQGSLFNHG¶7KLV DSSURDFK
allows the researcher to identify in advance certain people and deliberately select 
those most likely to produce some valuable data (Denscome, 2008: 17, Silverman, 
2005a: 250). Moreover Silverman (2007: 309) observes that this type of sampling 
permits the researcher to manipulate their analysis, theory and sampling activities 
interactively during the research process.  
 
Hence, for this research project the selection of key informants was on the basis of 
those who were directly involved, took charge or affected by security matters.  My 
attachment to the Ports Unit of MOT for more than five years, before being promoted 
and transferred to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), provided a 
good basis in establishing some connections to the informants prior to this study. This 
group were mainly from the port authorities, port terminals and a few other 
government agencies.   
 
For other informants whom I had never met before, assistance was sought from the 
officials interviewed to introduce them. This was done either through email or 
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telephone calls. In some cases, I was introduced personally to the individual 
concerned. Under this circumstance, snowball sampling was adopted where sample 
emerged through a process of reference from one person to another (Denscome, 2008: 
17).  
 
Since this study involves a qualitative approach, according to Maykut and Morehouse 
(2000:  62 - 63), this type of research does not involve a large number of samples. 
They argue that normally for in-depth interviews, twenty-five people were necessary 
before a researcher to reach the saturation point. Nevertheless, this is not an ideal 
number but depends on the process of analysis until no new information is found. 
Additionally, it has to be balanced with limitations of time, money and other logistical 
factors that may impinge the research. On that basis, the study identified twenty-eight 
individuals and two groups as the key informants from fifteen different organisations 
to provide a sufficient amount of information. All twenty-eight were interviewed 
individually, while two group interviews were held with port workers from Northport 
and Westport of Port Klang.  Figure 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the distribution of 
informants by category in terms of number and percentage.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Number of Key Informants by Category 
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of Key Informants  
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Essentially each category of key informants plays different roles in terms of realising 
and experiencing the effect of port security policies in different ways. In this order, 
33% or the biggest single percentage of those interviewed were enforcement officials 
and smallest number of 7% each represents terminal operators, port workers and 
maritime stakeholders. 20% of interviewees were from port authorities and the 
balance was from the port/shipping users and policy makers, represented 13% each.  
 
The representation of informants according to category may seem unbalanced, but as 
the study looked at the implementation and implication of policy measures, a larger 
number of enforcement personnel were approached for more insight into this aspect. 
This was primarily because the enforcement personnel were more aware of the 
practical aspect of this matter on the ground. As there are only two terminal operators 
in Port Klang, consequently two heads of security officials represented one from each 
terminal. For the port workers, only two groups were drawn from these terminals. 
Each group is considered as one entity for easy segmentation. The selection of 
informants from two important maritime players, that is, MIMA and IMB, was on the 
basis of their prominent role in security related matters and in the provision of policy 
advice at domestic and international platform. Apart from the Port Klang Authority, 
two other port authorities were approached to enrich and strengthen the information 
required for this study. The MASA, Federation of Malaysian Freight 
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Forwarders/Selangor Freight Forwarders, and MISC provided information on 
SRUWVKLSSLQJXVHUV¶SHUVSHFWLYH2QWKHKDQG, the key informants from the MOT and 
16&SURYLGHGGDWDRQWKHSROLF\PDNHUV¶SHUVSHFWLYH 
 
2.4.1.4 The interview process ± ethical issues 
 
In any research, ethical consideration plays a prominent role in determining whether 
the researcher has conducted the research professionally taking into account data 
FROOHFWLRQ WKH DQDO\VLV SURFHVV UHSRUWLQJ WKH ILQGLQJV DQG UHVHDUFKHU¶V FRQQHFWLRQ
with the people and fields they intend to study (Flick, 2006: 45 and Denscombe, 2008: 
$VVXFKHWKLFVULJKWO\UHIHUVWRDSSURSULDWHQHVVRIWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VEHKDYLRXULQ
relation to the right of those who become the subject of research work or affected by 
it. Ethics has been linked as:  
 
The norms or standard of behaviour that guide moral choices about our 
behaviour and our relationships with others. Research ethics therefore 
relates to questions about how we formulate and clarify our research topic, 
design our research and gain access, collect data, process and store our data, 
analyse data and write up our research findings in a moral and responsible 
way (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009: 184). 
 
 
Accordingly, those approached for interview in this research were provided with a 
Participant Information Sheet (PIS). (See Appendix I). The PSI provided information 
on the research objectives and gave an assurance to the respondents that the 
information provided would be confidential and would not be divulged or used for 
any other reason except for this research, in accordance with the UK Data Protection 
Act 1998. The informants were given the option to withdraw at anytime before or 
during the process of interview or refuse to answer any of the questions on their own 
accord as their participants are on voluntary basis. A Consent Form offered the 
informants an opportunity to agree (or not) to their participation in the study and was 
signed by the interviewee. (See Appendix II). They were also asked to agree to the 
recording of the interview session through the use of a digital audio recorder. Both the 
PSI and Consent Form had received prior approval from the University of Greenwich 
Research Ethics Committee (UREC).     
 
In addition, the informants were notified that I was a government employee 
conducting this research with a government scholarship but in a capacity of a student, 
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without any government or commercial interest involved. A supporting letter from the 
Public Services Department of Malaysia endorsed this statement.  By taking this 
measure, the informants were given an assurance that under no circumstances during 
the course of research my status as a civil servant would be allowed to compromise 
my academic standing as a researcher. The informants were also assured that any 
information they gave would not be used to threaten or obligate them in any way. 
  
2.4.1.5 The interview process ± conduct of interview   
 
It is noteworthy, that the supporting letter provided by the MOT (see Appendix III) 
carried a considerable weight in facilitating access to various institutions and gained 
cooperation from the parties concerned without necessarily affecting my status as a 
researcher, as it emphasises my academic role as a research student.  
 
The interviews with informants were conducted for approximately forty-five minutes 
to one and half hours. In order to maintain confidentiality of the collected data, all 
interviews were conducted LQ D VHSDUDWH URRP RI WKH LQIRUPDQWV¶ RIILFH SUHPLVHV
without disturbing other individuals. The conduct of the interview provided an 
assurance to the informants that the research was carried out professionally and data 
was secured only to the researcher. The interviews with the informants were 
conducted in English as most of them were professionals and possessed a relatively 
good command of English language. But in some cases, the informants tended to mix 
the English discussion with the Malay language, the national language of Malaysia. In 
certain circumstances, however, the interviews took place purely in Malay, especially 
in my interviews with the port workers due to their limited English language 
proficiency.  
 
As pointed out earlier, although gaining access to the agency identified was not a 
major problem, an obstacle emerged in getting appointments with the informants in 
the latter part of the field trip. As most of them were senior officials, they were always 
engaged in a busy working schedule. This required a lot of patience to get an 
appropriate date and time that fitted them well. On some occasions, the date and time 
fixed earlier had to be changed to another date due to a last minute pressing issue for 
the informants.  
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Another hurdle encountered during the process of interview was, notwithstanding the 
interview took place in a separate room, in certain circumstances discussions were 
LQWHUUXSWHGE\WKHLQIRUPDQWV¶SKRQHFDOOVRUrequest for meetings. In such a situation, 
our discussions were stopped and resumed at a later time. The interview was made 
more difficult for informants from the Port Klang Authority where it had to be 
conducted in two parts in different days according to their flexibility because of their 
busy engagement in official duties.  
 
In addition to this, certain informants, governmental and private, proved cautious in 
sharing information and documents. This appeared quite obvious during sessions with 
the terminal operators. This primarily because, ,ZDVFRQVLGHUHGDQµRXWVLGHU¶DQG the 
research was not conducted for their own interest or mandated by government for any 
specific reason.  
 
Nevertheless, as much as possible, the interviews were recorded with a digital device. 
An exception was one informant who refused to be recorded in order to maintain his 
privacy and for reasons of security.  For this case, the discussion was written down in 
field notes during and after the interview session. The main reason for recording the 
LQWHUYLHZVZDVWRSUHVHUYHWKHDFFXUDF\RIWKHLQIRUPDQW¶VZRUGV7KHVHZRUGVZHUH
then used as direct quotations from the interview transcripts in various part of the 
thesis. The advantage of the recorded interview was identified by Bell (2006: 164):   
 
Tape-recording can be useful to check the wording of any statement you 
might wish to quote, to allow you keep eye contact with your interviews, to 
help you look interested ± and to make sure that what you write is 
accurate...to identify categories...summarize and to note particular 
comments which are of particular interest without having to try to write 
them down during the course of the interview.  
 
Apart from the one-to-one interviews, group interviews were conducted with port 
workers of Northport and Westport of Port Klang, whose opinions and experiences 
important in view of their involvement in port security. A group interview is defined 
DV³DJURXSFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWKDSXUSRVH´0D\NXWDQG0RUHKRXVH7KH
approach allows for bringing several different perspectives into contact and used for 
HOLFLWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQIRUUHVHDUFKHU¶VIRFXVRILQTXLU\0D\NXWDQG0RUHKRXVH
103). Ideally this type of interview can be conducted with a maximum of six people to 
obtain a fair range of opinions and experiences (Maykut and Morehouse, 2000: 104). 
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Following this guidance, I restricted the numbers to five and six members in each 
group. The session was held at a separate date and time because of the different 
location of the terminals.  
 
Although it would have been helpful to conduct more group interview sessions 
representing port workers of Port Klang, the research had to be limited in this way due 
to restrictions imposed by the port management in releasing the workers from their 
duties as it might disrupt the port operations. For a port, efficiency and productivity 
are among the key components in shaping commercial viability. For this, port workers 
play a crucial role. I could not therefore demand more workers to be released from 
their duties to accommodate my research needs. Hence, the restriction imposed a 
limitation to my study in gathering more views from the port worker perspective of 
port security measures and how these affected their performance.   
 
However for the purpose of gathering valid data, I requested the management to 
provide long service workers from different segments of the operation based on 
'HQVFRPEH¶V   VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW ³XQGHU FHUWDLQ FLUFXPVWDQFes researchers 
can deliberately select participants who are very different in order to gather widely 
GLIIHULQJYLHZVDQGH[SHULHQFHVRQWKHWRSLFRIWKHLQWHUYLHZ´7KLVSURYLGHGDJRRG
representation of workers with diverse background.  Their views were considered 
sufficient to reflect the views of the majority of port workers. This was verified during 
the interview with a question concerning their co-ZRUNHUV¶RSLQLRQThey all agreed 
that their co-workers have the same opinion as theirs.  
 
In all cases, whether one-to-one or group, interviews were semi-structured.   
 
With the semi-structured interview the interviewer is prepared to be flexible 
in terms of the order in which the topics are considered, and, perhaps more 
significantly, to let the interviewee develop ideas and speak more widely on 
the issues raised by the researcher. The answers are open-ended, and there is 
more emphasis on the interviewee elaborating points of interest 
(Denscombe, 2008: 176).  
 
Based on this flexibility, interviewees were encouraged to give a free flow of thought 
in response to questions. Moreover, additional questions, not prepared in the list, were 
also asked.  In certain cases, the designed method was effectively changed from the 
³VHPL´ WR ³XQ-VWUXFWXUHG´EHFDXVHDOORZLQJ WKH LQWHUYLHZHH³WRXVH WKHLUZRUGVDQG
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develop their own thoughts...is a better way of discovering things about complex 
LVVXHV´ 'HQVFRPEH   7KH UHDVRQ IRU UDLVLQJ XQVWUXFWXUHG TXHVWLRQV LQ
PDQ\ LQVWDQFHV ZDV EHFDXVH WKH LQIRUPDQW¶V SRLQts intrigued me and made me 
interested to know more details. Thus, further explanations were sought, using such 
TXHVWLRQVDV³ZK\¶µZKDW¶DQGµKRZ¶DVVXJJHVWHGE\<LQ 7KHIUHHIORZRI
thought from the interviewees particularly, enabled me to elicit more information on 
the implementation and implications of port security policies.    
 
2.4.1.6 Informal discussions 
 
The interview process did not stop at the organised and official meetings. In order to 
gather additional information, informal discussions were held with other 
governmental and non-governmental officials, beyond the list of participating 
informants. The selection of this type of person was casual as some of them were 
already familiar to me. On many occasions we had discussions in their office premises 
about issues concerning my research. To some extent the discussions helped to verify 
the information collected from the selected interviewees. However in no 
circumstances was the collected data/information from the selected informants 
revealed or shared, either intentionally or unintentionally, to non-participating 
informants during the course of informal discussion.   
 
2.4.2 Secondary research  
 
2.4.2.1 Data collection    
  
Secondary data which include both raw data and published summaries are data 
collected by individuals or organisations other than the researcher, are regarded as a 
core component supplementing the primary data in most social science research 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009: 256). In a case study approach, integrating 
primary and secondary data helps to substantiate the findings. Mixing both these type 
of data forms a solid basis for improved accuracy and complements information from 
other sources (Denscombe, 2008: 139). Considering this importance, due attention 
was given to secondary data. According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009: 258-
259) there is a variety of secondary data. For this research, port security rules, 
regulation, Acts of Parliament, policy papers, official statistics, standard operating 
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procedures of ports, slide presentations, published and unpublished materials from the 
identified agencies and so on formed the main source of the information for analysis.   
 
Reliable web-based information is another source of secondary data. Since most 
agencies and organisations commonly published their information through web sites, 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009: 263-267) affirm that this media provides a 
wealth of secondary data, with numerous organisations around the world updating 
their information regularly. On this basis, statistics and various sources of information 
have been tapped quite often from related web sites, for instance from the IMO, MOT 
and Port Klang Authority.  
 
Both types of data, the interview results and the secondary data described above, are 
primary sources.  
 
Secondary sources are mainly books, refereed academic journals, periodicals, serials, 
magazines and newspapers (Lewis and Thornhill, 2009: 69-73).  The research made 
use of a range of secondary sources. Not just confined to books, it also referred to a 
large number of articles in scholarly journals, some available on-line as well as 
newspapers and magazines. These sources were used extensively throughout the 
thesis.  
 
2.5  Reliability and Validity 
 
In any qualitative or quantitative research, the issue of bias is a matter that demands 
attention, because sampling bias or researcher bias may affect the reliability and 
validity of data. Scholars like Mason (1997), Silverman (2005a) and Denscombe 
(2008), argue that the question of reliability and validity can be handled 
methodologically by taking certain precautions to reduce the degree of bias.  
 
According to Silverman (2005bUHOLDELOLW\ UHIHUV WR³WKHGHJUHHRIFRQVLVWHQF\
with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by 
VDPH REVHUYHU RQ GLIIHUHQW RFFDVLRQV´ ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH VDPH UHVXOWV VKRXOG EH
produced on different occasions with the same methods or research instrument 
(Denscombe, 2008: 296). As noted earlier, although this research was not used to 
generalise the finding to other ports, considerable attention was given in interviews to 
encouraging a sincere response from the informants to the questions asked. 
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Nonetheless Silverman (2007  FRQWHQGV WKDW µDXWKHQWLFLW\¶ LV UDWKHU PRUH
imperative than reliability in qualitative research. He observes that the aim is usually 
WRJDWKHUDQDXWKHQWLFXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISHRSOH¶VH[SHULHQFHV)RUWKLVWKHRSHQ-ended 
question is an effective method of generating a good source of data. This research 
approached the same principle as suggested by Silverman (2007) by using the semi-
structured as well as open ended questions in interviews.  
 
9DOLGLW\ UHIHUV WR ³«WUXWK LQWHUSUHWHGDV WKH H[WHQW WRZKLFKDQ DFFRXQW DFFXUDWHO\
represents the social phenomena to which LW UHIHUV´ 6LOYHUPDQ : 232). 
'HQVQFRPHGHVFULEHVVXFFLQFWO\WKH³LGHDRIYDOLGLW\KLQJHVDURXQGWKH
extent to which research data and the methods for obtaining the data are deemed 
DFFXUDWHKRQHVWDQGRQWDUJHW´7RHVWDEOLVKYDOLGLW\IRr this research, as Denscombe 
(2008: 201) suggested, the data collected for this study was verified through 
information obtained from other sources particularly the documentary evidence, 
informal discussions and observations. These were then cross-checked with interview 
data. Consequently this would form a level of consistency with secondary data.   
 
On the note of bias, as far as this research is concerned, I was fully aware that despite 
the efforts already described to ensure that the informants distinguished my role as an 
academic researcher from my previous position as a government official, there could 
still remain a certain prejudice against sharing relevant issues. Further, there was 
always a related risk, considering my good access to port and other organisations that 
informants might feel obligated to comply with my research and not respond to 
questions frankly. Keeping this awareness firmly in mind, I tried as much as possible 
to avoid such prejudices by being objective and took care to maintain the impression 
of impartiality in the whole process of my fieldwork.  
 
2.6 Data analysis 
 
Essentially all recorded interviews were transcribed as suggested by Bell (2006: 164 ± 
165). This process was initiated during and after the field trip. Each transcript text was 
then given a code to preserve the anonymity of interviewees. As Denscombe (2008: 
2002) proposed, key themes were drawn from each transcript based on the interview 
questions and interpretation. According to him: 
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A recurrent theme in interviews indicates that the idea/issue is something 
which is shared among a wider group, and therefore the researcher can refer 
to it with rather more confidence than any idea/issue which stems from the 
words of one individual. 
 
Further, such method allowed for discovering things from the data which is the main 
logic of analysing qualitative data (Denscombe, 2008: 288). Since the number of 
informants was only 30, identifying key themes from the text was done manually by 
reading it meticulously over several times. By doing so, I was able to extract the 
relevant themes and discovered logical things that were implanted in informants 
VKDULQJ6RPHH[DPSOHVRILGHQWLILHGWKHPHVDUH³VHFXULW\DZDUHQHVV´³ORRSKROHVLQ
VHFXULW\´ ³VRYHUHLJQW\´ ³FRVW´ ³JRYHUQPHQW SUREOHP LQ implementing the ISPS 
&RGH´DQGso on.  These themes were subsequently categorised in a tabular form and 
all related quotations were extracted and placed accordingly as advised by Silverman 
(2007: 163) and Denscombe (2008: 288).  
 
As Silverman (2007: 163), SRLQWVRXW³«UHSRUWLQJTXDOLWDWLYHGDWDLVRIWHQGHVFULEHG
DVDµWKHPDWLFDQDO\VLV¶DQGPD\EHSUHVHQWHGZLWKWKHTXRWDWLRQVLQWHJUDWHGLQWRWKH
WH[W«´ DORQJ WR WKLV VXJJHVWLRQ WKH VWXG\ WUDQVODWHG WKH UHOHYDQW WKHPHV LQWR
different sub-headings in the thesis and deliberated further. Those arguments were 
then supported with direct quotations and supplemented with other relevant sources. 
This has strengthened the overall discussion of issues concerned.   
 
Since English and Malay languages were used during the interviews, the Malay 
spoken words were translated into English in the written transcript accordingly. As I 
have a good command of spoken and written Malay language, translating Malay to 
English was not an issue. However, the English grammar of inforPDQWV¶ UHVSRQVHV
ZDVQRWFRUUHFWHGLQRUGHUWRPDLQWDLQWKHLUYLHZVDQGH[SHULHQFHVLQDV³SXUHEDVLF
DQGUDZ´DIRUPas discussed earlier.   
 
2.7  Conclusion 
 
The overall objective of this chapter is to explain the methodological approach 
adopted for this study. A qualitative strategy was used involving gathering primary 
data through interviews though secondary data has also been important. The research 
philosophy for qualitative study dictates that this type of study requires interpretation 
from the words expressed by the respondents, thus considerable attention was paid in 
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analysing and eliciting information from the interview data as will show in later 
chapters. In many cases the interview results were cross-checked with the information 
obtained from informal discussions, direct observations and published and 
unpublished material and subsequently incorporated in the relevant chapters.   
 
As already noted, the research encountered some practical problem due to the 
sensitive nature of the subject matter.  The interruptions encountered during the 
process of interview caused missing points in the midst of conversation as there was 
disruption in getting a free flow of thoughts from interviewees. This has impacted on 
obtaining a continuous explanation from one issue to another.  Logistical problems 
restricted visits to other Federal ports.  
 
However the most significant challenge was the subject that is being investigated. 
Port security is a sensitive issue and it has not been openly discussed. The support of 
the MOT for my research, referred to above, as also my professional background, 
undoubtedly facilitated my access to port facilities and the willingness of people to be 
interviewed. At the same time certain informants, governmental and private, proved 
cautious in sharing certain security issues as they were aware that my thesis would 
become a public document later. This appeared quite obvious during sessions with 
port terminal officials, in relation to security implementation and provision of the 
related documents. Ironically, a factor here may have been that I was no longer 
FRQVLGHUHGDJRYHUQPHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLYHEXWDQµRXWVLGHU¶$VSULYDWHHQWLWLHVUXQQLQJ
their operations on commercial basis, sharing information does not come easily to 
such stakeholders.  As a result, there was some restriction and selectivity in giving me 
access to certain material, though overall this was minimal. Overall, the research 
approach proved suited to answering the questions posed in this study, providing a 
fair amount of knowledge on the subject being investigated.   
 
As the study attempted an exploratory approach where the method requires 
discovering, understanding and describing new issues, the following chapter takes us 
to the understanding of various concepts of port, security and its interrelated issues as 
also the scenario of pre-9/11 security regimes.   
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
PORT SECURITY: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
7KHGLYLGLQJOLQHHVWDEOLVKHGE\DV³EHIRUH´DQG³DIWHU´LQWKHPDULWLPHZRUOGDV
explained in Chapter One, has led to significantly increased attention to the study of 
maritime security, particularly port security, which is a complex and subjective 
subject due to its interconnection with international relations and policy decisions as 
well as practices at different levels. It not only deals with a host of crimes that affect 
ports locally but also with the emerging dangers with repercussions to trade and 
economy both domestically and internationally. There is persistent debate among 
scholars in arriving at a precise definition of interrelated concepts that come along 
ZLWKWKLVW\SHRIVWXG\VXFKDVµSRUW¶µPDULWLPHWHUURULVP¶DQGµVHFXULW\¶ (Bateman, 
2006: 78; Banlaoi, 2009:59; Ng, Girish and Gujar, 2008: 257 and Hong and Ng, 2010: 
52). In order to gain a better understanding, it is appropriate to establish a clear 
explanation of some of the relevant concepts related to this study. This takes up the 
first part of this chapter. Subsequently, the chapter explains the introduction of 
various measures at different spatial levels as a way of protecting the maritime sector 
from the identified threats before 9/11. As such, the whole chapter attempts to provide 
a holistic view of issues related to port, trade, port security and its practices.  
 
3.2 Definition of a port 
 
In contemporary maritime sector, port-related issues have drawn sizeable attention as 
they are considered an integral part of the total transportation system. The importance 
of ports in providing services and acting as critical nodal points (Meersman, 2009: 2) 
in facilitating trade between land and sea, by handling at the end of the 20th century 
not less than 82% of world trade measured in tons through shipping cannot be 
overemphasised as a factor in national economic growth (Stevens,1999: 46). Through 
DSRUW¶VDFWLYLW\DQDWLRQEXLOGVLWVHFRQRPLFVWUHQJWKE\HQJDJLQJLQRFHDQWUDGHDQG
establishes economic connectivity with other nations and hence a close bond and 
interdependency is established. Thus, the efficient functioning of a port, with an 
uninterrupted flow of traffic, becomes the concern of many players within the 
maritime industry, as also for the state. 
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According to Hoyle and Hilling (1970: 227) there is a close relationship between port 
and economic development. This is applicable to both developed and developing 
nations. While the developed nations like the US and many European economies had 
claimed a big portion of maritime trade for many centuries (Wergeland, 1996: 160) 
equally the developing economies are firmly oriented towards the overseas market 
rather than overland trade. Hoyle and Hilling (1970) argue that because of over 
dependency upon overseas trade, the capacity of a seaport directly affects the 
FRXQWU\¶V HFRQRPLF JURZWK E\ SHUPLWWLQJ RU KLQGHULQJ WKH FRPPRGLW\ IORZ $t the 
same time, it can be argued that while ports do influence economic development, 
ports are also in their turn influenced by economic development (Beth, 1978: 15). 
Holding to this connectivity, Hoyle and Hilling (1970: 227) believe that ports do not 
grow in isolation. They respond according to the changing opportunities and demands 
at different times over different areas on different scales and with different intensities, 
taking into account the fact that each port is designed and developed according to the 
need where it is located. This situation is more observable in developing countries, for 
example on the African and Asia continents (Hoyle and Hilling, 1970: 227; Lee, Song 
and Ducruet 2008). This connection therefore raises a question, what constitutes a 
port?   
 
*HQHUDOO\ D SRUW LV EURDGO\ GHILQHG DV ³D ODQG DUHD ZLWK PDULWLPH DQG KLQWHUODQG
access that has developed into a logistics and industrial centre, playing an important 
UROHLQJOREDOLQGXVWULDODQGORJLVWLFVQHWZRUNV´9DQGHU/XJWDQG'H/Dngen, 2007: 
2). In traditional understanding, a port is known as a safe haven and ship/shore or 
maritime intermodal interface (Alderton, 1999: 2). It also been regarded as the 
land/sea interface in facilitating water-borne trade in domestic commerce between 
cities, and international commerce between countries (Fear,1992: 139). The word 
µLQWHUIDFH¶ H[SODLQV WKH FRQFHSW RI D PHHWLQJ SRLQW EHWZHHQ GLIIHUHQW PRGHV RI
transport. Therefore, there is a need to provide facilities and services required for 
transferring cargoes onto land carriage and vice versa and onto other ship for 
transhipment purpose (Baudelaire, 1986: 31). In this regard, a port is not just 
functioning to accommodate ships and other types of water transport but also acts to 
provide the capacity for a continuous flow of cargo between land and water as well as 
to water-to-water transport modes (Frankel, 1987: 7). As such any interruption of this 
cargo flow therefore has an impact beyond the port itself.  
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Reflecting a general understanding of a portWKHWHUPµSRUW¶LQIDFWKDVEHHQGHILQHG
and categorised in various ways in different parts of the world based on its purpose, 
function and contribution. It then goes beyond this immediate interface characteristic. 
In a macro-analytical approach which covers geographical, physical and corporate 
DVVHWV µSRUW¶ UHIHUV WR ZDWHUZD\ FRQQHFWLRQV ± relates to sea, lake, river, inland 
waterways and/or canal locations. The term can also cover a dry and inland port with 
no waterway access but connected through multimodal or intermodal means. Its 
functions centred of urban development, industrial activity, life activity bases and 
maritime leisure bases. In micro-perspective approach, a port is regarded as a place 
for providing facilities where vessel maintenance and cargo/passenger transfer is 
ensured. Its services are divided into ship-related, cargo-related and crew/human 
related (Bichou and Gray, 2005).  
 
This host of activities and other unforeseen circumstances actually stemmed from the 
process of port evolution over time when ports tended to retreat from their old city 
FHQWUH VLWHV WR QHZ µRXW RI WRZQ´ ORFDWLRQV EHFDXVH RI DGYDQFHPHQW LQ WHFKQRORJ\
PRGHUQLVDWLRQ DQG FKDQJHV LQ UROH $OGHUWRQ   &RQVLGHULQJ D SRUW¶V
involvement in various activities and evolution over time, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has framed this development into 
IRXU GLIIHUHQW µJHQHUDWLRQV¶. The divisions are; First generation (before 1960s), 
Second generation (after 1960s), Third generation (after 1980s) and Fourth generation 
(since 2000) (Beresford, et al, 2004: 95-96). However, Beresford et al (2004: 96- 99) 
argued WKDW WKLV W\SH RI GLVFUHWH µSRUW JHQHUDWLRQV¶ LV QRW SUDFWLFDO DQG FDQQRW
accurately reflect the port industry on a global basis. They instead proposed the 
WORKPORT model due to many variations and uniqueness of the port especially 
ports in Europe where their developments are greatly influenced by working culture, 
health and safety and environmental issues overlooked in the UNCTAD model. The 
fundamental issue however, in whatever ways ports evolved over time as described in 
different models, the latest developments suggest that a port has been transformed 
from being a gateway to a logistics hub where it becomes a vital part of the supply 
chain management (Pettit and Beresford, 2009). For this study, this is where the port 
becomes critically important, since security of the transportation system is a core 
component of this development.    
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On the seaward side the shipping that interfaces with the port also needs to be seen 
together with port development. The revolution of the shipping industry that went 
hand-in-hand with port modernisation in the 20th century with high levels of 
automation, advanced communications systems and changes in cargo handling greatly 
influenced the reorganisation of the overall port system (Hayuth and Hillling, 1992: 
56). The changing technology influenced almost every port in the 20th century. Since 
the Second World War, palletisation was one method developed in port innovation by 
using the fork-lift truck. However, the container revolution in 1966 was the watershed 
for port design and also brought a tremendous change in ship sizes in terms of 
carrying capacity of containers. In fact, the progressive growth of container vessels 
ZDVVHJPHQWHGLQGLIIHUHQWµJHQHUDWLRQV¶EDVHGRQFDUU\LQJFDSDFLW\&RQWDLQHULVDWLRQ
of mostly high value cargoes prompted the international container trade to escalate at 
a rate far exceeding that of maritime trade as a whole (ESCAP, 2007 (a): 4-9). 
According to the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP), 
during the 1980s the maritime trade growth with an average of 7.8% was largely 
attributed to the increased importance of container usage. As a result of this, shippers 
increasingly realised the importance of shipping in containers. Consequently goods 
that had previously been shipped as loose cargoes gradually converted to containers 
(ESCAP, 2007 (b): 4) and more ports developed the infrastructure and acquired the 
handling equipment needed to cater for container vessels. Although a port is designed 
in various shapes and sizes and differs in every geographical area according to the 
design and environment, it appears that the advent of containerisation brought greater 
standardisation or similarity in the provision of facilities for handling trade in most 
international ports. 
 
It must be concluded that port development, and indeed globalisation itself, in the 
modern period cannot be treated in isolation because the changes in the port and 
shipping sector which have been described go hand-in-hand.   
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3.3 Ports in trade facilitation and modernisation 
 
%HIRUHDQDO\VLQJWKHLVVXHRIµVHFXULW\¶LWLVDSSURSULDWHWRJHWDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRID
SRUW¶VUROHLQWUDGHIDFLOLWDWLRQ and its changes towards modernisation.  
 
The changes that occurred within shipping and ports over the last decade have 
brought a significant transformation of the world economy at large. One fundamental 
contributing factor was the increased reliance on international trade as the primary 
engine for economic growth and development as briefly stated above. Practical 
examples are evidenced in many economies especially the fast growing Asian giants 
such as China and India.  Being self sufficient in the past and protecting the domestic 
market, they then opened their doors to integrate within the global economy (ESCAP, 
2009) LQZKLFK81&7$'DSWO\GHVFULEHVWKLVDV³QHZJHRJUDSK\RIWUDGH´
Malaysia in the category of a developing country is no exception to this 
transformation. 
 
According to the ESCAP, there was a fluctuation in the growth rate of trade and world 
economy from post World War Two up to 1980s. However from 1990s a major 
change occurred in which the value of trade grew around 2.5 times faster than the rate 
of world economy. The increased pace of industrialisation in the Asian countries 
resulted in increased production of manufactured products which were then sold to 
markets in the West. The main trade growth was supported by the increasing number 
RIRFHDQJRLQJYHVVHOV$FFRUGLQJWR6WRSIRUGDFRXQWU\¶VSDWWHUQRIVHD
trade depends upon three variables: Gross National Product, stage of development and 
natural resources. He concludes that the character of trade changes as a country 
develops. As such, one could observe that as its ports face progression according to 
WKHFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQWWKHQHHGIRUDQGSDWWHUQRIWUDGHIROORZVVXEVHTXHQWO\ 
 
The fast growing developing nations especially the Asian countries like China, India, 
Singapore and Malaysia are good examples of high economic growth. By 2004 their 
UHPDUNDEOHJURZWKKDGSODFHG VL[RI WKHZRUOG¶V WRS WZHQW\-five ports in Southeast 
Asia (SEA) and fifteen of the top twenty-five ports in East Asia (Shie, 2004: 27). In 
0DOD\VLD¶V FDVH WKH FRXQWU\¶V SUHPLHU port of Port Klang was placed in the same 
league. Its impressive progress in terms of container traffic is reflected in its position 
as the fastest developing port in SEA but also placed the country in the fifth highest 
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position amongst the seventy six developing economies after China, Singapore, Hong 
Kong and South Korea from 2007 to 2010 for the same container traffic growth 
(UNCTAD, 2010: 95-96 and UNCTAD, 2011: 87-88). In global ranking, UNCTAD 
(2011) placed the Port Klang in thirteen position of the top twenty world container 
terminals based on its performance in three consecutive years as shown in Table 3.1. 
7KLV GHYHORSPHQW KDV EHHQ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK D VLJQLILFDQW LPSURYHPHQW LQ WKH SRUW¶V
ability to facilitate the growing trade.   
 
Table 3.1: Top 20 Container Terminals and Their Throughput in TEUs   
(2008, 2009 and 2010) 
 
Port name 2008 2009 Preliminary 
figures for 2010 
Shanghai 27,980,000 25,022,000 29,069,000 
Singapore 29,918,200 25,866,400 28,430,800 
Hong Kong 24,494,229 21,040,096 23,532,000 
Shenzhen 21,413,888 18,250,100 22,509,700 
Busan 13,452,786 11,954,861 14,157,291 
Ningbo 11,226,000 10,502,800 13,144,000 
Guangzhou 11,001,300 11,190,000 12,550,000 
Qingdao 10,320,000 10,260,000 12,012,000 
Dubai 11,827,299 11,124,082 11,600,000 
Rotterdam 10,800,000 9,743,290 11,145,804 
Tianjin 8,500,000 8,700,000 10,080,000 
Kaohsiung 9,676,554 8,581,273 9,181,211 
Port Klang 7,973,579 7,309,779 8,870,000 
Antwerp 8,662,891 7,309,639 8,468,475 
Hamburg 9,737,000 7,007,704 7,900,000 
Los Angeles 7,849,985 6,748,994 7,831,902 
Tanjung Pelepas 5,600,000 6,000,000 6,530,000 
Long Beach 6,487,816 5,067,597 6,263,399 
Xiamen 5,034,600 4,680,355 5,820,000 
New York/ 
New Jersey 
5,265,053 4,561,831 5,292,020 
Total top 20 247,221,180 220,900,801 254,387,602 
Source: UNCTAD, 2011: 89 
 
 
Table 3.2 indicates a progressive trend in global maritime trade in which shipping and 
hence ports play a fundamental role.   
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Table 3.2: Growth of World Merchandise Export by Selected Region in 
Percentage (1998-2006) 
 
Category/Region 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
World 4.7 4.7 10.4 -0.6 3.4 4.8 9.5 6.0 8.0 
North America 4.6 6.9 9.6 -5.0 -2.7 1.1 8.0 6.0 8.5 
South & Central 
America 
9.0 -0.4 4.4 5.0 1.9 6.0 13.0 8.5 2.0 
Europe 5.5 3.3 9.3 2.4 1.9 1.8 7.0 3.5 7.5 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
0.9 -8.8 11.8 4.5 8.7 12.8 13.0 4.5 3.0 
Asia 3.8 7.3 14.2 -3.4 11.2 11.4 14.5 10.0 13.5 
Source: ESCAP, 2007(a): 4 
 
The table highlights the fact that Asian trade as a whole was progressing more 
steadily and contributing a significant percentage of merchandise export as compared 
to other regions of the world. The high composition and direction of Asian trade could 
be attributed to its intense initiative in changing towards port modernisation and 
containerisation. Countries like China, Singapore and Malaysia are the good examples 
under this category. According to Lee, Song and Ducruet (2008: 381) the strong 
growth of Asian trade created a high demand for container transportation and 
therefore considerable attention was given to developing port infrastructure. In this 
respect they observed one common aspect: the facilities were built towards outer areas 
from cities due to lack of land capacity.  
 
Generally, the progressive trend in trade and technological advancement became 
among the contributing factors to port privatisation in the 1980s and 1990s.  Apart 
from the United Kingdom (UK), this was most clearly evidenced in the ports of 
developing nations, especially in Asia. They were most concerned with port 
reformation through privatisation and other forms of modernisation. A number of 
studies in relation to this can be noted, including Song (2007), Ryoo and Hur (2007), 
Inamura, Shibasaki and Ishiguro (2007), Wong (2007), Tongzon (2007) and Leong 
(2007). These studies emphasised that the container revolution, boosted by the rapid 
growth of Asian trade, modernised the ports in Asia in a short span of time.  
 
Improving port efficiency in the national interest was commonly given as the major 
reason for privatisation. The international trend towards privatisation of ports 
(Frankel, 1987: 339, Baird, 2002: 279 and Hill, Scrase and Wells, 2008: 98) did not 
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remove this government interest in having a strong modernised port system. The 
efficient functioning of a port was not a matter simply of interest to port owners, port 
operators and port users. It had an impact on the wider local and national economy 
and therefore continued to be of concern to government. However the transfer of port 
ownership, and/or management, to the private sector did make it more difficult for 
governments to influence what went on in ports after this, with implications also for 
ensuring compliance with international security measures.   
 
3.4 :KDWLVFRQVLGHUHGµVHFXULW\¶" 
 
Having said that the importance of port in national economic development through 
trade facilitation is unquestionable, the significance of port security cannot be 
underestimated. It will be shown in the next chapter how security in fact has become 
one of the pressing issues for the port administrators and policy makers after  9/11 
HYHQ WR WKH H[WHQW WKH ZRUG µVHFXULW\¶ has been projected in an entirely different 
GLPHQVLRQ $V .KDOLG   SRLQWV RXW ³WKH DIWHUPDWK RI -11 has involuntarily 
VKLIWHG WKH WHUP ³VHFXULW\´ LQWR D QHZ PRUH FRPSOH[ DQG PRUH GDQJHURXV
GLPHQVLRQV´,QIDFWWKHFRQFHSWµVHFXULW\¶LVDFRPSOLFDWHGPDWWHU,QWKHFRXUVHRI
debate among different parties, diverse interpretations were presented in most 
circumstances. However, four fundamental questions could be addressed within this 
concept. Namely, (i) who or what is to be secured (what is the object of security), (ii) 
who or what constitutes a threat to security (what is the source of security threats), 
(iii) who or what is responsible for the provision of or maintenance of security (who is 
the guarantor of security (iv) what is the best security policy? (Adamson and 
Grossman, 2004: 1). These are some of the issues considered in deliberating port 
security of this study.  
 
3.4.1 Difference between safety and security 
 
2IWHQ WKH WHUPV µVDIHW\¶ DQG µVHFXULW\¶ DUH FRQIODWHG DQG VHHQ DV WKH VDPH E\ WKH
general public. Although these two words may be seen as synonymous, in the 
maritime sector however, they carry different meanings%DVLFDOO\µVDIHW\¶is defined 
DV ³UHGXFLQJ WKH ULVN RU RFFXUUHQFH RI ORVV LQMXU\ RU GHDWK ZKLFK ZLOO EH RFFXUUHG
[sic] because of some accidental events or natural causes like natural disasters, while 
µVHFXULW\¶DV ³UHGXFLQJ WKH ULVNRURFFXUUHQFHRI ORVV LQMXU\RUGHDWK which will be 
RFFXUUHG>VLF@EHFDXVHRIGHOLEHUDWHRULQWHQWLRQDODFWLRQV´0D]DKHUL 
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But in a seaport environment as Kuo (2007) notes, safety not only involves a wider 
spectrum of incidents caused by either natural or human disaster but also includes 
disasters caused by hazardous cargo, complex technology, and many climatic and 
geological happenings. These may result in explosions, fires, earthquakes, hurricanes, 
flooding, and structural failure. In a broader spectrum of maritime safety, IMO 
extHQGVWKLVWR³SUHYHQWLQJRUPLQLPL]LQJWKHRFFXUUHQFHRIDFFLGHQWVDWVHDWKDWPD\
be caused by sub-standard ships, unqualified crew or operator error (Klein, Mossop 
and Rothwell, 2010: 6). 
 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHJHQHUDOWHUPRIµVHFXULW\¶LV³PRVWFRPPRQly associated with 
the alleviation of threats to cherished values; especially those which, if left 
XQFKHFNHG WKUHDWHQ WKH VXUYLYDO RI D SDUWLFXODU UHIHUHQW REMHFW LQ WKH QHDU IXWXUH´
(Williams, 2008: 5). In parallel to this, Tschirgi (2007: xv) refers security ³to a state 
RIPLQGD³IHHOLQJ´ LI\RX will, of comfort, of certainty that no imminent threat to 
that same feeling of comfort is on²or lurking just below²the horizon´. 
 
However, according  to Klein, Mossop and Rothwell (2010: 6) there is no precise 
GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH WHUP µVHFXULW\¶ IURP D PDULWLPH SHUVSHFWLYH ZLWK UHIHUHQFH WR WKH
United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), occasionally 
GHVFULEHGDVWKHµFRQVWLWXWLRQRIWKHRFHDQ¶They pointed out that the United Nations 
Secretary-GeQHUDO DFNQRZOHGJHG WKH DEVHQFH RI DQ DJUHHG GHILQLWLRQ RI µPDULWLPH
VHFXULW\¶ EXW KLJKOLJKWHG VHYHQ VSHFLILF WKUHDWV WR PDULWLPH VHFXULW\ LQ KLV 
Report. These are: (i) piracy and armed robbery against ship, (ii) terrorist acts, (iii) 
illicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), (iv) illicit 
trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, (v) smuggling and 
trafficking of person by sea, (vi) illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and (viii) 
intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment (ibid). 
 
To create a workable definition appears to be even more complex at regional level. At 
the Asia-Pacific region, maritime security is considered in the perspective of 
³WUDGLWLRQDOSRZHUULYDOULHVEHWZHHQQDWLRQVWDWHV, control of trunk shipping routes, to 
contemporary economic and social issues e.g., environmental degradation, weapon 
SUROLIHUDWLRQGUXJDQGKXPDQVPXJJOLQJHWF´1JDQG*XMDU 
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With reference to SEA, Banlaoi (2005: 59) claims: 
 
It is not easy to come to grips with the issue of maritime security in 
Southeast Asia because the term maritime security encompasses such a 
broad concept that a panoply of notions like maritime safety, port security, 
freedom of navigation, security of the sea lines of communications 
(SLOCs), security from piracy attacks, including armed robberies against 
ships, and security from maritime terrorism can be included as part of the 
concept of maritime security. In fact although many experts have spoken on 
the topic of maritime security there is still an absence of a commonly 
accepted definition that will form the basis for regional cooperation. 
 
Despite the shortcoming of a clear definition, Hawkes (1996: 174) has sought to 
GHILQH PDULWLPH VHFXULW\ DV ³WKRVH PHDVXUHV HPSORyed by owners, operators, and 
administrators of vessels, port facilities, offshore installations, and other marine 
organizations or establishments to protect against seizure, sabotage, piracy, 
annoyance, or surprise. It can also be considered as embracing all measures taken to 
SUHYHQWKRVWLOHLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKODZIXORSHUDWLRQV´&RUUHVSRQGLQJO\.OHLQ0RVVRS
DQG5RWKZHOOFRQVLGHUPDULWLPHVHFXULW\DV³WKHSURWHFWLRQRIDVWDWH¶VODQG
and maritime territory, infrastructure, economy, environment and society from certain 
KDUPIXODFWVRFFXUULQJDWRU IURPWKHVHD´ ,Q WKLVFRQQHFWLRQ3DOOLVDQG9DJJHODV
  VLPSOLILHG PDULWLPH VHFXULW\ DV ³WKH UHVLVWDQFH WR DQ LQWHQWLRQDO
XQDXWKRULVHGDFWGHVLJQHGWRFDXVHKDUPRUGDPDJHWRVKLSVDQGSRUWV´.  
 
It seems therefore that the best distinction between safety and security is that 
µVHFXULW\¶ UHIHUV WR SURWHFWLRQ IURP LQWHQWLRQDO DFWV ZKLOH µVDIHW\¶ IURP DFFLGHQWDO
events (Pallis and Vaggelas., 2007: 1). In the case of safety, accidents that happen 
from unwanted and unintentional events can be analysed from the past record and 
anticipate future incidents, whereas in security, the unwanted events due to intentional 
motives cannot be analysed from the past record for the future prediction as the 
characteristics of events may be very different (Bichou, Bell and Evans, 2007: vi). 
With regards to events threatening security of maritime sector, Melendez (2004: 13-
14) expanded into µlocally restricted¶ and µlocally unrestricted¶, although their borders 
are sometimes ambiguous and overlap with each other. µLocally restricted¶ includes 
cargo theft, drug smuggling, stowaways and illegal immigrants, piracy and armed 
robbery and sabotage. These types of issues are perceived to follow a certain pattern 
and can be assessed statistically. On the contrary, a µlocally unrestricted¶ issue is 
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international terrorism. This type of conduct is difficult to predict and seldom follows 
any specific pattern.  
 
'HVSLWHWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHPRWLYHVµLQWHQWLRQDO¶DQGµXQLQWHQWLRQDO¶GHWHUPLQHWKH
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI ERWK µVDIHW\¶ DQG µVHFXULW\¶ 0HMLD  KRZHYHU PDNHV WKH
criticism that there is no clear understanding of these two terminologies even in the 
IMO conventions. He argues that the IMO never defines precisely the definition of the 
word safety in the ISM Code and security in the ISPS Code. Even with the absence of 
this definition, Mejia (2005: 2) however agrees with Pallis and Vaggelas (2007) that 
µVDIHW\¶ LV ³SURWHFWLRQ DJDLQVW HYHQWV WKDW DUH XQLQWHQGHG UHDG DFFLGHQts) while 
security deals with intentional acts carried out by persons who undertake malicious 
acts with forethought and planning in order to promote their own goals, whether 
LGHRORJLFDOSROLWLFDORUUHOLJLRXV´ 
 
Notwithstanding this dualism, Yasin (20KRZHYHUDIILUPHGWKDWERWKµVHFXULW\¶
DQG µVDIHW\¶ LV PXWXDOO\ LQWHUOLQNHG +H DUJXHV WKDW LQ DQ\ WHVWHG FDVH VHFXULW\ RI
vessels would cause navigational hazard to other transiting vessels and the ensuing 
environmental damage would affect the safety aspect. Conversely, any serious 
accident would destroy the eco system and hence ruin the livelihoods of coastal 
inhabitants. This would eventually force them to resort to maritime crime for survival 
which reciprocally poses security threat to users.  
 
However for the purpose of this study, the intentional act that affects the security of a 
port and its causes will be the main focus. Therefore, it is appropriate to analyse what 
FRQVWLWXWHV µSRUW VHFXULW\¶ 7KH IROORZLQJ VHFWLRQ GLVFXVVHV WKLV IURP D GLIIerent 
perspective.  
 
3.5 The scope of port security  
 
,Q VSLWH RI WKH FRPSOH[LW\ DQG VXEMHFWLYH QDWXUH RI PDULWLPH VHFXULW\¶V PHDQLQJ LQ
ZKLFK µSRUW VHFXULW\¶EHFRPHVDSDUWRI WKLVEURDGHUFRQFHSWDVDVVHUWHGE\%DQODRL
(2005: 59) above, Talas and Menachof (2011: 3) however, briefly define port security 
DV³WKHDEVHQFHRIDQGRUWKHSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHDEVHQFHRIWKUHDWWRSRUWIDFLOLW\DVVHWV
cargoes and the ship-SRUWLQWHUIDFHIURPXQDXWKRULVHGDFWV´. This section attempts to 
analyse the issue of port security from various ankles that covers within the scope of 
this study.   
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The scope of port security can be seen in various dimensions. It covers both internal 
and external directed measures. Within these two measures, it takes into consideration 
of traditional way of safeguarding the port from many types of threats and later 
incorporating terrorism and piracy that are more recent and intimidating.  
 
3.5.1 Internal security 
 
In the past, security practice was traditionally a small component of port 
administration/operation. The main security function was to safeguard the cargo as 
Alderton demonstrates in his 1984 basic port administration model shown in Figure 
 7KLV SUREDEO\ FDQ UHODWH WR (OOHQ¶V   DVVHUWLRQ WKDW ³SRUWV DUH WKH
veritable treasure houses of the nation and, since time immemorial, they have suffered 
IURPWKHIWDQGSLOIHUDJH´ 
 
Figure 3.1: Port Administration 
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                                     Distribution 
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Source: Alderton, 1984: 186  
 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates that traditionally the component of internal port security was 
about safeguarding and not damaging the property of customers using the port (the 
ships and cargoes). Therefore, the Cargo Superintendent who was responsible for the 
welfare of the port labours also took full charge of managing and maintaining the 
required security of the port cargoes. This means that cargoes on the quayside, for 
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example, had to be protected against the elements either theft or accident. Along this, 
those handling the cargoes (port workers) had to do so with skill. Manual handling of 
break-bulk cargoes was necessarily associated with risk of accidental damage in 
which the safety aspect went in parallel with security.  
 
Thus there was a combination of safety and security element in internal security 
measures. When a port places some form of safety features to circumvent human 
accidents, engineering works and operations, it is therefore considered secure and free 
from disaster caused by human and natural factors (Kuo, 2007). As such, traditionally 
prevention of accidents and cargo security were the central focus of ways to make 
ports secure.  In this connection, Alderton (2005: 105) argues that port security is just 
a sub-set of safety, where the perceived risk is seen to arise from person or person 
with criminal or malevolent intentions. In another dimension, Ellen (1993: 4) suggests 
port security more relaWHVWRµVHFXULW\ULVN¶E\UHIHUULQJWR 
 
Any potential condition, having its basis in crime or other deviant 
behaviour, which, if it were to become a fact, would adversely affect 
efficiency. 
 
For Gomez (1996: 13) internal port security was a combination of both physical 
security and safety (industrial security). He explained that the security function was to 
protect life and property within the port boundary. In other words, the main attention 
was about preventing theft while goods are in the port. The measures taken to achieve 
WKLVFRXOGEHWKURXJKGLIIHUHQW³FLUFXODUEDUULHUV´FRQVLVWLQJRIQDWXUDOEDUULHUVVXFK
as rivers, oceans, mountains or mad-made barriers like walls, fences and lighting. The 
other barriers might be electronic devices such as closed circuit TV systems and 
animal barriers (dogs) as well as human barriers (security guards). 
 
With the advent of containerisation in the 1960s that prompted for mass movement of 
high value goods, cargo theft appeared to be a continuing problem. Custar (2008: 280) 
ULJKWO\ SRLQWV RXW WKDW ³ILJKWLQJ FDUJR WKHIW LV DV ROG DV WKH SURFHVV RI FDUJR
WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ´ 1RUPDOO\ FDUJR WKHIW SURYLGHV D PDMRU VRXUFH RI UHYHQXH IRU
organised crime. To mitigate such type of menace in the port and enhance security, 
The State of California and Florida in the US for example, where cargo theft was most 
endemic, had taken the matter seriously and defined this act firmly in their penal 
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codes.2 In a nationwide measure, the US Department of Transportation established a 
voluntary organisation, the National Cargo Security Council, in 1982 to develop 
educational programmes and coordinated with private industries to deter theft 
incidence (Custar, 2008: 279-282).  
 
Modern port technology is no longer as labour intensive as it used to be. Data from 
the Port of New York/New Jersey for instance shows that employment for port 
workers dropped from 30,000 in 1970 to 7,400 in 1986 (Bonacich and Wilson, 2008: 
177). Normally the downsizing of workers was carried out during the process of port 
restructuring in an effort to increase port performance and productivity. This situation 
was highly visible when many ports around the globe were privatised (Baird, 2002: 
279). 
 
Although the reduction of labour force was meant to enhance efficiency and hence 
might have been expected to reduce the crime rates because of less direct human 
involvement, in handling cargoes, this did not prove to be the case. The crime 
continued to happen in many different ways through various loop holes. Lack of port 
workers meant that the criminals were able to steal boxes unobserved and undetected. 
In fact a 1993 study in the US revealed that about 83% of crime within the port area 
was committed by those who had the right to be inside or were employees (Ellen 
1993:14-72) although the number of employees was not high. The same goes for the 
global level where the OECD (2003: 9) claimed that cargo theft was some form of 
internal conspiracy that enabled thieves to correctly identify and target containers of 
high value goods assisted by individuals legitimately employed in seaports or 
transport industry.  
 
In modern container ports, security seals on container doors are sometimes not 
checked due to lack of staff. For example in the US ports before 9/11, only about 2% 
of containers were physically checked (Harrald, Stephens and vanDrop, 2004). In 
terms of thefts and pilferages of containerised cargo in the U.S ports, the loss has been 
estimated in the range of USD15 billion annually. At the global level, the same crime 
                                                 
2
 7KH&DOLIRUQLD3HQDO&RGHKEGHILQHV³FDUJR´DV³DQ\JRRGVZDUHVSURGXFWVRUPDQXIDFWXUHG
PHUFKDQGLVHWKDWKDVEHHQORDGHGLQWRDWUDLOHUUDLOFDURUFDUJRFRQWDLQHUDZDLWLQJRULQWUDQVLW´DQG
HVWDEOLVKHVDOLQNEHWZHHQ³FDUJR´DQGWKHDFWLIWDNLQJLWFULPLQDOO\´&XVWDU 
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is estimated about 5% and incur a loss at least USD50 billion to the cargo owners 
annually (Custar, 2008: 284-285).  
 
3.5.2 External security 
 
External port security is about preventing unauthorised entry of people into the port to 
commit theft/armed robbery/acts of piracy. This also includes preventing unauthorised 
transit through the port of goods or illegal substances (smuggling) or people (illegal 
immigration/stowaways). It seems that although the container revolution effectively 
eased the movement of high value cargoes, it also provides a good opportunity to use 
containers for various illicit purposes such as transporting stowaways, contraband, 
drugs and small weapons.3 In some cases stowaways are considered to be acting as 
courier for the drug cartels (Barnes and Murray, 1996: 151).  
 
,QWKLVFRQQHFWLRQVRPHRIWKH³FLUFXODUEDUULHUV´VXJJHVWHGE\*RPH]DERYH
provide a good means of protection. However, some ports are more physically 
vulnerable than others as a consequence of geographic size, generally open 
accessibility by water and land, location in areas of dense population and connection 
to other transportation link. In this regard Frittelli (2006: 94) rightly points out that 
³FRPSDUHG WR FRPPHUFLDO DLUSRUWV VHDSRUWV DUH JHQHUDOO\ GLYHUVH LQ WHUPV RI WKHLU
physical infrastructure and operations. As a result of this diversity in characteristics 
HDFK VKLS DQG SRUW IDFLOLW\ SUHVHQWV GLIIHUHQW ULVNV DQG YXOQHUDELOLWLHV´ 7KH QHHG WR
VWUHQJWKHQWKHSRUW¶VDELOLW\WRUHVLVWVXFKH[WHUQDO WKUHDWVKDVOHGWRSROLFLQJRIWKH
waterfront.  
 
There is in fact nothing particularly new to the 20th or 21st centuries in the principle of 
guarding port facilities. For example, this was noticeable even in the 18 th century 
where port security in many parts of the world was carried out by guard forces who 
were soldiers armed with muskets to safeguard the storage and warehouse facilities. 
To further improve the measure, the waterfront area tended to take on a fortress 
                                                 
3
 The word stowaway is a traditional maritime word used to describe unauthorised passenger on a ship. 
This includes refugees, illegal immigrants, economic refugees, economic asylum-seekers and political 
asylum-seekers. A stowaway is also termed as criminal. He is travelling without payment or in 
contravention of a national law (Parritt,02LQLWV5HVROXWLRQ$³*XLGHOLQHVRQWKH
allocation of responsibilities to seek the successful resolutiRQRIVWRZDZD\FDVHV´GHILQHVVWRZDZD\DV
³DSHUVRQZKRLVVHFUHWHGRQDVKLSRULQFDUJRZKLFKLVVXEVHTXHQWO\ORDGHGRQWKHVKLSZLWKRXWWKH
consent of the shipowner or the master or any other responsible person, and who is detected on board 
after the ship has departed from a port and reported as a stowaway by the master to the appropriate 
DXWKRULWLHV´,02a). 
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FKDUDFWHU3DOPHU,Q%ULWDLQ¶V3RUWRI/RQGRQWKH0DULQH3ROLFe was set 
up during this period as first formal police force to safeguard the port (Ellen, 1993: 
50).  
 
It is apparent that most of the traditional aspects of security, internal and external, 
discussed above remained relevant to port security in the early 21st century, though 
there was a widening scope of security concerns beyond the immediate port area. The 
perceived scale of threat and level of organisation of threat altered in the later 20 th 
century, with organised crime seen to require different responses, at different levels 
(local, national, international) to those in the past.  
 
Two other threats, piracy/armed robbery and maritime terrorism, were perceived to 
pose greater challenges during this era and hence extended the scope of port security. 
The following discussion brings us to these two menaces. 
 
3.6 The extended scope of port security 
3.6.1 Piracy/armed robbery 
 
Since time immemorial, piracy has been regarded as hostis humani generis, meaning 
enemies of the whole human race (Birnie, 1987: 164). Historically the piracy problem 
has been legally dealt with by each littoral state according to their traditional 
municipal law. Piracy was codified as Article 101 under UNCLOS 1982. In brief, it 
relates piracy as any criminal acts of violence, detention or depredation committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship directed on the high seas 
against another ship, people or property on board a ship (Mejia, 2003: 159). On the 
other hand, the International Chamber of Commerce - International Maritime Bureau 
(ICC-,0%GHILQHVSLUDF\DV³DQDFWRIERDUGLQJRIYHVVHOZLWKWKHLQWHQWWRFRPPLW
theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the 
IXUWKHUDQFH RI WKDW DFW´ (Abyyankar, 1999: 2). In this connection, there are two 
internationally recognised universal principles applied concerning piracy. Firstly, the 
state is obligated to suppress piracy within its own territory. Secondly, every state has 
the authority to exert its jurisdiction over pirate ships on the high seas. However the 
application of international law eventually depends upon enforcing at municipal law 
level (Canty, 1996: 46). 
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It might seem that piracy is not a criminal activity of relevance to ports, but this is not 
in fact the case. Although this crime is committed at high seas and in a place outside 
the jurisdiction of any state, it is believed much of the present day piratical attacks 
occur within the territorial waters of a sovereign state (Abhyankar, 2003: 139), 
especially attacks to ships in port areas as pointed out by Talley and Rule (2008: 90). 
This type of piracy that takes place within the territorial water is regarded as armed 
robbery. The IMO defines µDUPHG UREEHU\ DJDLQVW VKLSV¶ DV µDQ\ XQODZIXO DFW RI
violence or detention or any act of depredation, threat thereof, other than an act of 
µSLUDF\¶ GLUHFWHG DJDLQVW D VKLS RU DJDLQVW SHUVRQV RU SURSHUW\ RQ ERDUG VXFK VKLSV
ZLWKLQDVWDWH¶VMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUVXFKRIIHQFHV¶0HMLD-163). On the other 
hand, Hong and Ng (2010:52) VXJJHVWWKDW³any unlawful act of violence or detention, 
or any act of depredation at anchor, off ports or when underway through a coastal 
VWDWH¶VWHUULWRULDOZDWHUV LVGHILQHGDVµDUPHGUREEHU\DJDLQVWVKLSV¶ Since the act of 
piracy goes beyond any boundaries, Mejia (DVVHUWVWKDW³YLUWXDOO\QRERG\
RIZDWHURUVHDZDVH[HPSWIURPSLUDF\´ 
 
Mejia (2003: 161) notes however that a study conducted by Dubner on piracy and 
armed robbery during the period 1989 to 1993 found that 61.8% of attacks occurred in 
the territorial waters of a country. To be precise, according to Talley and Rule (2008: 
LWRFFXUUHGPRVWIUHTXHQWO\LQSRUWDUHDV%LFKRX¶V (2008) Figure 3.2, covering the 
period 1994 to 2005, distinguishes the attacks on ports and anchorage sites only for 
the years after 9/11  but it is reasonable to assume that such port-based attacks were 
not confined to this period. Piracy/armed robbery were already identified as illicit acts 
with potential to cause disruption to the economic gains of a port.  
Figure 3.2:  Reported Actual and Attempted Piracy Incidents  
on Board Ships and Ports 
 
Source: Bichou, 2008: 13 
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Webb (2006), Guan and Skogan (2007) and Burns, Bateman and Lehr (2009) suggest 
that this was particularly a persistent scourge in SEA. Table 3.4 sets out the growing 
world wide trend in this problem over the period 1991 to 2011, in which the SEA 
claims a high proportion as against the rest of the world.    
 
Table 3.3 : Worldwide Reported Piracy and Armed Robbery  
Attacks by Region (1991-2011) 
 
Year SEA Far 
East 
Indian 
sub-
continent 
Americas Africa Rest of 
World 
Location 
unavailable 
Total  
1991 88 14 0 0 0 0 5 107 
1992 63 7 5 0 0 0 31 106 
1993 16 69 3 6 7 0 2 103 
1994 38 32 3 11 6 0 0 90 
1995 71 47 16 21 20 12 1 188 
1996 124 17 24 32 25 6 0 228 
1997 91 19 37 37 46 17 0 247 
1998 89 10 22 35 41 4 1 202 
1999 161 6 45 28 55 5 0 300 
2000 242 20 93 39 68 7 0 469 
2001 153 17 52 21 86 4 1 334 
2002 165 5 52 65 78 5 0 370 
2003 170 19 87 72 93 4 0 445 
2004 158 15 32 45 73 6 0 329 
2005 95 20 36 25 73 13 0 262 
2006 83 5 53 29 61 8 0 239 
2007 70 10 30 20 121 12 0 263 
2008 54 11 23 14 189 2 0 293 
2009 46 23 30 37 266 8 0 410 
2010 70 44 28 40 259 4 0 445 
2011 80 15 24 25 293 2 0 439 
Source: ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report, Annual Report 2000, 
2004, 2010 and 2011 
 
Chalk (2008: xi-xii) claims that seven main factors accounted for the increase in 
piracy/armed robbery cases that contribute to vulnerability of the maritime domain. 
These included (i) the increase in commercial maritime traffic corresponding with 
large number of ports around the world; this growth has provided pirates with a wide 
range of tempting, high-payoff targets, (ii) bottlenecks at narrow and congested 
maritime chokepoints, which require ships to reduce speed thus exposing them to 
mid-sea interception and attack, (iii) financial crises and the economic downturn 
EHIRUHEHFDPHD³SXOOIDFWRU´HVSHFLDOO\LQ6EA encouraging maritime crime for 
financial gain. At the same time economic crisis led to lack of funding in many littoral 
states to conduct effective monitoring regimes over their coastlines, (iv) since 9/11 
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more pressure exerted on many governments to invest extensively on land-based 
security initiatives that caused difficulties in expanding maritime surveillance systems 
(v) sloppy measures on coastal and port-side security that enabled thefts of goods 
from ships at anchor, (vi) corruption and loopholes in the judicial system. This also 
LPSDFWHGRQWKHHPHUJHQFHRI³SKDQWRPVKLS´SKHQRPHQRQLQZKLFKKLMDFked ships 
are re-registered under the flags of convenience (FOC) for unlawful activities and 
(vii) widespread small arms proliferation provided the means for more aggressive 
piratical activities. 
 
Kaneda (2005: 46), added five more reasons for the same problem to the Asia-Pacific 
region that made it unstable at the beginning of the 21st Century: (i) increase in 
YROXPH RI PDULWLPH WUDIILF LL ZLGHQLQJ RI WKH JDS EHWZHHQ WKH ³KDYHV´ DQG WKH
³KDYH-QRWV´ GXH WR UHJLRQDO HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW LLL SRRU HFRQRPic conditions 
forged ties to organised criminal groups which were able to take advantage of 
undermanned maritime guards and of deteriorated domestic security (iv) tolerance by 
local authorities and (v) the work of anti-government organisations or international 
terrorist groups. Banlaoi (2005: 62-63) expands the list by adding long coastline, 
underpaid maritime forces and limited regional cooperation that aggravated this 
menace.  
 
3.6.2 Maritime terrorism  
 
Different to the external security threats discussed previously are politically-
motivated destructive threats such as those encountered in wartime as in the case of 
the Second World War (Menefee, 1993) and as a means of terrorism, as in the case of 
the terrorist attacks. With this type of external threat the port itself, rather than any 
shipping present there, may become the object of attack because the wider economic 
consequences of disruption to port activities may be attractive to attackers. 
 
A number of studies (OECD, 2003, Bichou, 2008, Barnes and Oloruntoba, 2005 and 
Bruck, 2007) have analysed the economic impact and the estimated loss resulting 
from terrorism in this respect. The study conducted by Johnston and Nedelescu 
(2005), reveals the severity of the direct and indirect costs of terrorism. These include 
productivity loss, increased uncertainty and boosted market volatility which impact on 
the money market. In the case of the attack on the vessel Limburg in 2002, for 
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example, insurance premiums were tripled for ships calling at ports in Yemen after 
that attack, which forced many vessels either to cancel voyages or to divert to 
neighbouring ports (Richardson, 2004b: 3). 
 
In addition to this, the container revolution created the possibility of transporting 
WMD by terrorists which could potentially lead to destruction of a major portion of 
the transportation system, incurring loss of life and resulting in severe economic 
consequences (Erera et al, 2003). 
 
$FFRUGLQJWR5D\PRQGPDULWLPHWHUURULVPLVGHILQHGDV³DQ\LOOHJDODFW
directed against ships, their passengers, cargo or crew, or against sea ports with the 
intent of directly or indirectly influencing, for political purposes, a government or 
JURXSV RI LQGLYLGXDOV´ ,Q D EURDGHU FRQWH[W &KDON   GHILQHV LW DV ³WKH
undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (1) within the maritime environment, (2) 
using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their 
passengers or personnel, (3) against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist 
resortVSRUWDUHDVDQGSRUW WRZQVRUFLWLHV´*RLQJEH\RQG WR LQVWLWXWLRQDO OHYHO WKH
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific suggest a similar definition as 
espoused by Chalk (2008) and (Hong and Ng, 2010:52). 
 
As such, maritime terrorism is perceived to be another part of a larger problem of 
³PDULWLPH YLROHQFH´ 7KH DFW RI YLROHQFH SHUSHWUDWHG E\ PDULWLPH WHUURULVWs had 
created a profound effect on the port and shipping sectors since the incident of Achille 
Lauro in 1985. This was the first incident that brought the phenomenon of maritime 
terrorism to global attention and subsequently prompted the IMO to implement some 
security measures.   
 
In an historical context however, Dragonette (1996) argues, the hijack of Achille 
Lauro was not the first incident of maritime terrorism known to the world. An 
anarchist bomb explosion aboard the German passenger liner Mosel at Bremerhaven 
that killed 128 people in December 1875 was one of the earliest incidents that 
qualified as terrorist attack. But in a broader perspective, the Achille Lauro incident 
GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWWKHPDULWLPHWHUURULVPWKUHDWZDVDOVRDVµUHDO¶DVSLUDF\  
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However, in comparison to piracy/armed robbery data suggesting that this was a 
serious problem, the evidence for maritime terrorism suggests that this only 
constituted 2% of all international terrorist incidents from 1964 to 2004 (Chalk, 2008: 
41). In addition, Ong (2006: 13) points out, that there were only approximately forty 
maritime terrorist incidents carried out by various groups and organisations since the 
case of Santa Maria in 1961. This was further confirmed by Hong and Ng (2010: 52 
E\VD\LQJ WKDW³WHUURULVPDWVHDKDGQRWEHHQDVHULRXV LQWHUQDWLRQDOSUREOHPGXULQJ
the 1990s, in contrast to piracy and armed robbery against shiSV´$VWXG\FRQGXFWHG
by Jenkins el at (1983) chronicling terrorist and criminal activities from 1960 to 1983 
found out that a total of 111 incidents listed over the period of twenty-three years 
were terrorism in nature but not many were associated with maritime attacks. Writing 
in 1983, they argued that many terrorist groups were unlikely to treat the maritime 
realm as their prime target because of higher financial costs and the fact that such 
attacks required specialised skills. But the study never dismissed the possibility of 
terrorists choosing maritime assets as their future targets and indicated that a port 
facility might be one of these because of its unprotected nature.  
 
This judgement proved to be correct. An aborted attempt to target the USS Sullivans 
in January 2000 did not discourage Al Qaeda from attacking the USS Cole in October 
2000 and two years later the French oil tanker Limburg both off the Yemeni coast. 
The Al Qaeda was also believed at one point to control approximately fifteen ships 
flying Yemeni and Somalian flags disguised as legally registered cargo ships, which 
would be testimony of their capability in extending their skills to maritime terrorism 
(Richardon: 2004(a): 14 and Bakir, 2007: 23).  
 
Some of the terrorist groups considered to possess maritime capabilities in the later 
20th and early 21st centuries were Polisario, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Palestine 
groups, Al Qaeda, Moro Islamic Liberation Front  (MILF), Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), Lashkar-e-Taiba, JI, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Irguna and Haganah 
(Jewish nationalist movements in Palestine), and Ethniki Organosis Kyprion 
Agoniston (EOKA) or National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (Menefee, 1993: 
278, Raymond, 2006: 240, Talas and Menachof: 2009: 50, Sakhuja, 2009: 6-8). 
 
Apart for this, according to Ng and Gujar (2008: 269) the scope of port security could 
even be expanded to a much wider political spectrum than just deterring smuggling, 
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trafficking, piracy/armed robbery and other crimes. But this is more obvious in post 
9/11 as compared to pre-9/11 period. A good example is the failed attempt by the 
Dubai Ports World (DP World) to operate marine terminals in some US ports in 2006. 
Since the DP World was an Arab state-owned company, its direct involvement in 
accessing the US terminals created a political firestorm and strong opposition from 
the US Congress on security ground. As the effect of 9/11 attacks had deeply 
imprinted in the minds of the US, there was intense criticisms that the ³$UDE
company, DP World may be coerced into providing visas for Al Qaeda operatives to 
OHJDOO\ HQWHU WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´ %HLVHFNHU   )ROORZLQJ &RQJUHVVLRQDO
opposition, the DP World eventually decided to sell its stake in the US terminals to 
the US entities (Frittelli and Lake, 2006: 1). The denial of security clearance of 
Hutchinson Port Holdings (HPH), in bidding for a port construction project in 
Mumbai, India in 2006 by the Indian authority is another example of political concern 
in port security (ibid). 
 
3.7 Attitudes to port security before 9/11 
 
,Q VSLWHRI DSRUW¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\ WKH UHYLHZRI SRUW OLWHUDWXUHEHIRUHJHQHUDOO\
indicates that port security was not a grave concern for either those involved in port 
planning or for those involved in port administration as it was regarded as a sub-set or 
perhaps a small component of port function, as observed by Alderton in 1984 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 above. Security was seen as just a small component of port 
administration. Interest was focussed on physical development through reformation 
DQG SULYDWLVDWLRQ &HQWUDO DWWHQWLRQ ZDV RQ LQFUHDVLQJ D SRUW¶V HIIHFWLYHQHVV LQ
supporting the growth of the national economy. 
 
The lack of emphasis on security matters during the era before 9/11 would probably 
be due to the fact that there were relatively few recorded maritime terrorism incidents, 
despite their high profile at that WLPH.KDOLGFRQVLGHUHGWKDW³EHIRUH-11, 
WHUURULVP RQ FDUJR VKLSV GLGQ¶W HYHQ ILJXUH PXFK RQ WKH UDGDU RI PDULWLPH VHFXULW\
DQDO\VWV´ EHFDXVH only a fraction of the maritime domain had been tested. Spencer 
  UHFDOOHG WKDW ³LQ WKRVH GD\V EHIRUH ZH KDG KHDUG RI DO-Qaeda and port 
security was not the issue it is today, families would stroll past the ship on their 
DIWHUQRRQ ZDONV´ A close resemblance to this attitude can be seen in the case of 
Swedish port, where Wengelin (2006: 2) explains; 
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Since the very beginning, the Swedish port has been viewed as a very exotic 
place, a place open to the public where worlds meet, foreign flags catch the 
wind, and strange tongues can be heard. At night, the port changes and the 
activities with it. In the luring dark, players on the black market make their 
deals, smuggled goods are traded, prostitutes make their rounds, and fist 
fights break out on street corners. 
 
 
Indeed one of those interviewed for this research project, a former seafarer, provided 
a further example of this relaxed attitude:   
 
I used to go to US ports in the 70s. Everything was opened. You see families 
come next to the ship. Fishing and bringing their dogs, where cats going for 
their walk, cargo operation are going on. They come up to the ship, it was so 
lax...You go to any American ports in 70s even 80s, there is no security. The 
ship comes along site in the town, you just walk and gR«SXEOLF MXVW
walking to the ship especially Saturdays, like parties (interview Code: 15) 
 
 
3.8 Achieving port security:  initiatives at different spatial levels 
 
Having looked at the various potential challenges to security that face ports, we can 
now turn to the measures taken to meet those challenges. For this purpose, the 
discussion touches on different spatial levels.  
 
The issue of port security cannot be just confined to an individual port or even to the 
QDWLRQDO SHUVSHFWLYH $V µPDULWLPH VHFXULW\¶ Ltself is very international and 
transnational in nature, it is necessary to have a wider view of measures, looking at 
these through various spatial levels, following the approach espoused by Selkou and 
Roe (2004: 39-44) in considering the formation of shipping policy.  
 
These authors state that policy in shipping sector is developed and implemented 
through five distinct spatial regimes as shown in Figure 3.3 below.  They argue that 
the formulation of shipping policy is influenced by a variety of external factors which 
pose many challenges in the process of implementation at all spatial stages. One 
apparent problem that occurs in maritime policies across international, supra-national 
and national spatial boundaries is the difficulty in achieving consistency where each 
level of interests is fundamentally different. The conflict of interest was said to be the 
underlying cause of disparity in interpreting policies which consequently affects the 
implementation process at all these stages.  
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Figure 3.3: The Policy Making Process 
Policy Making
CONTEXTS Institutional level Interest Group CONTEXTS
Political
Economic
Technical
Organizational
Social
Spatial
Legal
Managerial
International
Supra-national
National
Regional
Local
Source: Selkou and Roe, 2004: 48 
 
Although the model in Figure 3.3 was designed for shipping policy, its core principal 
can be applied to the development of port security policies before and after 9/11. 
However, it should be emphasised that this discussion is here confined to the first 
three spatial levels of pre-9/11 consisting of international, supra-national and national. 
The other two stages, regional and local, will be covered within the formulation and 
implementation at those three levels. The same principle is applied to post 9/11 
situation in the following chapter.  
 
3.8.1  Security measures at international level 
 
Essentially, the IMO was silent on the implementation of matters concerning 
µVHFXULW\¶ XQWLO WKH Achille Lauro incident. $OWKRXJK WKH ZRUG µVHFXULW\¶ ZDV ILUVW
mentioned officially in the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime 
7UDIILF)$/&RQYHQWLRQIRUWKHSXUSRVH³WRIDFLOLWDWHPDULWLPHWUDQVSRUWE\
simplifying and minimizing the formalities, documentary requirements, and 
procedures associated with the arrival, stay and departure of ships engaged on 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOYR\DJHV´, the actual measure only emerged after that incident (Hawkes, 
n.d: 3). After adopting Resolution A.584 (14) Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts 
Which Threaten the Safety and the Security of Their Passengers and Crews on 20 
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November 1985, the IMO subsequently issued a circular; MSC/Cir.443 on 26 
September 1986 entitled Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and 
Crews on Board Ships. The same incident later led to SUA Convention in 1988 and 
its Protocol relating to offshore platforms. These act as anti-terrorist and crime 
prevention instruments for the maritime sector.  
 
This international treaty popularly known as the Rome Convention came into force on 
0DUFK 7KHSULPHREMHFWLYHRI68$ LV ³WR HQVXUH WKDW DSSURSULDWH DFWLRQ LV
taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships. These include the 
seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against persons on board ships; and the 
SODFLQJRIGHYLFHVRQERDUGDVKLSZKLFKDUH OLNHO\ WRGHVWUR\RUGDPDJH LW´ ,02
2011). Hence, the measure was intended to ensure that persons committing unlawful 
acts against ships would not be given shelter in any country but would either be 
prosecuted or extradited to a State where they will stand trial (ibid). 
 
In addition to that circular, to further boost security, MSC\Circ.754 was introduced in 
1996. This primarily related to passenger ferries operating on international routes and 
the ports serving those routes. The circular provides recommendations on security 
measures for passenger ferries on international voyages shorter than 24 hours and 
ports.  
 
Prior to 9/11, between 1998 and 2000 to address other security problems, the 
international community through the effort of the UN adopted two instruments 
designed to address the problem of smuggling and unsafe transport of migrants by 
sea. The smuggling of migrants by sea was dealt with in Section 2 of the Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Crime (Roach, 2004: 44). In 1997 through 
Resolution A.897(20), the IMO issued guidelines for the prevention and suppression 
of the smuggling of drugs, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals on ships 
engaged in international maritime traffic. This guideline was an amendment to 
FAL.5/Circ.1.  
 
On another aspect, the IMO issued guidelines for a State to take action against any 
ship suspected of unsafe practices associated with trafficking or transport of migrants 
by sea through MSC Circular 896 on 12 June 2001. As for the measures to 
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overcoming piracy/armed robbery, MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1 was issued. This was a 
recommendation to governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed 
robbery against ships. Correspondingly MSC/Cirs.623/Rev.3 was issued as guidance 
to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews (IMO, 2010). In another 
context, the IMO also adopted Assembly Resolution A.871 (21) on guidelines on the 
allocation of responsibilities to seek the successful resolution of stowaways cases.  
 
It should be noted that none of these measures were directly related to ports. It is also 
noteworthy that most of these IMO resolutions and circulars were recommendatory in 
nature instead of binding on its member states. Indeed the former IMO Secretary 
General, Efthimios Mitropolous commented in a speech in 2004, that the international 
FRPPXQLW\ ODEHOOHG WKH ,02 D ³µWRRWKOHVV WLJHU¶ ZLWK QR UHDO FRQWURl over the 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHUXOHVDQGUHJXODWLRQVLWGHYHORSV´0DULQH/LQNFRP 
 
3.8.2 Security measures at supra-national level 
 
Measures taken at supranational level refer to actions by regional associations of 
countries such as the EU, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Security measures at the EU 
often accompanied other policy formulations.4 According to Pallis and Vaggelas 
(2007: 2) since early 1990, European port policies have focused on restructuring port 
industry and improve the service quality by integrating ports in the supply chain. This 
was done through Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T). Ideally, the purpose 
of this programme is to establish more integrated and efficient transportation system 
encompassing all types of modes by linking across Europe allowing for quicker 
movement of people and goods between member states and also assuring international 
connections (European Commission Transport, 2009). The overall objective of port 
policies was to set a standard framework for the service providers. In order to give 
effect, these policies were later transformed into EU laws. As for a long term strategy 
for transport sector taking into account of port and shipping, the European 
Commission published a White Paper (covering for the period 2001 to 2010) just one 
day after 9/11 (without expecting the 9/11 incident) detailing the EU transport policy 
                                                 
4
 The Europe Union (EU) consists of 27 countries and the whole of Europe has a 70,000 km coastline 
along two oceans and four seas: the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, the Baltic, the North Sea, the 
Mediterranean, and the Black Sea. (Commission of the European Communities, 2007: 3). As such it 
needs a better protective measure to safeguard its vast coastline.   
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which had a broad reference to security of passengers onboard cruise vessels and 
ferries and also the transportation of nuclear goods (Pallis and Vaggelas, 2008: 9). 
 
A supra-national level activity that aimed to enhance maritime security was found in 
ASEAN. Having the SOM as the main Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in SEA, 
countries located here have a combined coastline of 92,451 km which is 15.8% of the 
ZRUOG¶V WRWDOZLWKFRPELQHG LVODQGV LQ WKH DUFKLSHODJRRI ,QGRQHVLD DQG WKH
Philippines. This makes the sea difficult to police and it is expensive to maintain a 
higK VHFXULW\ VWDQGDUG %DQODRL   $6($1¶V QRQ-interference policy was 
another possible reason that made the sea difficult to control effectively. This notion 
ZDVRULJLQDWHG IURP WKHJURXS¶VFRQFHSWRI=RQHRI3HDFH)UHHGRPDQG1HXWUDOLW\
(ZOPFAN) adopted in 1971 that underscores the principle of being free from any 
interference of outside powers (Nik, 2009: 209). 
 
To safeguard the maritime sphere, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and 
Treaty of Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone were brought into effect in 
1976 and 1997 respectively under the concept of ZOPFAN. But before this, the Five 
Powers Defence Arrangement (FPDA) was established in February 1971 involving 
the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia (Nik, 2009: 210). This 
measure was primarily for defence purpose conducted as a joint military exercise 
among these countries than eradicating the actual piracy menace.  
  
Therefore, despite the fact that maritime crime especially piracy was rampant in the 
SEA waters as mentioned earlier (see Table 3.4), Banlaoi (2009: 262) asserts that the 
measures taken at ASEAN regional level did not produce a strong positive result. 
Since 1967 the bulk of ASEAN maritime security measures were subsumed under the 
issue of non-traditional security (NTS).5 This was due to the fact that all initiatives, 
declarations, agreements and plans conducted in ASEAN were through non-
interference in domestic affairs of member states as enshrined in the TAC. Hence this 
probably would be the main reason for AS($1¶VIDLOXUHLQ WDNLQJILUPPHDVXUHVWR
                                                 
5
 Non Traditional Security (NTS) threats are defined as challenges to the survival and well-being of 
peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, cross-border 
environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular 
migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, money laundering, piracy, arms 
smuggling, cyber crimes and other forms of transnational crime.  They are mainly non-military in 
nature, transnational in scope²neither domestic nor purely interstate, come with very short notice, and 
are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and communication revolution (Anthony, 2007: 1-6).   
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mitigate illicit activities in SEA waters. The issue of sovereignty of national waters 
and encroachment are significantly serious issues among the member states. 
According to Yaacob (1997: 18) because of this factor, there was a lack of co-
ordination among ASEAN members which makes each members state decide 
independently and unilaterally with respect to ratifying or acceding to the IMO 
convention. As a result of this, spatial measures in ASEAN may be perceived to 
produce a less promising result as compared to the EU prior to 9/11.  
 
Albeit the non-interference policy and other shortcomings, ASEAN attempted to 
mitigate some problems through the ASEAN Ministers of Interior/Home Affairs 
forum. It had shown considerable concern in combating the transnational crimes that 
threatened its member states. Consequently, during the inaugural of the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) on 20 December 1997, the 
ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime was adopted for greater regional 
collaboration to fight against such menace.  This was the first organisational 
document to identify sea piracy as a problem for regional concern which also included 
terrorism. In June 1999, AMMTC adopted a Plan of Action to Combat Transnational 
Crime which committed members to:  
 
Work on the criminalisation in ASEAN member Countries of specific 
transnational crimes such as illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, 
terrorism, piracy, arms smuggling and trafficking in persons (Pushpanathan, 
1999: 3). 
 
In order to enhance regional cooperation, the Plan also committed members to: 
 
Enhance information exchange with ASEAN Dialogue Partners, regional 
organisations, relevant specialised agencies of the United Nations and other 
international organisations, particularly towards the sharing of critical 
information on the identities, movements and activities of known 
transnational criminal organisations (Pushpanathan, 1999: 3). 
 
It seems that most measures taken at supra-national level before 9/11 are generally 
covered for a wide spectrum of maritime domain and transportation sector like in the 
FDVHRI WKH (8DQG$6($1+RZHYHU LQ$6($1¶VGLPHQVLRQ WKHLU PHDVXUHVGLG
QRW WDUJHWVSHFLILFDOO\ WRSRUWV7KHSULPHUHDVRQFDQEHUHODWHG WR$6($1¶VVWUong 
sentiment of sovereignty that did not allow for any external inference. Therefore, port 
security measures are managed by the individual states.     
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3.8.3  Security measures at national level 
 
Security enhancement at national levels is mostly done through domestic rules and 
regulation. There is a paucity of academic publications referring to specific measures 
on port security at national levels. Most initiatives at national level were based on the 
guidelines provided by international and regional organisations. These were then 
given effect to national or municipal law by the contracting parties.   
 
Despite this paucity, some examples of the UK and the US are worth mentioning. 
There are approximately 1,000 ports and terminal/wharf facilities in the UK (Baird 
and Valentine, 2007: 69). By having a total coastline of 19,491 miles (Darkes, 2008), 
port security in UK was given serious consideration following the Achille Lauro 
incident in 1985. Realising the potential increase of terrorism threat in the 
transportation system, to circumvent any untoward happening, in 1990 the British 
government made the Aviation and Maritime Security Act a mandatory law 
applicable to all UK ports and vessels (including foreign registered vessels) in its 
waters. The purpose of this legislation was to protect ships, persons and property on 
board ships, harbour areas, and persons or property in harbour areas from acts of 
violence. The act gave power to police and security staff to search ships, harbour 
areas, property and people for firearms and weapons. The Department of Transport 
took full charge in providing a legal framework and monitored the security standards 
(Saunders, 1993: 83-84). In this connection, the Customs and Border Agency has also 
played a role in different aspect of security at sea particularly in terms of interdicting 
illegal goods and illegal immigrants. Normally, this type of enforcement is noticeable 
in most countries around the world as permitted by the UNCLOS 1982 provisions.6   
 
The US has 361 seaports in 50 states with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger 
terminals and over 1,000 harbour channels spreading along 95,000 miles of coastal 
waters. Under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, the United State Coast 
Guard (USCG), part of the US Department of Transportation, had charge of patrolling 
ports for illegal drugs, undocumented immigrants and drug interdiction, while 
                                                 
6
 For example, Article 21 (1) (h) of UNCLOS 1982 under the sub-KHDGLQJ³/DZVDQGUHJXODWLRQVRI
the coasWDO 6WDWH UHODWLQJ WR LQQRFHQW SDVVDJH´ VWDWHV WKDW ³WKH FRDVWDO 6WDWH PD\ DGRSW ODZV DQG
regulations, in conformity with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, 
relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following: (h) the 
prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the 
coastal State. This is also extended to Contiguous Zone under Article 33 (1).  
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maintaining its identity as a military service (Caforio, Kummel, Purkayastha, 2008: 
112). Before 9/11, most USCG operational hours were dedicated to search and rescue 
task, along with enforcement for protecting fisheries, interdicting illegal migrants at 
sea and controlling drug movements. 
 
One of the laws used as an instrument for this purpose was the Merchant Marine Act 
of 1936 (Frittelli, 2005: 10). To beef up port security, a joint effort was also 
established between the proprietary force and local police. They provided physical 
security to port by focusing on access control, cargo security, passenger and crew 
security (Haveman, Shatz, and Vilchis, 2005: 2).  
 
Looking at the total perspective of all these policy measures however, Brook and 
Pelot (2008: 213) observe that port security pre-9/11 was generally a failure for 
ignoring the following aspects: (i) port security involves multiple jurisdictions, (ii) it 
is part of larger supply chain security challenges; (iii) considerable disparity and 
complexity internationally, (iv) significant problem with privacy issues in information 
sharing; (v) ever-present issue of timing of initiatives; (iv) costs, and (vii) the 
measurement for effectiveness and continuous improvement. They further argued that 
the nature of ports which is interlinked with much longer chains in total transportation 
system made the issue of security more complex with the absence of a risk-based 
approach. In the same vein, Harrald, Stephens and vanDrop (2004: 1) claim three 
reasons corresponding to poor port defence system. These are (i) poor information 
sharing to security personnel about any immediate threats at any given time, (ii) lack 
of understanding of the vulnerabilities and (iii) difficulties in anticipating the risk 
accurately to bring scarce resources to produce better result. As such, the policy 
measures that followed in the aftermath of 9/11 through a wide range of security 
requirements had attempted to tackle such failings but undoubtedly created many 
challenges to the interested players. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven 
and Eight.  
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed some of the key concepts in this research, in order to 
obtain a better understanding of the subject of this study. Port development, its 
relationship to shipping and connection to national and international economic 
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development through trade facilitation have been discussed in order to provide the 
necessary context. Along this line, the chapter also brought to light the revolution of 
containerisation in the port and shipping sector that prompted port modernisation and 
privatisation. However, the transfer of ownership to the private sector became an issue 
for the government in overseeing security matters. Nonetheless security was regarded 
as a subset of safety in overall port management. Looking at port security itself, the 
study has distinguished internal and external security aspects. Internal security threats 
are matters concerning cargo theft and pilferages whereas external threats refer to 
smuggling, stowaways and armed robbery and politically motivated acts. Port security 
before 9/11 was not generally regarded as a serious problem, though some maritime 
terrorist attacks had prompted international regulation, and intervention at any level of 
governance was limited. Port security before 9/11 was considered weak due to poor 
defence systems with the absence of a risk-based approach. Security measures of pre-
9/11 are summarised in Appendix IV. The next chapter takes us to port security in the 
post 9/11 era when it was perceived to be more challenging.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
PORT SECURITY AFTER 9/11 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the various security measures introduced in ports after 9/11 at 
a global level with data gathered from secondary sources. Obviously port 
development and port security in both developed and developing countries are 
interrelated and connected albeit with different features. The evolution of ports over 
time especially in advanced countries like the UK, US and other Western states has 
brought a different outlook due to technological advancement as compared to 
developing states which are more labour intensive. However the situation is changing 
through port reform in the developing economies due to the process of privatisation 
that were actively taking place from the 1980s as mentioned in the preceding chapter . 
But as we have seen, the issue of port security had not received much attention in 
these developing countries during the process of port modernization as the focus was 
usually on physical development, reducing the work force and cutting the public 
expenditure. There were no significant global worries about maritime security threats 
except a few high profile incidents on attacking vessels by terrorist and the rising 
issues of piracy and cargo theft during the era before 9/11.    
 
Recognising that port reform is a continuous process irrespective of the status of a 
countr\¶V HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW, this chapter considers the way in which the 
literature shows that attitudes to and practices in port security have changed or altered 
as a result of 9/11. Although maritime trade is a core component of the world 
economy, security nevertheless had been less important factor in the design or 
evolution of the world economy. However the 9/11 attack made it clear that 
revolutionary changes in maritime and port security became fundamentally 
prerequisite from thereon (Harrald, 2005: 1). Therefore, in the interests of national 
economy and defence, greater attention and/or resources have been devoted to 
ensuring security at all levels from international organisations such as the IMO and 
International Labour Organization (ILO), governments, port authorities, private 
operators, shipping lines, shippers and intermodal freight forwarders/customs brokers 
and other related stakeholders. The analysis which follows distinguishes between the 
three spatial levels and some security measures in the selected economies.  
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4.2 The security scenario after 9/11 
 
Owing to the fact that the total security scenario in the port industry has changed in 
the wake of 9/11, these changes can be related to the changes in the attitudes of 
various stakeholders. A simple example of change in attitude which led to physical 
changes because of the regulatory requirement is described by Wengelin (2006: 3): 
 
The post ± 1/7 2004 port is different. The change has in most cases been 
substantial: fences with manned gates surround all ports; identity checks are 
performed on all passages through the gates; and CCTV cameras cover large 
areas of the perimeter. This change has not passed unnoticed by the 
SXEOLF«WKHSXEOLFEHLQJNHSWRXWRI WUDGLWLRQDOILVKLQJVLWHVELUGwatching 
etc.; the underlying reasons for the implementation of the [ISPS] code were 
hardly mentioned. 
    
According to Barnes and Murray (1996) and Banlaoi (2009), one main reason for 
serious attention and immediate action in port security from the international 
community was because of the notion that the sea is an anarchic domain that can 
hardly be policed even today. Although historical and empirical evidence indicate that 
there are not many maritime terrorism cases since  9/11 except some cases such as 
Limburg (2002) and attacks on the Israeli Port of Ashdod (2004) as compared before 
9/11 by referring to the several high profile cases such as Achille Lauro (1985), City 
of Poros (1989) and USS Cole (2000),) all these strikes confirmed the worries of 
maritime security experts that it would not be beyond the capabilities of terrorists to 
conduct assaults on maritime interests such as ships and ports. According to Shie 
(2004: 9-10) there are three possible reasons why terrorists could target maritime 
assets. These include (i) marine based attacks will receive a greater media attention, 
(ii) the link between maritime targets and global commerce provides an avenue that 
disrupting national economic affairs could potentially affect the international trade 
and (iii)  sinking  a ship in a strategic sea lanes could potentially impede the 
international commerce. 
 
$V0RRUHDGGXFHV³WKH  WHUURULVWF\FOHEHJLQVZLWKVHYHUDO WDUJHWV«WKHQ
VHHNVWRILQGYXOQHUDELOLWLHVWKDWFDQEHH[SORLWHG«KDYLQJDIDLUO\GHWDLOed description 
of the potential targets, seeks to find those with the combination of vulnerability to 
attack, psychological and political significance and which, if attacked, poses the least 
ULVNWRWKHWHUURULVWV´7KLVW\SHRIVWUDWHJ\ZKLFKWHUPHGDVµQHZWHUURULVP¶HPHUJHG
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after 9/11 signals a departure from states to non-state actors to wage war against 
another. Their primary aim is to create catastrophe with a political motive (Sandole, 
2004: 1). Technically, the strategy adopted by terrorists is difficult to gauge and 
unforeseeable thus triggered trepidation that they may turn their attention from land to 
maritime vessels and also port facilities where these assets face a tremendous risk of 
maritime terrorism (Khalid, 2005: 2, Banlaoi, 2009: 254).  
 
Price (2004: 330-VXSSRUWV+HFNHU¶VDUJXPHQWIURP the US General Accounting 
2IILFH *$2 ZKR VDLG WKDW ³SRUWV DUH LQKHUHQWO\ YXOQHUDEOH WR WHUURULVW DWWDFNV
because of their size, generally open accessibility, metropolitan area location, 
materials tranVSRUWHG DQG UHDG\ WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ OLQNV WR PDQ\ ORFDWLRQV«´ 7KH
repercussions will be enormous if there is any failure in protecting the port. Thus 
Brook and Pelot (2008: 204) emphasised six key areas that port could encounter in 
consequences of failure to establish security; namely (i) destruction of port property, 
(ii) consequential supply chain impact, (iii) economic impact, (iv) environmental 
GDPDJHYSHRSOHLPSDFWDQGYLGDPDJHWRSRUW¶VUHSXWDWLRQ 
 
According to Blumel et al (2008), security threat to seaports through terrorism is just 
one component of unlawful acts which emerged more prominently after 9/11, but 
such incidents as property violation, robbery, fraud, stowaways, contraband and 
vandalism should not be overlooked as well.7 If one asks a question what causes all 
these unlawful incidents in the maritime context, the answer is to look for the place of 
origin which is essentially lDQG)RUH[DPSOH-HQLVFKSRLQWVRXW³DQDUFK\
RQODQGHDVLO\OHDGVWRSLUDF\DWVHD´ 0HMLD WKHUHIRUHVXJJHVWV³WKHWUXH
solutions to the problems of piracy, armed robbery against ships, terrorism, and other 
PDULWLPH FULPHV OLH QRW DW VHD EXW RQ ODQG´ 7KLV ODQG EDVHG WHUURULVP DSSDUHQWO\
originates for various reasons but a survey conducted by the authorities on terrorism 
in 1985 identified that state sponsorship, ethnic conflict, religious fanaticism and 
ideological conflict are among the prominent factors (Brook and Pelot, 2008: 232).   
 
                                                 
7
 It was reported in 2008 that that pirates are also pretending to be stowaways (Flynn: 2008: 25). In a 
worst case scenario, terrorist act as a stowaway as a case happened in October 2001, when port 
authorities in the southern Italian port of Gioia Tauro discovered a stowaway within a well-appointed 
shipping container complete with bed, heater, toilet facilities and water. The suspect held various 
technological gadgets, security passes and airline tickets (OECD, 2003: 8). 
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Judging from the vulnerability of seaports where seaports form a key transport and 
logistics node between maritime and hinterland processes, comprehensive security 
therefore becomes highly important in the maritime domain as a whole. Thus the 
realisation of the significance of security in the total transportation chain has arguably 
changed the attitude of various maritime industry players. This then followed by the 
changes in practical aspects.   
 
4.3 The impact of 9/11 on attitude and practice to port security  
 
According to Harrald, Stephens and vanDorp (2004: 1) the potential danger to the six 
key areas in the port sector as identified by Brook and Pelot (2008) could easily 
become a reality because of the poor available defensive measures before the 9/11 era. 
This arises due to three main reasons as explained in the preceding chapter. First, in 
spite of recognising terrorist capacity to inflict damages by any means, the responsible 
authorities for the port security are unlikely to be well-informed about profiles of 
immediate threats at any given time. Second, there may be a lack of understanding of 
the inherent vulnerabilities in the complex economic system and, third, risks are 
difficult to anticipate accurately in bringing limited resources to produce an effective 
result.   
 
Hence, considering these potential dangers, the 9/11 incident has changed attitudes to 
ports in a number of ways. One such change can be viewed in the overall logistic 
sector where the port is one component. The merits of the intermodal logistics chain 
have been viewed somewhat differently chiefly for the reason that the port has not just 
become an integral component of the transport system, but is a major sub-system of 
the broader production and logistics system. Additionally it may often consist of four-
modal nodes where ocean ships, short-sea/river ships and road and rail modes 
converge (Almotairi and Lumsden, 2009: 198-204). Over time the port industry has 
grown drastically and become an integral part of a supply chain.8 According to 
                                                 
8
 The term logistics refers WR³WKHIXQFWLRQIRUWKHIORZRIPaterials from suppliers into an organization, 
through operations within the organisation, and then out to customers´ (Waters, 2003: 5). Materials are 
inclusive of both tangible and intangible. On the other hand supply chain UHIHUUHGWR³VHULHVRIDFWLYLWLHs 
and organisations that materials move through on their journey from initial suppliers to final 
FXVWRPHUV´ :DWHUV   $GGLWLRQDOO\ supply chain is also considered ³FRPELQDWLRQ RI
organizations and service providers that manage the raw material sourcing, manufacturing, and 
delivery of goods from the source of the commodities to the ultimate users. Organizations directly 
involved in the supply chain include raw material providers such as mines, farms, manufacturers that 
enhance the value of raw materials, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers. Other stakeholders involved 
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Coulter (2002: 140) this has made ports the key point RQDQDWLRQ¶VERUGHUZLWKRQHRI
the weaker barriers to entry and also the weakest link in the logistics chain, so 
providing a good avenue for causing destruction. In the modern growth of global trade 
containers have become the cheap medium for movement of almost every types of 
cargo in an intermodal supply chain comprising different transportation means. The 
container is not only being moved by sea transport but also through land transport,   
where it may in turn be moved in different types of transport, road or rail.  The port, 
forming part of the supply chain, naturally has to be designed in such a way to enable 
trade to take place with the support of such different transport players (Pallis and 
Vaggelas, 2008: 2).  
 
As such, the port is highly vulnerable to disruption by external forces by means of 
transporting weapons or any dangerous material for malicious purpose. As Jayakumar 
SRLQWVRXW WKDW³WKHJOREDOVXSSO\FKDLQLVRQO\DVVHFXUHDV LWVZHDNHVW OLQN
Hence any programme to raise its security must address all parts of the chain and not 
MXVW VHOHFWHG SDUWV RI LW´ 0HHUVPDQ et al (2009: 143) argues that in spite of this 
weakness, the success of the chain as a whole depends on the competitive strength of 
incorporated ports and conversely the success of ports depends upon the competitive 
strength of logistics chains. In this regard, Blumel et al (2008:209), expressed their 
views that the hinterland part of port which connects through multimodal 
transportation from sea to port and vice versa  should be given considerable attention 
as it forms an essential component of overall security in port sector.  
 
Although the port acts within a holistic and complex logistics chain system, the 
concern for the port is somehow different. Some of the old concerns about port 
operations were put into a new context in the period after 9/11. Johnstone (2006:2) 
aptly described the situation of the US ports prior to 9/11 as; 
 
On September 10 we were not a nation at war. On September 10 we were a 
nation bedevilled by delays, concerned about congestion and impatient to 
keep moving. 
 
However the events on the next day made an impact on every aspect of port practices 
and security. The port reform that had rigorously took place before 9/11 mainly driven 
                                                                                                                                            
ZLWK VXSSO\ FKDLQ RSHUDWLRQV LQFOXGH JRYHUQPHQWV FDUULHUV DQG WHUPLQDOSRUW RSHUDWRUV´ &ORVV DQG
McGarrell, 2004: 8). 
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by globalisation of maritime trade and reconfiguration of the role of the state (Hill et 
al, 2008: 94) was turned into a different dimension. As Capt. Dave Scott, the 
Commander of United Stated Coast Guard (USCG) Sector Delaware Bay commented 
³JOREDOL]DWLRQUHTXLUHGUDSLGFDUJR throughput and safe, efficient seaports. The 9/11 
attacks changed that paradigm. After 9/11, the maritime community realized that 
security was as essential to successful seaports and marine transportation as safety and 
ORJLVWLFHIILFLHQF\´+HOPLFN16).  
 
Harrald (2005:159 - 161) argues that the post 9/11 era coupled with the effects of 
globalisation created potential vulnerabilities in the sea-trade system because of the 
stronger global economic growth. This can also be interlinked with the growth of 
containerisation as 90% of global trade in volume is moved by sea trade. UNCTAD in 
2011 Annual Report states that in 1990 world container throughput volumes were 
approximately 85 million TEUs but the figure has grown to six-fold by registering 
531.4 million TEUs in 2010.  
 
In this regard, one could simply describe the contemporary maritime commerce as 
³VKLSSLQJPHDQVFRQWDLQHUV´7KHFXUUHQW scenario means that almost all consumer or 
physical goods are transported through containers. Global estimates show that 
approximately 232 million containers were moved in world wide ports each year 
(Blumel, 2008: 209). However, in addition to containers, goods are also transported in 
other types of sea going vessels such as bulk, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) or even small boats. These types of vessels can be the 
vector for, or target of, attack. Additionally containers and these vessels also serve to 
raise revenues for terrorist organisations through illegal means (Blumel, 2008: 209).  
 
Some commentators have focused on the direct maritime involvement of terrorist 
organisations. The Washington Post noted in a report of 31 December 2002 that Al 
4DHGD¶s capability to own and operate fifteen cargo ships clandestinely in the 
international maritime commerce meant that it could possibly use these vessels to 
perpetrate violence against any targets (The Washington Post, 31 December 2002). 
Similarly, other terrorist networks have varying levels of maritime expertise and 
capabilities and could possibly endanger the maritime world as noted in Chapter 
Three. In this instance, LTTE which had terrorised the Sri Lankan government for 
political reasons has owned and operated a fleet of at least a dozen deep-sea-going 
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ships registered in Honduras, Panama and Liberia to run a legitimate commercial 
activity but at the same time facilitated logistic support for transporting illegal 
materials (Sakhuja, 2008, 44 and Sakhuja, 2010, 8). The scenario suggests that there 
are some weaknesses in the way ships are managed in the maritime world that 
provides a good opportunity for terrorists to enhance their maritime capabilities. One 
of the main reasons was laxity in ship registration under some FOC (Ozcayir, 2000). 
The perpetrators can cover their true identity in the pretext of being legitimate 
shipowners or ship crew members. These are further examples of terrorist capabilities 
in inflicting huge disaster if maritime transportation is not protected reasonably well.  
 
Whereas previous terrorist incidents, including Achille Lauro and USS Cole had made 
a political point but little loss to human life and resulted in limited damages, after 9/11 
the potential economic impact became a matter of concern. An assessment set out in 
Table 4.1 of the economic impact of a terrorist attack was made in a 2002 Brookings 
Institute study.   
 
7DEOH6XPPDU\RI%URRNLQJV,QVWLWXWLRQ¶V6WXG\6KRZLQJ Economic 
Disruption Resulting from Terrorism 
Nature of attacks Nature of Economic Disruption Potential costs (USD) 
Weapons of mass destruction 
shipped via containers, mail. 
Extended shutdown in deliveries; physical 
destruction and lost production in 
contaminated area; massive loss of life; 
medical treatment for survivors. 
Up to $ 1 trillion 
Efficient release of biological 
agent through much of a 
major urban area. 
Disruption to economic activity in affected 
area; threat to confidence and economic 
operations in other areas; massive loss of 
life; medical expenses. 
$750 billion 
Widespread terror against key 
elements of public economy 
across nation (malls, 
restaurants, movie theatres, 
etc). 
Significant and sustained decline in 
economy activity in public spaces; 
associated drop in consumer confidence. 
$250 billion 
Large attacks that expose a 
finite and reparable 
vulnerability (like 9/11). 
Substantial but temporary weakening of 
economy due to direct (loss of human life 
and physical capital) and indirect effects 
(decline in confidence and network 
failures). 
$100 billion 
Cyber attack on computer 
systems regulating regional 
electric power; combined 
with physical attacks on 
transmission and distribution 
network. 
Regional electricity shortages that persists 
for a week; health risks from heat/cold; 
interruption of production schedules; 
destruction of physical capital. 
$25 billion 
Bombings or bomb scares. Effective shutting down of several major 
cities for a day. 
$10 billion 
Source: Shah , 2004: 6 
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In another context, a war game in port security conducted by a consulting firm in the 
U.S, Booz Allen Hamilton in October 2002 running strategic simulation by 
GLVFRYHULQJ ³GLUW\ ERPEV´ LQ FDUJR FRQWDLQHUV DW WKUHH 86 SRUWV HVWLPDWHG WKDW WKH
cost to the economy from the resulting disruption of trade was about USD58 billion.9 
The results showed that even a relatively small nuclear weapon detonated in a major 
seaport might kill between 500,000 and 1 million people; directly destroy up to 
USD500 billion worth of property; cause losses due to trade disruption of USD100 to 
USD200 billion and impose further indirect costs of up to USD1.2 trillion (Kanev, 
2005: 196-197). In a worst case scenario demonstrated through a study conducted by 
'HSDUWPHQWRI7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ¶V9ROSH&HQWUHLWZDVHVWLPDWHGWKDWWKHH[SORVLRQRID
10 to 20 kiloton weapon in a container would cause a disruption of trade valued at 
USD100 to USD300 billion, property damage of USD50 to USD500 billion and the 
loss of 50,000 to 1,000,000 lives (Harrald, 2005: 158). 
 
There was, of course, nothing new in identifying the wider economic impact of 
interruption to trade. In the context of SEA where it has one RIZRUOG¶VQDUURZVHD
SDVVDJH RU ³FKRNHSRLQWV´ WKH 620 D VWXG\ FDUULHG RXW E\ WKH &HQWUH IRU 1DYDO
Analyses in 1993, revealed that the closure of this Strait due to any major disaster 
would have massive economic implication for world trade. It was estimated that 
diversion of ships around the SOM would cost the world economy USD3.5 billion to 
USD8 billion. The study estimated that the port blockage cost for Singapore would be 
USD130 billion. If all major SEA ports were closed, the cost to the global economy 
was estimated to be over USD230 billion (Noer, 1996: 47-48). What arguably new 
after 9/11 was the identification of terrorism as a possible cause of such interruption.  
  
The argument that the maritime environment is an easy target has also focussed on the 
capability of the maritime perpetrators who could, it has been alleged, easily perform 
covert shipment of people, arms or a variety of WMD including chemical, biological, 
or radiological ones in containers from origin to destination; use a small vessel 
approaching a large vessel with an explosive on board; use the vessel as a battering 
ram into a bridge or other infrastructure, sink a vessel in a navigation channel, or, in 
                                                 
9
 ³'LUW\ERPE´ is described as radiological bomb. It is a conventional explosive such as dynamite or 
ammonium nitrate that has been packaged with radioactive material which scatters when the bomb 
goes off. It contains radioactive material, but does not use that material to produce a nuclear explosion 
(Richardson, 2004: 51). 
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the case of a cruise ship, cause death of a large number of people; or cause major 
disruptions to port operations, military shipments and international trade through 
destruction of key assets such as container cranes and pier facilities or blockages of 
key facilities (Yim and Downey, 2002: 3). According to Brooks and Pelot (2008: 
203), other potential security hazards threatening ports such as cyber attacks by 
stealing, corrupting or destroying port or supply chain information or communication 
equipments should also be given equal attention.  
 
Some of the commentary on maritime port security since 9/11 focussed on the 
particular difficulties here in comparison with airport security. Basically, access to an 
airport is more easily controlled because of a buffer zone between airport and other 
activities. This gives the ability for the aviation system to stop, check and restart in 
the wake of a terrorist attack (Yim and Downey, 2002: 6 ± 7). However, ports may 
not have a clearly defined parameter, even on the landside where they might be 
located in or adjacent to heavily populated urban areas. This is due to the fact that 
ports vary physically by virtue of geography, topography, surroundings and 
population (Bateman, 2006: 84). Therefore security of ports must consider all 
environments comprising of land, air, sea surface and sub-surface (Bateman, 2006: 
84). In such an environment, it has been concluded as very unlikely that the same 
response as in the aviation system could be activated in the port sector in the event of 
any terrorist attack (Yim and Downey, 2002: 6 ± 7). This is the reflection of ports 
YXOQHUDELOLW\DQGµVRIWQHVV¶DVHDV\WDUJHWs. Further, Raymond (2006: 255) infers that 
³WKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWGHYHORSPHQWVHHQLQUHFHQW\HDUVWKDWKDVDIIHFWHGWKHH[WHQWWR
ZKLFKPDULWLPHWHUURULVPSRVHVDWKUHDW LV WKH³KDUGHQLQJ´RI ODQGWDUJHWV following 
7KHµVRIWXQGHUEHOO\¶RIWKHPDULWLPHLQGXVWU\LVQRZE\GHIDXOWRQHRIWKHQHZ
WDUJHWVRIWKLVJOREDOWHUURU´ 
 
RHIHUULQJ WR SRUW¶V YXOQHUDELOLW\ as described above, a phenomenal change in the 
attitude of maritime stakeholders took place with the influence of policy decisions 
made at various spatial levels. One such influence begins from the rule making body 
of international organizations such as the IMO where most polices made at that stage 
will be transposed into supra-national and national regulations subsequently. It should 
be emphasised here that such decisions were made because of the embedded 
complexity in the port system particularly in the containerized cargo system. Figure 
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4.1 elucidates the port security event chain in the containerised cargo system. As 
argued before, containerisation contributes a significant form of global trade, thus the 
risk encountered by seaports in handling the sheer volume and number of goods 
transported through this medium is perhaps foremost among the risk associated with 
SRUWV 2(&'  7KH FRQFHSW RI µULVN¶ LQ WKLV FRQWH[W FDQ EH GHILQHG DV ³WKH
OLNHOLKRRG RI RFFXUUHQFH RI DQ HYHQW DQG WKH LPSDFWV RI WKH HYHQW VKRXOG LW RFFXU´
(Harrald, 2005: 161). Therefore the embedded weaknesses demonstrated in the 
containerised cargo system offers the possibility for perpetrators to use this medium in 
causing the desired consequences.   
 
Figure 4.1:  Port Security Event Chain: Containerised Cargo System 
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4.4 The contributing factors to changes in approaches to port security 
 
4.4.1 The United States initiatives ± national level approach  
 
In this part it is appropriate to begin the discussion with the US initiative which is 
regarded as a national approach instead of international and supra-national approaches 
when we take into consideration of the US influence and its lead role in determining 
numerous security regimes imposed upon the international maritime community. 
 
There are a number of reasons to explain why the maritime transportation industry 
perceived security issues in a different way in the post 9/11 era. Given the fact of the 
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SRUW¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGLWVFRQVHTXHQWLDOHIIHFWVDVVKRZQLQ7DEOHDERYHWKH8S 
foremostly viewed this matter very seriously. As the direct victim of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, the US considered that any major catastrophe affecting maritime assets had 
the potential to seriously damage not only global commence but also its own domestic 
economy. For example according to Goodrich (2002) the 9/11 attacks had caused an 
immediate negative economic impact to the US travel and tourism industry. The same 
result is potentially possible to shatter the maritime sector where ports are regarded as 
a fundamental pillar in facilitating the US economy. This had drawn considerable 
concern of the US administration (Frettelli, 2008). In another context, the US equally 
paid serious consideration to waging ³the war against terror´LPPHGLDWHO\DIWHU
when it recovered strong evidence during the invasion of Afghanistan in October 
2001 of the intention of the Al-Qaeda and its associated terrorist groups to invest 
extensively in developing technologies, tactics and techniques for conducting 
maritime terrorist operations. The recovery of training manuals and attacks plans 
targeting naval and commercial maritime shipping in Asia, the Gulf and in the 
Mediterranean was the primary contributing factor leading the US to push its security 
defence border beyond its legitimate waters (Richardson, 2004: vii). 
  
It is estimated that the top fifty ports in the US account for 90% of all cargo tonnage 
and twenty-five of them account for 98% of container shipments. Additionally the US 
receives more than 10,000 ocean going container vessels from around the world 
calling at its ports annually (Cannon, 2008: 1-2) by handling 41 million TEUs in 2007 
and 39 million TEUs in 2008 respectively, a little decrease in 2008 due to global 
economic down turn (IAPH, 2010 &RQVHTXHQWO\ EHLQJ RQH RI WKH ZRUOG¶V OHDGLQJ
maritime trading nations, accounting for nearly 20% (measured in tons) of the annual 
world ocean-borne overseas trade, 25% of the US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
supported through maritime trade and 95% of this trade is dealt with non-North 
American traders (Frittelli, 2005: 3).  
 
In response to this alertness, the US took several drastic measures to fill in its existing 
security gap. Although 9/11 created huge impacts for the US, that very incident 
became a wake up call for the whole world and triggered warning of imminent 
terrorist attacks at any time and in any form. This was one of the realisations that 
brought changes in attitude towards security at various spatial levels in which the 
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maritime industry players were requested to adhere to the rules made, especially those 
originated primarily from the international organisations such as the IMO. The change 
was brought forward with the forceful contribution of the US and its persistent 
influence in the international arena. Before the IMO introduced global security 
policies, the US played a crucial role through this Organization and several other 
international bodies such the UN, ILO and World Customs Organization (WCO) to 
push for tougher security regimes in the global commercial agenda (Wengelin, 2006 
and Pinto, Rabadi and Talley, 2008). In this context, Scott (2010: 82) rightly points 
out: 
 
It is well recognized that the US was the chief architect of the network of 
international organizations and treaty regimes established following World 
War II. In many instances, the US provided the draft text of a treaty based on 
recent US legislation so that the treaty served in effect to extend that 
legislation beyond US borders. 
 
In a swift response to protect its 361 ports, 5,000 facilities, 10,000 vessels and forty 
offshore facilities from any terrorist attacks and protecting 6.5 million cruise ship 
SDVVHQJHUV¶DQGPLOOLRQYHKLFOHVFDUULHGWKURXJKIHUU\V\VWHP<LPDQG'RZQH\
2002: 1), in February 2002, the U.S. Congress began working on legislation that 
would become the MTSA. Simultaneously, the U.S. delegates to the IMO proposed a 
similar initiative (based on MTSA but to be implemented at international scale) to the 
,02¶V 0DULWLPH 6DIHW\ &RPPLWWHH (MSC). Following some initial hesitation, this 
proposal was largely incorporated into the ISPS Code, which was approved on 
December 13, 2002 (Pinto, Rabadi and Talley, 2008).10  
 
In recognising the threat of maritime terrorism after 9/11, the US adopted a two-
pronged approach to obtain international cooperation although some of the measures 
are more prone to their interest. Firstly, in addition to the activities within the IMO, 
the US also worked closely with the UN Security Council and the IMO in ensuring 
that member countries imposed new measures to deal with the threat of maritime 
terrorism. Secondly, the US used its power and influence to get cooperation from 
RWKHU VWDWHV WKURXJK ELODWHUDO DJUHHPHQWV E\ HVWDEOLVKLQJ µFRDOLWLRQV RI WKH ZLOOLQJ¶
(Beckman, 2005: 248). Wengelin (2006: 3) argues that this is one effective United 
                                                 
10
 As of 2010, the ISPS Code was applied in 148 countries around the world (Metaparti, 2010: 729). 
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States foreign policy strategy, directed at its trading partners, designed to protect its 
own interests. ,Q WKLV µSRZHU SOD\¶ VFHQDULR ZLWK PLV-matched players, non-
compliance was not an option for those countries concerned to maintain economic 
ties, and good political relations, with the much stronger United States. The security 
regimes such as the ISPS Code are meant to make the international maritime 
community obliged to protect the US interest. The strong US influence can also be 
seen in another international treaty. Wengelin (2006: 4) quoted a good example of the 
observation of the chairman of the IMO Legal Committee during the process of 
amending the SUA Convention. The chairman described briefly the manner of the US 
exerted its power:   
 
The political pressure was so strong that it [US] virtually dictated the 
GLUHFWLRQLQZKLFKWKHILQDOUHVXOWLQJFRQYHQWLRQVKRXOGJR«$VXSHUSRZHU
was in the lead with the determination to achieve certain pre-arranged [sic] 
JRDOV«,WZDVIHOWDVLIWKHSODFHDQGWKHFKDLUPDQKDGEHHQOHQWRXWWRRWKHU
people.  
 
Basically the essence of the ISPS Code which was introduced by IMO is based on the 
86¶076$DQDPHQGPHQWWRWKH0HUFKDQW0DULQH$FW+RZHYHUWKH076$
was designed to protect the U.S. ports and waterways from terrorist attacks and signed 
into law in November 2002 (Boske, 2006: 42), whereas ISPS was a framework 
adopted to create security standards for the ship and port facilities in the international 
maritime industry. The US adopted the whole ISPS Code (part A and B) as a 
mandatory requirement which was not the case for many countries around the world. 
The expansion of this Code to its territory was done through the MTSA. This implies 
that all vessels calling at the US ports shall not only meet the ISPS Code requirements 
but also the MTSA (Zhao, Chun and Ruan, 2005: 132).  
 
In order to give effect to all the security initiatives adopted at the national level, the 
US government established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The US 
national initiatives have brought far reaching implications to the international 
maritime communities where in many cases the developing economies are obliged to 
follow. Consequently, ships sailing from non conforming countries to the US ports are 
bound for rigorous inspection. For example ships that have visited some of the 
African countries (Democratic Republic Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and 
Mauritania) experience this tough measure quite often (Kent, 2005: 8 ± 9).  
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In addition to this, in the initial stage of the ISPS implementation when the Code 
came into force on 1 July 2004, the US was most visibly active enforcing this Code 
with 8.5% of inspections in the first month resulting in enforcement actions including 
denial of entry, expulsion or detention. Most non-compliant vessels under this 
category were reported to belong to FOCs (McNaught, 2005) which basically 
originated from the developing economies.11 Corresponding to this type of vessels, a 
study conducted by Yilmazel and Asyali (2005) for the implementation of the ISPS 
Code from 1st July 2004 to 1st April 2005 under the major Port State Control (PSC) 
regimes  ±  the inspection of foreign ships in national ports for safety reasons around 
the world -  found that the detention rate under the USCG regime for substandard 
ships that did not conform to ISPS Code requirement accounted for 46% of the 100% 
of all detentions world wide. The study also reveals that 45% of the overall detentions 
in the USCG regime were attributed to FOCs12. This implies that although the PSC 
regime is meant for safety reason, the US still detained ships to bolster its security 
standard using the same measure on the ground of security. 
 
In addition to the MTSA 2002 and the ISPS Code, the US government undertook 
oWKHU ILUP PHDVXUHV DVVHVVHG WR EH ILOOLQJ XS D µVHFXULW\ SROLF\ JDS¶ EXW EURXght 
VLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\$PRQJVWWKHKLJKOLJKWVDUHWKHµ
KRXU UXOH¶ µ KRXU UXOH¶ &RQWDLQHU 6HFXULW\ ,QLWLDWLYH &6, &XVWRPV-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Security and Accountability For Every 
(SAFE) Port Act, Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC), Mega 
Port initiative and many other layered approaches (Pallis and Vaggelas, 2008: 4-9).13 
                                                 
11
 7KHUHDUHFRXQWULHVGHFODUHGDV)2&VE\WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDQVSRUW:RUNHUV¶)HGHUDWLRQ,7)
The list shows that majority of these countries are developing nations (International Transport 
:RUNHUV¶)HGHUDWLRQ 
 
12
 Port State Control (PSC) is the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that the 
condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the requirements of international regulations and 
WKDW WKH VKLS LV PDQQHG DQG RSHUDWHG LQ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKHVH UXOHV,W SURYLGHV D ³D VDIHW\ QHW´ WR
FDWFK VXEVWDQGDUG VKLSV´ In addition to that operated by the USCG, the major Port State Control 
regimes around world are as follows: Paris; Tokyo; Acuerdo de Vina del Mar; Caribbean; Abuja ; 
Black Sea ; Meditterranean ; Indian Ocean;Riyadh  (International Maritime Organization, 2012).  
 
13
 96-Hour Advance Notification of Arrival - a security screening procedure introduced in 2001 by the 
USCG and the US Immigration and Naturalization Service to facilitate vessel boarding efforts. This 
procedure requires all vessels bound to US ports must provide a Notification of Arrival 96 hours in 
advance of their arrival. 24-Hour Rule ± a regulation implemented by US Customs since 2003 
requiring Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers (NVOCCs) to provide the agency with details of the 
contents of sea containers bound for the US ± 24 hours before being loaded on board. The rule allows 
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The main highlight of the US initiatives which become part of the supply chain 
programmes according to the related sector is shown in Table 4.2. By using the power 
and influence to get the international community to agree on some of the US security 
defences especially the CSI and C-TPAT, the method adopted is a layered approach 
consists of four zones i.e. foreign port, offshore, coastal and dockside (Pinto, Rabadi 
and Talley, 2008: 226).14 One of the strategies under this approach is to extend the US 
zone of security outward so that American borders become the last line of defence 
instead of the first (Khalid, 2005:3). 
 
Table 4.2: The List of US Initiatives to Enhance Supply Chain Security 
 
Port & Cargo related Ship related Other supply chain related 
ISPS Code Implementation / 
Enforcement 
Advance Notice of 
Arrival  
 
Participation in International Forums 
(e.g, APEC Trade Recovery Workgroup) 
24-Hour Rule Long Range Identification 
and Tracking of Vessels 
Maritime Domain Awareness Program 
Container Security Initiative  Rail Protocols for Transportation of 
High-Risk Hazardous Materials 
Container Security Devices  Air Cargo Security Programs 
 
Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism 
 HAZMAT Truck Tracking Program  
DOE Megaports 
 
 Hazmat Threat Assessment program  
Secure Freight Initiative  Enhanced Security Measures for Highly 
Hazardous Materials 
CBP Cargo Screening   Federal Security Clearances for State 
Departments of Transportation 
International Port Security 
Program 
 Certain Dangerous Cargo Tracking  
Non-Intrusive Inspections 
and Radiation Scanning 
Technology 
 Freight Railroad Security Plans  
 
                                                                                                                                            
US Customs officerV WR DQDO\]H WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ RI WKH FRQWDLQHUV¶ FRQWHQWV DQG LGHQWLI\ SRWHQWLDO
terrorist threats before they arrive at American ports (Khalid, 2008: 5-6). The explanation on C-TPAT 
and CSI is given in the main text as they are some of the key initiatives. The Megaport Initiative is 
another set of layered approach. Malaysia is one of the countries party to this initiative. Further 
explanation is given in Chapter Seven.     
 
14
 Layer 1: The foreign port zone is the far-out-to-sea-as-possible security defence for US ports. For a 
vessel arriving at a US port from a foreign port for which there are security concerns, the USCG may 
deny entry or prescribe conditions for entry. Layer 2: The offshore zone includes US waters inside the 
200 mile exclusive economic zone but beyond the 12-mile territorial sea. Ship in this zone bound for 
US ports are required to provide Advanced Notice of Arrival of at least 96 hours prior to entering a US 
port. Layer 3: The coastal zone includes US waters that extend inward from the 12 mile territorial sea 
to the docks and piers of a US port. In this zone, high-interest vessels may be escorted into port by 
armed Sea Marshals on board. Layer 4: The dockside zone is the port itself (Pinto, Rabadi and Talley, 
2008: 226). 
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Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential 
 Known Shipper Database 
Automated Targeting 
Systems 
 Nationwide Automatic Identification 
System 
  Domestic Maritime Security Regulations  
  Strategy to Enhance International Supply 
Chain Security 
  Corporate Security Review (CSR)  
  REAL ID Act  
  Security and Response Operations 
  FLETC Training of Roadside 
Enforcement Officers 
  ICE International Affairs & Trade 
Relations 
Source: Adapted and regrouped according to the related sectors from Strategy to Enhance 
International Supply Chain, 2007: 14-15 
Note: The list is not exhaustive for all the US initiatives. Among the main ones drawn the 
global attention are the C-TPAT, CSI and Megaport Initiative. 
 
Notably, both the CSI and C-TPAT are voluntary in nature but have created a massive 
impact to those countries that have a high volume of trade with the US. Both these 
initiatives are meant to enhance the US maritime security by securing the 
interconnected global supply chain. The C-TPAT, announced in 2001, is formed as a 
joint government-business partnership in which businesses play an active role in 
enhancing the security measures in the parts of supply chain that they represent. It is 
designed to strengthen the overall supply chain and the border security by working 
in close cooperation with the key members of the supply chain. Initially the 
programme focused on large US importers and exporters, ports/terminal operators and 
carriers. The measure began with only seven major importers and other participants 
were added subsequently. As of 2008 it had 12 different categories of participants 
such as importers, manufactures, Customs brokers, terminal operators and so on (Jim, 
2008: 17). Data shows that by January 2012, C-TPAT had 10,082 members with 
largest portion of members are importers with 4,401 certified followed by 2,827 
carriers and 1,109 foreign manufactures (Supply Chain Asia, 16 January 2012). This 
programme effectively provides incentives for the shippers with reduced number of 
cargo examination and speedier customs clearance.  
 
On the other hand, the CSI was implemented in 2002 aiming at securing the maritime 
link by identifying high-risk containers through pre-VFUHHQLQJH[HUFLVHVDWWKHZRUOG¶V
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twenty largest ports. It requires that the vessel carrier sends to the US Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) the manifest of every container destined for the US, 24 hours 
before the container is loaded onto the vessel in the foreign port of export (Jim, 2008: 
17). One of its goals is to have foreign nations cooperate with the US by allowing the 
US Customs officials to operate in their ports. Since initiation until 2011 there are 58 
foreign ports participating in the CSI accounting for 85% of container traffic bound 
for the US (Department of Homeland Security, 2011). Worthy to note however, the 
CSI programme is a good example of the US establishing a framework for 
international cooperation outside of the existing international institutions and the 
international regulations. Given the economic interest and port competitiveness, states 
were willing to accept the US direction in what would have been regarded as an 
infringement of their sovereignty before 9/11 (Beckman, 2005: 255). 
 
The US port security measures can be seen as a unilateral strategy though with a 
global dimension. Albeit the US adopted a two pronged approach by having 
cooperation with the international organisations and bilateral agreements with other 
states as mentioned above, the trend appears to be more towards unilateralism. 
According to Dudziak (2003: 3-7), the 9/11 incident effectively helped the U.S 
administration to reinforce the unilateral policies in the name of security and the right 
to respond to terrorism without much opposition or greater resistance from the 
international community. Because of this DSSURDFK%DYLHUDDVVHUWVWKDW³,W
was easy enough to argue that what was bad for the United States was bad for the 
world, given the important role the United States plays in the world economically and 
politically, and in international security´ +ROGLQJ WR WKLV YLHZ 3UHVLGHQW %XVK
GHFODUHG WKDW³HLWKHU\RXDUHZLWKXVRU\RXDUHZLWK WKH WHUURULVW´ %DYLHUUD
36).    
 
Taking the advantage that maritime commerce is interdependent; the US imposed 
multiple programmes to non-US ports in the name of enhancing security standards 
and practices both domestically and internationally. This has been achieved through 
the layered approach as explained earlier where the US border is secured as the last 
line of defence. What appears to be truth though is that, through various security 
schemes, the US accrues more benefit without granting any tolerance to other trading 
partners. Although the intention is noble to safeguard the maritime sector from any 
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untoward incident, it entails the trading partners to bear the financial cost and other 
form of supply chain requirement in complying with the condition imposed by the US 
(Stasinopoulos, 2003 and Khalid, 2008). One such obvious example is the 
implementation of Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act which is a 
part of the broader framework defined by the MTSA 2002 where the act imposes on 
100% scanning for all the inbound containers to the US. In order for the full 
enforcement to take place, this initiative has been postponed from 2012 to 2014 taking 
into consideration the financial and technical requirement for both the US and the 
trading partners (LloyG¶V /LVW  'HFHPEHU 09). While the initiative¶V IXOO
enforcement is in the pipe line, the CSI has taken care of the inbound cargoes. The 
SAFE Port Act has legally endorsed and transposed both the CSI and CTPAT 
programmes into this Act and sets a condition that scanning should take place 
regardless of prior risk assessment of each containers. If a container does not pass 
through this scanning process, it will not be allowed for the US shipment.  The 
difference between the CSI and the SAFE Port Act is that the former is conducted 
through a bilateral agreement but the latter is a unilateral policy requiring the trading 
partners to comply with the ruling mandatorily (Pallis and Vaggelas, 2008: 6).  
 
Apart from this, one significant expansion of the US unilateral approach beyond its 
border is through the establishment of International Port Security Program (IPS) 
where USCG assesses the effectiveness of port security measures in foreign trading 
SDUWQHUV 8QGHU WKLV SURJUDPPH WKH 86&* XVHV D FRXQWU\¶V LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH
ISPS Code as a primary indicator of the effectiveness of such measures. In the process 
of evaluation, they also promote the effectiveness of the ISPS Code to improve port 
and vessel security. If a country is found having inferior anti-terrorism measures, the 
US will LPSRVH PRUH VWULQJHQW UXOHV IRU YHVVHOV DUULYLQJ IURP WKDW FRXQWU\¶V SRUW
(Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, 2007).  
 
Outside a port context, the US initiated the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to 
establish a coalition of willing partners to respond to the growing challenge posed by 
proliferation of WMD. The initiative was announced by the Bush administration on 
31st May 2003. There were initially sixteen participating countries that formed a 
coalition in an effort to interdict ships suspected of carrying WMD and missile-related 
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technologies.15 As of May 2010, the number of participants has increased to 96 
countries representing six continents around the world (U.S Department of State, 
2010). Under this programme, the USCG and the Navy are prepared to board vessels 
in international waters to interdict member states¶ vessels suspecting of carrying 
harmful weapons or other weapons of mass destruction for wrongful purpose although 
such action is considered not in compliance with the UNCLOS (Harrald, 2005: 171). 
Pressured by influence of the US, the member states agreed to the Interdiction 
Principles of the PSI. These principles are not legally binding and focused on pre-
emptive interdiction, seeking to allow ships, aircraft and vehicles suspected of 
carrying WMD rHODWHG PDWHULDOV IORZLQJ WR RU IURP µVWDWH RU QRQ-state actors of 
SUROLIHUDWLRQ FRQFHUQ¶ WR be detained and searched as soon as they enter member 
FRXQWULHV¶ WHUULWRU\ WHUULWRULDO ZDWHUV RU DLUVSDFH ,W ZLOO DOVR HQFRXUDJH PHPEHU
countries to deny overflight rights to suspicious aircraft or ground them when they 
stop to refuel (Shah. 2004: 18). 
 
4.4.2 Security measures at international level 
 
Following 9/11 and in response to the United Nations Security Council resolution 
S/Res/1373 (2001) on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist 
acts (United Nations, 2010), the former IMO Secretary-*HQHUDO :LOOLDP $ 2¶1HLO
consulted member governments on the need to review measures already adopted by 
the IMO to combat acts of violence and crime at sea.16 Thereafter he proposed the 
adoption of a UHVROXWLRQRQWKH³5HYLHZRI0HDVXUHVDQG3rocedures to Prevent Acts 
of Terrorism which Threaten the Security of Passengers and Crews and the Safety of 
6KLSV´ 7KLV UHVROXWLRQ ZDV VXEVHTXHQWO\ DGRSWHG DV 5HVROXWLRQ $ DW WKH nd 
IMO Assembly in November 2001 and called for a review of the existing 
international legal and technical measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts 
                                                 
15
 The sixteen participating countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, US and Turkey. (Shah, 
2004:18). However during the first anniversary of the PSI in May 2004, more than 60 states had 
expressed their intention to join in this programme (Beckman, 2005: 256). 
16
 The Security Council, which had unreservedly condemned the 9/11 attacks through resolution 1368 
(2001), on 28 September adopted resolution 1373 (2001), which has become a cornerstone in the UN's 
concept of terrorism and in its anti-terrorist actions. It is a resolution adopted pursuant to Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, which contains legally enforceable obligations issued from the UN that can result in 
the threat of sanctions. This resolution was unanimously adopted by the members of the Security 
Council. The resolution imposes general obligations on all Member States such as the criminalisation 
RIERWKWHUURULVPDQGLWVILQDQFLQJ«8nited Nations Security Council, 2007). 
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against ships at sea and in port and to improve security aboard and ashore. The aim 
was to reduce risks to passengers, crews and port personnel on board ships, port areas , 
the vessels and their cargoes, hence to enhance ship and port security from becoming 
a target of international terrorism (Hesse, 2003: 330). 
 
In response to the adoption of Resolution A.924 (22), the IMO developed a new 
comprehensive security regime for international shipping and port which entered into 
force on 1st July 2004 following the adoption by a Diplomatic Conference on 
Maritime Security held in London from 9 to 13 December 2002 (Hesse, 2003: 330). 
During this conference, the IMO adopted a series of wide-ranging new security 
measures along with eleven associated resolutions (IMO, 2009b). 
 
This was done through the amendments to Chapter XI of SOLAS 1974 in which it 
was divided into two parts: Chapter XI-1: Special Measures to Enhance Maritime 
Safety; and Chapter XI-2: Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security. Under 
Chapter XI-2, the ISPS Code was developed as part of the security measures (Hesse 
and Charalambous, 2004: 125). 
 
In principle, Chapter XI-2 incorporates new regulations for ship and port facilities 
UHTXLUHPHQWV WKRXJKWKHUHLVQRVSHFLILFGHILQLWLRQIRUµVHFXULW\¶DVDUJXHGE\0HMLD
(2005:2). This regulation stipulated as Regulation XI-2/2 enshrining the ISPS Code 
has a mandatory section (part A) and a recommendatory section (part B). The 
guidance in section B is supplementing the provisions of part A. In essence, the new 
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code take the approach that ensuring the security 
of ships and port facilities is basically a risk management activity and that to 
determine what security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risks must be 
made in each particular case. The purpose of the ISPS Code is to provide a 
standardised, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to 
offset changes in threat levels with changes in vulnerability for ship and port facilities 
(Hesse, 2003: 331-332).  
 
The risk management approach stipulated in the ISPS Code carried through a number 
of minimum functional security requirements for ships and port facilities. For ships it 
includes: 
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(a) ship security plan 
(b) ship security officers 
(c) company security officers; and 
(d) certain onboard equipment. 
 
For port facilities: 
(a) port facility security plans; and 
(b) port facility security officers. 
 
Other additional requirements for ships and port facilities include: 
(a) monitoring and controlling access 
(b) monitoring the activities of people and cargo; and 
(c) ensuring that security communication are readily available.  
 
Under part A of the Code, Contracting Governments can establish Designated 
Authorities (DA) within Government to undertake their security responsibilities. In 
turn the Government or DA may also delegate the undertaking of certain 
responsibilities to Recognised Security Organisations (RSO) outside Governments. In 
addition to this, the Code also requires the Contracting Governments to set up the 
security level for international use to their ships and port facilities. The three levels 
are: 
 
(a) Security Level 1: normal 
(b) Security Level 2: lasting for the period of time when there is a heightened risk of a 
security incident; and 
(c) Security Level 3: lasting for the period of time when there is the probable or 
imminent risk of a security incident (Trelawny, n.d: 3 ± 4). 
 
In summary, the whole Code adopts the objectives RI³ WKHGHWHFWLRQRIVHFXULW\
threats, (2) the implementation of security measures, (3) the collation and 
promulgation of information related to maritime security, (4) the provision of reliable 
methodologies in assessing maritime security risks, (5) the development of detailed 
security plans and procedures for reacting to a change in security level, and (6) the 
establishment of security-related roles and responsibilities by contracting 
governments (and their administrations), shipping companies and port operators at 
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QDWLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHOVLQFOXGLQJWKHSURYLVLRQRISURIHVVLRQDOWUDLQLQJ´1J
and Vaggelas, 2012: 677).  
 
One significant setback of the ISPS Code is that it does not apply to inter alia either 
fishing vessels or pleasure craft or cargo ships below 500 gross tonnage or to the ports 
which serve them (Bazan et al, 2007: 3), but covers passenger ships and cargos of 500 
gross tonnage and upwards, including high speed craft, mobile offshore drilling units 
and port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages (IMO, 2009b). 
 
In addition to the formation of Chapter XI-2, other pertinent amendments to 1974 
SOLAS Convention were: 
 
(i) Modification to Chapter V (Safety of Navigation) accelerating the implementation 
of the requirement to fit Automatic Identification Systems (AIS). Ships other than 
passenger ships and tankers, of 300 gross tonnage and upwards but less than 50,000 
gross tonnage are required to fit this system. 
 
(ii) Modification to Chapter XI-1 ± Regulation XI- UHTXLUHV 6KLSV¶ ,GHQWLILFDWLRQ
QXPEHUV WR EH SHUPDQHQWO\ PDUNHG LQ YLVLEOH SODFH ZKHWKHU RQ WKH VKLS¶V KXOO RU
superstructure. 
 
(iii) Regulation XI-5 requires ships to be issued with a Continuous Synopsis Record 
(CSR) which is intended to provide an on-board record of the history of the ship. 
 
(iv) Regulation XI-2/6 requires all ships to be provided with a ship security alert 
system. The main function of this system, when activated it shall initiate and transmit 
a ship-to-shore security alert to an authority, identifying the ship, its location and 
indicating that security of the ship is under threat or it has been compromised. (IMO, 
2010)   
 
Interestingly though, the amendments to SOLAS 1974 were conducted on a fast track 
EDVLV WKURXJK ³WDFLW DFFHSWDQFH SURFHGXUH´ LQ RUGHU WR JLYH LPPHGLDWH HIIHFW WR WKH
contracting parties. As noted above, both the measures and the speed with which they 
were introduced were in response to the US requests for swift action as Fairly (17 
February 2011: 5) succinctl\H[SODLQHG³ZLWKH[WUHPHXUJLQJIURPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
the normally very deliberative IMO was able to move quickly, passing the ISPS in 15 
PRQWKV´ 
 
Furthermore the ISPS Code specifically, marks a deviation from the rule making 
norm of the IMO instruments from merely addressing ships to include port facilities 
as well, an area that had previously been considered a matter within the domestic 
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jurisdiction of the port states because of their territorial sovereignty (Beckman, 2005: 
252 and Mejia, 2009: 2). In a broader sense, the impact of 9/11 has brought a 
paradigm shift in the role of IMO in dealing with maritime matters from merely 
IRFXVLQJ RQ ³6DIHU 6KLSSLQJ DQG &OHDQHU 2FHDQV´ WR ³6DIH 6HFXUH DQG (IILFLHQW
6KLSSLQJ RQ &OHDQ 2FHDQV´ 7KH UHIRUPDWLRQ WRZards security matters by the IMO 
reflects its broader and deeper concern in providing a blueprint for better action in the 
future (IMO, 2010) which eventually brought a change of attitude in the international 
maritime players with the involvement and co-operation of other international 
organisations alike such as ILO, WCO and International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) without denying that the influence of US either directly or 
indirectly through these organizations is equally important.   
 
In addition to the ISPS Code, the Code of Practice on Security in Ports was developed 
collectively by the IMO and ILO.17 The guidelines provided in this Code cover a 
more defined framework for a number of issues around port security. The risk 
assessment part is given a special attention in this Code. The full methodology 
suggested here obviously go beyond the ISPS Code requirements (Schroder et al, 
n.d.). This was followed by several other subsequent initiatives such as the ISO 
Standards like ISO 20858 (guidelines on maritime port facility security assessment, 
demanding that the relevant port authority develop a port facility security plan and 
ensure its application in the case of the critical port facility assets), ISO 28000 
(guidelines on security management supply chains) and ISO 28001 (specifications on 
                                                 
17
 The Code of Practice on security in ports has been undertaken by IMO jointly with ILO. This 
combined initiative complements the provisions of the ISPS Code with respect to security of the wider 
port area was approved by the Governing body of the ILO of its 289th Session in march 2004 and later 
the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of its 78th Session in May 2004. This code of practice is 
not legally binding instrument and is not intended to replace national laws and regulations. It is not 
intended to affect the fundamental principles and rights of workers provided by the ILO instruments, or 
WKH IDFLOLWDWLRQ RI WKH DFFHVV RI ZRUNHUV¶ RUJDQL]DWLRQV WR SRUWV WHUPLQDOV DQG YHVVHOV 7KLV &RGH
provides a framework of guidelines for the development of a strategy appropriate to identifying threats 
to security in ports that as outlined in SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code (Security in port: ILO 
and IMO code of practice, 2004:,v-vii). Among the main provisions of this code are: 
x 7KHGHYHORSPHQWRIDSRUWV¶VHFXrity policy statement by the signatory 
x The establishment of a Port Security Assessment; 
x The identification and evaluation of the critical assets and infrastructures that are important to 
protect; 
x The development of a Port Security Plan, compatible with the ISPS Code for a Port Facility 
Security Plan; 
x The increased security awareness of personnel training (Pallis and Vaggelas, 2007:4). 
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best practices for implementing supply-FKDLQ VHFXULW\ 5HYLVHG 6HDIDUHU¶V ,GHQWLW\
Documents by ILO and the SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate 
Global Trade by WCO (Pallis and Vaggelas, 2008: 3 and Boske, 2006).  
 
To enhance the development of standards for safety and security in the wider field of 
transportation, the IMO and WCO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 
July 2002 to strengthen cooperation in the fields of container examination, integrity of 
the multi modal transport chain and matters relating to the ship/port interface. This 
agreement was a result of the IMO Resolution A.942 (22) where the resolution seeks 
additional support of other international organisation addressing the security issues. 
As such, the WCO was identified as the relevant agency in improving the integrity 
and security of Cargo Transport Units in multi modal transport (Allan, 2003). 
 
4.4.3 Security measures at supra-national level 
 
In response to the measures adopted at the IMO and probably also under the influence 
or pressure of the US, the EU reacted in parallel to safeguard its 27 member states by 
formulating its own comprehensive regional regulatory framework aiming to secure 
its 9,500 flagged vessels (over 500 gross tonnage), 4,300 maritime companies and 
1,250 ports over 4,100 port facilities within this member groups (Pallis and Vaggelas, 
2008: 4-9). Although coincidentally the European Commission had published a White 
Paper detailing the EU transport policy up to 2010 just one day before 9/11 as stated 
in Chapter Three, its emphasis was more on security of passengers onboard cruise 
vessels and ferries as well as on the transportation of nuclear goods.   
 
7KH (8¶V DFWXDO VHFXULW\ LQLWLDWLYH WR SURWHFW WKH SRUt and shipping facilities was 
covered in the Regulation 725/2004 by transposing the ISPS Code into EU 
Community legislation. The measure was brought into force on 31 March 2004. To 
reinforce the effect of the Code, the Regulation includes provisions that extend these 
measures to the ships engaged in national voyages within the EU as well as the related 
port facilities that serve them. The regulation expanded for the list of ships to include 
Class A passenger ships effective 1st July 2005 and other domestic ships effective 1st 
July 2007. Additionally, the Regulation which was transposed into the EC law made a 
mandatory part A of the ISPS Code and some aspects of the Part B compulsory for 
inner EU traffic (Anyanove, 2007: 26).  
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The EU policy was further strengthened with the Directive 65/2005 that came into 
force in 2007. This Directive applied to a much wider scope in port area apart from 
µVKLSSRUW¶ LQWHUIDFHDVVSHOOHGRXW LQ5HJXODWLRQDQGDSSOLHV WRHYHU\SRUW
located in the territory of Member States (Pallis and Vaggelas, 2008: 10). The purpose 
of this Directive is to cover the remaining uncovered part in both international rules 
and European legislation. However it is noted that the Directive gives freedom to its 
member states in terms of implementation according to their own accord because of 
the heterogeneous nature of their ports (Anyanova, 2007: 26). In view of the nature of 
ports and financial requirement, a study conducted by Dekker and Stevens (2007) 
reveals that as of 1st January 2004, in accordance with the Regulation 725/2004, the 
EU ports on average only managed to comply with the ISPS Code approximately by 
70% with the average investment cost per facility about Euro 464,000 and the average 
running cost about Euro 234,000. This shows that there were many factors drawn to 
(8¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQSDUWLFXODUO\WKHILQDQFLDODVSHFWGXULQJWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKLV
Code. 
 
The EU also implemented Revised Customs Code similar to the US C-TPAT as a 
framework to minimise security risks throughout the entire supply chain. Under this 
measure, the transport operator would be granted Authorized Economic Operator 
(AEO) status when it fulfilled all the necessary requirements.18 Upon achieved this 
status, the operator is granted peer recognition of AEO status among the member 
countries, reduced inspections, relaxed standards for pre-arrival and pre-departure 
requirements and simplified procedures for customs declarations (Boske, 2006: 67 
and Pallis and Vaggelas, 2008: 12).  
 
                                                 
18
 Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) is a party involved in the international movement of goods in 
whatever function that has been approved by or on behalf of a national Customs administration in 
accordance with the WCO or equivalent to supply chain security standards. AEO include inter alia 
manufacturers, importers, exporters, brokers, carriers, consolidato rs, intermediaries, ports, airports, 
terminal operators, integrated operators, warehouses, distributors. AEO was establi shed under the 
:&2¶V 6$)( )UDPHZRUN RI 6WDQGDUG WR VHFXUH DQG IDFLOLWDWH JOREDO WUDGH NQRZQ DV 6$)(
Framework. The framework is meant to improve the security of international trade supply chain in a 
uniform and holistic way. The framework encourages and makes it easier for buyers and sellers to 
move goods between countries securely. It sets the principle and standards for its 171 member 
countries to follow and proposed to conduct through twin pillars of Customs-to-Customs network 
arrangement and Customs-to-Business partnership. Those players who obtained AEO status will reap 
benefit such as faster processing of goods by Customs through reduced examination rates (World 
Customs Organization, 2010).  
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In another supra national spectrum, members of ASEAN signed the ASEAN Plan of 
Action to Combat Transnational Crime in 2001. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
an informal multilateral dialogue between the ASEAN and other Asia Pacific regional 
members, issued a Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threat to 
Security in June 2003 (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2010). Essentially its measures are 
more directed at combating piracy and terrorism at sea than anything directly related 
to ports. The framework is merely implemented by voluntary participation among 
member states and not binding in nature. Nevertheless, ASEAN forged some form of 
cooperation among its member states in implementing the ISPS Code in their 
respective ports. The practical mechanism of their approach is explained in Chapter 
Seven.  
 
In another instance, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has made the 
only effort in addressing the maritime security through Security Trade in the APEC 
Region programme (STAR Programme). The programme was initiated by the US 
which is a member country of this organisation with the aim to standardise the 
practice of the ISPS Code in the regional security measures by requiring all member 
countries to submit a Counter Terrorism Action Plan (CTAP). The plan provides a 
concise checklist of counter-terrorism measures undertaken by the member states. 
Apart from this, the STAR program also included other wider measures by promoting 
cyber security, energy security and protecting the health of communities in addition to 
secure trade and halting terrorist financing (Ng and Gujar, 2008: 261).  
 
4.4.4 Other national initiatives 
 
Driven by the US regulations and subsequently required by the international regime, 
some of the programmes developed by other governments mirror the US initiatives 
while a few others establish their own unique approach. Examples include the 
&DQDGLDQ*RYHUQPHQW¶V3DUWQHUVKLS LQ3URWHFWLRQSURJUDPPH, a reflection of the C-
TPAT programme (Brooks and Pelot: 2008: 206) and the Swedish Stair-sec is another 
one. The Australian government established the Australian Maritime Identification 
System in order to identify vessels while they are still 1,000 nautical miles away from 
the coast (Klein, 2006: 1). On the other hand, New Zealand worked closely with the 
US and developed a robust procedure for screening of shipments to US ports through 
a Supply Chain Security arrangement. The procedure is considered one of the first in 
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the world which involves using risk assessment and intelligence to identify high-risk 
shipments. They also introduced a voluntary scheme called the Secure Export 
Partnership Scheme in which businesses undertaking security measures get the special 
privilege of their shipments being classified as secure (Klein, Mossop and Rothwell, 
2010: 58). The UK basically complies with the regulation and directive set by the EU 
which is applicable to all member states at the supra national levels. 
 
Canada, in response to 9/11 also undertook initiatives to enhance the border security 
with the US that went beyond the port and shipping sectors need. The government 
realised that after this major incident, the vulnerability of the US-Canada became very 
obvious. Therefore one such programme introduced between the two countries was 
the Smart Border Declaration (SBD) in December 2001. A study conducted by 
Carpentier (2007) reveals that the Canadian government took affirmative actions in 
response to threat to its national security and forged a bilateral relationship with the 
US. This programme was organised through changes to national security policy. The 
programme was designed to provide a secure flow of people, goods, infrastructure and 
information sharing. Further, the Free and Secure Trade Program, a transborder 
security initiative was established by tying the US and Mexico together for increasing 
the integrity of the supply chain (Canada Border Services Agency, 2010). Although 
this is not directly a maritime related regime, it has been incorporated into SBD to 
enable free and safe flow of goods and common clearance. This programme is similar 
to C-TPAT but only involves key players comprised of carrier, drivers, importers and 
southern border manufactures.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the contributing factors and its consequences of changed 
attitude as well as practices regarding port security. Ports occupy a unique position in 
the total maritime transportation system. In this juncture, it is worthy noting that the 
subject of port security contains a range of issues at various spatial levels chiefly for 
the reason of safeguarding ports for dual objectives. First, to sustain the core function 
of the port in trade facilitation for national and global economic prosperity by 
complying the required regulations and second, the port has to be protected from any 
casualties involving loss of lives or damage to physical property. For the purpose of 
national economy and defence, both objectives are intertwined and mutually 
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supporting each other. In realising this fact, the international maritime community 
took every possible effort in introducing regulations and practices and in 
implementing numerous counter-measures at different spatial levels with some of the 
measures introduced with the US backing.   
 
This chapter reveals that in the wake of 9/11, a raft of security regimes have been 
introduced and imposed to the maritime sector in the name of countering terrorism. 
Appendix V summarises the extent of these. Security matters have been perceived 
YHU\ GLIIHUHQWO\ LQ WKH SRVW  HUD 7KH PDULWLPH VHFWRU LV UHJDUGHG DV µVRIW¶ DQG
vulnerable to many forms of malicious attack. Furthermore, the relatively open nature 
of seaports, even allowing for the introduction of the security measures discussed, 
seemingly provides an attractive alternative for terrorists to attract global attention 
through their actions.  
 
One important factor that has brought a change in attitude and practice to port security 
in international dimension was driven by the significant role played by the US. In 
realising the potential danger of terrorism, the US imposed firm measures to its 
trading partners by making its border as the last line of defence. Those countries are 
obliged to comply in order to carry out trade smoothly in US ports. Failing this, ships 
from these countries will encounter rigours inspections even before entering the US 
ports. Additionally, as a super power and with a greater influence in the international 
organisations, the US has played its card well in pushing its security agenda through 
those bodies to other parts of the world, as otherwise would be regarded as 
infringement of sovereignty in normal circumstances. In this sense, though most of 
the US measures are meant for its national interest, their effects are global in nature. 
At the international level, the IMO introduced the ISPS Code in a fast track manner as 
a key instrument in protecting the port and shipping sector. Additionally, other 
international organisations such as the ILO, WCO and ISO added up more security 
regimes to the whole supply chain in the maritime sector. At the supra-national level, 
the regional groupings introduced various other measures along with the international 
and US requirements. All these security regimes reflect the fact that the post 9/11 
period created anxiety, especially for the West that the port sector is very vulnerable 
to easy attack therefore a risk-based approach is needed for its protection.      
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Having seen a broad spectrum of security measures at different spatial levels, the 
IROORZLQJFKDSWHUSURYLGHVDKROLVWLFYLHZRI0DOD\VLD¶VPDULWLPHVHFWRULQFOXGLQJthe 
ports. Chapters Three and Four provided a global dimension which will help to view 
and comprehend how those measures were then translated or practised in the national 
context. Before elaborating further on the Malaysian port security system before and 
after 9/11, the next chapter essentially establishes a background setting in order to 
FRPSUHKHQG 0DOD\VLD¶V port system and security policies which are explained in 
detail in the subsequent chapters.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
MALAYSIA : A MARITIME NATION  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Malaysia is one of the fastest and most powerfully growing nations in the SEA region. 
$VDPHPEHURI$6($10DOD\VLD¶VUROHLQUHJLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWHVSHFLDOO\LQWKH
maritime sector, in securing and safeguarding the surrounding waters by various 
means has received recognition and cooperation not only from the regional members 
but also from other states around the world. By setting an aspiration to become a 
developed nation by year 2020, the importance of the maritime sector especially the 
development of the port industry is not overlooked in the national development plan.19 
0DOD\VLD¶VSRVLWLRQDVDQRFHDQLFVWDWHFORVHO\VLWXDWHGQH[WWRPDMRUZDWHUZD\VWKDW
connect Asia with the west coast of the US and with the Middle East and Europe as 
illustrated in Map 5.1 and 5.2 below, creates a situation where Malaysia faces many 
challenges in keeping her waters safe from any unlawful activities as well as in 
maintaining its economic prosperity. Against this backdrop, it is the objective of this 
chapter to analyse the importance of maritime sector which consists of many different 
sub-sectors and in particular, the contribution of ports to the Malaysian economy. In 
line with this, a historical overview will be presented as a background for 
unGHUVWDQGLQJ 0DOD\VLD¶V LQWHQWLRQ LQ HQKDQFLQJ WKH FRXQWU\¶V VWDWXV DV D PDULWLPH
nation in this region. This will then be followed by a discussion of some important 
issues concerning various sub-sectors and subsequently the port policy and port 
development in the country.  
                                                 
19
 Malaysia has set an agenda to be a developed nation by the year 2020. This agenda which is known 
as µ9LVLRQ¶ZDVPRRWHGE\WKHIRXUWKPrime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohammad. 
The key to the attDLQPHQWRIDIXOO\GHYHORSHGQDWLRQDVHQYLVDJHGLQµ9LVLRQ¶LVRYHUFRPLQJWKH
nine strategic challenges; namely 
(i) Establishing a united Malaysian nation made up of one %DQJVD0DOD\VLD¶ 
(ii) Creating a psychologically liberated, secure and developed Malaysian society 
(iii) Fostering and developing a mature, democratic society 
(vi) Establishing a fully moral and ethical society 
(v) Establishing a mature, liberal and tolerant society 
(vi) Establishing a scientific and progressive society 
(vii) Establishing a fully caring society 
(viii) Ensuring an economically just society, in which there is a fair and equitable distribution of the 
wealth of the nation; and 
(ix)Establishing a prosperous society with an economy that is fully competitive, dynamic, robust and 
resilient (Okposin, Hamid and Boon, 2005: 46). 
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5.2 The Malaysian economy 
 
The Malaysian economy is essentially ocean dependent with more than 90% of its 
exports seaborne (Seventh Malaysia Plan, 1990: 319). In this sense, the importance of 
ports and shipping cannot be overstated. MalayVLD¶V SURJUHVVLYH JURZWK LQ
merchandise trade as will be discussed later in this chapter, placed the country as the 
20th largest trading nations in the world in 2009, with a share of approximately 1.4% 
of global trade (Khalid, Ang and Joni, 2009: 16). Apart from this, Malaysia is also 
heavily ocean dependent for various resources, communication, commerce and 
security (Ahmad, 1988: 3-5). Interestingly though, Malaysia is geographically an 
agro-based economy with an abundance of natural resources and the nation is rapidly 
transforming into a growing industrial country.  
 
This development can be divided into three main broad stages that is (i) economic 
status during independence, (ii) economic status during the 1960s to 1980s; and (iii) 
economic status since the 1990s. In the first stage, the economy was dominated by the 
primary sector consisting of agriculture and mining. The second stage of the 
economic progress witnessed an economy heavily dependent on manufacturing which 
evolved through two strategies: import substitution and export promotion. This was 
pursued through the First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) and Second Malaysia Plan 
(1971-1975) respectively. However fundamental changes in the pattern of 
industrialisation resulted from the implementation of two core strategies in two main 
plans and policies, that is the First Outline Perspective Plan 1971 to 1990 (OPP1) and 
the Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2) covering the period from 1991 to 2000. 
OPP1 covers the Second to Fifth Malaysian Plan whereas OPP2 covers the Sixth and 
Seventh Malaysia Plan. OPP1 has been the main foundation on which the past and the 
present industrial success have been built on. The main thrust of the subsequent OPP2 
has been a follow up industrialisation strategy (Okposin, Hamid and Boon, 2005: 47-
52). The current economic progress with focus on the industrial activities was 
therefore achieved through the adoption and intensification of both the First and the 
Second Industrial Master Plan in 1985 and 1996 respectively (Okposin, Hamid and 
Boon, 2005: 23-28).  
 
During the tenure of Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
the export-oriented industrialisation strategy was implemented successfully through 
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the Malaysia Incorporated policy introduced in 1983 as the fundamental basis for 
national development. This also assisted the process of developing the marine sector 
particularly ports. This policy, coupled with the Industrial Master Plan, contributed 
significantly by attracting transnational corporations (TNCs) which brought foreign 
direct investment to Malaysia and hence boosted further economic prosperity. 
According to Mak and Tai (2001: 204), during the period 1981 to 1992, TNCs 
accounted for 82% of the WRWDO0DOD\VLDQH[SRUWV0DOD\VLD¶VDELOLW\WRWDNHDKLJKHU
leap which transformed and diversified the country from a merely agro- based to an 
industrial based country is due to the various strategic plans and a vision (Okposin, 
Hamid and Boon, 2005: 23). With the forward-ORRNLQJµ9LVLRQ¶0DOD\VLDKDV
committed LWVHOI WR IDFHFKDOOHQJHV WRDFKLHYH WKDWGUHDP ,QDFWXDO IDFW0DOD\VLD¶V
ambitious vision serves as a basic template against which the performance of all 
sectors of the Malaysian economy should be judged, also including the marine sector 
(Saharuddin, 2001: 2). In this context, the maritime sector is a key component that 
needs greater attention if it is to achieve the prescribed agenda.  
 
Map 5.1:  The Strait of Malacca  
 
 
Source: Rodrigue, 2009  
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Map 5.2: Shipping Lanes and Passages in Pacific Asia 
 
 
Source: Rodrigue, 2009 
 
 
5.3 Historical background and the importance of maritime sector in Malaysia 
 
5.3.1 Early history 
 
Map 5.1 demonstrates that Malaysia is well positioned in SEA by having strategic 
trade routes for the East and West. Surrounded by the oceans, the country is well 
connected to the west of the US, the Middle East and Europe. The natural 
geographical location and the vast coastline are contributing factors for the Malaysian 
government to set an agenda to become a leading maritime nation in this region. 
Generally, Malaysia has about 4,490 kilometres of coastline. The maritime zone it has 
is larger than the combined landmasses of Peninsular Malaysia (West Malaysia) and 
Sabah and Sarawak (East Malaysia), a total of 623,907 square kilometres 
(Saharuddin, 2001: 427-428). Within this maritime zone, Malaysia also claims 
sovereignty over 878 islands and 510 other geographical features such as offshore 
rocks, shoals, reefs, ridges, patches and grooves (Gunasekaran, 2011: 20). 
 
$SDUW IURP WKH YDVW QDWXUDO FRDVWOLQH 0DOD\VLD¶V VWURQJ SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH PDULWLPH
sector and its urge to become a leading maritime nation should also be viewed against 
her long historical background. It was not just the current political or economic 
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factors that encouraged the development of the maritime industry including the port 
sector, the early economic history was one of the contributing, or rather inducing 
motives for re-establishing the past glory.  Therefore it is worth looking generally at 
Malaysian maritime development, particularly the port sector in this context in order 
to comprehend its importance from a historical perspective.  
 
Before independence in 1957, Malaysia was known as Malaya.20 In the early era of 
the 4th ± 12th century, Kedah, located in the northern part of Peninsular, was the first 
place used as an entrepot, an intermediary centre of trade and transhipment, by the 
Indian and Chinese traders who were plying the Malacca Straits. During this period, 
Kedah was not just a place for trading activities but also a place for settlement by 
large Indian traders (Tregonnning, 1964). The emergence of several empires during 
this era, especially the Funan, Srivijaya, Sailendras and Majapahit that had great 
influence in the SEA and in their quest for spreading powers around the neighbouring 
countries made the political situation apparently unstable and severely affected the 
trading pattern in this region. Thus Kedah could not sustain herself as a main trading 
centre for a long time. When Malacca was found in the early 13th century by a Hindu 
king known as Parameswara from Sumatra, the place was well developed and built 
into a main entrepot replacing Kedah.  
 
Geographically well positioned in the SOM and facing a good climatic monsoon 
season, Malacca was found to be more conducive environment for trading by the 
Indian and Chinese traders. The port was turned into a focal point for ships sailing 
from two different directions following the monsoon winds blowing across the Indian 
Ocean and South China Sea at two different times of the year. Its suitable location and 
commercial viability were not just restricted to the Indian and the Chinese traders but 
were well received by the regional traders as well as traders from the Middle East. 
Malacca port was entirely transformed into a transhipment hub through the active 
trading during this period (Ryan, 1969: 10-15). Gradually the Malacca port entered 
into a different phase of development. From a main trading centre it also became the 
diffusion centre for spreading the Islamic religion. The traders from the Middle East 
                                                 
20
 In 1963, the name Malaya was changed to Malaysia by forming together the Federation of Malaya 
(consisting eleven states) Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei (in Borneo Island) and Singapore, However both 
Brunei and Singapore refused to join in this formation and thus opted out due to political and various 
other related factors. They stand as single independent countries respectively.   
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played a prominent role in bringing this religion and subsequently established their 
cultures here. Eventually many settled down and transformed the Malacca port into a 
centre of Islamic civilisation. During this period, Malacca port was not just used for 
the maritime activities, but was developed into a port city and became a fortress for 
the kingdom of Malacca sultanate. Interestingly though, the socio-cultural and socio-
economic interactions did not seem to happen just in Malacca but as Palmer (1999: 
100) argued, historically it happened in most parts of the world where the port was 
treated as a centre of interaction among the different political, economical and cultural 
entities and turned into a source of national wealth and pride. This consequently 
stimulated WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI SRUW FLWLHV ,Q 0DODFFD¶V FDVH WKH VWUHQJWK RI SRUWs 
created enormous wealth and pride to the rulers and helped them build a well known 
empire during this era.   
 
The arrival of European powers to Malacca in the 14 th century initiated first by the 
Portuguese was a turning point for the downfall of Malacca supremacy in the 
maritime field. The Portuguese destroyed the status of Malacca as a main 
transhipment port when they captured it for the purpose to gain control over the spice 
trade and built their own fortress. Subsequent to foreign arrival, the political and 
economic situation became unstable in this region (Hussin, 2008: 9-13).  
 
The emergence of the Renaissance in Europe during the 14th century particularly, was 
considered to be the watershed and pushing factor for the Europeans to quest for New 
World trade and simultaneously spread the Christianity. Their vast knowledge in the 
maritime field opened the door for further exploration and eventually brought them to 
the East and established their hegemony through imperialism or colonialism (Love, 
2006: 7-8). This was how the Portuguese arrived in Malacca and gained control from 
1511 to 1641, followed by the Dutch from 1641 to 1824 and the British from 1824 to 
1957 (Hussin, 2008: 16).  In addition to these maritime powers, the Spanish and 
French too had spread their colonialism to various parts of SEA in different periods of 
time (Hattendorf, 1996). 
 
Upon the colonial arrival, MalaccD¶VWUDQVKLSPHQWVWDWXVGHFOLQHG quite considerably. 
The conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese in the 14th century and their monopolistic 
policy as well as imposition of heavy levies for the traders using the Malacca port had 
led to the port losing its status as a main trading centre. This caused the trading point 
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later to transfer to Johor (Southern state of Peninsular Malaya). Nevertheless, Johor 
could not retain its strategic port for too long. After the defeat of Portuguese by the 
Dutch in 1641, the maritime centre was shifted to Batavia, Indonesia for the interest 
of the Dutch and Malacca was merely made as an administrative office.  
 
The explanation of maritime historical facts thus far provided a broad picture that has 
FRQQHFWLRQ WR 0DOD\VLD¶V LQWHUHVW DQG SURJUHVV LQ WKH PDULWLPH VHFWRU ,Q IDFW WKH
influence of colonial powers especially the British had a significant role in port 
development particularly the development of the Port Klang which will be explained 
in detail in the next chapter. However, at this stage, the following section expands 
further the development of maritime sector in different sub-sectors.    
 
5.3.2  An overview of the maritime sector 
 
As mentioned earlier the importance of the maritime sector is increasingly 
acknowledged and recognised by the Malaysian government for several reasons. One 
such reason is that the maritime domain provides the footing for the growth and 
development of various marine-related industries. The primary maritime sectors that 
contribute significantly to the Malaysia economy can be outlined briefly as follows 
with two selected sectors (shipping and ports) to be discussed in detail later in the 
chapter (Saharuddin, 2001: 428-429 and Rahman, Janib and Wei, 1997: 5-18 and 
Naidu, 1997: 51).  
 
(i) Ocean and coastal shipping 
The shipping sector in Malaysia is divided into two components, ocean going 
shipping and coastal shipping. Ocean going shipping comprises of bulk carriers, 
chemical tankers, container ships and LNG carries. In this category, Malaysia 
established her own ocean fleet company called the Malaysia International Shipping 
Corporation (MISC) in 1968. On the other hand, the coastal shipping sector includes a 
large number of smaller fishing boats, landing crafts, pleasure boats, barges and 
harbour crafts. To handle the domestic shipping, the government has setup Domestic 
Shipping and Licensing Board (DSLB) under the purview of MOT. (Further 
discussion of 0DOD\VLD¶VVKLSSLQJIROORZVEHORZ 
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(ii) Barter trade 
Barter trade is another component that contributes to domestic maritime growth. A 
survey carried out in the first half of 2008 indicates that there are about 2,000 barter 
trade boats entering and leaving the Peninsular Malaysia followed by 1,500 ferry 
boats transporting 4.8 million passengers (Sun2Surf, 2009). The number is more 
prominent in the Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area 
(BIMP-EAGA) region. A study conducted by a private consultant in 2010 reveals that 
non-conventional vessels (NCV), vessels below 500 gross tonnage including the 
traditional wooden-hulled and fishing vessel, have been highly used for barter trading 
activities and they are not regulated effectively within this region. In 0DOD\VLD¶VFDVH
various ports in Sabah (East Malaysia) have become the centre for barter trading 
activities mostly by NCVs from Indonesia and southern Philippines (Mak, 2010: 10-
11). 
 
(iii) Shipbuilding and ship repairing 
This sector LV FRQVLGHUHG D IDLUO\ D QHZ GHYHORSPHQW EDVHG RQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
Industrial Master Plan. There are about 65 shipyards and repair facilities established 
in Malaysia . It is anticipated that with the growing number of shipping services vis-à-
vis with counWU\¶VVHDERUQHWUDGHWKLVVHFWRUZLOOSOD\DQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQSURYLGLQJ
maritime services (Saharuddin, 2001: 428). As such, the industry is one of the key 
FRQWULEXWRUV WR 0DOD\VLD¶V HFRQRP\ JHQHUDWLQJ 50 Eillion of revenues and 
employed 20,000 people at the shipyards and in associated activities in 2011 (The Star 
Online, 8 October 2012). 
 
(iv) Port services 
As a consequence of trade expansion and changes in policy to cater for the industrial 
based activities, the local ports role in facilitating the growing trade becomes vitally 
important. This trend picked up during the mid-80s where there was a four fold 
increase in the total cargo traffic, with Port Klang being the leading port handling a 
TXDUWHU RI WKH QDWLRQ¶V WUDGH YROXPH 0RUH GHWDLOV RI 0DOD\sian ports will be 
discussed later in this chapter and matters concerning Port Klang in the following 
chapter.   
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(v) Offshore oil and gas 
Malaysian economy is considerably supported by the offshore gas and oil industry 
which contributes a substantial amount of revenue to the government. Realising the 
abundance of oil and natural gas available in the offshore, the government 
incorporated the oil company Petroleum National Berhad (PETRONAS) in 1974 to 
explore the full potential of these natural resources. It is estimated, oil and gas 
reserves will last about 17 and 100 years respectively (Saharuddin, 2001: 429). The 
income from the oil and gas industry has contributed substantially to the growth and 
development of the economy. For example, the government¶V revenue derived from 
the industry amounted to RM8.8 billion (USD2.84 billion) in 1990 and within two 
decades, the amount rose to RM30 billion (USD9.8 billion) in 2010 and RM30 billion 
(USD9.8 billion) again in 2011 (Rahman, Janib and Wei, 1997: 8 and Anggaran Hasil 
Kerajaan Persekutuan Tahun 2011 and 2012: 13).21 
 
(vi) Inshore and offshore fisheries  
Strategically surrounded by waters, this sector potentially provides a good source of 
income for the national economy growth and also additionally vast employment 
opportunities because of broad activities in this industry. The LQGXVWU\¶VDFWLYLWLHVDUH
divided into three components consisting of marine fisheries, aquaculture and inshore 
fishing. With the combination of these three components, the total fish production for 
the year 2008, 2009 and 2010 was 1.64 million, 1.71 million and 1.81 million metric 
tonnes respectively.  In the year 2010, the fisheries sector contributed 1.3% to the 
national GDP (Annual Fisheries Statistic, 2010: 22-36). 
 
(vii) Recreation centres and marine tourism 
Having an extensive coastal area, both east and west coasts provide the best tourism 
centres and attract tourists from around the world. The well-known tourist attractions 
include Langkawi Island, Penang, Pangkor, Besut, Sipadan Island and there are many 
more. Maritime tourism is fast growing with great potentials and has gained 
popularity both domestically and internationally, especially in the growth of cruise 
shipping. Additionally, Basiron (1997) points out that the joint contribution of 
government and private sector in developing major resorts, hotels, small cottage or 
                                                 
21
 Based on January 2012 currency exchange rate:  RM 1  =  USD 0.32 
                                                                                   USD 1 =  RM 3.10  
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village level industries significantly developed marine tourism. Activities such as 
sports fishing, yachting, boating and sailing, scuba diving and ecotourism are gaining 
greater importance.     
 
(viii) Naval defence and other maritime enforcement agencies 
This type of industry is categorised as a public good rather than part of the economy. 
Its contribution is viewed on the basis of its primary role in providing coastal defence 
and maritime security. There are eleven agencies involved apart from the naval forces 
in safeguarding the Malaysian waters with a total manpower of 5,300 people and 486 
ships and boats in various sizes and capacities. The government allocates 
approximately RM3 billion annually for the operation of these agencies. One of the 
prime agencies is the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) that 
subsequently merged the enforcement function of all other eleven agencies under one 
roof (Annual Report of MMEA, 2009: 11).  
 
Among those listed industries above, port services act as a backbone for the national 
economy. For safeguarding the port services through security measures, the role of 
maritime enforcement agencies such as the MMEA is extremely crucial. As naval 
forces focus on defence through military system, the enforcement agencies, together 
with the Marine Department which bears the responsibility as the Designated 
Authority (DA) in implementing the ISPS Code, play various pertinent roles in 
matters of port security. There are several key stakeholders in this respect and their 
role will be elaborated in the succeeding chapter.          
 
At this juncture, it is worth noting that during the OPP2, the New Development Policy 
(NDP) was formulated to oversee the overall development of maritime sector and 
accordingly laid out some strategies over this plan period (Rahman, Janib and Wei, 
1997: 73). For this purpose, the government outlined three fundamental objectives in 
the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) that became part of the OPP2 (Saharuddin 
(2001: 428): 
 
(i) A global approach to industrialization allowing firms to venture into large-scale 
operations to gain economies of scale by exporting to world markets; 
 
(ii) Maintaining and enhancing competitiveness in the face of changing market 
SUHIHUHQFHV WKDW UHTXLUH UHLQIRUFLQJ WKH QDWLRQ¶V FRPSHWLWLYH IRXQGDWLRQ DQG
strengthening infrastructure; and 
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(iii) Developing a modern, dynamic and outward oriented services sector to become a 
major catalyst for growth and a potential for export of services in international trade. 
 
 
Furthermore, to ensure that the maritime sector continues to prosper and is well 
managed, the government has formulated a host of legal frameworks for fourteen 
different marine related sectors which include port and shipping. For this reason there 
are at least seventy-four national laws formulated and additionally thirty-five to forty 
subsidiary legislative instruments and by-laws brought into force (Saharuddin 2001, 
429). At the international level, Malaysia has ratified twenty-one UN Conventions 
and seventeen IMO Conventions. In relation to port security, Malaysia has ratified the 
SOLAS 1974 since 19 January 1984 (Khalid and Kaur, 2011: 25) which, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, became the basis for the formation of the ISPS Code. 
Beyond this, as a member of the UN, Malaysia was also obliged to initiate a 
preventive measure when Resolution 1540 was adopted by the UN on 28 April 2004 
on non-proliferation of WMD. Member States were required to establish domestic 
controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and 
their means of delivery including by establishing appropriate controls over related 
materials (Jaafar, 2011: 7).  
 
5.4 An overview of the shipping sector  
 
Malaysia not only has a range of ports scattered throughout the country but also has a 
significant number of ships registered under the national flag. This puts Malaysia 
ranked in the nineteenth place among the top global thirty-five maritime countries in 
2011 shown in Table 5.1 below. This sector is equally important as the port sector in 
promoting and facilitating trade. As Stopford (2003: 3) asserts, shipping is a catalyst 
for economic development, which as the cheapest source of transportation opens up 
the market to specialization, in a similar understanding the Malaysian government 
established the MISC in 1968 and a second national line, Perbadanan National 
Shipping Lines in 1982 to assist in developing a balanced and diversified fleet as well 
as achieving a better position in international trade. To further boost the shipping 
sector, under the Seventh Malaysia Plan, the government earmarked RM1.1 billion 
(USD355 million) Shipping Fund comprising the Shipping Venture Facility of 
RM500 million (USD161 million) and Shipping Finance Facility of RM600 million 
(USD194 million) (Seventh Malaysia Plan: 373). Further, to make national 
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registration attractive the government made a provision under the Malaysia's 
Merchant Shipping Ordinance (1952) that a vessel must be 51% owned by Malaysian 
interests for it to be eligible to fly the national flag (Trace, Frielink and Hew, 2009: 22 
- 23). 
Table 5.1: World Top Maritime Fleet Ranking ± 2011 
(Ships owned by nationally-registered companies and by citizens) 
 
  Number of Vessels In thousand dwt Total as a 
% of World 
Total Country National Flag Foreign Flag Total National Flag Foreign Flag Total 
Greece 758 2,455 3,213 64,659,201 137,728,951 202,388,152 16.17 
Japan 724 3,071 3,795 18,942,573 178,287,143 197,229,716 15.76 
Germany 442 3,356 3,798 17,149,221 97,623,425 114,772,646 9.17 
China 2,044 1,607 3,651 46,207,468 61,762,042 107,969,510 8.63 
Rep of Korea 736 453 1,189 18,135,391 29,317,780 47,453,171 3.79 
US 971 1,001 1,972 24,363,690 22,011,225 46,364,915 3.71 
Norway 818 1,166 1,984 14,850,693 28,127,239 42,977,932 3.43 
Hong Kong 399 313 712 24,102,438 13,080,401 37,182,839 2.97 
Denmark 383 592 975 13,998,073 21,113,253 35,111,326 2.81 
Taiwan 97 565 662 4,096,790 28,863,160 32,959,950 2.63 
Singapore 659 363 1,021 18,693,547 12,939,490 31,633,037 2.53 
Bermuda 17 268 285 2,297,441 28,252,207 30,549,648 2.44 
Italy 616 220 836 16,556,782 6,774,107 23,330,889 1.86 
UK 366 412 778 89,277,892 13,395,899 22,323,791 1.78 
Turkey 551 648 1,199 7,869,898 11,914,688 19,784,586 1.58 
Russia 1,406 485 1,891 5,548,938 13,952,473 19,501,411 1.56 
Canada 201 226 436 2,474,401 16,654,836 19,129,237 1.53 
India 460 74 534 14,679,913 3,445,887 18,125,800 1.45 
Malaysia 421 105 526 9,323,448 4,743,829 14,067,277 1.12 
Belgium 91 158 249 6,119,923 6,835,060 12,954,983 1.04 
Iran 62 80 142 628,381 12,024,439 12,652,820 1.01 
Saudi Arabia 70 105 175 1,745,029 10,675,882 12,420,911 0.99 
Brazil 128 44 172 2,227,804 8,400,258 10,628,062 0.85 
Indonesia 868 85 953 8,203,079 1,757,088 9,960,167 0.8 
Cyprus 129 158 287 4,016,022 5,462,113 9,478,135 0.76 
Netherlands 522 320 842 4,357,102 5,076,376 9,433,478 0.75 
United Arab 
Emirates 69 354 423 655,296 8,705,135 9,360,431 0.75 
France 177 274 451 3,179,832 5,888,255 9,068,087 0.72 
Vietnam 476 86 562 4,723,669 2,249,774 6,973,443 0.56 
Sweden 115 186 301 1,161,602 4,481,787 5,643,389 0.45 
Kuwait 35 45 80 2,986,997 2,636,129 5,623,126 0.45 
Isle of Man í 33 33 í 5,456,847 5,456,847 0.44 
Spain 163 226 389 1,508,173 3,482,572 4,990,745 0.4 
Thailand 285 53 338 3,475,509 1,014,469 4,489,978 0.36 
Qatar 46 32 78 878,634 3,315,599 4,194,233 0.34 
Total of 35 
countries 15,314 19,618 34,932 378,744,850 817,449,818 1,196,194,668 95.57 
World Total     45,662     1,378,230,893   
Source: Malaysia 6KLSRZQHUV¶$VVRFLDWLRQ: 8 
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Although the Malaysian companies and citizens own a reasonable number of 
nationally registered ships, looking at a complete scenario of the shipping policies, 
there appeared to be a weak element in the way they were managed and organised at 
the institutional level. This was primarily because the government delegated the 
management of shipping matters to various agencies as shown in Table 5.2. This type 
of administrative scenario has the potential to create difficulties for any single agency 
to formulate and implement a specific policy to shipping sector as each agency may 
tend to focus more on its core function, thus possibly produces conflicting directives 
if it does not understand fully issues concerning shipping matters. This has hampered 
the effort in formulating a comprehensive shipping policy. According to Khalid 
(2010: 2) the absence of a national merchant shipping policy hampers the long-term 
development and boosts the growth of the shipping sector in a structured, systematic 
and sustained manner. A comprehensive policy would provide a better platform in 
observing the international conventions, rules, regulations and best practices related to 
security matters in addition to the ISPS Code which is currently enforced for the ships 
engaged on international voyages.  
 
Table 5.2: Institutional Framework in the Implementation of Malaysian 
Shipping Policy 
No Ministry,agency,unit Roles and fucntions 
1. Implementation and 
Coordination Unit, Prime 
0LQLVWHU¶V'HSDUWPHnt 
Responsible for MISC, PNSL, ALAM and Petronas. 
2. Economic Planning Unit, 
3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V
Department 
Responsible for the allocation of funds to organizations in the 
industry and for making policy decisions for development and 
privatisations of ports 
3. Ministry of Transport Provide secretariat for the National Shipping Council and is 
responsible for the National Maritime Council. 
4. Maritime Division This division is responsible to plan, develop, and execute 
legislation, policies and programmes related to shipping and 
ports. 
5. Marine Department All legislation, including the Merchant Shipping Ordinance. 
This includes all matters relating to safety. The Marine 
Department also has responsibility for ports and landing place. 
6. Ministry of Entrepreneur 
Development 
Responsible for the development of national shipyards 
(MARA & MSE) and licensing of haulage and trucks. 
7. Ministry of Finance Introduction of fiscal measures relating to the maritime 
industry and provision of ship financing established under 
bank industry, a fund for the acquisition of vessels. 
8. The Custom and Excise 
Department 
Responsible for imports and export matters and involved in 
the implementation of EDI. 
9. Inland Revenue Department Introduction and interpretation of tax legislation relating to the 
activities of ship-owners. 
Source: Saharuddin, 2001: 432 
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However, this does not mean that the government totally neglected to establish a 
specific policy for the development and protection of domestic shipping. Efforts were 
made to introduce a Cabotage Policy (Coastal Shipping Policy) in 1980. To 
implement this effectively, the government established the DSLB under the aegis of 
the MOT to regulate and control the licensing of ships engaged on domestic shipping 
between ports in Malaysia (Farid, n.d 1). The MOT stated:  
 
Under this policy, the shipping of goods and carriage of passengers from 
any port or place in Malaysia to another port or place in Malaysia including 
the exclusive economic zone must be by Malaysian registered vessels 
holding valid Domestic Shipping Licenses. The Merchant Shipping Act 
(Amendment) 1998 has expanded the definition of 'domestic shipping' to 
include other service-oriented activities namely dredging, cable and pipe 
laying and hydrographic surveys. Ships employed in such activities are 
therefore subject to licensing (Ministry of Transport, Malaysia, 2011). 
 
Although there is no specific policy apart from a policy for the domestic shipping, for 
the overall development of the shipping sector, the government has shown affirmative 
concern in terms of monetary assistance in the mid-term review of the Seventh 
Malaysia Plan where it stipulates that: 
 
The local shipping industry will be expected to consolidate and take more 
strategic measures such as leasing arrangements and global alliances with 
the aim to improve services, gain economies of scale, lower costs and share 
risks. Benefits will accrue in the areas of logistics management, leasing of 
containers, purchases of spare parts and training. The conversion of the 
existing RM 1.1 billion Shipping Fund into a revolving fund as a measure to 
expand shipping capacity will be studied. By the end of the Plan period, the 
number of ships registered in Malaysia is expected to increase to 3,500 ships 
with a total capacity of 7.5 million dwt (Mid-Term Review of the Seventh 
Malaysia Plan, 1999: 321). 
  
 
5.5 An overview of port sector  
 
Ports in Malaysia are administered either by the Federal Government or State 
Governments. There are altogether seven major Federal ports which come under the 
jurisdiction of the MOT, namely Port Klang, Penang Port, Bintulu Port, Johor (Pasir 
Gudang) Port, Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP), Kuantan Port and Kemama Port. Map 
5.3 below illustrates the location of the main ports. These ports are regulated by the 
Port Authorities Act 1963. To manage these Federal ports, statutory bodies were 
established by the Federal government, included the Port Klang Auhtority, the Penang 
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Port Commission, the Johor Port Authority, the Kuantan Port Authority, the 
Kemaman Port Authority and the Bintulu Port Authority.  
 
Map 5.3: Location of Major Ports in Malaysia 
 
 
Source: The National Maritime Portal, 2009 
Note: The Federal ports that come under the purview of MOT in the list of major ports shown 
in Map 5.3 are as follows: Port Klang, Penang Port, Johor Port, Port of Tanjung Pelepas, 
Kuantan Port, Kemaman Port and Bintulu Port.  
 
Looking from a geographical point of view, two out of seven Federal ports in 
Malaysia ± Port Klang and Penang Port are situated along the SOM. The Johor Port 
which is another Federal port located in the southern part of Peninsular Malaysia 
though not considered as the SOM port also serves the traffic generated by the states 
bordering the Straits (Naidu, 1997: 33). In principal such a position implies that some 
of the key Malaysian ports naturally demand a multi dimensional attention for 
effective function.  
 
According to Ahmad (1997: 8), the SOM is viewed by the international maritime 
users as a key feature in the development of commerce and security in the East-West 
OLQNDJH DV ZHOO DV WKH DUWHU\ IRU 0DOD\VLD¶V VXUYLYDO DV DQ LQGHSHQGHQW VWDWH )RU
economic powerhouses such as China, Japan and South Korea, the Straits essentially 
EHFRPH D µFULWLFDO OLIHOLQH¶ FKDQQHOOLQJ HQHUJ\ VKLSPHQWV WR IXHO WKHLU HFRQRPLHV
(Shahryari and Mohammad, 2011: 4-5). As a very busy international waterway, the 
620LVDFRQGXLWIRUPRUHWKDQRQHWKLUGRIZRUOG¶VWUDGHDQGPRUHWKDQKDOIRf the 
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ZRUOG¶V RLO VKLSPHQW DQQXDOO\ 7KH 6WUDLWV UHJLVWHUHG  DQG  YHVVHO
movements in 2009 and 2010 respectively (Hamidi, 2011) with additional traffic of 
30,000 barter trade vessels and ferries plying between Peninsular Malaysia and 
Indonesian Sumatra Island annually. It is estimated that the total ship traffic will swell 
to 140,000 in another decade (Shahryari and Mohammad, 2011: 4).  
 
In addition to the major ports, there are about 105 minor ports or landing jetties under 
the purview of the Marine Department (Rahman, Janib and Wei,1997: 15). Ports in 
East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) come under the administration of the State 
Government. The ports in Sabah are regulated by the Sabah Ports Authority, a state 
statutory body established under the Sabah Port Authorities Enactment 1967. The 
6DEDK VWDWH¶V 0LQLVWU\ RI &RPPXQLFDWLRQV DQG :RUNV LV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH 6DEDK
Port Authority. The state ports in Sarawak were established under the Sarawak Port 
Authorities Ordinance 1961 and are regulated by three state port authorities, namely 
the Miri Port Authority, the Kuching Port Authority and the Rajang Port Authority. 
6DUDZDNSRUWDXWKRULWLHVDUHXQGHUWKHSXUYLHZRIWKHVWDWH¶V0LQLVWU\RI,QIUDVWUXFWXUH
Development and Communications. There are a total of 49 ports in East Malaysia 
(Khalid, 2007: 3 and Jamaluddin, 2002: 143). 
 
Ports in Malaysia can be categorised into two distinct groups: the publicly owned and 
the privately owned ports. The once public Federal ports which were placed under the 
respective port authorities have been privatised. Here the port authorities assume the 
regulatory function while the operation of the ports has been transferred to private 
companies through concession agreements (Interview, Code: 02).22 The privatisation 
of ports, pioneered in the case of Port Klang, is considered in Chapter six. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 The date of privatisation of each Federal Ports is as follows:  
(i) Kelang Container Terminal (taken over by Northport later) : 17 March 1986 
(ii) Northport, Port Klang : 1 December 1992 
(iii) Johor Port : 1 January 1993 
(iv) Bintulu Port : 1 January 1993 
(v) Penang Port : 1 January 1994 
(vi) Westport, Port Klang : 25 July 1994 
(vii) Port of Tanjung Pelepas : 24 March 1995 
(viii) Kuantan Port : 1 January 1998 
(ix) Kemaman Port : 1 October 2006 (Interview, Code: 02). 
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5.5.1 Malaysian port policy  
 
Historically Malaysia had two main ports during the colonial era, Port Klang and the 
Penang Port. Port Klang, renamed from Port Swettenham, has been playing a 
fundamental role in trade facilitation over a century.23  Considering its pivotal role for 
0DOD\VLD¶VHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWDGHWDLOHGDFFRXQWRIthe Port Klang is elaborated 
in the next chapter.  
 
Notably however, until the Seventh Malaysia Plan there was no overall specific policy 
for ports in Malaysia. Thereafter more attention was given to Port Klang. As Port 
Klang had been considered the premier port, specific policies were formulated to 
enhance its position as one of the leading container ports of the world. Nonetheless 
the development of other ports was never entirely overlooked. The main concentration 
was on the Federal ports instead of the minor ports. According to Naidu and Lee 
(1997: 28-39), the government stimulated the economic growth through the five-year 
plans since the 1960s by giving greater importance in infrastructure development with 
port as one of the sectors included in the list of development targets. As part of the 
strategy to sustain the economic growth and serve the needs of growing external trade 
as shown in Table 5.3, the physical capacity of port sector was increased with the 
construction of new ports and expanded existing facilities under the development 
programmes. In a broad overview, the data clearly illustrates that there was a 
remarkable growth in external trade in every ten years. For instance, the amount of  
total trade registered in the 1960 was RM5,078 million (USD1,368 million). It then 
grew to RM9,451 million (USD3,048 million), RM51,622 million (USD16,652 
million), RM158,764 million (USD51,214 million) and RM1,168,622 million 
(USD376,975 million) in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 respectively. On this 
aspect, (Rahman, Janib and Wei,1997: 17) claim that; 
 
$V WKH FRXQWU\¶V WUDGH LQFUHDVHV SRUW IDFLOLWLHV VKRXOG DOVR EH further 
expanded to meet the increasing demand for better and more efficient 
services, otherwise Malaysian merchandise will continue to be exported 
through Singapore.   
 
 
                                                 
 
23
 Port Klang Authority celebrated its 110 years on 23 ± 25 September 2011 under the theme 
³&HOHEUDWLQJ2YHU\HDUVRI3RUW.ODQJ´(Port Klang Authority, 2011).  
 116 
Table 5.3: Malaysia¶V3ULQFLSDO6WDWLVWLFVRI([WHUQDO7Uade 1960-2011 in Million 
Ringgit Malaysia (RM)  
 
Year Export Import Total Trade Trade Balance 
1960 2,927.4 2,150.6 5,078.0 776.8 
1961 2,626.1 2,230.5 4,856.6 395.6 
1962 2,625.9 2,447.4 5,073.3 178.5 
1963 2,704.6 2,516.9 5,221.5 187.7 
1964 2,780.9 2,521.4 5,302.3 259.5 
1965 3,782.6 3,356.2 7,138.8 426.4 
1966 3,845.8 3,378.7 7,224.5 467.1 
1967 3,722.8 3,319.0 7,041.8 403.8 
1968 4,122.5 3,524.1 7,646.6 598.4 
1969 5,051.6 3,581.9 8,633.5 1,469.7 
1970 5,163.1 4,288.4 9,451.5 874.7 
1971 5,016.8 4,416.2 9,433.0 600.6 
1972 4,854.0 4,543.2 9,397.2 310.8 
1973 7,372.1 5,933.9 13,306.0 1,438.2 
1974 10,194.7 9,891.2 20,085.9 303.5 
1975 9,230.9 8,530.4 17,761.0 700.5 
1976 13,442.0 9,713.3 23,155.3 3,728.7 
1977 14,959.2 11,164.7 26,123.9 3,794.5 
1978 17,073.9 13,645.9 30,719.8 3,428.0 
1979 24,222.0 17,161.1 41,383.1 7,060.9 
1980 28,171.6 23,451.0 51,622.6 4,720.6 
1981 27,109.4 26,603.8 53,713.2 505.6 
1982 28,108.2 29,023.0 57,131.2 -914.8 
1983 32,771.2 30,795.2 63,566.4 1,976.0 
1984 38,646.9 32,925.9 71,527.8 5,721.0 
1985 38,016.7 30,437.8 68,454.5 7,578.9 
1986 35,720.9 27,921.4 63,642.3 7,799.5 
1987 45,224.9 31,993.9 77,158.8 13,291.0 
1988 55,260.0 43,293.4 98,553.4 11,966.7 
1989 67,824.5 60,858.1 128,682.6 6,966.4 
1990 79,646.4 79,118.6 158,764.9 527.8 
1991 94,496.6 100,831.1 195,327.7 -6,334.4 
1992 103,656.7 101,440.5 205,097.2 2,216.2 
1993 121,237.5 117,404.7 238,642.2 3,832.8 
1994 153,921.2 155,921.0 309,842.2 -1,999.8 
1995 184,986.5 194,344.5 379,331.0 -9,358.0 
1996 197,026.1 197,279.8 394,305.9 -253.7 
1997 220,890.4 220,935.5 441,825.9 -45.0 
1998 286,563.1 228,124.5 514,687.6 58,438.6 
1999 321,559.5 248,476.8 570,036.4 73,082.7 
2000 373,270.3 311,458.9 684,729.2 61,811.4 
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2001 334,283.8 280,229.1 614,512.9 54,054.7 
2002 357,430.0 303,090.5 660,520.5 54,339.6 
2003 397,884.4 316,537.9 714,422.2 81,346.5 
2004 481,253.0 399,632.2 880,885.2 81,620.8 
2005 536,233.7 432,870.8 969,104.5 103,362.9 
2006 589,240.3 478,147.9 1,067,388.3 111,092.4 
2007 604,299.6 502,044.6 1,106,344.3 102,255.0 
2008 663,013.5 519,804.3 1,182,817.8 143,209.2 
2009 552,518.1 434,669.8 987,187.9 117,848.3 
2010 639,428.1 529,194.6 1,168,622.7 110,233.6 
2011    694,500.0 574,200.0 1,268,700.0 120,300.0 
Source: Compiled from Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2011 
 
 
Under the blueprint for port development in the five-year plans, each port was 
developed according to trade need. As noted above, Malaysia had only Port Klang 
and the Penang Port to facilitate international trade during the British rule. These two 
ports served the national need until 1970. During this period, the Penang Port largely 
served the external trade requirements of north western Peninsular Malaysia 
comprising states from Perlis, Kedah, Penang and Perak.  On the other hand, Port 
Klang handled most of the throughput of west-central Peninsular Malaysia; its 
hinterland included Selangor and extended northwards to Perak, eastward to Pahang, 
Terengganu and Kelantan and in a southerly direction to Negeri Sembilan and 
Malacca (Naidu, 1990: 149-150).  
 
As a consequence of the inability of these two ports to fulfil the capacity requirement 
IRUJURZLQJWUDGHDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VQHHGVXQGHUWKH6HFRQG0DOD\VLD3ODQWZRPRUH
ports were constructed, the Johor Port and Kuantan Port in 1977 and 1984 
respectively. Following this development, two other ports were subsequently built, the 
Bintulu Port in 1982 and the Kemaman Port, known as Kemaman Supply Base, in 
1983. The PTP, a greenfield port was the latest Federal port constructed in the 
southwestern tip of Peninsular Malaysia and completed in 2000. This port was made 
as a transhipment hub for the containers to compete equally with the arch rival Port of 
Singapore (Ministry of Transport, 2011). Interestingly though, all these Federal ports 
are located in the Peninsular Malaysia (West Malaysia) except Bintulu Port on the 
northern coast of  Sarawak on Borneo (East Malaysia). The main reason for this 
imbalance is simply that the main international trade for the country takes place along 
the coastline where the Federal ports in Peninsular Malaysia are located. Cargo for 
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West Malaysia is handled through feeder services from Peninsular. The Bintulu Port 
in East Malaysia specialises in handling LNG and LPG cargoes (Jamaluddin, 2002: 
140-141). 
 
In an effort to make port development more successful, all these Federal ports were 
designed and encouraged to specialise in handling certain types of cargo so as not to 
affect the business of other ports. Even though these ports were generally assigned to 
handle merchandise goods in their respective industrial zone and closest hinterlands, 
yet they assume certain specialisation according to their need. For example, the 
Kuantan Port was initially established with the intention of handling timber products 
in the eastern region, whereas the Kemaman Port, which is located about 50 
kilometers north of the Kuantan Port in the same region was made to specialise in 
serving steel manufacturing plant and as a supply base for the oilrigs off Kemaman 
coast. The Bintulu Port is highly specialised in serving liquefied natural gas and other 
petroleum products (Jamaluddin, 2002: 140-141). Though specialised, these ports also 
handle containers and other types of cargo. 
 
'HYHORSPHQWV LQ 0DOD\VLD¶V SRUWV VLQFH WKH V can be associated with the 
recommendations of a 1988 National Port Plan (NPP) study. Since this Plan 
particularly affected Port Klang, the background and recommendations of this study 
are considered in the following chapter. As well as encouraging each port to specialise 
in their respective locality or Malaysian region, the government aimed to promote 
port development through privatisation, financial support for capacity expansion and 
load centring as well as supply driven policies specific to Port Klang.24  
 
As such, in spite of specialisation, the port sector which had a similar kind of scenario 
as in the case of shipping with a lack of a single policy (except domestic shipping) 
                                                 
24
 Load centre theoretically refers to container traffic concentration in a few, large ports. Generally, it 
LQYROYHV³WKHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUSRUWDQGWHUPLQDORSHUDWRUVDLPLQJWRDFKLHYHRUPDLQWDLQ³PDLQSRUW´
status, to provide overextended facilities and take the risk of exacerbating excessive competition are 
two issues which take central place in the debate around load-centring and the choice between the 
µGLUHFWFDOOYHUVXVWUDQVKLSPHQWDQGIHHGHULQJSRUW´RSWLRQV´0RQLH,Q0DOD\VLD¶VFDVH
DVVWLSXODWHG LQ WKH3ULYDWLVDWLRQ)HDVLELOLW\5HSRUWRI-XQHµORDGFHQWUH¶ WHUPHGDV ³LQNHHSLQJ
with the primary policy objectives of promoting direct shipping service to Malaysian ports and 
LQFUHDVLQJSRUWSURGXFWLYLW\´ (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 428). Port Klang is to become the principal 
container port and Malaysian load centre for most trade routes.  As such, Port Klang is expected to 
handle most of the international container traffic from the northern and central parts of Peninsular 
Malaysia, as well as from Sabah and Sarawak (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 428). 
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that decides the future direction of the port industry as a whole, received a directive in 
the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) as a result of the NPP study. In the Seventh 
Malaysian, a distinct directive was issued for making the Port Klang a load centre and 
a transhipment as well as regional hub port (Seventh Malaysia Plan, 1996: 372).  
 
Apart from this, the government also intended to create a National Port Authority in 
the same Plan period in which the Plan states:    
 
To inject greater focus in port development policy and strategy, as well as 
enhance professionalism in the maritime sector, a National Port Authority, 
with the requisite expertise, will be established to replace these numerous 
regulatory authorities. With the strengthened single regulatory authority to 
monitor developments in the maritime sector, the efficiency and quality of 
port-related services are expected to improve in line with predetermined 
performance standards (Seventh Malaysia Plan, 1996: 373). 
 
This new organisation, also termed the Malaysian Port Commission (MPC) was not 
only expected to act as a regulatory authority but also to coordinate port policy at the 
national level. The Commission was expected to work as a single umbrella body by 
merging all the existing Federal port authorities with the objective of planning for 
national port development and prioritising development projects, rather than for each 
port acting individually. However the proposed MPC created apprehension among the 
WHUPLQDORSHUDWRUVWKDWLWZRXOGKDYHD³WRWDOVD\´RYHUWKHUXQQLQJRI0DOD\VLDQSRUWV
/OR\G¶V /LVW  0D\  Hence, the proposed MPC was not materialised. 
Although the MPC would have no direct impact on port security, such an organisation 
would provide a better ground for smooth coordination and standardised practice to 
enhance the port competitiveness across the Federal ports.   
 
In this regard, Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004) contend in their analysis that one way 
of increasing the port efficiency that goes along with port competitiveness is through 
having competitive transport charges. Since 1965 the Malaysian government has 
maintained the lowest port tariffs in this region from a commercial point of view in 
order to strengthen port competitiveness. Although operators have voiced their 
concern about increasing operational costs, the government is mindful of the risk of 
liberalizing the tariff regime for the interest of balancing commercial imperatives and 
enhancing trade. However to be fair to both the operators and users, the MOT 
undertook measures to review the overall tariff structure (Khalid, 2008). According to 
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a senior official of the MOT, the review had yet to be finalised (Interview data, 
Code:02). 
 
Considering the process of port development continues, the Malaysian government 
under the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015), announced the formation of a national 
port policy to outline the objectives, strategic directions and further development of 
the port sector (Tenth Malaysia Plan, 2010: 111). In the same Plan period, the 
government intends to establish a National Port Council to coordinate the 
management of ports nationwide (Baird Maritime, 2010).  
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter essentially highlights the maritime richness that had contributed 
significantly to nurturing the national economy since 0DOD\VLD¶V independence and 
WKH0DOD\VLDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VHIIRUW WRPDNH WKHFRXQWU\RQHRI WKH OHDGLQJPDULWLPH
nations in the region. This has to be seen in the overall historical context in which the 
country was heavily exposed to maritime trading activities and colonial influences by 
several parties. Along with contributions of many different sub-sectors within the 
maritime sector for the development of national economy, both the port and shipping 
sectors however considered equally important as they are playing a fundamental role 
in facilitating trade DVPRUHWKDQRI0DOD\VLD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGHWKHOLIHEORRG
of its economy is being carried through the oceans via its international ports. 
Considering their importance, the government formulated separate policies for 
shipping and ports. Under different Five Year Plans the government undertook 
various port expansions especially targeting the Federal ports in meeting the growing 
merchandise trade. From these development plans, specific policies were formulated 
for Port Klang to further strengthen the port. Hence, the following chapter gives a 
broad account of the physical as well as administrative development of the Port Klang 
as it is the key port for this research. Importantly, the chapter will also elaborate early 
port security issues, so providing a platform for further discussion of various aspects 
of port security in subsequent chapters.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
PORT KLANG DEVELOPMENT: ADMINISTRATION,  
GOVERNANCE AND EARLY SECURITY ISSUES 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explains the general development of Port Klang. It starts with a brief 
history of the port, then examines the changes that KDYHWDNHQSODFHLQ3RUW.ODQJ¶V
administration and governance and also identifies the port security issues before the 
9/11 incident. It is essential at this stage to provide a brief historical account to form a 
solid basis for understanding how Port Klang, being the national premier port, 
evolved over time. Apart from the physical development, the port underwent several 
changes in administrative matters where two main measures in 1963 and 1986 in 
particular, contributed to the improvement of port performance. These measures also 
had early consequences for port security. To have a holistic picture of the Port Klang 
and its current security measures, it is necessary to comprehend its security setting 
before 9/11. This chapter therefore provides a basis to explicate other security 
measures and policy concerns which are dealt with in subsequent chapters.  
 
6.2 A brief early history of Port Klang 
The preceding chapter has explained that the strategic position of Malaya made it a 
viable place for international trading and therefore attracted the interest of a number 
of colonial powers which subsequently fought among themselves to establish their 
hegemony. However at the time of British rule beginning in the 18th century, ports in 
Malaya entered into a different dimension. Britain was no longer interested in treating 
Malacca as a main trading centre when they found out that its harbour was not 
suitable for big ships. Therefore Port Swettenham, (to be re-named Port Klang in 
1972) was founded in 1901.  The idea of constructing Port Swettenham had been 
mooted as far back as 1885 for replacing the existing up-river Port of Klang when the 
idea of constructing a railway from Kuala Lumpur to the coastal area was put forward 
by the colonial administration.25  During the construction of the twenty-two miles of 
                                                 
25
 Historically, for many years before 1885, Port of Klang which was located 12 miles up the winding 
and muddy Klang River had been the primary source for providing port services between the Straits 
Settlement and Selangor. However this port had only three poorly constructed wooden jetties and only 
able to handle ships less than 13 feet (Jamaluddin, 1963: 1).  
 122 
railway line (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 30) they realized the necessity of providing 
port facilities at the railway terminus at the newly identified location called Kuala 
Klang. The new coastal area was found to have a good harbor with deep anchorage, 
and very suitable for wharves.   
The construction of the port with initial three wharves was completed in 1901 and the 
port facilities were handed over to the Ways and Work Department of the Malayan 
Railways Administration which was placed under the Federated Malaya States (FMS) 
at that time to operate and administer the port. The Marine Department was 
responsible for navigational aids, safety to shipping and other maritime matters.   
Following the completion of this new facility, the Port of Klang (the old port at Klang 
river) was officially closed on 15 September 1901. As a result of this development, all 
traffic was re-URXWHGWRWKLVQHZSRUWLQ.XDOD.ODQJGHVFULEHGDWLWVRSHQLQJDV³WKH
most commodious and best equippeG SRUW LQ WKH 3HQLQVXOD´ Klang Port Authority, 
1988: 53). It was named as Port Swettenham, after Sir Frank Athelstanes Swettenham, 
the Resident General of FMS who was in 1897 promoted to Governor of the Straits 
Settlements and High Commissioner for the Malay States (Jamaluddin, 1963: 1-5).  
6.3 Port development  
The evolution of Port Klang should be viewed in broad perspective. This is not a port 
IRXQGHG DV D PRGHUQ µJUHHQ ILHOG¶ SRUW DV LQ WKH FDVH RI WKH RWKHU PDLQ 0DOD\VLDQ
ports, Kuantan Port and PTP. The above historical description is the testimony to the 
British influence and their legacy in forming a strategically well connected and well 
equipped port that could facilitate economic development. Though initially the port 
was developed for the colonial interest nevertheless the seed sown in the beginning 
paved the way for subsequent modernization of the port. The continuous progress 
made at various stages led to what is Port Klang today, which bustles with all the 
excitement and dynamism of a major port.  
It is not the intention of this section to provide a comprehensive account of the 
development of Port Klang which began humbly with a couple of jetties in the early 
¶V DW .XDOD .ODQJ 2YHUWLPH WKH SRUW XQGHUWRRN YDULRXV SK\VLFDO GHYHORSPHQW
projects described below. But the key issue here is that during this process, two land 
mark measures were brought forward to further strengthen the port which is pertinent 
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to the issue of port security. These are the Port Authority Act of 1963 separating the 
port from railway administration, and port privatisation in 1986.  
6.3.1 Port facilities  
To begin with, it is best to describe the current port facilities of Port Klang where it 
serves as a gateway for the national economy. Map 6.1 below illustrates the location 
of modern Port Klang and the current position of two main terminals North Port 
(South point is part of North Port facility) and West Port.   
 Map 6.1: Location of Two Main Terminals of Port Klang ± North Port 
(Including South Point) and West Port 
 
 
Source: Subramaniam, 2006 
Note: Scale : 1cm : 4 km 
 
These are privately owned and managed since the port privatisation started in 1986. 
The port now, in 2011, has H[FHOOHQWIDFLOLWLHVDVDUHIOHFWLRQRIWKHSRUW¶VVWDWXVDVa 
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main gateway, there is no doubt that the Port Klang increasingly figures as an 
important port in the development of trade in the SEA region as well as at 
international level (see Table 3.1), spurred by the opportunities arising from changing 
times and the support from the government (Gateway, 2009: 5). Table 6.1 elucidates 
the current facilities that have been developed in the port during the process of its 
evolution until 2010.  
Table 6.1: Port Klang Facilities - 2011 
 
CONTAINER Northport Westport Total 
 BERTHS    
No of berths 12 11 23 
Length (metres) 2,679 3,200 5,879 
Draft (metres) 11.0 ± 15.0 16 11 ± 16 
    
STORAGE    
Annual capacity  5 million TEU 6 million TEU 11 million TEU 
Reefer points 751 1,236 1,987 
    
EQUIPENMENT    
Quay cranes 26 34 60 
Rubber tyred gantry cranes 57 92 149 
Straddle carriers 67 - 67 
High stackers 8 25 33 
    
LIQUID BULK    
No of berths 4 5 9 
Length (metres) 779 1,305 2,084 
Draft (metres) 10.5 ± 11.5 10 ± 16.5 10 ± 16.5 
    
DRY BULK    
No of berths 2 4 6 
Length (metres) 426 850 1,276 
Draft (metres) 12 14 ± 15 12 ± 15 
    
STORAGE    
Open storage (Sq m) 17,520 - 17,520 
 
   
BREAK BULK    
No of berths 9 5 14 
Length (metres) 1,286 1,000 2,286 
Draft (metres) 6.0 ± 12.5 15 6.0 ± 15 
    
STORAGE    
Warehouse (Sq m) 47,169 33,740 80,909 
Open storage (Sq m) 57,805 80,357 138,162 
 Source: Gateway, July 2011: 23 
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Through various modernization processes by providing better facilities, Port Klang 
was able to register a remarkable cargo throughput for the past one decade. Table 6.2 
demonstrates this. 
Table 6.2: Total Cargo, Container and Ship Calls at Major  
Malaysian Federal Ports (2008-2011) 
Source: Statistics, Ministry of Transport Malaysia, 2011 
 
The port owns such modern facilities with a capacity of handling 11 million 
containers alone and capable of handling other types of cargo with different 
capacities, because from just wooden jetties in the beginning as the demand increased, 
 
PORTS 
KLANG 
 
TG. 
PELEPAS 
 
PULAU 
PINANG 
 
JOHOR 
 
KUANTAN 
 
BINTULU 
 
KEMAMAN 
 
CARGO  
('000 TON) 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011  
 
 
 
65,277 
70,149 
82,271 
88,888 
99,911 
109,659 
122,004 
135,514 
152,425 
137,694 
170,364 
151,969 
 
 
8,528 
36,891 
38,896 
50,224 
57,078 
59,552 
68,776 
84,150 
88,090 
95,155 
99,965 
95,457  
 
 
20,473 
20,473 
21,800 
22,390 
23,415 
22,563 
22,862 
27,222 
25,999 
24,259 
28,846 
24,000 
 
 
 
23,548 
27,307 
25,102 
27,798 
31,204 
28,568 
27,467 
28,841 
29,771 
25,234 
26,218 
21,921 
 
 
6,027 
7,532 
8,999 
9,804 
9,699 
9,411 
10,673 
10,065 
9,405 
10,273 
12,079 
12,772 
 
 
 
24,897 
25,210 
25,592 
28,977 
33,623 
36,405 
36,558 
38,484 
58,401 
34,642 
40,557 
33,496 
 
 
2,155 
2,054 
1,479 
2,987 
3,358 
3,019 
3,000 
3,778 
3,666 
2,880 
2,447 
2,129 
 
CONTAINER 
(TEUs) 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011  
 
 
 
 
3,206,753 
3,759,512 
4,533,212 
4,841,235 
5,243,593 
5,543,527 
6,326,295 
7,118,714 
7,973,579 
7,309,779 
8,871,745 
9,603,856 
 
 
 
418,218 
2,049,487 
2,668,512 
3,486,785 
4,020,419 
4,177,121 
4,772,986 
5,465,065 
5,618,183 
6,016,451 
6,535,838 
7,499,298 
 
 
 
635,780 
604,294 
634,042 
688,171 
772,024 
795,289 
849,730 
925,991 
929,639 
958,476 
1,108,428 
1,199,219 
 
 
 
659,181 
638,718 
683,816 
750,466 
805,689 
836,744 
880,611 
927,285 
934,767 
844,856 
876,268 
831,609 
 
 
 
 
60,376 
76,339 
91,524 
108,108 
122,745 
119,075 
124,834 
127,600 
127,061 
132,252 
142,080 
132,262 
 
 
 
47,609 
66,139 
104,081 
145,661 
143,783 
147,800 
199,594 
251,800 
286,013 
248,452 
251,284 
211,362 
 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
SHIP CALLS 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008  
2009 
2010 
2011  
 
 
12,416 
14,207 
15,313 
16,251 
15,150 
15,044 
16,404 
17,104 
16,864 
15,355 
17,910 
17,725 
 
 
692 
2,283 
2,483 
3,150 
3,193 
3,128 
3,261 
3,747 
3,764 
3,776 
4,162 
5,125 
 
 
7,263 
7,460 
7,328 
6,428 
6,993 
6,220 
6,177 
6,036 
5,736 
5,559 
6,134 
6,347 
 
 
6,485 
6,242 
6,603 
6,879 
6,526 
6,438 
6,337 
6,004 
5,823 
5,121 
4,880 
4,880 
 
 
1,677 
1,855 
2,067 
2,280 
2,382 
2,195 
2,324 
2,143 
2,315 
2,447 
2,405 
2,459 
 
 
4,047 
4,375 
5,019 
4,825 
5,617 
5,775 
6,024 
6,007 
7,015 
7,514 
7,578 
7,689 
 
 
 
280 
266 
317 
363 
337 
319 
249 
372 
301 
224 
208 
261 
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the administration identified surrounding areas for further expansion. As a result, the 
former Port Swettenham opened up the North Klang Straits, named as North Port in 
1967 as shown in Map 6.1. For over six decades before this, the colonial 
administration undertook several development projects. This was a response to higher 
demand which meant that the port encountered some deficiencies and congestion 
caused by surging cargo volumes and passenger traffic, as well as the need to cater for 
both local shipping and increasing calls by ocean-going steamers (Klang Port 
Authority, 1988: 81).  
The expansion of port facilities at the North Klang Straits was already been 
considered in 1931 when the Imperial Shipping Committee, a high powered group of 
shipping and transport experts forwarded a proposal for port expansion to serve the 
increasing traffic and to allow for further port development (Klang Port Authority, 
1988: 161-162). The proposal was accepted by the Federal Ports Committee on the 
EDVLV ³WKH RSHUDWLRQ RI D QHZ ZKDUI LV D SUDFWLFDO DQG HFRQRPLF SURSRVLWLRQ DQG
almost indefinite expansion iV SRVVLEOH´ Klang Port Authority, 1988: 235).  The 
proposed extension was finally completed at the end of 1963. The project was 
designed to overcome the port congestion in which the port registered a spectacular 
volume of cargo growth particularly in 1962 (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 315-316).  
For example Table 6.3 shows a steady growth of cargo and ship traffic for the period 
from 1906 to 1962. The figure is highlighted in an average of five years beginning 
1906. Generally, such a progressive growth over time had reduced the efficiency of 
the port. With the limited capacity during this time, Port Klang was unable to handle 
such a growth which eventually produced congestion. As we can see from the table, 
while merely handling 254,000 tonnes of cargo in 1906, the cargo throughput 
increased approximately three times in the 1940s and in 1955 onwards it went beyond 
one million tonnes. In 1962 the amount was close to two million tonnes. This 
corresponded well with the number of ship calls at Port Klang during the same time 
period. Although data is not available for the ship traffic before the 1960s, since the 
1960s however, there was a noticeable surge in the number of ship calls. The big 
surge in cargo throughput and ship traffic in Port Klang during the 1960s can partly 
be attributed to the growing QDWXUH RI WKH 0DOD\VLD¶V HFRQRP\ DV D ZKROH ,Q WKLV
context, Cho (1990: 32) points out: 
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The performance of the Malaysian economy during the 1960s and 1970s, 
while unspectacular, was nevertheless sufficient to maintain growth and 
other demands. In the first half of the 1960s, for instance, exports grew 
extremely slowly while the value of imports grew at a rate of 3.5 percent per 
year. Such a pattern may be explained partly by the rapidly growing 
population but more accurately by the substantial increase in inflows of 
private long-term capital for investments in agriculture and industrial 
YHQWXUHV«'XULQJ WKH ODWWHU KDOI RI WKH V KRZHYHU GRPHVWLF GHPDQG
grew only slightly and exports performed better than expected.  
Hence the expansion of Port Klang capacity became paramount in the 1962 onwards 
to cater for the growth of both domestic and international trade.  
Table 6.3: Cargo Growth and Ship Traffic (1906-1962) 
Year No of ships 
(ocean steamers) 
Total Tonnes Handled 
1906 14 176,326 
1911 n.a 245,000 
1915 214 224,887 
1920 299 252,528 
1925 n.a 360,000 
1930 n.a 511,000 
1935 n.a 397,000 
1940 n.a 612,000 
1945 n.a 613,000 
1950 n.a 762,000 
1955 n.a 1,201,669 
1960 1,746 1,615,091 
1961 1,539 1,689,696 
1962 1,740 1,908,679 
Source: Compiled from Jamaluddin, 1963, Port Sweettenham Feasibility Study, 1968 and 
Klang Port Authority, 1988 
Note: n.a - denotes the missing data 
 
In this sense, North Port facilities did not, however, prove sufficient to meet demand 
which continued to increase. As a result, the establishment of West Port in Pulau 
Lumut (Lumut Island) adjacent to North Port was mooted in 1981. Since previous 
development at Port Klang had taken place on mainland territory, this time a 
substantial port infrastructure had to be brought into existence on an island which was 
formerly a fishing village (Gateway, 2009: 12).  One of the reasons for the choice of 
Pulau Lumut was that it was: 
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an island about 15 kilometres long in the Klang River delta, bounded on the 
west side by the relatively deep, straight South Kelang Straits and on the 
north side by the Anchorage Reach where the water depth is of the order of 
8 metres (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 394). 
 
Pulau Lumut was earmarked as the ideal site of what was intended to become an 
ultra-modern port.  The sea off Pulau Lumut has a depth of 14 metres and it could be 
deepened by another 3 metres to allow 80 thousand deadweight ton vessels to berth at 
any time without tide restrictions (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 441). 
 
A  Business Times editorial of 24 June 1989 highlighted the rationale for proceeding: 
³WKH 3XODX /XPXW SURMHFW LV EHLQJ DFWLYDWHG EHFDXVH FDSDFLW\ DW 3RUW .ODQJ LV QRW
adequate to meet the soaring demand. Also, further expansion on the mainland is not 
possLEOH´Klang Port Authority, 1988: 424). After two feasibility studies in 1982 and 
in 1985 the project for constructing port facilities and industrial spaces on the forty-
nine square kilometres of land was accepted. The government endorsed it explicitly 
and officially launched it on 8 August 1992. Furthermore, the project was identified 
as one of the principal infrastructure elements under the Fifth Malaysia Plan and was 
completed in several phases. The West Port commenced operation on November 1994 
(Klang Port Authority, 1988: 392- 453).  
 
With its up-to-date facilities especially the container terminals, Westport positioned 
itself ideally to become the preferred megahub for both local and transhipment 
containers (Gateway, 2009: 12).  
6.3.2 Port policy development   
It is clear from the above account that the development of Port Klang over the 20th 
century was a long process. Notwithstanding its geographically strategic location, 
natural resources and hence potential for maritime development, one obvious 
drawback however was that the ambition to realise that potential was not clearly spelt 
out in any of the government policies after gaining independence in 1957. With the 
formation of Malaysia in 1963, the government was more interested in nation building 
and national integration.  Despite the fact that the maritime sector contributes to the 
development of marine-related industries as mentioned in the preceding chapter, in 
which subsequently encouraged the establishment a few other Federal ports apart 
from the Port Klang, in terms of government policy however, there was no significant 
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measure to stop the Malaysian cargo leakages to Singapore port. This was primarily 
because the local traders had accepted Singapore port as the main transport centre and 
the best alternative to transport the Malaysian goods because of its immediate and 
efficient services. For example, it was estimated that in the ¶VDERXW3.5 million 
TEUs of the 14.5 million TEUs handled by Singapore port was 'Malaysian cargo ' 
/O\RG¶V /LVW 8: July 31). Hence this reflected some weaknesses in the then 
existing government measures to further promote the local ports (Mak and Tai, 2001: 
1). 
 
Although, the government in order to fulfil its socio-economic obligation and to meet 
the growing demands of the economy, paid greater attention and spent more money 
on road and rail networking system as well as port expansion during the development 
period in the 19¶V DV LOOXVWUDWHG LQ 7DEOH  WKH LPSURYHG ODQG WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ
however indirectly encouraged more reliance on Singapore port as it was capable of 
providing good services with lower transaction cost and thus established itself as a 
regional port and main transport centre.  
 
Table: 6.4: Infrastructure Growth by Sector (1965 ± 1995) 
 
Sector 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Roads        
Length of roads 
(kilometers) 
15,356.0 21,995.0 24,037.0 26,219.0 38,973.0 50,836.0 64,328.0 
        
Railways        
Length of roads 
(kilometers) 
2,115.0  ņ  ņ 2,118.0 2,222.0 2,222.0 2,222.0 
        
Ports        
Number of ports 2.0 2.0 2.0 6.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 
Total capacity 
(millions in tons) 
0.0  ņ  ņ 25.5 56.6 120.5 174.1 
Number of 
containers 
 ņ  ņ  ņ 4.0 6.0 10.0 15.0 
Source: Naidu and Lee, 1997: 33 
Note: Total number of ports in the ¶VUHSUHVHQWVVL[ Federal ports and three state ports 
 
 
7KLVVLWXDWLRQDOVRUHIOHFWHG6LQJDSRUH¶VORQJ-standing position since 1891 because of 
its location and colonial interest as a centre for entrepot trade. From the late 1960s 
Singapore had begun to focus on strengthening itself as a transhipment hub for 
international cargo, which also included local cargo from Malaysia and Indonesia 
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(Cullinane, Yap and Lam, 2007: 288-289).  The quality and range of services 
available at Singapore port provided a better option for the Malaysian shippers to ship 
most of their goods via Singapore rather than using local ports (Naidu,1990:166). 
After all, the furthest land journey from Northern Peninsular (Penang) to Singapore 
takes about 14 hours (Mak and Tai, 2001: 201). Another added reason for relying on 
Singapore port was: 
 
«WKDW WKH H[FHVVLYH QXPEHU RI SRUWV KDV VSUHDG FDUJR WRR WKLQO\ DPRQJ
them [Malaysian ports]. As a result, many shipping lines avoid making 
direct calls at Malaysian ports and prefer to feed Malaysian cargo through 
the terminals of Singapore Port. An estimated 40 percent of Malaysia's 
external trade is shipped through Singapore, and a much larger portion of 
Malaysia's container traffic is transhipped through Singapore Port (Naidu 
and Lee, 1997: 40). 
 
As WKH GHSHQGHQFH RQ 6LQJDSRUH EHFDPH PRUH SURPLQHQW LQ WKH ¶V the 
government decided to have its own efficient international port by increasing its 
productivity and reduce the under-utilisation of port capacity (Naidu and Lee, 1997: 
39-40). Thus the Malaysian government undertook several initiatives to stop cargo 
leakages through Singapore port where it was considered a strong rival as compared 
to other neighbouring ports. Subsequently various plans were introduced to enhance 
local port competitiveness and increase efficiency. Since Port Klang had all the 
required infrastructural support, the government chose to VWUHQJWKHQ WKH SRUW¶V
commercial viability and provide a better service to the local users.   
 
To formulate a long term plan for the future development and management of 
Malaysian ports, the government authorised the National Ports Plan (NPP) study with 
the support of World Bank in August 1986. This was completed in March 1988. The 
study was intended to prepare a master plan for a systematic and coordinated 
development of the ports in the country to avoid redundancy and under-utilization of 
existing port facilities as well as to establish coordinated port expansion strategies 
(Naidu, 1990, Abdullah, 1992: 361, Rahman, Ianib and Wei, 1997: 19-20). However 
according to Naidu (1990) the main essence of this plan was to redirect the shipment 
of Malaysian goods to Malaysian ports instead of Singapore port. Writing in 1990, he 
argues that this has been clearly VWDWHGLQWKH7HUPVRI5HIHUHQFHRIWKLVVWXG\WKDW³DV
far as ports are concerned, the policy is to channel as far as economically justified all 
0DOD\VLDQFDUJRWKURXJK0DOD\VLDQSRUWV´1DLGX 
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In respect of protecting the national cargo, the NPP recommended that load centring 
policy would be the viable option. Under this strategy a sufficiently large amount of a 
particular cargo would be concentrated in a certain port and this critical mass provides 
a good opportunity for shipowners to initiate direct shipping services between the load 
centre port and foreign ports. Port Klang was recommended as the principal 
concentration port in Malaysia (Naidu, 1990: 160). The rational for this policy as 
envisaged by the MOT by stating that: 
 
As the premier port, Port Klang is designated as load centre for both 
Malaysian and South East Asian containers. The government has simplified 
documentation requirement, build sufficient infrastructure and ensured 
internationally accepted equipment ratio in Port Klang and implement 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) to ensure efficiency of Port Klang is the 
EHVW LQ WKH UHJLRQ ,W LV DOVR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SROLF\ WR GLYHUW 0DOD\VLD¶V
containers being feedered to Singapore port to Port Klang to achieve the 
critical mass needed to make it attractive for Main Line Operators to call to 
Port Klang. This will develop Port Klang as a transhipment hub and 
distribution hub (Jamaluddin, 2002: 34). 
 
Following this recommendation, the government issued a directive in 1993 to develop 
Port Klang as a load centre as well as a transhipment hub in this region (Sgouridis, 
2003: 8).26  
 
It should be stressed here that up to the present (2011) there is no official Malaysian 
policy with regard to ports contained in any single document. Most of it appeared in 
various parts of the five-year plans, mid-term reviews, annual economic reports and 
statements issued by the government through the public media (Mak and Tai, 2001: 
200). Consistent with this approach, a policy on ports was spelt out in the Seventh 
Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) which among other things outlined distinct strategies, 
including  (i) consolidation of cargo at Port Klang, (ii) establishing close link with 
regional ports as well as other ports in Sabah and Sarawak through the provision of 
feeder services at competitive rates, (iii) supply of efficient facilities and the gazetting 
of a  free commercial zone, (iv) restructuring of rebates and tariff; (v) maximum back-
up facilities, (vi) volume discount and (vii) foreign equity participation in the 
                                                 
26
 7KH WHUP µhXE¶ XVXDOO\ refers to describe the centre of a hub-and-spoke structure. A hub port is 
referred as an area serving such functions as transshipment centre and a gateway for the larger 
hinterlands by connecting mainline services with various feeder networks (Song and Lee, 2005: 145). 
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Terminal Dedicated Berth Scheme (Mak and Tai, 2001: 201). Additionally, the Plan 
stated that: 
 
More concerted efforts will be undertaken to promote Port Klang as a hub 
port. Cargo from all other Malaysian ports which act as feeder ports will be 
consolidated, where possible through Port Klang where shipping services 
are more frequent and expedient. In this regard, close linkages with regional 
ports, as well as those ports in Sabah and Sarawak, will be established 
through the provision of feeder services as competitive rates (Seventh 
Malaysia Plan, 1996: 372).  
 
In the mid-term review of the Seventh Malaysia plan (1999), the government further 
emphasised the importance of sea borne trade and making Port Klang a primary 
national gateway.  
 
During the remaining Plan period, ports, shipping and maritime-related 
services will play an increasingly important role in improving foreign 
exchange earnings, given that over 90 per cent of the nation's international 
trade is seaborne. The main strategy will, therefore, be to intensify the 
promotion of Port Klang as a hub and load centre for the region. In addition, 
continuous efforts will be undertaken to ensure the integrated development 
of all service providers in the transportation chain in order to enhance 
utilization of local ports (Mid-term Review of the Seventh Malaysia Plan, 
1999: 319). 
 
The current, now well-established role, of Port Klang is reflected in this statement: 
 
Port Klang, the premier port, is designated as the national load centre for 
both local and regional containers. This is to ensure sufficient critical mass 
at one port and subsequently make it an attractive destination for Main Line 
Operators (MLOs), thereby developing the port as a transhipment and 
distribution hub of the region (Ministry of Transport, 2011). 
 
In further expanding and strengthening the port sector, the government adopted 
another implicit policy called the Supply-Driven policy. The policy adopting the 
objectives of (i) developing and expanding port facilities, (ii) enhancing the utilization 
of existing port facilities, (iii) improving efficiency and productivity of port 
operations, (iv) enhancing port capacity, (v) promoting multi-modalism, (vi) pushing 
ahead with port privatisation, (vii) developing and improving ancillary services; (viii) 
developing and improving land side transportation and (ix) enhancing and promoting 
automation and use of computers in port operations (Mak and Tai, 2001: 201). The 
Supply Driven policy aimed to provide high quality port services without congestion 
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and low waiting times which in turn requires adequate port capacity and high 
utilization of port facilities (Sgouridis, 2003: 25). 
 
Evidentially such measures have produced a remarkable cargo growth in Port Klang 
as shown in Table 6.2 above as well as placing it in top twenty world container ports 
shown in Table 3.1. 
 
6.4 Port Klang administration, governance, and ownership  
Following the development of North Klang Straits, the Port Authorities Act 29 May 
1963 allowed the Port Swettenham to be administered by a Port Authority and so 
completely divorced from the Railway Administration. The Railway Administration 
EHFDPH D µFRUSRUDWLRQ DJJUHJDWH¶ 7KH H[SHFWDWLRQ ZDV WR DOORZ ERWK DXWKRULWLHV WR
operate on a purely commercial basis (Klang Port Authority,1988: 315). This 1963 
Act is considered the first hallmark in shaping the port towards a competitive position. 
The same Act allowed for the establishment of port security force. The new authority 
was subsequently called the Port Swettenham Authority.   
With this separation, Port Swettenham was brought one step higher for its significant 
contribution to the State of Selangor.  Thus, His Royal Highness the Sultan of 
Selangor, announced a change of name for the port.  The Port Swettenham was re-
named Port Kelang. It was mentioned that;  
  
 Since the announcement was made on the auspicious day it is anticipated 
that the change will augur well for the future of the port.  The contributing 
factor that may have influenced His Royal Highness to this proposal was the 
rapid development of the Royal Town of Kelang as well as the port. It is His 
5R\DO+LJKQHVV¶FRQVLGHUHGRSLQLRQ WKDW WKHWLPHKDVFRPHIRU WKHSRUW WR
revert to its original name i.e. Port Kelang, which was the name of the port 
of Selangor, and all early references referred to the port as Port of Kelang 
(Klang Port Authority, 1988: 356). 
 
If we look at the social perspective, the decision of Sultan to change the name of port 
according to local context signifies that there is a need to impart national pride and 
create an identity for the country. It was apparent that since the country had been 
freed from the British rule in 1957, perhaps there was realisation that it was not 
DSSURSULDWH WR UHWDLQ WKH5HVLGHQW¶VQDPHWR UHIOHFW WKHGLVWLQFWLYHQHVVRIDSRUW WKDt 
serves significantly for national economic development. In other words, by removing 
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certain traces of colonialism especially in socio-economic sector would promote and 
instil national pride among the locals.  
 
Corresponding to this decision, on 12 January 1972 Port Swettenham was officially 
renamed Port Klang or Port Kelang. In Malay language it began to be called 
Pelabuhan Kelang. The Port Swettenham Authority was renamed Kelang Port 
Authority in July 1972 after the legal formalities had been complied with (Klang Port 
Authority, 1988: 357).27 Under this new arrangement, the Port Authority acted as a 
statutory body answerable directly to the MOT. 
 
Privatisation was a second hallmark tested in Port Klang in response to the changing 
times and strengthening port services and competitiveness. According to the 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU) the fundamental aspect of overall privatisation 
VWUDWHJ\ ZDV WR ³IDFLOLWDWH WKH FRXQWU\¶V HFRQRPLF JURZWK UHGXFH WKH ILQDQFLDO DQG
administration burden of the Government, reduce the Government's presence in the 
economy, lower the level and scope of public spending and allow market forces to 
govern economic activities and improve efficiency and productivity in line with the 
1DWLRQDO'HYHORSPHQW3ROLF\´(FRQRPLF3ODQQLQJ8QLW 
 
Malaysia began privatising some of the public utilities in 1983. This policy was aimed 
at attracting private sector involvement in a partnership basis between the public and 
private sector in an effort to share the management, operation and investment 
requirements of a public owned enterprise (Phang, n.d: 1).  
 
$FFRUGLQJO\ WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V LQWHQWLRQ RI SULYDWLVLQJ 3RUW .ODQJ ZDV LQ WKH Fifth 
Malaysian Plan 1986-1990. The Plan briefly states: 
 
With regard to private sector participation in the operation and management 
of port facilities, a study was undertaken with a view to determining 
different approaches to the privatisation of the container terminal at Port 
Klang.  Following the study, the Government decided on the most feasible 
approach of privatizing the container terminal at Port Klang. In addition, a 
number of other areas were identified for privatization.  These included the 
dry bulk cargo and tug boat operations in Port Klang (Fifth Malaysia Plan, 
436-437). 
 
                                                 
27
 Although the Authority was named Kelang Port Authority (KPA), but the Authority commonly uses 
Port Klang Authority (PKA) in English as an alternative. Therefore, throughout this study, the term 
PKA will be used to refer the Port Klang Authority. 
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The proposed idea was well received by the Associated Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce (ACCC) which had great business interest in Malaysia. The association 
pointed out that there had been occasions in the past when Port Klang had been 
plagued by labour problems, cargo pilferage and delays. It argued that privatisation 
would induce healthy competition through private sector involvement in port related 
operations and enhance the port efficiency (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 406 ± 407). 
 
To give effect to the privatisation, the Port Authorities Act 1963 was amended as the 
first step to turning a public seaport into a private one. With privatisation, the 
government anticipated that the port would be operated more on commercial basis and 
provide quality services to the port users.  According to Abdullah (1992; 352-352), 
Port Klang Authority (PKA) being a statutory body, encountered erosion over the 
years of its autonomy and did not have the full freedom and flexibility to manage and 
operate its facilities on a commercial basis. The dilemma of the Port Authority which 
in one hand was expected to operate as a commercial organization but on the other 
hand was required to comply as a statutory body with all the bureaucratic procedures 
of a government agency had led to a situation in which it did not have the same 
competitive advantage of a business unit.   
 
However in the process of privatisation, not all facilities and services were privatised.  
The following entities were identified as the services for which the PKA would 
continue to be responsible:  
 
 (i).  Fire Fighting Services  
(ii). Security Services   
(iii).  Property Management  
(iv).  Port Planning and Development (Information)  
(v).  Port Marketing and Promotion  
(vi).  Pilotage Committee  
(vii).  Hydrography and Dredging  
(viii).  Training Centre (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 413). 
 
Under the privatisation exercise, the port authority regulated both port security and 
safety in the port based on laws and regulations implemented by the appropriate 
agencies. Enforcement aspects of these activities was delegated to the privatised 
entities while the authority monitored the implementation part (Phang, n.d: 6). Such 
arrangement was to ensure that the government maintains a big responsibility on 
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issues concerning security because of national interest. A further explanation on this 
matter is given in later part of this chapter.   
 
The privatisation of the container terminal was described as the flagship of the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VRYHUDOOQDWLRQDOSULYDWLVDWLRQVWUDWHJ\3ULYDWLVLQJWKHFRQWDLQHUWHUPLQDO
at Port Klang was the pioneer exercise in this field and the first instance in the port 
sector (Naidu and Lee, 1997:40) in which the same strategy swept across other ports 
of the world for the past twenty years (Trace, Frielink and Hew, 2009: 29). In 
0DOD\VLD¶VFDVH WKH LQLWLDWLYHZDVXQGHUWDNHQHYHQEHIRUH WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VRYHUDOO
privatisation strategy was fully streamlined (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 408).   
 
(VVHQWLDOO\WKHSULYDWLVDWLRQDGRSWHGZDVDµFRQWUDFWLQJRXW¶DSSURDFKDVVWDWHGLQWKH
(38¶V³Guidelines on Privatization´ in which it underlines; 
 
Privatisation can also take the form of private sector involvement in the 
provision of certain services or activities, but without any change in the 
organisational set-up of the Government agency responsible for the services.  
This form of privatisation essentially hives-off the responsibility for 
providing the existing service to a private firm, or company, or a private 
firm or company can be invited to provide new services or facilities to the 
Government (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 430). 
 
The same approach was adopted in Port Klang by leaving a substratum of services 
that PKA would carry on with. The Guidelines recommended that the remaining 
sectors for privatisation be given to a single operator. The rationale was:  
 
This is because only if one company has the entire services under its control, 
can it control, manage and operate the services in a manner to see profits 
FRPLQJ ,I DQ\ RQH VHFWRU LV QRW XQGHU WKH RSHUDWRU¶V FRQWURO LW EHFRPHV
very difficult for a private operator to set operational targets, negotiate terms 
with shippers and ship owners. This will also be beneficial to all LPK 
[PKA] staff who shall be absorbed by the single operator (Klang Port 
Authority, 1988: 430).  
 
 
The first phase of privatisation was initiated by hiving off the container terminal to 
Kelang Container Terminal (KCT) which commenced operations on March 1986 
(Abdullah, 1992: 357). KCT was set up in line with the provision of the Companies 
Act 1965.  Shares were issued to PKA in return for movable assets which were 
acquired by KCT.  The fixtures, land and fixed capital assets like wharves and berths, 
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were leased by PKA to KCT for 21 years under a formal agreement. PKA then issued 
an operating licence to KCT for the provision of container terminal services and 
facilities for the same 21 years (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 410).  
 
+RZHYHUWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWGHYHORSPHQWRI3RUW.ODQJ¶VSULYDWLVDWLRQH[HUFLVHZDV
LQZKHQWKHUHVWRIWKHSRUW¶VRSHUDWLRQDOVHUYLFHVZHUHKLYHGRIIIURP3.$WR 
Kelang Port Management Sdn Bhd (KPM), which was established on 1 December 
1992. In the privatisation agreement with the government, KPM had a 21-year lease 
WRRSHUDWHEHUWKVLQ1RUWK3RUWDQG6RXWK3RUWPDNLQJLW0DOD\VLD¶VELJJHVWSRUW
operator in terms of facilities and services (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 436 ± 437).  
 
On 18 September 2000, KCT and KPM merged as a single entity as Northport 
Corporation Berhad (NCB). Under the restructuring exercise, the establishment of 
NCB was to fuel the growth of the transportation and port services. Also the merger 
gave the group the ability to combine and optimize their resources and undertake 
further investment according to the demand and supply situation of the market (The 
National Maritime Portal, 2009). 
 
As for the West Port, a new facility in Port Klang started its commercial operation in 
 ,Q FRQWUDVW WR .&7 DQG .30 WKLV WHUPLQDO¶V SULYDWLVDWLRQ ZDV µGU\
SULYDWLVDWLRQ¶ZKLFKPHDQVWKHUHZHUHQRSHRSOHRUJRRGZLOODVVHWVWRWDNHRYHUDVLQ
the North Port.  The company was permitted to invite partners into lease and/or 
operate facilities as and when they were developed. PKA granted a licence to Kelang 
Multi-Terminal Sdn Bhd (KMT) to operate, manage, maintain and control the West 
Port operation business.  KMT was granted  a lease of the relevant property for a 
period of 30 years, on the terms and conditions as set out in the West Port 
Privatisation Agreement 1994 (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 449). KPM was also 
granted with opportunities to develop the remaining port facilities in the West Port 
terminal planned under the Port Master Plan 1990 to 2010 (Gateway, 2009: 12 and 
Trace, Frielink and Hew, 2009: 26). 
 
Notably the privatisation exercise initiated in 1986 was a milestone in shaping the 
port in a better and competitive position as well as enhanced the port performance. 
For example, the most recent data of 2011 (Table 6.2) indicates that Port Klang 
performed well despite global economic glitches for the last two years. The port 
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continued to show a growing trend in terms of container throughput. It was reported 
WKDW³LQWKHILUVWKDOIRI3RUW.ODQJVDZDJURZWKLQFRQWDLQHUVKDQGOHG
 0LOOLRQ 7(8V´ *DWHZD\ 2010: 8). In comparison to 2009 where the port 
registered 7.3 million TEUs, the same corresponding period of 2010, the port chalked 
up 8.8 million TEUs, an increase of 21.4% (Statistics, Ministry of Transport, 2011). 
6.4.1 The new role of Port Klang Authority   
Following privatisation, the PKA was made responsible for aspects of the port 
including the port security matters. Accordingly, the Port Privatization Act 1990 
(2006: 8) states that; 
 
The port authority shall, in addition to the powers conferred, and the 
functions and duties imposed upon it by any written law, exercise regulatory 
functions in respect of the conduct of the port activities and the running of 
port facilities and services in the port by licensed operators including the 
determination of their performance standards and standards of facilities and 
services provided by them and the enforcement thereof.   
 
As a consequence of the power vested in the Port Privatization Act 1990, PKA 
therefore had to ensure that the private operators and port users abided by the relevant 
rules, regulations and conditions laid down by the Authority and the government 
(Klang Port Authority   3.$ EHFDPH WKH µZDWFKGRJ¶ E\ UHTXHVWLQJ WKH
private operators to furnish relevant data and statistical information relating to port 
operations. As such to a certain extent, the Authority would be able to assess of public 
benefit and attainment of government objectives to make sure all public policy 
objectives were honoured (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 432 - 453).  
 
With the hiving off of port operations, PKA relinquished its traditional function as a 
port operator and assumed new and challenging roles which were not core activities 
before. Briefly, the core functions of PKA after privatisation were:   
 
Port planning ± to provide a supply driven environment 
by identifying the need for facilities to meet specific 
cargo growth trends as well as ensuring fast turnaround of 
ships. 
 
Trade facilitation ± to act as a catalyst by providing a 
FRQGXFLYHFRPPHUFLDOHQYLURQPHQWWRHQKDQFHWKHSRUW¶V
regional role. 
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Port promotion ± WR SURYLGH XWLOL]DWLRQ RI WKH SRUW¶s 
facilities and facilitate the development of new 
commercially viable trade while retaining existing ones, 
through maintaining appropriate levels of charges. 
 
Environment needs ± the protection of a balanced 
environment while ensuring port requirements are met. 
 
Port security and safety ± for security, the enforcement 
aspects are delegated to the privatised entities and the 
Authority monitors their implementation. For safety the 
Authority will ensure the navigational safety within the 
port limits, that all regulations and procedures for 
navigation and handling hazardous cargo are observed. 
 
Performance standard ± monitoring the performance of 
terminal operators so that high standards are maintained. 
 
Assets management ± to ensure the vast assets of PKA, 
comprising over 800 hectares of land and other port-
related properties are maintained at optimum level, and to 
encourage the development of port-related industries 
within and outside the port area (Klang Port Authority, 
1988: 463-464 and Phang, n.d: 6). 
 
 
Additionally, to enhance port competitiveness, the government also initiated a mega 
project called the Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ) by acquiring 1,000 acres of land in 
3XODX,QGDK:HVW3RUWLQLQOLQHZLWK3RUW.ODQJ¶VGHYHORSPHQWVWUDWHJ\3.$
assumed the role of authority as with other functions. The primary objective of this 
project was to expand the logistical sector by providing a range of commercial 
facilities and incentives to both local as well as foreign investors. Thus the main idea 
was to develop a comprehensive Free Trade Zone and Free Industrial Zone centred in 
one location modelled after Jabel Ali Free Zone Area in Dubai (Laporan 
Jawatankuasa Kira-Kira Wang Negara Terhadap Projek Pembangunan Zon Bebas 
Pelabuhan Kelang, 2009)28. Between its full inception in 2006 and the end of 2007, 
the project had managed to attract thirty nine investors with RM729 million (USD235 
million) worth of investments (The Star Online, 30 November 2007) and up to 
October 2007, PKFZ generated 890 TEUs from its import and export activities (The 
Star Online, 7 November 2007). However the project was highly criticised and 
                                                 
28
 A report produced by the Malaysian Parliament Public Accounts Committee on Port Klang Free 
Zone Development Project in 2009.  
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created national controversy for mishandling the public fund during the land 
acquisition process where the total cost was escalated from RM1.957 billion (USD631 
million) to RM4.947 billion (USD1.6 billion) (Laporan Jawatankuasa Kira-Kira 
Wang Negara Terhadap Projek Pembangunan Zon Bebas Pelabuhan Kelang, 2009). 
The government has initiated legal proceedings against certain personalities to 
ascertain any misappropriation of public money and as of 2011, the court case was 
still ongoing (The Star Online, 14 April 2011, also see The Star Online 30 November 
2010 and 28 February 2011). 
6.5 Port security issues 
Having undergone several stages of physical as well as administrative development, 
the security aspect of Port Klang needs to be viewed in a broader context. In this 
sense one could ask what were the measures and implications of these changes in 
particular the establishment of  the PKA in the 1960s  and the impact of privatisation 
LQ WKH V IRU 3RUW .ODQJ¶V VHFXULW\" Notably, however, over time the steady 
growth of the port in terms of its physical development as well as cargo volume and 
ship calls had influenced the firming up of the security of Port Klang in many 
respects.  
6.5.1 Legal provisions 
Until 1963 when Port Klang was still under the administration of the Malayan 
Railway, port security was managed by the Railway Police Force headed by an officer 
with the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police with two European Police 
Inspectors, two Sergeants-Major, four Investigating officers, twelve Detectives and 
over 650 constables (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 114). The role of the railway police 
was chiefly to curb theft and pilferage in the port area.  
The following regulations relating to safety, introduced in the 1930s, and remaining in 
force until Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952, also indicate a concern to monitor the 
movement of small vessels in the interests of security (Klang Port Authority, 1988: 
168).  
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 Gazette Notification No. 6057, August 12, 1932, No. 17, Vol. XXIV. 
 
,Q H[HUFLVH RI WKH SRZHUV YHVWHG LQ KLP E\ VHFWLRQ  RI ³7KH 3RUW
(QDFWPHQW ´ WKH 5HVLGHQW RI 6HODQJRU KHUHE\ PDNHV WKH
following Ports Rules to have effect within the limits of Port 
Swettenham only: 
 
1. No vessel or small craft shall lie at anchor opposite the 
wharves east of a line drawn parallel to the wharves half-way between 
the wharves and the nearest point of Pulau Lumut. 
 
2. Small craft shall anchor only within the area which would be 
defined by a line drawn from a beacon on Tanjong Sungei Agas, 
thence to the end of the passenger jetty, thence to the end of wharves 
Nos. 1, 2 and 3, thence in a straight line to the port limit on Pulau 
Lumut at the mouth of the Langat River. 
 
3. No vessel or small craft shall anchor in the fair-way of the 
mouth of the Klang River. 
 
4. The speed of all vessels entering and leaving Port Swettenham 
is not to exceed six knots and is only to be increased in case of danger 
or when maneuvering near the wharves.  When entering the port, 
speed shall be reduced to six knots or less at a distance of a thousand 
yards from the first vessel at anchor or at a buoy; when leaving the 
port, speed may be increased after passing the last vessel anchor or at 
a buoy. 
 
5. No vessel shall proceed either to the passenger jetty or to a 
wharf unless signalled to do so by the Harbour Master. 
 
 10. No small craft proceeding to or from the Klang River from or 
to any wharf or vessel shall pass through the area contained within the 
following boundaries: 
 
 From the railway passenger jetty for a distance of 800 feet in line with 
mooring buoy No. 1; from thence on a bearing 320o for a distance of 
1,000 feet from thence in a straight line to a beacon carrying a white 
circular mark erected on the foreshore to the southward of Tanjong 
Kubu [G. 1581/31]. 
 
These were a small fraction of the legal regulations aimed at Port Klang security. But 
a significant feature was that the importance of the port for trade meant that it was 
declaUHGDVDQ µHVVHQWLDO¶ VHUYLFH LQ WKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU7KLVHQWDLOHGSDUWLFXODU
attention to security. Gazette Notification No. 4376 on 4 September 1939 declared 
FHUWDLQVHUYLFHVDVEHLQJRIµSXEOLFXWLOLW\HVVHQWLDOIRUWKHSURVHFXWLRQRIWKHZDUDQG
to WKH OLIH RI WKH FRPPXQLW\¶ 7KH 1RWLILFDWLRQ GHVLJQDWHG VL[WHHQ VHUYLFHV DV
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µHVVHQWLDOVHUYLFHV¶1XPEHURQWKHOLVWZDVµWKH)HGHUDWHG0DOD\6WDWHV5DLOZD\V¶
which covered all the operations at railway ports, including Port Swettenham (Klang 
Port Authority, 1988: 182). 
 
Notification No.4376 should be viewed in the context of State of Emergency that was 
declared by the High Commissioner of the Malay States on 2 September 1939 
followed by Emergency Regulations. The declaration of emergency was a response to 
the communist and other threats that posed massive challenges to colonial 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ 3DUW ,9 RI WKH (PHUJHQF\ 5HJXODWLRQV WLWOHG µ&RQWURO RI 3RUWV DQG
0RYHPHQWV RI 9HVVHOV DQG $LUFUDIW¶ SURYLGHG IRU  D FRPSHWHQW DXWKRULW\ WR LVVXH
µQDYLJDWLRQ RUGHUV¶ WR UHJXODWH WKH PRYHPHQWV QDYLJDWLRQ SLORWDJH DQFKRUDJH
mooring, berthing and lighting of vessels within the harbours and territorial waters 
(Klang Port Authority, 1988: 182). Such safety measures also restricted opportunities 
for sabotage.  
 
A subsequent Gazette Notification No. 4433 declared the dock at Port Swettenham 
and all land and premises as essential service. A further Gazette Notification 4434 
made it an offence for any person except under the authority of a written permit 
granted by the High Commissioner or a competent authority, to have in his possession 
a camera in any such area or to make any photograph, sketch, plan or other 
representation of such area or any part of or object in such area (Klang Port Authority, 
1988: 182).  
During the Japanese occupation in Malaya from mid-January 1942 to August 1945, 
the regime continued to maintain railway ports as an essential service and 
administered them as previously with public access restricted (Klang Port Authority, 
1988: 188).  
After the war, with the country exposed to the communist threats, such security 
measures continued (further explanation on land based threats is given in Chapter 
Seven). Indeed, the World Bank Report of May 1954 reported that communist 
terrorism constituted a heavy drain on the resources of Malaya (Klang Port Authority, 
1988: 260). The Protected Areas and Protected Places Act 1959 was introduced to 
VWUHQJWKHQWKHSURWHFWLRQRISRUWVDVDQµHVVHQWLDO VHUYLFH¶7KH$FWdeclared a port as 
a protected area and at the same time boosted the security measures. The Act 
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underscored restriction measures by prohibiting any unauthorized person to be present 
in the protected areas. Section 4 of this Act said; 
(2) Any person who is in any protected area shall comply with such 
directions for regulating his movement and conduct as may be given by an 
authorized officer, and an authorized officer may search any person 
entering, or seeking to enter, or being in, a protected area, and may detain 
any such person for the purpose of searching him. 
 
(3) If any person whilst in a protected area fails to comply with any 
direction given under subsection (2) then, without prejudice to any 
proceedings which may be taken against him, he may be removed from the 
area by an authorized officer. 
Further, Section 5 (1) of the Act mentions one such way to control the movement, by 
issuing permits where the provision said: 
(1) If as respects any premises it appears to the Minister to be necessary or 
expedient that special precautions should be taken to prevent the entry 
therein of unauthorized persons he may by order declare the premises to be 
a protected place for the purposes of this Act; and so long as the order is in 
force no person shall be in those premises unless he is in possession of a 
pass-card or permit issued by such authority or person as may be specified 
in the order, or has received the permission of an authorized officer on duty 
at those premises to enter the same. 
The penalties were stated in Section 7 of this Act; 
If any person contravenes or fails to comply with any of the provisions of 
section 4 or 5 or any order made thereunder or any direction given or 
requirement imposed thereunder he shall be guilty of an offence against this 
Act and shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of two years or to a fine 
of one thousand ringgit or to both. 
While the port is considered a protected area and restricted for public access, the Port 
Authorities Act 1963 as mentioned earlier empowered the authority to establish Port 
Security Force to maintain as well as to strengthen the good order of port. Section 13 
(A) of the Act, provides the following provisions; 
(1) The authority may, with the approval of the Minister, establish a security 
force for keeping order and security within any premises vested or deemed 
to be vested in, or in the possession or under the control of, the authority. 
 
(2) The security force shall consist of such persons as may be appointed 
under subsection 13(1). 
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(3) A member of the security force shall have the power to arrest without 
warrant any person found on any premises of the authority or in premises in 
the possession or under the control of the authority, or any part thereof, 
without lawful excuse. 
 
(4) Every person arrested pursuant to subsection (3) shall be taken to the 
nearest Police Station as soon as possible. 
 
(5) Any rules made under section 15 shall unless expressly excluded therein 
apply to members of the security force established in this section (Port 
Authority Act 1963, 2006: 20). 
 
The data generated in this research demonstrates that the government is increasingly 
concerned on the need to secure the port and most importantly its relation to national 
security interest before 9/11. Overwhelming evidence on this issue was confirmed by 
two senior officials responsible in policy making by mentioning: 
 
Even before 9/11, we already considered the port as one of security area. In 
fact our ports are already fenced up way back many years for the national 
interest. For the national interest all the exit and entry point, port is one of 
those. So the ports are fenced up. There is also security force by the port 
authority before the ports are privatised. So the ports are already secured 
area. In fact it is a no entry zone (Interview Code: 02). 
 
And  
 
In Malaysia even if 9/11 not happened, we already established our port 
security. Certain port has been gazetted as protected area under the national 
committee on protected area act. So it was well prepared. Even though if 
there is no 9/11, whatever it is we are prepared. 9/11 is just catalyst and 
strengthened our security (Interview Code: 04). 
 
In this connection we could view from Figure 6.1 of the organisational chart shared 
by the person responsible for security in PKA that PKA established a small workforce 
to manage both security and fire services in the port since its privatisation in 1986 
until 2008. The small number of employees is due to its regulatory function where the 
enforcement has been assigned to private entities.   
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Figure 6.1: Organisational Chart of the Security Department, 
Port Klang Authority (1986-2008) 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled from Interview Code: 17 
 
Pertaining to the issue of port security provision as enshrined in Port Authorities Act 
1963, power is granted to all port authorities of Federal ports including Port Klang to 
appoint Auxiliary Police. The auxiliary police power essentially comes under the 
purview of the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in the Police Act 1967. Part IX, 
Section 47 of the act gives the following proviso: 
 
(1) The Inspector General may, with the concurrence of the Minister, 
appoint or promote any person to serve in the Auxiliary Police as a senior 
auxiliary police officer with the honorary rank of Superintendent, Deputy 
Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent or Inspector, and may prescribe 
the area in which he shall serve. 
 
(2) A Commanding Officer or any police officer authorized by him in that 
behalf, may, with or without written engagement, appoint or promote any 
person to serve in the Auxiliary Police as a junior auxiliary police officer 
with the honorary rank of subinspector, sergeant-major, sergeant or 
corporal or as an auxiliary police constable, and may prescribe the area in 
which he shall serve. 
 
The police force is obligated to perform such auxiliary duties in connection to their 
duties stipulated in Section 20, sub-section (3) (e) of the Police Act 1967 in which it 
states;  
 
Giving assistance in the preservation of order in the ports, harbours and 
airports of Malaysia, and in enforcing maritime and port regulations. 
 
Manager Safety & Fire Services 
Grade KP 48 
Officer - Fire Services  
Grade - KB 41 
Clerk  
Grade - N 17 
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To fulfil a proper enforcement, the RMP in turn delegated the auxiliary police power 
to the port authority to exercise policing duties in port facilities in line with the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V PHDVXUH WR SURWHFW WKH SRUW XQGHU WKH 3URWHFWHG $UHDV DQG 3URWHFWHG
Places Act 1959. After the privatisation, the police power was still retained under the 
3.$¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ 7KLV KDV EHHQ YHULILHG ZLWK WKH SHUVRQ LQ FKDUJH RI VHFXULW\
matters in PKA where the respondent confirmed that: 
 
My knowledge is only for Federal ports. Whether you go to Bintulu, 
Penang, PTP, Kuantan, you will find same kind of security standard being 
maintained. And all the ports, they have auxiliary port police. They do not 
employ company ABC from outside where old man sitting down with stick 
is not the case. All ports have the auxiliary police and the thing about the 
auxiliary police is that they have AP which is Auxiliary Power which has 
EHHQKDQGHGGRZQE\WKH503RI%XNLW$PDQ«EHFDXVH3.$LVWKHERG\
which has been given the authority by the RMP. Now the ports have been 
privatised, but they have auxiliary powers and there are security people to 
report to us. And you will find it all the Federal ports in same standard. This 
is all prior to 9/11 (Interview Code: 15). 
 
In this sense, while PKA holds the responsibility of auxiliary police power as 
empowered by RMP, the enforcement of policing duties at the privatised terminals is 
conducted by the private companies (Northport and Westport) with same auxiliary 
police power delegated by the port authority. However, the employment of security 
personnel in both Northport and Westport is the responsibility of the respective 
terminals. $VRI1RUWKSRUW¶VSROLFH VWUHQJWKZDV97 (Northport presentation, 
2010) and Westport was 208 personnel (Westport presentation, 2010). The breakdown 
of auxiliary police force of both terminals is illustrated in Table 6.5. These forces then 
perform security duties with police power. Such arrangement requires the privatised 
companies to collaborate and report their progress any matters concerning the 
application and practices of police powers in the port to the PKA (Interview Code: 15 
and 16). In addition to this, the terminals also forged a close collaboration and report 
serious crimes to RMP, Officer in Command Police District of Klang (Interview 
Code: 23) 
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Table 6.5: Number of Auxiliary Police Force in Northport and Westport - 2010 
 
Northport Westport 
Rank No of Personnel Rank No of Personnel 
Senior Manager 1 Senior Manager 1 
Manager 1 Manager 6 
Asst. Manager 2 Executive 4 
Executive 9 Other Rank & File 187 
Officer 13 Civilian Staff 8 
Rank & File 171 Administration 2 
Total 197  208 
Source: Compiled from Northport, 2010 power point presentation and Westport, 
2010, power point presentation 
 
 
To give further effect to the auxiliary police in relation to Police Act 1967, the Police 
(Auxiliary Police) Regulations, 1970, which came into force on 1 July 1970, ensured 
that the auxiliary police in port performs duties in tandem with normal police force as 
stipulated in section 5 of the regulation; 
 
(1) A member of the Auxiliary Police when performing police duties shall 
have the same powers and duties and shall be subject to the same authority 
as a police officer of corresponding rank. 
 
(2) A member of the Auxiliary Police shall be subject as far as possible to 
the same discipline as a police officer of the corresponding rank. 
 
 
With regards to person under employment performing police duties as a member of 
Auxiliary Police, Section 6 of the same regulation states; 
 
(1) Where any person under an employment of any other person or body of 
SHUVRQV KHUHLQDIWHU UHIHUUHGDV³HPSOR\HU´ LV DSSRLQWHGDVDQDX[LOLDU\
police officer or constable to perform police duties in an area under the 
control of the employer, such employer shall be responsible for- 
 
(a) supply of uniforms, badges, arms and ammunitions; 
 
(b) providing such suitable guard-room, armoury and defence works as may 
be considered necessary by the Commissioner or Chief Police Officer of the 
State in which the area situates; and 
 
(c) payment of compensation to any auxiliary police officer or constable 
who had died or injured during the course of performing police duties.   
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Notably, the Regulation underscores that the auxiliary police is not only carrying 
weapons and granted power to investigate and prosecute but at the same time Section 
13(A) 3 of the Port Authority Act 1963 has given power to port security officers to 
arrest any person without warrant who breaches security.  This type of provisions, 
allowed the port police to perform strict security measures in the port. This was 
further approved by the head of the security unit in one of the terminals who said: 
 
2XU >VHFXULW\@ LVXQLTXH:HKDYHSROLFHSRZHUVZKLFKRWKHUVGRQ¶WKDYH
What ever they catch must give it to police outside. They cannot deal with 
effectively. In other countries, they have coast guard and inside there is 
VHFXULW\7KHVHFXULW\ZRQ¶WFDUU\PXFKSRZHU7KH\DUUHVWDQGKDQGRYHU
[to police]. Ours are very stringent. We investigate and we charge them in 
court. That is why ours are very different form. We also carry gun like the 
police. We are carrying the authority card exactly like the police. I have the 
rank of the DSP [Deputy Commissioner of Police] (Interview Code: 23). 
 
With the establishment of auxiliary police, Port Klang was generally well prepared in 
port security much earlier to 9/11. This has to be viewed in connection with the 
historical fact where the measure put in place was rather a proactive rather than 
reactive as opposed to what have been witnessed in the aftermath of 9/11. 
 
Notwithstanding the port police was established in accordance with the provision of 
Port Authorities Act 1963 and at the same time it was earmarked as essential services, 
the port passes that are issued as a measure for access control are placed under the 
responsibility of Chief Government Security Office (CGSO) an agency under the 
3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V'HSDUWPHQW7KLVLVEHFDXVH&*62LVRQHRIWKHDJHQFLHVPDQGDWHG
to enforce all essential services under the Protected Areas and Protected Places Act 
1959. In this connection, the port police who hold the police power monitor the 
movement of every person and vehicle through port passes as conditioned by the 
CGSO. Interestingly however, the port pass requirement for the port workers was 
introduced in Port Klang much earlier than the US introduced Transportation Workers 
Identification Credential (TWIC) as part of the security measure in response to 9/11 
incident as pointed out in Chapter Four. Nonetheless the main difference is, TWIC 
which is issued by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under the DHS 
is to ensure that any individual or merchant mariner seeking unescorted access to a 
secure area of maritime transportation facilities and vessels holds a TWIC. For this 
purpose, TSA together with the USCG have endeavoured to register approximately 
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1.2 million transportation workers in the US by using biometrics system. These 
workers generally have access to ports in various capacities. As such the measure 
adopted a rigours background check before a card is issued to a worker (Lord, 2008: 
2-3). However, Port Klang did not implement the same standard or similar type of 
SUDFWLFHDV WKH86EXW LWV HIIRUW VXJJHVWV WKDW3RUW.ODQJ¶V DFFHVV FRQWUROKDVEHHQ
considered with security features much earlier in an effort to secure the port.  
 
Under the essential services requirement, CSGO also conducts an auditing in port 
with a committee comprising of State Security Council and the Police. The auditing 
process is performed annually with their own standard set of requirement.   
Another security initiative that provides supporting measure for the port is worth 
noting at this juncture. To ensure a proper running of the port during any form of 
situational crisis or natural disaster, the government established the 40 th Regiment in 
1963. It is a special unit from the Reserved Army and placed under the Armed Forces 
institution. Since establishment, the unit is still active until now (2011). The 40th 
Regiment recruits and trains the port workers on voluntary basis and prepares them to 
run the port operations in the event of any crisis that jeopardy the port. Although the 
recruitment process is voluntary, only those workers who are physically fit and free 
from criminal activities will be given an opportunity to join. However, the recruited 
port workers are not eligible to become auxiliary police officers, as the main focus of 
the Regiment is to run the port operations during any major crisis. As a form of 
encouragement all these volunteers are provided uniform and training allowances. 
Training usually conducted two weeks in a year. A similar kind of voluntary army 
was also created to other three main essential services namely railway, water and 
electricity ((Kertas Cadangan Penyusunan Semula Perjawatan Regimen Pangkar 
Pengendalian Pelabuhan Ke 40 Regimen Askar Jurutera Diraja - Askar Wataniah) 
(Proposal Paper for Restructuring Exercise of the Position of the 40 th Regiment 
Engineering Corps - Reserved Army) 2010 and Interview, Code: 03)).  
Despite the fact that Malaysia is no longer intimidated by communist threats, such 
SURWHFWLYH PHDVXUHV IRU SRUWV DV µHVVHQWLDO VHUYLFHV¶ LQFOXGLQJ WKH YROXQWHHU IRUFH
continue up to the present (2011) and are not just confined to Port Klang but apply to 
several strategically located seaports, airport and other utilities all over the country. In 
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this respect, even though Port Klang has been privatised, the service of 40th Regiment 
still maintained for the purpose of national interest. This reflects that the Malaysian 
government had tried to instill security awareness and practices way back to 9/11 in 
contrast to noticeable change of attitude and practices emerged in most part of the 
world in response to 9/11 attacks.  
6.5.2 Security situation in Port Klang  
 
In terms of security situation or threat in Port Klang before 9/11, the perception was 
Port Klang encountered more common threats as with any other ports in different 
parts of the world. As one respondent from the Marine Department asserted; 
 
Before 9/11, the situation of port in terms of security was similar onboard 
ship during that time. We could say, we concentrated on issues of theft, 
smuggling, there is no cases of threats from any form of terrorism or piracy 
(Interview Code: 07). 
 
Views from the private stakeholders are also worth considered at this point in which 
the person charge in security affairs at a terminal observed; 
 
Before 9/11, basicalO\\RXPXVWXQGHUVWDQG0DOD\VLD¶V threat scenario, you 
FDQ¶WH[SHFWVRPHWKLQJOLNH that of other countries where we have terrorist 
WKUHDWDOO WKLV WKLQJV:HGRQ¶WKDYH WKDW9HU\SHDFHIXOFRXQWU\ ,¶PYHU\
qualified to say that because I came from the intelligence. So when we talk 
about pre-911 in context of port, there is actually no serious security threat. 
What we have LV RI FRXUVH ZH ZRXOGQ¶W FDOO LW a big security threat, but 
petty theft and smuggling. There is always attempt because smugglers leave 
within the container business. These are the two things. Petty theft as well as 
smugglers (Interview Code: 23). 
 
Closely related to this view, a senior official with twenty-\HDU¶V H[SHULHQFH LQ D
shipping line pointed out; 
 
Basically the security measures in Port Klang that I can see before 9/11, I 
can see that the area of Port Klang was very well cordoned off; fences are 
there, barb wires are there. The security of personnel in Port Klang itself is 
there. They already implemented these security measures even before 9/11. 
The people who access to the area will also be controlled. The proper 
implementation of the equipment and maintenance of equipment for 
example, CCTV might not be WKHUH , GRQ¶W WKLQN VR WKHUH ZDV CCTV 
(Interview Code: 28). 
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In terms of access control, despite Port Klang was observed a close port system prior 
to 9/11, yet in certain situation there was some flexibilities provided to the public. 
This was evidenced from a response given by one respondent who takes charge in 
port security in PKA. The argument was; 
 
Before the 9/11 days, public we allowed after first line of scrutiny. Of 
course we check why they come onboard, why coming into the port, what is 
their business, most of the time. The public come into the port is to visit 
crew members onboard. Or they come to visit their guest something from 
WKHSDVVHQJHUVKLS2WKHUZLVH WKHSXEOLF UHDOO\GRQ¶WKDYHDQy business in 
WKH SRUW«7KH SXEOLF UHDOO\ FRPLQJ WR WKH JDWH LV YHU\ PLQLPDO LQ WKRVH
days. 
 
In summary, although the security threat in Port Klang is perceived to be minimal 
which is very much confined to internal threats related thefts and smuggling before 
3RUW.ODQJ¶VSURDFWLYHVHFXULW\PHDVXUHVKRZHYHUSHUFHLYHGWREHWLJKW, not just 
for the interest of the port alone but also for the national economy and national 
security as well.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
The establishment and development of Port Klang physically, geographically and in 
terms of policy, ownership and management have been analysed from an historical 
perspective. The port developed from a couple of jetties at the riverside of Klang but 
today it stands as a national premier port.  It evolved over time until it reached its 
current position (2011) as the thirteenth leading container port in the world in terms of 
its container throughput (UNCTAD, 2011: 89). Its separation from the railway 
administration in 1963 and the privatisation measures initiated in 1986 have 
contributed to a massive transformation in modernising the port with the state-of-the-
art equipment. During the process of port development however, there were cargo 
leakages to Singapore port due to 6LQJDSRUH¶V strategic location with good services 
and lower transaction cost. The government subsequently formulated additional 
policies to offset those drawbacks. The outcome of the NPP study which was carried 
out with the support of the World Bank had contributed some positive results for the 
development of national ports. The recommendations of the study encouraged the 
government to formulate additional measures such as the load centering and supply 
driven policies that KDYHIXUWKHUVWUHQJWKHQHGWKH3RUW.ODQJ¶Vcompetitiveness. These 
were highlighted in different five-year development plans and mid-term reviews. 
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Further, as a result of privatisation, the governance of the port has changed, with the 
role of the Port Authority totally different to the case in the past. 
 
Significantly, it has been shown that security is not a new element for Port Klang if 
one were to refer to its long progress. Even before the responses to 9/11 outlined in 
the earlier chapter, as a response to military needs and earlier terrorist threats, 
Malaysian ports were subject to considerable security measures. In this respect, the 
Protected Areas and Protected Places Act 1959 served as an excellent legal instrument 
LQSURWHFWLQJWKHSRUWE\FDWHJRULVLQJDOONH\SRUWVDVDQµHVVHQWLDOVHUYLFH¶By doing 
so, the act underscored restriction measures by prohibiting any unauthorized 
movement by person or vehicle in the protected areas and hence boosted the security 
level of the port. While the port is protected under this restrictive measure, the Port 
Authorities Act 1963 empowered the authority to establish the Port Security Force to 
further strengthen the good order of the port.  
 
However following the privatisation process there appeared to be a greater conflict 
between commercial and security needs. There are more stakeholders than in the past 
with the presence of private entities. Furthermore, the privatisation exercise not only 
required private participation but simultaneously required the port to establish port 
police as enshrined in the Port Privatization Act 1990. The responsibility of port 
security was retained under the Port Authority together with its role as landlord and 
regulatory body and the PKA shouldered the main Auxiliary Police powers 
empowered under the Police Act. Under this circumstance, one of the challenges for 
the PKA was to monitor and takes the full responsibility upon its delegation of 
Auxiliary Police powers to the private operators to establish port police in their 
respective terminals (Interview Code: 17). Interestingly however, the port police were 
given the same police power as the normal police force. This allows carrying guns 
and power to investigate and prosecute, as well as to arrest any person without 
warrant who breaches security within the port area. To further safeguard the port, the 
government established the 40th Regiment in 1963 and trained the port workers 
voluntarily who are not in the port police force to operate the port in the event of any 
major emergencies. All these security measures suggest that the Malaysian 
government adopted a rather more proactive than reactive approach in handling port 
security matters. $OWKRXJK 3RUW .ODQJ¶V VHFXULW\ VLWXDWLRQ EHIRUH  ZDV XQGHU
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control and only encountered common threats, such as thefts and pilferage, as with 
any other ports in the world, Malaysia was well prepared in terms of port security 
much earlier than the 9/11 attacks.  With the explanation of security arrangements 
EHIRUH  WKH QH[W FKDSWHU &KDSWHU 6HYHQ HODERUDWHV LQ GHWDLO 3RUW .ODQJ¶V 
security initiatives and policies after 9/11.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
 
PORT SECURITY MEASURES AFTER 9/11 IN PORT KLANG 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Having considered some security measures before 9/11 in Port Klang where its 
gradual development and historical background provided a basis for various 
initiatives, this chapter examines the security situation in Malaysia in general and Port 
Klang in particular. This includes the initiatives introduced in the post 9/11 era by 
showing how the security policies were translated into action. In addition to this, the 
chapter also elaborates the institutional and organisational arrangements as well as 
international and the US unilateral measures.  
 
7.2 Security threats to Port Klang and surrounding waters 
 
In view of 3RUW .ODQJ¶V SRVition in close proximity to the SOM, naturally the 
sensitivity of the location and associated security threats need to be viewed in this 
context 6HYHUDO VWXGLHV -D¶DIDU  1LN DQG 3HUPDO  1LN  .KDOLG
2009) have highlighted the significance of the SOM. The SOM are vitally important 
for socio-economic and political prosperity and stability for the ASEAN region and 
this in turn greatly influences the littoral and other user states concerns to safeguard 
access to the water, but conversely the Strait exposes them to various maritime 
security threats. According to Nik and Permal (2008: 190) there are two major types 
of security threats in the SOM, traditional and non-traditional. The traditional threats 
mainly relate to maritime boundary disputes and naval clashes, whereas the non-
traditional threats arise from various criminalities such as piracy, armed robbery and 
smuggling.29  
 
The data collected for this study has lent support to this identification of the type of 
threat. The interviews supported Nik and 3HUPDO¶VDUJXPHQW7KHPDLQWKUHDWV
are people smuggling, human trafficking, smuggling of drugs, weapons, cigarettes and 
other contrabands, illegal immigrants and illegal fishing.   
                                                 
29
 There are several maritime boundary disputes yet to reach a compromise stage or resolved among the 
regional states. One such persisting case is the claim for Spratly Islands by six countries. See The Star 
RQOLQH-XQH³0DOD\VLDZDQWV6SUDWO\LVVXHUHVROYHZLVHO\VD\V$KPDG=DKLG´ 
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Many of the threats in the SOM are related to maritime security, which covers a much 
bigger scope than port security. In a broader context, however, there is a connection. 
Crimes perpetrated at sea, such as armed robbery and the smuggling of humans and 
arms, may have implications for port security.  
 
Table 7.1 below shows the incidence of maritime crimes in Malaysian waters from    
2006 to 2011.  
 
Table 7.1: Vessels Arrested for Various Offences in Malaysian Waters ± 
(2006 ± 2011) 
 
Crimes 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Vessels arrested± 
without 
document/permit  
114 512 504 738 898 604 
Encroachment of 
foreign vessels 
37 89 82 137 102 69 
Smuggling 19 50 54 58 131 127 
Illegal 
immigrants 
3 39 38 96 191 80 
Source: Statistics, Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, 2011  
 
The data generally demonstrates that there is an increase in the number of various 
types of maritime crimes each year especially cases related to vessels arrested without 
permit, smuggling and illegal immigrants. As the scenario suggests that a greater 
enforcement measures have been undertaken by the government, on the other hand, it 
reminds the policy makers of the challenges to contain the situation in the Malaysian 
maritime sector as a whole.  
 
In this regard, despite the fact threats in the Malaysian waters are not directly related 
to terrorism, the information from interviews provides a further insight into perceived 
or anticipated threats in the Malaysian waters, VSHFLILFDOO\ LQ 3RUW .ODQJ¶V
environment. Responses from senior officials from the NSC and Marine Department 
WR WKH TXHVWLRQ ³ZKDW ZHUH WKH SHUceived or anticipated threats in the port 
HQYLURQPHQWDIWHU´VXJJHVWWKDWWHUURULVPGRHVQRWIHDWXUHDPRQJIHDUVRIFULPH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Threats at the moment are like we can read in the newspaper, armed robbery 
at sea. Recently we have heard marine accidents, smuggling and illegal 
fishing. About terrorism, there is not so much (Interview Code: 04). 
 
And 
 
There is none [terrorism] in Malaysia. The most common one nowadays are 
the unauthorised access and they do pilferages and theft in the port like 
stealing steHO EDUV ,W¶V PRUH RQ WKH QRUPDO FULPH DQG VWHDOLQJ LQ WKH SRUW
There are no cases of attempts to sabotage our ports (Interview Code: 08). 
 
And 
 
,QP\H[SHULHQFH,KDYHQ¶WKHDUGRISLUDF\DQGWHUURULVPLQ3RUW.ODQJ7KH
only thing is tampering with the cargo. They break and steal the cargo or there 
are cases of smuggling. They also brought in prohibited items (Interview 
Code: 09). 
 
 
These responses further indicate the reality WKDWLQUHODWLRQWR3RUW.ODQJ¶VVLWXDWLRQLQ
particular, the main threats are traditional threats that commonly experienced in most 
ports of the world (Ellen, 1993). This was clearly affirmed by a PKA respondent who 
attached to this organisation for seventeen years: 
 
Basically the threat here [Port Klang] is pilferage. In terms of incursion or 
people who infiltrate into the port are the petty fellows. They come in for 
WKHIW RU FRPPLW SLOIHUDJH RU SHWW\ WKHIW :H GRQ¶W KDYH DQ\ ELJ WLPHUV
coming in. But of course we have found out there are lot of economic crimes 
taking place in the port where sometimes you find undeclared cargoes 
moving out from the port (Interview Code: 16). 
 
From a practical point of view there is no difference in the degree of these long-
established challenges to port security since 9/11. Table 7.2 below shows that 
traditional port crime remained a problem in Port Klang. However at this stage, I 
could not demonstrate any specific data before 9/11, as the same PKA respondent 
DERYH ,QWHUYLHZ &RGH  PHQWLRQHG WKDW ³ZH >SRUW DXWKRULW\@ GRQ¶W NHHS WKH
UHFRUG´ %XW KH DVVHUWHG ³WKLV >SRUW FULPH@ KDSSHQV DOO WKH WLPH´ *HQHUDOO\ WKLV
suggests that in spite of strict security measures in Port Klang even before 9/11, the 
µWUDGLWLRQDO¶ port crimes have not been eradicated in totality. On this perspective, 
Tschirgi (2007: [Y ULJKWO\ SRLQWV RXW ³«IXOO VHFXULW\ ZDV XQDWWDLQDEOH WKDW WKH
search for security is necessarily a multifaceted and ongoing process which can never 
EHFDSSHGE\GHILQLWLYHHQGXULQJVXFFHVV´ 
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Table 7.2: Theft and Pilferage in Port Klang ± (2006-2011) 
 
Year Theft and pilferage incidents -  Port Klang 
(Westport) 
2006 20 
2007 15 
2008 17 
2009 26 
2010 21 
2011 30 
Source: Statistics, Westport, Port Klang, 2011 
Note: This data is only available in Westport of Port Klang. There is no data available for 
Northport 
 
 
Cargo theft is a serious problem in Malaysian ports. According to the US-based 
watchdog, Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA), almost RM70 million 
(USD22.6 million) worth of cargo was reported stolen in Malaysia in 2010. Although 
this amount includes both the seaport and the DLUSRUW7$3$¶VUDQNLQJSXWV0DOD\VLD
in the list of countries like Mexico, Brazil and several Eastern European countries 
where cargo thefts are common (Khalid, 2011: 1-2).  
 
However piracy and armed robbery, which traditionally posed a major concern for 
safety and security of navigation for both users and littoral states of the SOM, have 
clearly declined in the recent past, as shown in Table 7.3.  
 
Table 7.3: Piracy and Armed Robbery Incidents in the Straits of Malacca -   
(2000 ± 2011) 
 
Year IMB 
2000 75 
2001 17 
2002 16 
2003 28 
2004 38 
2005 12 
2006 11 
2007 7 
2008 2 
2009 2 
2010 2 
2011 1 
Source: ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Annual Report, 2000, 2004, 2010 and 2011 
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This decline has been attributed to several factors. These include: the improved 
situation following the peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the 
terrorist group of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka; national and regional responses with 
increased patrolling and surveillance; tighter government controls and local policing 
onshore and greater awareness of the implementation of multifarious security regimes 
(Bateman, 2010, 742-743).    
 
Bateman (2010: 1-3), asserts that with the overall improvement of piracy cases in 
SEA and South Asia, regionally the problem has shifted to the southern part of South 
China Sea, with by far the greatest concentration now centred off the Horn of Africa 
and Red Sea perpetrated primarily by the Somalian pirates.  
 
One feature of the SOM, as noted in Chapter Five, is a large number of barter trade 
vessels plying between the Malaysian Peninsular and Sumatra along the SOM. Small 
vessels are not only considered to pose a danger for safe navigation but possibly could 
be used as a vector for inflicting catastrophic damage by ramming targeted vessels, as 
in the case of USS Cole and Limburg, or other maritime assets. Albeit barter trading 
has been a traditional business since the 15th century and still continues, it has been 
suggested that Non-Convention Vessels (NCVs) pose safety and security dangers as 
their trading is currently under-regulated (Mak, 2010: 37).  
 
Respondents from the Marine Department and PKA were asked specifically whether 
³WKHUHDUHDQ\WKUHDWVIURPVPDOOYHVVHOVRSHUDWLQJIURPVPDOOMHWWLHVHVSHFLDOO\Irom 
EDUWHU WUDGH MHWWLHV´ 7KLV TXHVWLRQ SURPSWHG VRPH FRQIOLFWLQJ UHSOLHV $Q RIILFHU LQ
charge of the ISPS Code implementation in the Marine Department responded:  
 
In terms of security threat that commonly happens in Port Klang for 
example, when the ships are in the port, barter trade vessels and fishing 
vessels, normally pass through big vessels while engaged in cargo operation. 
It increased the security threat actually. (Interview Code: 09). 
 
Another respondent who is in charge of port and seamen affairs from the same 
department, however, held an opposite view, claiming that such type of vessels are 
not a major threat for the Malaysian maritime sector.  He said: 
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For the time being, I could not see there is any form of threat. Between 
Malaysia and Indonesia for the barter trade purpose, it is point to point. We 
know their situation there. Malaysia and Indonesia is more or less like 
brothers. There is no suspicion or threat between them. It is different in 
international port. We do not know where the threats are coming from. Like 
barter trade is very special. It is like we know each other. They are depending 
on each other for their business survival. So, threat is almost zero (Interview 
Code: 07.)30  
 
 
Against this is the view of a senior official of the PKA who involves greatly in 
security matters. He considered that:  
 
Barter trade is still a problem in a sense that, barter trade vessels are not 
licensed by Malaysia. It is actually by the Indonesian government. Barter 
trade vessels are small vessels. They are about thirty meters long; most of 
them can carry about 500 tonnes of cargo or less than that. Some of these 
guys are really quite distressful looking, very sad to look at them. You will 
be surprised how they all can be licensed to carry cargo between Malaysia 
DQG ,QGRQHVLD«WKHVH JX\V DUH VR SDWKHWLF WKH\ GRQ¶W HYHQ KDYH 9+)
RQERDUG 7KH\ DFWXDOO\ FRPH KHUH WKH\ GRQ¶W GR DQ\ UHSRUWLQJ 7KH\ MXVW
come straight into the port. So who are going to control these people? We 
are not concern about these people :H JLYH SHUPLVVLRQ WR FRPH , GRQ¶W
NQRZZKRJLYHWKHPSHUPLVVLRQ8QWLOWRGD\,¶PVWLOOLQWKHGDUNZKRJDYH
them permission to come in to the port (Interview Code: 16). 
 
Another senior official responsible for implementing the ISPS Code, noted possible 
ZLGHU LPSOLFDWLRQV H[SUHVVLQJ WKH YLHZ WKDW ³\HV DEVROXWHO\ WKHUH DUH SRWHQWLDO
WKUHDWV0RVWRIWKHVPDOOMHWWLHV>DUH@ORFDWHGZLWKLQWKHUHJLRQRI0762´,QWHUYLHZ
&RGH6RPHRQHHOVHDUJXHGWKDW³LQWKH0DODFFD6WUDLWVHVSHFLDOO\EHWZHHQ3RUW
Klang and Malacca we see very much smuggling activities than anything else. It can 
EHXVHGDVRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRLQIOLFWGDQJHUWRYHVVHOVLQKDUERXUDQGYHVVHOVDORQJVLGH´
(Interview Code: 14).  
 
Even so, albeit there was a notion of danger from small vessels, one respondent 
FODLPHGWKDW3RUW.ODQJGLGQRWHQFRXQWHUDQ\EDGH[SHULHQFHIURPWKHVH³«EHFDXVH
there is marine police in our area, we have lot of departments looking after the 
security matter. Our port police will secure up to few meters away from the ZKDUI´
(Interview Code: 24). 
                                                 
30
 Historically Malaysia and Indonesia established a closed relationship for centuries due to regionalism 
and sharing of longest maritime and territorial borders. This was clarified by Tan Sri Razali Ismail who 
has been in the Malaysian Foreign Service for 40 years. See the detail in The Star Online, 24 July 2011, 
³'\QDPLFVRI0DOD\VLDQ-,QGRQHVLDQELODWHUDOWLHV´ 
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%DWHPDQ¶V DUJXPHQW DQG WKH HYLGHQFH RI 7DEOH  FRXQWHUV WKH FODLP E\ %DQODRL
DVHFXULW\H[SHUWZKRZURWHLQWKDW³6RXWKHDVW$VLDLVIDVWEHFRPLQJ
WKH ZRUOG¶V PDULWLPH WHUURULVP KRW VSRW EHFDXVH RI D YHU\ incidence of piracy and 
EXUJHRQLQJ WKUHDW RI WHUURULVP«WKH JURZLQJ QH[XV EHWZHHQ SLUDF\ DQG WHUURULVP
PDNHVPDULWLPHWHUURULVPLQ6RXWKHDVW$VLDDUHJLRQDOVHFXULW\FRQFHUQ´ 
 
Nik (2007: 14) also against BDQODRL¶VYLHZFRPPHQWV WKDW³LW LVDP\WK that 
scourges of piracy and terrorism are intertwined because terrorism has not spilled any 
EORRGLQWKH6WUDLWVRI0DODFFD´+HDVVHUWVWKDWLWLVLPSRVVLEOHIRU6RXWKHDVW$VLDQ
terrorists to cause catastrophic damage to the passageway. Arguably if the Straits 
were crippled, ships could temporarily resort to alternate routes around Lombok or 
even South of Australia. He concludes that in reality the risk of maritime terrorism in 
the SOM is very low. In line with this, Teo (2007: 546) argues that Malaysia was 
reluctant to believe there was any credible evidence to suggest a relationship between 
piracy and terrorism and therefore considered the possibility of any terrorist attack in 
its water very remote.  
 
It is noted shown in Chapter Three that the 9/11 event aggravated the fear of maritime 
terrorism. This fear had been amplified across the globe which eventually led to the 
imposition host of security regimes and additional vigilance. It can be argued, 
however, that the level of threat was exaggerated (Metaparti, 2010: 723). It is of 
relevance to highlight here that twenty-eight individual respondents who participated 
in  this research comprising both government and private sector, disputed that any 
form of terrorism threat exists in the vicinity of Port Klang waters, so supporting both 
1LNDQG7HR¶VRSLQLRQ7KLVSHUFHSWLRQRIPDULWLPHWHUURULVPDVQRWD
serious risk was accentuated by the Home Minister himself when said in May 2011 
WKDW³0DOD\VLDKDVQHYHUEHHQDWDUJHWRIDQ\WHUURULVWPRYHPHQW or militant group so 
IDU«DVRIWRGD\WKHUHLVQRUHDOFRQFHUQWKDW0DOD\VLDLVDWDUJHW´7KH6WDURQOLQH
May 2011). 
 
7KHJHQHUDOYLHZLVWKDW3RUW.ODQJ¶VVWUDWHJLFSRVLWLRQIDFLQJWKH620KDVQRWPDGH
terrorism the risk envisaged by the US and its western allies. The primary concern is 
other types of maritime crime which takes place in the close vicinity of port as well as 
outside the port area as evidenced in Table 7.1 and 7.3. One such threat is armed 
robbery. Despite piracy no longer being a significant issue in Malaysian waters, the 
 161 
IMB has reported cases of armed robbery while ships have been berthed and anchored 
in the port area. There are 5, 7, 11 and 7 cases registered in Malaysia in 2008, 2009, 
2010 and 2011 respectively (ICC-IMB Report, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011). In 
addition to ships, there are also reported attacks on ports in Malaysia. Four incidents 
were registered in 2004 and 2009 respectively in Sandakan (ICC-IMB Report, 2006 
and 2009. This was further confirmed by the head of the Marine Department who 
said: 
 
[In] Port Klang there is no threats at all. If you look at the IMB report, 
annually maybe we have a few incidents in Bintulu, Sandakan, where vessels 
are anchored have been boarded and things have been stolen. These are armed 
robber\7KH\JR WR WKH VKLS¶VFUHZ WKH\ERDUG WKHVKLS WDNH WKHYDOXDEOHV
and leave the ship (Interview Code: 05). 
 
7.2.1 Land based security threats 
 
While maritime terrorism is viewed as of low risk, land-based terrorism has been a 
big threat in Malaysia since the colonial period as noted in the preceding chapter. It 
started with communist terrorism from the Communist Party of Malaya in 1948 which 
aimed to spread communism and establish a communist state in Malaya (Bakashmar, 
2008: 480). This group was also known as the Communist Terrorist Organisation by 
the Malaysian security forces and the colonial regime. In response to this threat, the 
British regime declared a state of emergency but lifted it in 1960 after Malaya gained 
its independence (Hussin Shah, 2006: 115-117). However the group was officially 
crippled though a peace deal between the governments of Malaysia and Thailand in 
1989. Subsequent to this threat, there were many other terrorist threats stemmed 
internationally and domestically. Though the international effect was not so serious, 
the domestic one is considered perilous as the terrorists operated as home grown 
militant groups which started in the 1960s and affiliated with Al-Qaeda group. Their 
ultimate motive is to establish an independent and sovereign Islamic state (Hussin 
Shah, 2006: 112-114).  Arguably the concept of global terrorism trend espoused by 
Robertson (2007:114) could well be related in this context. He highlights that 
throughout history terrorism has operated in cycles. However after decades of 
nationalism and self-determination movements, terrorists seem to have returned to 
religious motivations in the 21st-century.  
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The religious extremism in fact posed a bigger FKDOOHQJH WR 0DOD\VLD¶V QDWLRQDO
security. In order to mitigate such form of extremism a general policy on terrorism 
was stipulated in the NSC Directive No. 18 that outlines key principals as follows: 
 
(i) to oppose all form of terrorism 
(ii) to protect the lives of hostages or possessions 
(iii) to find a solution by negotiation 
(iv) not to exchange hostages as a means of resolutions 
(v) to agree to assault operations as the final choice if negotiations fail 
(Hussin Shah, 2006: 276) 
 
As the NSC Directive provides a guideline and does not contain any legal binding 
force, the draconian legislation, Internal Security Measure Act 1960 (ISA) or Act 82 
grants full legal power to the government to arrest and detain any suspected militant 
that poses threat to national security. Seen as a preventive rather than punitive law, 
ISA allows the police to arrest individuals without warrant that threaten peace and 
security and held for 60 days for investigation (Hussin Shah, 2006: 276-277). After 60 
days the Home Minister as of Section 8 of the act can issue order a two year detention 
which states; 
 
(1) If the Minister is satisfied that the detention of any person is necessary 
with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 
security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential 
services therein or to the economic life thereof, he may make an order 
KHUHLQDIWHUUHIHUUHGWRDV³DGHWHQWLRQRUGHU´GLUHFWLQJWKDWWKDWSHUVRQEH
detained for any period not exceeding two years. 
 
 ,Q VXEVHFWLRQ  ³HVVHQWLDO VHUYLFHV´ PHDQV DQ\ VHUYLFH EXVLQHVV
trade, undertaking, manufacture or occupation included in the Third 
Schedule (Act 82, 2006:17-18). 
 
One of the components listed in the Third Schedule of this act incorporates essential 
services by taking into account port, dock, harbour services and undertakings (Act 82, 
2006: 69). Notwithstanding the act has been used for many extremist cases including 
for political reason, according to Hussin Shah (2006: 277-278) the arrest of twenty-
five members of Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) and 93 JI members involved 
in religious terrorism in 2004 was a good example of how the act brought into force in 
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maintaining law and order.31 This is further evidenced in the arrest of Abdul Haris 
Syhuhadi under the same legal instrument for suspecting involved in terrorist 
activities on 7 June 2011 (The Star Online, 7 June 2011). Although one respondent 
who is involved in policy advice argued that ISA gives the right to government to 
arrest whether or not the person poses a threat at sea, land or air, thus far it has never 
been used in the maritime sector (Interview Code: 29). What is obvious in this 
perspective is that the origin of numerous illicit activities at sea has some connection 
at land too (Mejia, 2009: 12).  
 
Generally, terrorism studies (Vaughn, et.al, 2008, Robertson, 2007 and Levin, 2006) 
demonstrate that extremists operate covertly on the land side. If the government 
overlooks this, the perpetrator could pose a potential threat to port security as well. 
With this reference, an unnoticed development among the university students 
involving both locals and foreigners alarmed the authority and challenged the level of 
national security. There were some reported cases where foreign students who came 
to Malaysia started brainwashing the local university students with an intention to turn 
into extremist. The JI terrorist group has been found in recruiting the Malaysian 
university students to participate in jihad (holy war) (The Star, 18 June 2010). This 
has prompted the Malaysian Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak to issue a 
statement which states ³ZHQHHG WRDOHUW DOO WKH WLPHDV UHFUXLWPHQWRIVWXGHQWV LQWR
H[WUHPLVWDQGPLOLWDQWJURXSVIURPWDNLQJURRWLQWKHFRXQWU\«WKRVHUHFUXLWHGZLOOEH
LQIOXHQFHG WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ WHUURULVW DFWLYLWLHV IRU FHUWDLQ REMHFWLYHV´ 1HZV 6WUDLWV
Times, 17 June 2010). Although the Home Minister assured that there is no serious 
terrorist threat in the country particularly affecting the maritime sector, the Prime 
0LQLVWHU¶V view however, indicatives that there is a possibility of such menace 
endangering the country.  
 
In analytical point of view, this type of incident provides a practical example of what 
Robertson (2007: 14) argues that terrorist typically recruits young educated people to 
                                                 
31
 Due to public outcry that the ISA is an arbitrary law and it also been abused in the pretext of national 
security IRUSROLWLFDOUHDVRQWRVLOHQWGLVVHQWLQJYRLFHVDJDLQVWWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGLQIULQJHVDSHUVRQ¶V
right to a fair trial (The Malaysian Insider, 7 June 2011), eventually prompted the government to repeal 
the Act and replaces with two new acts, deemed suitable and provide a balance between individual 
rights, civil liberty and safeguards the public order. (The Star Online, 16 September 2011, The Star 
Online, 25 December 2011 and The Star Online, 12 March 2012).  As a first step to do away with the 
ISA, the Parliament tabled a new Bill called the Security Offences (Special Measures) Bill 2012 for 
first reading on 10 April 2012 (Star Online, 10 April 2012). 
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fight for social inequalities and injustice and seek ways to correct the imbalance. He 
IXUWKHUSRLQWVRXWWKDW³KLJKHUHGXFDWLRQPLJKWLQIDFWPDNHSRWHQWLDOWHUURULVWVPRUH
DZDUH RI DQG VHQVLWLYH WR GLVFULPLQDWLRQ DQG LQHTXDOLW\«WHUURULVP LV DQ RFFXSDWLRQ
for the young, the idealistic, and the naïve. Most terrorists either recruits or 
YROXQWHHUVWHQGWREHLQWKHLUV´5REHUWVRQ 
 
Correspondingly, a senior official from an enforcement agency VWDWHG ³WKH UHFHQW
incident of terrorism in universities is another indication that it started there and not in 
villages. You neeGWRFRQWUROWKHHGXFDWHGSHRSOHWKDQWKHYLOODJHUV´,QWHUYLHZ&RGH
13). This view implies that these extremist would easily spread their influence 
through any means and possibly target any weakest link along the supply chain. 
However another official who involves heavily in policy making denied that this issue 
has any direct consequences for port security, yet EHOLHYHGWKDW³LIWKH\ZDQWWRSRVHD
threat, they pose a threat anywhere and there is heightened  tension in the country 
given recent developmentV´,QWHUYLHZ&RGH 
 
Nevertheless, port security is embedded within a transportation system involving 
various modes (rail, air, water and road). Since the movement of goods and people 
increasingly relies on the intermodal system, with a container transferring many times 
in the course of its journey (Szyliowicz, 2004: 355), any carelessness would have a 
profound implication for ports if extremism on the land side went unchecked.  The 
comment made by one respondent who provides policy advice to the government is 
worth mentioning here. He said: 
 
Terrorism is the future challenge. It can happen if it is unchecked. Because 
like I said, if no matter how best the system you put in, there are ways and 
means for terrorist making into the country by various means by onboard of 
the vessel, by plane, or they smuggle themselves into the country. Even 
today if you notice [that] people from Afghanistan coming into KLIA 
[Kuala Lumpur International Airport] and suddenly they disappear. They 
came in without going against our law. And when they landed in Malaysia 
through tourist visa, they then disappear (Interview Code: 03). 
 
 
In overall perspective in connection to land based security threats however, the Prime 
Minister Datuk Seri Najib issued a new statement on 3 February 2012 by assuring 
that terrorist threat has been contained well in the country. He mentioned: 
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Terrorism has failed to find a footing in Malaysia because of pro-active and 
pre-emptive measures taken by authorities to weed out those with extreme 
EHOLHIV«WKRVHZLWKPLOLWDQWLGHRORJLHVZRXOGKDYHWR³SUDFWLFH¶WKHLUEHOLHI
HOVHZKHUH WKDQNV WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V VWULFW FRQWURO 7KLV LV RQH RI WKH
reasons why there are no serious terrorists in the country (The Star Online, 3 
February 2012).  
 
 
7.3 The institutional framework for the ISPS Code 
 
One of the international measures that Malaysia uses to enhance port security is the 
adoption and implementation of the ISPS Code. It is therefore necessary to have an 
understanding of the institutional arrangements introduced in connection with this.  
 
Decisions pertaining to most of the international maritime conventions such as 
SOLAS were entrusted to the MOT in the ratification process. The core responsibility 
of the MOT involves planning, formulating and implementing policies related to the 
national maritime industry including the port sector. The principal policy areas are 
maritime safety and security, shipping and protection of the marine environment 
(Malaysia Maritime Dossier, 2010: 3).  
 
Since merchant marine issues fall under the MOT, the Marine Department that 
functions under the aegis of the MOT has been assigned as an implementing agency 
for policies formulated at ministerial level. Its core duties include regulating the safety 
of ships and navigation, maritime transport security, training and certification of 
seafarers and preventing pollution from ships. The department has the primary 
objective of enhancing the national maritime sector by establishing a system for safe 
and secure sea lanes of communication and marine conservancy. As such, the 
department requires implementing and enforcing all the IMO instruments that are 
ratified, including all relevant national laws (Malaysia Maritime Dossier, 2010: 13). 
In addition to this, the five Federal port authorities, namely Klang Port Authority, 
Penang Port Commission, Johor Port Authority, Bintulu Port Authority and Kuantan 
Port Authority have been assigned responsibility for the regulatory function of their 
respective ports. Figure 7.1 shows the organizational structure of the MOT. 
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Minister of Transport Malaysia 
Deputy Minister 
Secretary-General 
Maritime Division Marine Department Malaysia 
Maritime Attaché, IMO 
Headquarters 
Klang Port Authority 
Penang Port Commission 
Johor Port Authority 
Bintulu Port Authority 
Kuantan Port Authority 
Figure 7.1: Organisational Chart of the Ministry of Transport  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Malaysia Maritime Dossier, 2010: 4 
 
 
Within the Maritime Division of the MOT, there are several sub-units responsible for 
various marine matters. Figure 7.2 provides a general overview of the segmentation of 
the Maritime Division. 
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Undersecretary,  
Maritime Division 
Ports Unit Maritime Attaché, IMO 
Headquarters 
Maritime Safety Unit 
Maritime Economy Unit 
International Conventions Unit 
Domestic Shipping Licensing 
Board Secretariat 
Figure 7.2: Organisational Chart of the Maritime Division,  
Ministry of Transport 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Malaysia Maritime Dossier, 2010: 5 
 
 
In view of sensitive nature of security, there appears to be some complexities in the 
way security policies are delegated in the Maritime Division of the MOT. Although 
port security is regarded as imperative for all Federal ports particularly, within the 
organisational arrangement, the MOT did not create a specific unit for security 
primarily because the Ports Unit in the Maritime Division is given responsibility for 
all policy issues pertaining to Federal ports. The Unit then delegates the related policy 
decisions made at the Ministry level to all Federal port authorities for implementation. 
However, since the Marine Department holds the responsibility as the DA for the 
ISPS Code implementation (as explained below), the Ports Unit has to liaise with the 
Marine Department to carry out the required security policies effectively. This means 
that the Ports Unit has a limited role or no direct control of port security measures at 
the Federal ports. The lack of co-ordination with the individual port authorities creates 
difficulties for the Ports Units in monitoring the outcome of the security measures in a 
close manner. In addition to this, at the national level, the government established the 
NCS under the PrimH 0LQLVWHU¶V 'HSDUWPHQW WR PDQDJH all the security issues in a 
wider spectrum. This type of segmented arrangement however seemed have some 
implications which will be deliberated in the following chapter (Chapter Eight).   
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In relation to implementation of the ISPS Code, the MOT has responsibility for policy 
matters while the Marine Department is the enforcing agency. As the Code involves a 
security issue, the NSC is also connected. At the institutional level there were some 
difficulties in deciding which agency to lead the ISPS implementation. According to 
-D¶DIDU 07: 200) the initial idea to assign the Marine Department as the DA was 
objected to strongly by the RMP. The RMP argued that it would be inappropriate for 
the DA to share classified security intelligence information with other agencies in 
order to fulfil the requirement of the ISPS Code. As the ISPS Code stipulates that it is 
the duty of the Contracting Governments to set three different levels of security at any 
particular time which requires intelligence sharing among the related agencies, such a 
condition did not fit well with the RMP. In Malaysia, the security intelligence role is 
usually performed exclusively by the Special Branch Department under the RMP. 
With such strong objections from the police force, even given the existing functions 
of the Marine Department, conflict still arose at the outset as to who should be 
DSSRLQWHG DV WKH '$ LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH &RGH¶V UHTXLUHPHQW 2QH UHVSRQGHQW
involved in the ISPS process in the Marine Department asserted: 
 
The main issue was who is going to become the '$«:KHQZHVDLGWKDW
we are willing to become the DA, there were lot of questions coming out 
WKDW ZH DUH QRW D XQLIRUPHG DJHQF\ KRZ FDQ ZH EHFRPH WKH '$«
Agencies start questioning who are we to become the DA because we are 
not a uniformed body. We have to start explaining to them that this is 
nothing to do with guns or firearms (Interview Code: 06). 
 
 
Since the ISPS Code does not pertain to the use of arms, such as by armed forces, and 
neither imposes any condition that it should be implemented by uniformed services, 
the government, through NSC which chaired the ISPS Security Committee, eventually 
decided that Marine Department was the appropriate agency recognising that its core 
functions are closely related to the ISPS requirements.  
 
The specific responsibility of the DA was subsequently stipulated in Part V, Section 
249D of Merchant Shipping (Amendment and Extension) Act 2007 where the Code 
was transposed into national legislation by amending the Merchant Shipping 
Ordinance 1952. The Act was endorsed by the Parliament and came in force as Act 
A1316 on 24 December 2008 (Act A1316, 2008). The DA duties are to approve the 
ship security assessment and plan and the maritime transport security area assessment 
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and plan; to verify the compliance of maritime transport security areas; to exercise 
control and compliance with security measures to be adopted at the different declared 
VHFXULW\OHYHOWRQRWLI\WKHFRPSDQ\VKLS¶VPDVWHURURSHUDWRURIDGHVLJQDWHGPDULQH
facility the security level declared for the ship; to declare any area or part of an area in 
Malaysian waters as a maritime transport security area.  
 
It is worth noting that the NSC holds the lead responsibility for coordinating the 
response to various types of natural disaster such as floods at national level. It has the 
authority to mobilize different security forces including the Royal Malaysian Navy, 
MMEA, RMP and numerous other government agencies when the situation warrants 
greater attention and resources (Osnin, 2009: 338). For the ISPS Code national 
security requirement, the NSC holds the chairmanship of the National Level Security 
Committee by determining the security level in consultation with its committee 
members. Members of this committee include representatives of the MOT, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Marine Department, Armed Forces, MMEA, RMP, Research 
'HSDUWPHQWRI WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V'HSDUWPHQW ,QWHOOLJHQFH'HSDUWPHQW&XVWRPV
&KLHI *RYHUQPHQW 6HFXULW\ 2IILFH RI WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V 'HSDUWPHQW 0DULQH
Police, Immigration, Fire and Rescue Department and Department of Environment.    
 
7.4 The difference between the ISPS Code (Act A1316) and Act 298 
 
Following implementation of the ISPS Code, Port Klang was subjected to an 
additional auditing process as mandated by this. It means that each year the port 
undergoes two types of auditing process, one for domestic and the other for 
international purposes (Interview Code: 09).  
 
According to a respondent involved in implementation of the ISPS Code, since Port 
Klang was already observing a strict port security measure through the Protected 
Areas and Protected Places Act 1959 (Act 298), when the ISPS came into force, the 
port found it rather easy to comply: 
 
They [Federal ports] actually had all the procedures like access control all 
that. The only thing is that they did not document it in accordance with the 
ISPS programme. So when this ISPS came, we told the major ports and 
when they look at it they said they have no problem for them. They said we 
can comply. The only thing is to re-document it into our system as 
according to ISPS Code because for them there is no security level before 
WKH,636&RGH«EXWZKHQWKHVHFXULW\OHYHO>LV@KHLJKWHQHGWROHYHOWZRDQG
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three then they have to do additional enforcement. So for those ports, 
security is just added few extra continuum. The fencing all that is already in 
place before that. So [for a ] major port is not a problem (interview Code: 
06).   
 
Even so, despite the fact that the port implemented the ISPS Code without much 
problem, when the security level is heightened from Level One to Level Two and 
Three, additional external support is needed particularly at Level Three. The Federal 
government through the NSC is involved directly, deploying various enforcement 
agencies to mitigate the impending risk. Figure 7.3 illustrates the three levels of 
security arrangement under the ISPS Code in the Malaysian context. At Level One 
where the security is in normal condition, the Marine Department as the DA takes 
charge of the security and requires the shipping lines and port authorities to report 
directly to them if there is any threatening incident in the port. When there is a 
heightened risk of a security incident, the security level will be increased to Level 
Two. During this situation, the Marine Department will report directly to NCS and 
NCS then relay to other key security organisations such the Police, MMEA and 
Armed Forces the need to be alert and control the situation. However, when the 
situation has lasted for a period and it is considered that there is a probable or 
imminent risk of a security incident, the NSC will increase the security level to Level 
Three. It then tasks all the key agencies and coordinates simultaneously to take the 
appropriate actions to contain the situation.    
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Security level 1 (Normal) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security Level 2 (Heightened) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security Level 3 (Imminent) 
Security Level 1 ( or al) 
Figure 7.3: Security Levels of the ISPS Code implementation in Malaysia 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Peraturan Tetap Operasi Majlis Keselamatan Negara (Standard Operating Procedure  
of the National Security Council), ISPS Code, (n.d.): 26-28  
 
As already made clear, all Federal ports in Malaysia including Port Klang had 
established advanced security infrastructures and manpower resources prior to 9/11 as 
mandated by the domestic law. This has consequently eased the expenses burden 
when the ISPS Code came into force. As one senior respondent responsible for the 
ISPS Code implementation commented: 
Marine Department 
Shipping Lines/Port Authorities 
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Even before this, the security already existed. We only updated according 
the ISPS requirement. Each port here has already taken measures at their 
respective port. There is redundancy between the requirements of National 
Security Council under the Protected Area Act because they take action 
according to their own act. Their requirement is to protect the things from 
any trespassing and illegal entry or smuggling. But under the ISPS we not 
RQO\ SURWHFW EXW DOVR QHHG WR JHW LQWHOOLJHQFH LQIRUPDWLRQ 7KDW¶V PDGH D
little difference. In terms of structure, is almost the same (Interview Code: 
08) 
 
Table 7.4 briefly illustrates the main difference in port security measures between the 
Act 298 and the ISPS Code. 
 
Table 7.4: The Difference Between Act 298 and the ISPS Code 
 
Act 298 ISPS Code ± Act A1316 
Any area that appears to be necessary or 
expedient that special measures should be 
taken to control the movement and 
conduct of persons, the Minster may 
declare the area to be protected area.  
The Designated Authority (DA) ± who is 
the Marine Department declares or ceases 
any area or part of an area in Malaysia 
and Malaysian waters as a maritime 
transport security area. 
Adhere to the guidelines as required by 
CGSO. 
Adhere to the guidelines as required by 
DA. 
Maritime facilities covered on land site 
only. 
Maritime facilities covered both land and 
port waters. 
There is no security level 1,2 and 3. There is security level 1,2 and 3. 
There is no drill. There is drill and exercise. 
Protect port from trespassing, illegal 
entry, smuggling. 
Protect port from trespassing, illegal 
entry, smuggling and need to get 
intelligence information.  
Source: Compiled from Interview Code: 08, 09, 06 and 23 
 
Despite there are some differences between these two instruments as one initiated 
based on national jurisdiction and the other is mandated by the IMO for international 
requirement, 0DOD\VLD¶V SURDFWLYH PHDsure indicates that considerable thought and 
attention have been given to safeguard the port from any form of security threats. This 
advance arrangement much earlier than the ISPS Code provided a solid platform to 
carry out the international practice without much resistance or difficulties.   
 
7.5 Implementation of the ISPS Code  
 
Technically, amendments to Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952 for incorporating the 
ISPS Code were carried out in a pragmatic way. According to the respondent directly 
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responsible for the implementation, the Malaysian government literally adopted the 
whole ISPS Code and legislated as Act A1316. Nonetheless additional clauses such as 
penalties and port authority responsibility were included with the international 
requirements to further strengthen the practicality of the Code in line with the national 
environment. This makes the practical application of the ISPS Code in Malaysia more 
robust than the standard international requirements or practices.  Such expansion has 
to be viewed in the WRWDOFRQWH[WRI0DOD\VLD¶s serious commitment in matters relating 
to security. The government is very particular about any issue that touches on national 
security, trading and foreign policy. The main reason for the ISPS extension is 
explained further below.  
 
The Code was introduced as an international framework for the SOLAS 1974 
FRQWUDFWLQJSDUWLHVWREHDGRSWHGLQQDWLRQDOFRQWH[WE\DIILUPLQJWKDW³LWLVUHFRJQL]HG
that the extent to which the guidance applies may vary depending on the nature of the 
SRUWIDFLOLW\DQGRIWKHVKLSLWVWUDGHDQGRUFDUJR´,636&RGH+RZHYHU
the Code limited the definition of port facilities solely to the ship/port interface only 
(ISPS Code, 2003: 4). In the Malaysian context, the government widened its scope by 
expanding application beyond the port and ship interface. This is mainly for the 
reason that on the land side, the whole port facilities are regulated under the Act 298 
for essential services which provided a good ground for a smooth implementation of 
the Code. But at sea, ships calling at Northport, Westport and Star Cruise Terminal 
are required to share one common anchorage point as a waiting area before berthing 
alongside. This area is referred to as the Maritime Transport Security Area. To suit 
security needs under the ISPS mandate, Act A1316 grants the responsibility to the 
port authority to take charge of such an area beyond the immediate port/ship interface. 
As such, port security covers port facility as well as port area.  
 
While the terminal operators take charge of their own facility security at the land site 
and a range of 50 to 100 meters towards the waterside as a restricted area, beyond this 
point up to the anchorage is the responsibility of the port authority. One respondent 
who is very knowledgeable in the ISPS matters explained: 
 
In Malaysia, it is unique where they share the anchorage point and none of 
them is actually want to take the responsibility to take care of this area. 
Because the anchorage area is a common area, that is why the Port Klang 
Authority comes into picture, where the Port Klang Authority will act as a 
 174 
Port Area Security Officer which is responsible for the anchorage point 
approaches. Since they [PKA] are the authority they also take part in 
ensuring the whole security under their purview. That is why it is unique in 
Malaysia because we share the areas...because users share the anchorage 
point, nobody has actually taken the responsibility. That is why the Port 
Klang Authority comes into the picture and we have port area. That part of 
WKH ZRUOG >GLIIHUHQW FRXQWULHV@ , GRQ¶W WKLQN WKH\ KDYH SRUW DUHD OLNH
WKLV«3RUW$UHD6HFXULW\2IILFHU3$62QRZUHIHUVDV0DULWLPH7UDQVSRUW
Security Officer (MTSO) (Interview Code: 09).    
 
In Malaysia, WKH ZRUG µSRUW IDFLOLW\¶ DV SURSRsed by the Code has been changed to 
µPDULQH IDFLOLW\¶ LQFRUSRUDWLQJ WKH DUHD EH\RQG the port and the ship interface as 
prescribed by Section 249A, Act A1316;  
 
(a) an area of land, water or other supporting surface used, designed, 
prepared, equipped or set apart for use, either in whole or in part, for the 
arrival, departure, movement or servicing of vessels; 
 
(b) a building or installation and equipment in the area associated with it or 
used or set apart for handling or storing goods that have been or are 
destined to be transported on a vessel; 
 
(c) equipment and facilities used to provide services relating to marine 
transportation; 
 
(d) a fixed and floating structure, including an offshore industry structure; 
 
(e) an off-shore industry mobile unit. 
 
Correspondingly the port authority employee referred to as the Port Area Security 
Officer (PASO) before the Act A1316 came into force became the Maritime 
Transport Security Officer (MTSO) and the port operator employee is the Maritime 
Facility Security Officer (MFSO) rather than the Port Facility Security Officer 
(PFSO).  Under this act, the authority is given a heavy responsibility which has not 
EHHQVSHOOHGRXWDQ\ZKHUH LQ WKH&RGH IRU LQWHUQDWLRQDOSUDFWLFH%XW LQ0DOD\VLD¶V
case: 
 
Everything is authority that is MTSO. In the Code, there is no mention of 
DXWKRULW\ ,W¶V PRUH WR '$ GLUHFW WR IDFLOLW\ %XW LQ 0DOD\VLD ZH KDYH
authority. 90% of our Act refers to the role of authority. The other 10% of it 
discusses about the implementation.  The authority is the Port Authority 
(Interview Code: 08).   
 
 175 
While the Act A1316 requires the MFSO prepares the Marine Facility Security Plan 
(MFSP) for the area covered by the terminal operators, The Act mandates the MTSO 
to draw up a Maritime Transport Security Area Security Plan (MTSASP). This plan 
covers a much bigger area and going beyond the marine facility by taking into 
account waterways, anchorage areas, and marine service providers such as pilot boats, 
bunker boats, tugboats, water barges and mooring boats which is not addressed by the 
MFSO in preparing the MFSP. 
 
In the case of those ports which are not under the purview of any port authority, the 
responsibility is given to the Marine Department to undertake the task of the MTSO. 
In 2011 all together there were 20 MTSO and 90 MFSO throughout Malaysia as 
shown in Appendix VI (interview Code: 09).)   
 
Figure 7.4 LOOXVWUDWHV0DOD\VLD¶V,636&RGHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQVWUXFWXUH 
 
Figure 7.4: The ISPS Code Implementation Structure in Malaysia 
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 Source: Modified from Osnin, 2009: 339 
 
As explained earlier, since Malaysia is a party to the SOLAS 1974 Convention, the 
country is obligated to implement the ISPS Code as mandated by the IMO. In this 
regard the NSC takes charge as the Chairman of Security Committee and shares the 
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policy direction with the MOT. The MOT then implements the policy through the 
Marine Department which operates under its purview. As an appointed DA, the 
Marine Department takes the full responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the 
Code in all the Federal as well as the state ports. In this circumstance, both the MTSO 
and the MFSO are required to abide by all instructions given by the DA. They are also 
VXEMHFWHGWRWKH'$¶VLQLWLDODXGLWRIWKHVHFXULW\DVVHVVPHQWDQGSODQEHIRUHJHWWLQJ
the Statement of Compliance (SOC) to certify that the port facility is ISPS compliant. 
The SOC is valid for five years. Before its expiry, the DA will carry out unscheduled 
audits either in the second, the third or the fourth year and a renewal audit in the final 
year. While the DA carries out the auditing process for both the MTSO and MFSO, 
the MTSO will conduct its own internal audit with the MFSO as the terminal is 
answerable to the port authority directly. Since the Code mandated ships too required 
a security certificate called the International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) to 
certify as the ISPS compliant, the Marine Department has appointed seven private 
shipping companies as the RSO for this purpose. They are; American Bureau 
Shipping (ABS), Det Norske Veritas (DNV), Germanischer Lloyds (GL), Lloyds 
Register (LR), Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK),  Bereau Veritas (BV), Ship 
Classification of Malaysia (SCM) (interview Code: 09). 
 
The appointed RSOs take charge of issuing the ISSC certificate for ships through 
various auditing and verification process. The Marine Department maintains a close 
relationship with these RSOs and did not relinquish its full responsibility to them, 
instead it established some form of monitoring. It was explained, however, by an 
official of the Marine DepDUWPHQW WKDW ³WKH 0DULQH 'HSDUWPHQW KDV HVWDEOLVKHG
cooperation with each of these RSOs and at any time we can follow with them for 
auditing. But rarely do we involve because of time constraint. The Marine Department 
will not do the audit but just be an obVHUYHU´,QWHUYLHZ&RGH 
 
When the ISPS Code was implemented, the Malaysian government went further by 
not confining its application to passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft, 
ships above 500 gross tonnage and port facilities serving such ships engaged on 
international voyages but also included floating storage offloading (FSO) and floating 
SURGXFWLRQVWRUDJHRIIORDGLQJ)3627KHVHDUHµVWDJQDQW¶VKLSVWKDWSURYLGHVWRUDJH
facilities for oil rigged under the sea. As one respondent in charge of the ISPS 
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enforcement in the Marine Department mentioned, ³DERXW WKLV IDFLOLWLHV LQ RWKHU
FRXQWULHV,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKH\FHUWLI\WKH)62)62LVQRWDFWXDOO\PRELOHGULOOLQJXQLW
They are actually floating objects. In Malaysia we have eleven FPS2 DQG )62´
(interview Code: 09).   
 
Another interesting aspect of the ISPS practice in Malaysia is that the Act A1316 
imposes punishments for non-compliance, whereas the Code proper did not mention 
anywhere any form of penalties. A senior official from the Marine Department who 
has a good knowledge of the ISPS Code explained, ³LQ WKH &RGH WKHUH LV QR
imposition of fine or penalty. But in the act there is penalty. If you fail to comply then 
they have to pay the penalty. The fine ranges from RM25,000 [USD8,065] to 
RM50,000 [USD16,130]-DLOLVIRUWKUHHWRILYHWKUHH\HDUV,W¶VDOOEDVHGRQWKHDFW
7KH DFW KDV WR UHDG WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKH &RGH´ ,QWHUYLHZ &RGH  7KLV ZDV D
reference to Section 249M of the Act. 
 
Further, Section 249R of the Act states; 
 
(1) The company, master of a ship, Maritime Transport Security Officer or 
operator of a designated marine facility shall report immediately to the 
Designated Authority upon the occurrence of the following security 
incidents: 
 
(a) an explosion that is not the result of an accident; 
(b) a bomb threat, armed attack, hostage taking, stowaway or hijacking; or 
(c) any breach of security. 
 
(2) Any company, master of a ship, Maritime Transport Security Officer or 
operator of a designated marine facility who fails to report the security 
incident shall be liable for each offence to a fine not exceeding fifty 
thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or 
to both. 
 
 
Despite the fact that maritime terrorism is not considered a serious threat in Malaysia, 
the extension of security beyond ship/port interface and imposition of heavy 
penalties, neither of which are required by the Code, may be intended to demonstrate 
WKH0DOD\VLDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VVHULRXVFRPPLWPHQWWRUHDOLVLQJWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHJLPH
in a local context. There are three reasons to explain this. Firstly, it is due to the 
historical background. Before attaining independence, Malaysia encountered 
numerous types of threats originated from communist insurgency and other forms of 
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land-based terrorism as explained earlier. Such pressures prompted harsh legislative 
measures to maintain law and order. This precedent was reflected in the 
implementation of the ISPS Code at the national level with the notion of creating fear 
in potential wrong doers. Secondly, Malaysia was attempting to demonstrate to the 
international community especially to the US its strict port security measures. This 
was particularly expected from its major trading partners by the US and reflected 
0DOD\VLD¶VSRVLWLRQDVWKHnineteenth largest trading partner of the US (See Table 7.5 
below). Thirdly, the spirit of sovereignty holds strongly among the ASEAN member 
states encouraging Malaysia to demonstrate its determination to defend its security 
from any form of infringements. The issue of sovereignty and its significance for 
0DOD\VLD¶VPDULWLPHVHFXULW\LVFRQVLGHUHGIXUWKHUin Para 7.9 below.   
 
7.6 Port Klang Authority - MTSO 
 
As the legally appointed MTSO, the PKA has responsibility for four facilities under 
its portfolio - Northport, Westport, Jetty Sultah Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Power Station 
and Star Cruise Terminal.32 In addition, the area of jurisdiction extends to Port of 
Tanjung Bruas, Malacca by virtue of the 3.$¶V ([WHQVLRQ RI )XQFWLRQ WR 3RUW RI
Malacca) Order 1986 (Interview Code: 16 and 17). 
 
In meeting the legal duties of the MTSO, PKA has been assigned the chairmanship of 
Port Klang Maritime Transport Security Area Security Committee (PKMTSASC). 
The committee was established in line with the provision section 249G (3) Act 1316 
which says; 
 
(1) The Designated Authority may appoint a Maritime Transport Security 
Officer in respect of a maritime transport security area. 
 
(2) The Maritime Transport Security Officer shall be responsible for the 
development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the maritime 
transport security area security assessment and maritime transport security 
area security plan. 
 
(3) The Maritime Transport Security Officer may establish a committee to 
monitor and coordinate security matters within the maritime transport 
security area. 
                                                 
32
 Jetty Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Power Station or simply known as Kapar Power Station is a 
facility that provides importation of coal and oil for the utility industry, Tenaga Nasional Berhad which 
located in the North Klang Straits. Star Cruise Terminal is a dedicated cruise terminal providing 
berthing services for passenger cruises.    
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The main objective of this committee is to build awareness of potential threats to 
Maritime Transport Security Areas, identify those threats, improve security 
procedures, promote coordinating and reduce any vulnerability. The committee must 
convene a meeting at least once a year or as and when required. (Interview Code: 
17).33  
 
Act A1316 Section 249G stipulates that: 
 
(2) The Maritime Transport Security Officer shall be responsible for the 
development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the maritime 
transport security area security assessment and maritime transport security 
area security plan. 
 
(3) The Maritime Transport Security Officer may establish a committee to 
monitor and coordinate security matters within the maritime transport 
security area. 
 
:KLOH WKH\ DUH DFFRXQWDEOH IRU 3RUW .ODQJ¶V DUHD WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI the MFSO 
under Section 249H (3) of Act A1316 is: 
 
The Marine Facility Security Officer shall be responsible for the 
development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the marine 
facility security assessment and marine facility security plan, and for liaison 
with the Ship Security Officers and Company Security Officers.  
 
The area covered by the MTSO includes all buildings, stretches of roads, installations, 
jetties and internal and external wave-breaker facilities within the perimeter fences of 
                                                 
 
33
 Member of the PKMTSASC comprises of representatives from the government and private agencies. 
They are:  
(i) Northport 
(ii) Westport 
(iii) Port Klang Cruise Centre 
(iv) Kapar Energy Ventures 
(v) SPPG (M) Sdn Bhd 
(vi) CGSO ± State of Selangor 
(v) Marine Department ± Central Region 
(vi) Royal Police ± Special Branch Deparment 
(vii) Royal Police ± Marine Deparment 
(viii) Royal Customs 
(ix) Immigration Department 
(x) MMEA 
(xi) Health Department 
(xii) Shipping Agents (Interview Code: 17) 
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WKH0)62¶VVHFXULW\DUHDVWUHWFKLQJ50 to 100 meters towards the sea within an area 
of 2,045 acres in the District of Klang (Interview Code: 17). 
 
Since the 0762LVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUIDFLOLWLHVDQGDUHDEH\RQGWHUPLQDO¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\
the DA will issue a separate SOC to PKA in addition to MFSO as mentioned earlier. 
This requires the PKA to prepare its own security assessment and plan in order to get 
SOC. On this, a DA official commented: 
 
If the authority fails to comply then they have to pay the penalty. So the DA 
LVVXHV WZR 62&¶V RQH IRU WKH DXWKRULW\ DQG RQH IRU IDFLOLW\ ,I DQ\WKLQJ
happens to the facility and they failed to report, both the facility and 
authority will be compounded. That is why the authority has to know each 
facility under their control. That is why under our act the authority is known 
as Port Area Security Officer [later changed to MTSO] and it is mentioned 
in our Act 1316. But this is not stipulated in the ISPS Code (Interview Code: 
08). 
 
The choice of the actual MTSO is in the hands of the DA which appoints a named 
individual. However this created some anxiety in the appointee in view of harsh 
penalties for breaching their responsibility, going beyond the ISPS Code proper. As a 
consequence, a senior security official of the PKA stated: 
 
I was appointed personally as the MTSO. This scares me. If there is any non 
compliance or breach of any provision, I will be penalised or summoned. 
The penalty is RM50,000 [USD16,130]. This charge is for failing to adhere 
to the Act. Because this is a national Act, the appointment is done by name, 
a personal appointment. It is done by the Marine Department. They 
appointed me as the MTSO not PKA as the MTSO (Interview Code: 17). 
 
Looking at a critical stand point however, this type of fear imposes more pressure and 
alertness to those holding the key responsibilities in security matters. Further, such a 
move is expected to avoid them for having a lackadaisical attitude in order to 
maintain the required security standard since the Malaysian government intends to 
demonstrate a good security practice as noted above.    
 
Apart from securing the port facilities, the MTSO is also responsible in monitoring 
the arrival of ships in Port Klang for security reason. The Act A1316 under Section 
249O UHTXLUHVWKDW³HYHU\PDVWHURIDVKLSVKDOOUHSRUWWRWKH0DULWLPH7UDQVSRUW
Security Officer before entering any designated marine facility within a maritime 
transport VHFXULW\ DUHD LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH SUHVFULEHG SURFHGXUHV´, For this 
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purpose, the PKA Security Department issued a Pre-Arrival Notification (PAN) using 
the NPM38/2010 form. Under this arrangement, the PKA must receive the PAN not 
less than 48 hours prior to arrival of all ships (except for ships RQµVKRUWFDOO¶IURP
the shipping agent or master via email or fax before the ship is allowed to enter the 
port (Annual Report of Port Klang Authority, 2010, 55).  
 
Despite the PKA retaining its regulatory function and continuing to be responsible for 
port security in Port Klang after the privatisation, inadequate staffing in Security Unit 
was one of a critical factor that created some concern for effective security 
enforcement. As stated in the monthly bulletin of PKA (Gateway, 2011: 16), the PKA 
operates with a capacity of 60 to 70 staff. The Regulatory Division comprises of five 
departments; the Marine Operations, Security, Fire, Dangerous Goods and Free Zone 
and it is given the responsibility for overseeing and regulating all shipping and 
maritime activities within the port limit (Gateway, 2011: 16). Figure 7.5 provides the 
organisational chart of Security Department (Auxiliary Police) of the PKA since 2009 
to present (2011). As compared to Figure 6.1 with minimal workforce as seen in the 
previous chapter, there was a little expansion in the department since 2009 in view of 
the ISPS need. A drawback of such arrangement is that the personnel of Security 
Department are also responsible for the Fire Services. Within this combination, the 
head of the Security Department; Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) is 
appointed as the MTSO.  
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Figure 7.5: Organisational Chart of the Security 
Department, Port Klang Authority (2009 ± 2011) 
 
 
  
Source: Compiled from Interview Code: 17 
 
 
7.7 Port Klang ± Securing the supply chain 
 
The following section discusses other security measures going beyond the ISPS Code.  
 
7.7.1 Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
 
It has previously been argued that ports do not function as stand alone entities but as 
components in supply chain management. While the ISPS Code may be regarded as 
the epitome of international port security measure, the US-led measures such as the 
CSI, CTPAT and Megaport are national measures having a global effect. The US 
considered some of its measures, especially the CSI, as indispensable for the global 
trade chain, given the strategy to secure its border from any potential terrorist threat 
using containers (Container Security Initiative, 2006: 6). Furthermore, given the fact 
that security standards vary greatly from country to country, it is much easier to place 
any illicit or dangerous material into a container and have it shipped to other 
destinations. Since the container is usually transferred several times in the course of 
its journey, there is a possibility for any perpetrators to tamper with one unit, mixed 
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up amid thousands of other similar containers. Therefore locating and intercepting the 
one with the dangerous content is not a simple matter (Szyliowicz, 2004: 355).  
 
As explained in Chapter Four, the CSI was introduced in January 2002 with the initial 
goal to establish this in the twenty largest container seaports of the world with the 
largest volume of exports to the US (US Customs Border and Protection, 2011). 
Considering Malaysia is one of the major trading nations of the US, the Malaysian 
government has made every effort to be part of the programme and Port Klang and 
PTP have been identified for this purpose.   
 
MalaysiD¶V LQWHUHVW WR SDUWLFLSDWH WKLV SURJUDPPH VKRXOG EH YLHZHG LQ D EURDGHU
context by looking at its relationship with the US in terms of foreign policy. 
*HQHUDOO\WKHFHQWUDOWHQHWRI0DOD\VLD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\LVWRXSKROGWKHSULQFLSOHVRI
³VRYHUHLJQW\ DQd mutual respect for territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, and 
non-LQWHUIHUHQFH LQ GRPHVWLF DIIDLUV RI RWKHU FRXQWULHV´ $XVWUDOLDQ *RYHUQPHQW
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012). In addition, the government also 
PDLQWDLQV ³HTXLGLVWDQW foreign policy that enables the government to exercise 
µIOH[LELOLW\¶LQVDIHJXDUGLQJWKHQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW´1HVDGXUDLE\DGDSWLQJWR
the existing world order (Khalid, K.M., 2011: 433). Such principles have encouraged 
Malaysia to maintain a good bilateral relationship with the US in a range of 
endeavours including trade, defence and security and combating transnational crimes 
since the 1970s (Nesadurai, 2004: 25). Although the bilateral relationship in general is  
positive, it is murky during the Mahathir Administration characterised as a 
µFRPELQDWLRQ RI FULWLFLVP DQG FRRSHUDWLRQ¶ (Nesadurai, 2004: 1), KRZHYHU ³PXFK
clarity was restored not only by Abdullah but also Najib, who continues to build 
stronger ties with the Obama administration´.KDOLG, K.M., 2011: 449).34 In essence, 
ZKLOH VXVWDLQLQJ WKLV DPLFDEOH UHODWLRQVKLS 0DOD\VLD KROGV WKH SROLF\ RI µUHMHFWLQJ
GRPLQDQFHHPEUDFLQJHQJDJHPHQW¶ZLWKWKH861HVDGXUDL 
 
                                                 
34
 Malaysia has been administered by six Prime Ministers since independence in 1957. Following is the 
order: 
(a) Tunku Abdul Rahma (1957 ± 1970) 
(b) Tun Abdul Razak (1970 ± 1976) 
(c) Tun Hussein Onn (1975 ± 1981) 
(d) Tun Mahathir Mohammad (1981 ± 2003) 
(e) Tun Abdullah Badawi (2003 ± 2009) 
(f)  DaWR¶6ri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak (2009 ± present - 2011) 
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In relation to the area of trade, there is a reasonable trade flow between these 
FRXQWULHVLQZKLFKLWJUHDWO\VXSSRUWV0DOD\VLD¶VHFRQRPLFSURJUHVVFor example, as 
of 2010, Malaysia was the nineteenth largest trading partner of the US as illustrated in 
Table 7.5.  
 
Table 7.5: Top US Trading Partners by Total Merchandise Trade in 2010 
(in Million US Dollars) 
 
Rank Country Total 
Trade 
% 
Share 
US 
Exports 
US 
Imports 
US Balance 
0 World 3,189,595 100.00 1,277,504 1,912,092 -634,588 
1 Canada 524,672 16.45 248,194 276,478 -28,284 
2 China 456,822 14.32 91,878 364,944 -273,066 
3 Mexico 392,975 12.32 163,320 229,655 -66,334 
4 Japan 180,893 5.67 60,545 120,348 -59,802 
5 Germany 130,881 4.10 48,201 82,680 -34,478 
6 UK 98,252 3.08 48,497 49,755 -1,259 
7 South Korea 87,703 2.75 38,844 48,860 -10,016 
8 France 65,561 2.06 27,010 38,551 -11,541 
9 Taiwan 61,934 1.94 26,027 35,907 -9,880 
10 Brazil 59,275 1.86 35,357 23,918 11,439 
11 Netherlands 54,031 1.69 34,998 19,033 15,965 
12 India 48,754 1.53 19,223 29,531 -10,308 
13 Singapore 46,628 1.46 29,150 17,478 11,671 
14 Venezuela 43,436 1.36 10,661 32,775 -22,114 
15 Saudi Arabia 43,011 1.35 11,591 31,420 -19,829 
16 Italy 42,655 1.34 14,191 28,463 -14,272 
17 Ireland 41,170 1.29 7,272 33,898 -26,626 
18 Belgium 41,141 1.29 25,551 15,590 9,962 
19 Malaysia 39,887 1.25 13,982 25,905 -11,923 
20 Switzerland 39,821 1.25 20,692 19,129 1,563 
Source: Nanto and Donnelly, 2011: 24 
 
For Malaysia, the US is the fourth biggest trading partner (The Star Online, 19 May 
2011).35 As such Malaysia is considered a key trading partner of the US. Trade flows 
between Malaysia and US are shown in Table 7.6.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 0DOD\VLD¶VNH\WUDGLQJSDUWQHUVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHUFKDQGLVHWUDGH([SRUWDQG,PSRUWGHVWLQDWLRQV
as of 2011 is shown in Appendix VII.  
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Table 7.6: Malaysia-US Trade Flows (2001-2011) 
(in billion US Dollars) 
 
Year Exports % of Total 
Export 
Imports % of Total 
Import 
2001 17.8 20.2 11.8 16.0 
2002 18.8 20.2 13.1 16.4 
2003 17.8 17.8 12.2 15.2 
2004 23.6 18.7 15.2 14.5 
2005 33.9 19.7 18.3 12.9 
2006 35.7 18.8 19.4 12.5 
2007 30.3 15.5 17.6 10.8 
2008 27.6 12.5 18.7 10.8 
2009 19.5 10.9 15.7 11.2 
2010 19.6 9.5 18.3 10.7 
2011  18.5 8.3 17.8 9.6 
Source: Complied from MITI , 2012 and Martin, 2008: 24 
1RWH0,7,¶VILJXUHs in Ringgit Malaysia (RM) were converted into USD 
 
In addition to trade, the US also forged an informal tie with Malaysia in respect of 
commercial access to Malaysian ports and repair facilities. The US companies were 
involved in logistic services as well as ship repairs and maintenance by joint 
venturing with the local players (Martin, 2008: 3).  
 
Apart from the trade significance as stated above, because of the cordial relationship, 
9/11 is regarded as a crucial turning point in Malaysia-US relations in which the 
Malaysian government not only condemned the attacks but also hastened its measures 
by arresting the suspected Islamic militants especially the JI members for national and 
regional security purpose (Nesadurai, 2004: 15-16). At the same time, Malaysia also 
assisted the US in arresting and handing over the suspected terrorists wanted by the 
US (Wah, n.d. 7). This indicates that the Malaysian government provided a full 
support to the US in fighting against terrorism and also cooperated extremely closely 
with the US on anti-terrorism activities (Nesadurai, 2004: 20). It appears that the post 
9/11 era brings these two countries even closer for security cooperation. In view of 
this, the US and Malaysia signed a joint declaration to fight terrorism in SEA on May 
2002. The declaration established a mutual cooperation in counter-terrorism in 
defence, banking, intelligence sharing, border control, transportation and law 
enforcement. Hence the existing defence cooperation has not only been enhanced but 
provided another avenue in the form of non-military and anti-terrorism related 
cooperation (Wah, n.d. 6).  This includes safeguarding the merchandise trade from 
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any security threats through the CSI initiative in which Malaysia agreed to participate 
as required by the US. As already noted, the whole scenario reflects the power-play 
between the US and Malaysia in view of their national interests. For Malaysia, as a 
fast developing nation, there is the need for the US support for its socio-economic 
development. Therefore attempts were made to please the US by complying with the 
anti-terrorism measures through an amicable relationship. On the other hand, the US 
QHHGV 0DOD\VLD¶V VXSSRUW QRW RQO\ IRU FRPPHUFLDO UHDVRQs but also, as there were 
many Islamic militant groups operating clandestinely, to maintain a close eye on 
terrorism activities within the ASEAN region.  
 
On this account, the government signed the Declaration of Principle to join in the CSI 
programme and implemented it in the local context. Malaysia was represented by the 
Director General of Customs and for the US was Commissioner Robert Bonner. The 
agreement was singed on 20 January 2003. On that day, the Commissioner stated: 
 
We recognize the high volume of trade between the Ports of Klang and 
Tanjung Pelepas and seaports in the U.S and Malaysia's role as an 
intermodal transport hub for cargo originating in many countries. This is an 
important step not only for the protection of trade between the U.S and the 
government of Malaysia, but for the protection of the most critical 
component of the world trading system as a whole - containerized cargo 
(United States Customs Border and Protection,  2011).  
 
A reciprocal programme enforced on a bilateral basis. The Port Klang signed the 
agreement on 8 March 2004 and the PTP on 18 August 2004 (Royal Malaysian 
Customs, 2010).  
 
The CSI is conducted by posting the US officials at the selected major foreign ports 
and requiring the advance transmission of manifest documentation to the US Customs 
by pre-screening containers bound for the US before they are loaded onto the ship. In 
3RUW .ODQJ¶V FDVH WKH VFDQQLQJ PDFKLQH UHTXLUHG IRU SUH-screening purpose had 
already been installed by the Royal Malaysian Customs (RMC) in both Northport and 
Westport for their own use prior to the CSI implementation. There were two in 
Northport and Westport respectively and one mobile machine. However, information 
obtained during the field trip indicates that there were no additional machines 
installed as the US preferred to utilise the existing machines in Port Klang.  
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The initiative provides for a reciprocal process where the host country allows the 
stationing of their officers in the US.  Malaysia, however, did not do so.  As one 
senior Customs official explained:  
 
We the Customs here help them and did not posted any of our officers in the 
US. But some of the European countries did that. But the Malaysian 
JRYHUQPHQWGLGQ¶WPDNHDQ\ UHTXHVW IRU WKDW7KH UHDVRQ LVEHFDXVHSRVWLQJ
officers are not that cheap (Interview Code: 10).  
 
$OWKRXJK WKH 86 LV 0DOD\VLD¶V IRXUWK ELJJHVW WUDGLQJ SDUWQHU DV QRWHG DERYH
Malaysia trusted goods arriving from the US because of their layered security 
measures. This created less anxiety on the Malaysian side due to the low risk category 
of the US goods. Therefore stationing Malaysian Customs officers in the US ports 
was viewed inappropriate. This is reasonably justified if we look at international 
practice by other compliant states. Out of fifty-one foreign ports participated in the 
CSI as of 2011 (United States Customs and Border Protection, 2011) with the 
majority of them in Asia and Europe, only Canada and Japan have stationed at US 
ports to screen the outbound containers destined for their respective countries 
(Peterson and Treat, 2008: 11).   
 
In practice the actual number of containers scanned in Port Klang under the CSI has 
only been a small proportion of the total number of container exported. Table 7.7 
provides a complete breakdown from 2005 to 2011 and Table 7.8 provides the 
percentage to support this argument. According to a Customs official, the small 
number of containers scanned was primarily attributed for two reasons. Firstly, the US 
CBP used their own risk assessment to identify any particular container for scanning 
purpose based on the export manifest submitted by the shipping agents to the US 
National Targeting Centre. Secondly, US CBP deployed only four staff in Port Klang 
in the beginning of the CSI implementation and subsequently reduced to one staff in 
2011 due to budget constraint. Furthermore, since there were no serious cases 
detected over the years, they probably consider the Port Klang as a safe port 
(Interview Code: 10). In this context, the decreased number and percentage of 
scanned containers over the period as shown in Table 7.7 and 7.8 further approve the 
safe nature of the Port Klang.  
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Table 7.71XPEHURI&RQWDLQHUV7(8¶V6FDQQHG8nder  
the CSI Initiative in Port Klang 
 
Year/Month 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
JAN 26 50 39 44 24 10 11 
FEB 36 26 36 18 16 9 6 
MARCH 47 60 41 54 33 9 6 
APRIL 48 69 46 35 28 10 5 
MAY 46 50 55 26 30 14 2 
JUN 41 68 37 42 10 12 3 
JULY  5 47 40 35 11 17 5 
AUG 36 66 54 25 18 1 0 
SEPT 0 71 49 21 19 4 12 
OCT 0 57 45 35 32 15 0 
NOV 0 57 56 49 20 6 0 
DEC 60 34 52 34 17 12 0 
TOTAL 345 655 550 418 258 119 50 
Source: Statistics, Royal Malaysian Customs, Selangor, 2011  
 
 
Table 7.8: PeUFHQWDJHRI&RQWDLQHUV7(8¶V6FDQQHG8nder the CSI  
Initiative in Port Klang 
 
Year Total Export of Port Klang 
(TEUs) 
CSI 
(Scanned TEUs) 
Percentage (%) 
(Scanned for CSI) 
2005 1,276,661 345 0.027 
2006 1,387,625 655 0.047 
2007 1,474,193 550 0.037 
2008 1,598,544 418 0.026 
2009 1,478,354 258 0.017 
2010 1,719,325 119 0.0069 
2011 1,720,542 50 0.0029 
Source: Statistics, Royal Malaysian Customs, Selangor, 2011 
Note: There is no statistical data available for container traffic between Port Klang and US, 
specifically. Therefore the percentage is FDOFXODWHG EDVHG RQ WKH WRWDO QXPEHU RI 7(8¶V
handled in Port Klang with the total number of TEUs scanned. 
 
Due to prior arrangement of the RMC, there was no capital cost of the CSI to Port 
Klang in terms of purchasing additional scanning devices that could cost in the range 
of USD 1 - 5 million (OECD, 2003: 52). Nonetheless, a Customs respondent pointed 
out that there is an indirect cost to cargo owners who will be charged RM200 
(USD65) by the terminal operator if their container is moved for inspection for 
security purpose. Even the 2(&'FRQILUPVWKLVE\VWDWLQJWKDW³VFDQQLQJ
high-risk containers also generates indirect costs linked to the number of container 
yard moves and time required to get the container out of a stack, to the scanning 
VWDWLRQDQGEDFN´7KHUHLVWKHUHIRUHDFRQVHTXHQWLDOHIIHFWZKHUHDWVRPHSRLQWWKH
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same cost will be passed down to consumers. A case study conducted by Azuh (2007: 
67) in the context of another developing country, Nigeria, further approves this cost 
implication to customers. He points out: 
 
The initial cost of procuring the equipment [scanning machine] falls on port 
authorities because of the required capital investment. Such costs are passed 
onto carriers who in turn will recover their cost by increasing the charges for 
exports. Increased freight rates invariably add to the overall cost of 
transportation. 
 
Consequently the regime has caused dissatisfaction to the PKA as evidenced from a 
VHQLRUVHFXULW\RIILFLDO¶VYLHZ 
 
Like in the EU, if EU says go, they all have to go because the big brother is 
on the other side, the USA. Of course we had our reservation initially. I 
personally have my own reservation. Why should we be doing all these 
when the country is affected is the US. But then we have no choice due to 
economic pressure. We are all under the flavour at that time. We called it 
economic blackmaiO >7KH 86 VD\V@ LI \RX GRQ¶W GR WKLV \RX GRQ¶W WUDGH
ZLWKXV,I\RXGRQ¶WGRWKDW, \RXGRQ¶WFRPHWRP\SODFH,I\RXGRQ¶WFRPH
to my place, \RX FDQ¶W WUDGH <RXU H[SRUW FDQQRW FRPH WR P\ FRXQWU\
(Interview Code: 16)  
 
In this respect, a similar kind RIGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQFDQDOVREHVHHQLQ$]XK¶V
study as well. He affirms that developing countries are under pressure to comply such 
a measure in order to avoid losing their business with the US. However, in spite of 
some dissatisfaction, Malaysia complied with the ISPS Code and other US-led 
measures due to trade significance and bilateral understanding with the US as stated 
above.   
 
 7.7.2 Megaport Initiative 
 
Megaport Initiative is another US-led port security measure established by the US 
government with the help of the US Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) and Office of Second Line of Defense (SLD). The 
principal objective of this programme is to reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of 
nuclear materials and other radioactive isotopes that might be used in WMD or 
radiological dispersal devices before they reach the US borders. Again, this 
SURJUDPPHLVLPSOHPHQWHGDVDMRLQWSURJUDPPHWKURXJKWKHµFRDOLWLRQRIWKHZLOOLQJ¶
with the identified countries. The initiative involves installing radiation detection 
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HTXLSPHQW WR D SULRULWL]HG OLVW RI ZRUOG¶V ODUJHVW DQG EXVLHVW SRUWV 0HJDSRUWV WR
HQKDQFH WKH SRUW¶V FDSDELOLW\ WR VFUHHQ FRQWDLQHU FDUJR VSHFLILFDOO\ IRU QXFOHDU DQG
other radioactive materials. To further bolster the measure, on April 2009, President 
Obama drew an ambitious plan to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world 
ZLWKLQ IRXU \HDUV FDOOLQJ WKH GDQJHU RI D WHUURULVW DFTXLULQJ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV ³WKH
most immediate and extreme threat WR JOREDO VHFXULW\´ 1DWLRQDO 1XFOHDU 6HFXULW\
Administration, 2011). 
 
Similar to the CSI programme, in response to the US requirement, the Malaysian 
government agreed to be party to it in an effort to curtail any movement of WMD in 
the Malaysian water. The RMC was identified as a suitable agency to deal with this 
matter. Since Customs is not familiar with radioactive material, the Atomic Energy 
Licensing Board (AELB) was included as an additional member as the regulatory 
body for nuclear and radio activity under the Atomic Energy Act 1984. AELB stands 
behind to assist and verify any suspected radioactive materials (Interview Code: 11). 
 
The regime was legalised through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) between the RMC and the US government on 27 February 2008. The 
Megaports initiative is primarily designed to screen as many containers passing 
through the port as possible. The strategy to achieve this goal is by installing 
Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) integrated with Optical Character Recognition 
(OCR) systems (to identify the container number) located at the selected locations but 
normally it is placed in a narrow bridge between the container wharf and container 
yard. The system is designed to monitor movement of all import, export and 
transhipment containers. The equipment does not emit radiation, hence does not pose 
any health hazard to anyone. In comparison to CSI which uses human assistance for 
scanning, the Megaport initiative is equipment focused (free flow of containers 
through RPM without disruption) where the host country scans all containers 
regardless of container origin or destination through RPM (National Nuclear Security 
Administration, 2006, 9). As of 2011, the number of detection units and containers 
involved in Port Klang under this programme are shown in Table 7.9 and Table 7.10 
respectively.  
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Table 7.9: Number of Detection Equipment Units for Megaport Initiative  
in Port Klang (2010) 
 
Location Radiation Portal Monitor Advanced Spectroscopic 
Portal 
 Entry Gate Quay Bridge CSI Station  
Westport 6 13 1 1 
Northport 7 5 - 1 
Total 13 18 1 2 
Source: Heong, 2010: 3 
 
Table 7.10: Number of Containers (7(8¶V,nvolved in Megaport Initiative  
in Port Klang  (2009 ± 2011) 
 
Year Import Export Tranship
ment 
Total  
TEU 
Alarm 
Trigger 
Secondary 
Inspection 
% Inspt. 
with total 
TEU 
2009 
(Oct-
Dec) 
408,406 353,539 1,203,836 2,025775 10,688 - - 
2010 1,716,345 1,719,325 5,434,626 8,870,296 67,523 44 0.000049 
2011 
 
1,795,864 1,720,542 6,087,450 9,603,856 51,311 58 0.0006 
Source: Royal Malaysian Customs, Selangor, 2011 
Note: Although an MoU was signed on February 2008, the official compilation of data by the 
RMC only available from October 2009 onwards.  
 
 
 
Albeit the Megaport Initiative system does emit any radiation, the system however 
detects any excessive radioactive contents from any cargoes passing through the RPM 
by sending alarm signals. This alarm signal will be captured through computer 
monitors in the control room. The number of excessive radioactive content containers 
triggered by alarm is shown in Table 7.10 above. Nonetheless only the suspicious 
containers were brought to secondary inspection for further investigation. Thus far no 
containers were held for WMD reason (interview Code: 10).  
 
One setback of this programme is that although it targeted for 100% screening as 
mentioned earlier, a senior Customs official who takes charge for this matter admitted 
that in reality it is quite impossible to achieve 100% screening. The agency only 
managed to screen 74.5% for the year 2010. Primarily because some of the quay 
bridges in Port Klang were not equipped with scanner either because it was not 
suitable or able to accommodate the movement of oversized cargo. Additionally, 
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when the scanner was down due to technical fault or accident, it disrupted the 
screening process as well (Interview Code: 10). 
 
Despite being a US-led initiative, this measure is considered a new platform in line 
with the WCO SAFE Framework that would enhance global trade and port security. 
As a member of the WCO, the Malaysian government is obliged to implement the 
)UDPHZRUN¶V UHTXLUHPHQW WR PDLQWDLQ a certain level of security along the supply 
chain in order to sustain well balanced trading activities with the US (interview Code: 
10).  
 
In any case, although the US initiated this measure on a voluntary basis, it was 
smartly designed in such a way to incorporate into WCO SAFE Framework, an 
international regime required to be implemented by Customs member states. This 
would enable member countries especially the exporting country to scan the 
containers if there is a reasonable request apart from fulfilling the US needs. One 
&XVWRPV UHVSRQGHQWDIILUPHG WKDW³RQHRI WKH MXVWLILFDWLRQV LV WKDWE\ WDNLQJSDUW LQ
the Megaport initiative we comply to the WCO SAFE Framework of StandDUG´
(Interview Code: 10).  Presumably if Malaysia had refused to participate in this 
regime, the US would have directed the containers to other ports for a better risk 
assessment and treatment from the US CBP such as Singapore and Laem Chabang 
ports. TherHIRUHDQRWKHU&XVWRPVRIILFLDOFRPPHQWHG³DVDSROLF\PDNHU\RXGRQ¶W
KDYH DQ\FKRLFH«WKHEHVW DSSURDFK LV WRSUDFWLFH LQWHUQDWLRQDOSUDFWLFH´ ,QWHUYLHZ
Code: 11). This is a reflection of how the unilateral approach of the US has greatly 
influenced the international maritime players by giving them no option if they want 
sustainable trade with the US.  
 
Despite the fact that the initiative involves only a small percentage of secondary 
inspection as against the total number of TEUs handled in Port Klang since its 
implementation as shown in Table 7.10 by registering 0.00049% and 0.0006% in 
2010 and 2011 respectively, a direct result of such arrangement led to some 
dissatisfaction as it seen solely for the interest of the US. The same Customs official 
commented:  
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The problem is everything passes through Megaport sometime the final 
destination is not to US. So they cannot find the logical explanation. Why 
should we scan for US? Why should be borne by the additional cost just 
because the Megaport is US-led initiative? The question maybe sends back 
WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW ZK\ WKH\ VLJQHG WKH DJUHHPHQW , GRQ¶W NQRZ P\VHOI
whether Malaysia itself in a very difficult situation because once you signed, 
WKH 86 KDV LQYHVWHG DURXQG ZH GRQ¶W NQRZ KRZ PXFK EXW LQ PLOOLRQV
(Interview Code: 11). 
 
A similar dissatisfaction was felt by port users. The Head of Federation of Malaysian 
)UHLJKW)RUZDUGHUVFRPPHQWHG³,IHHOWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGQRWIROORZKXQGUHG
SHUFHQWZKDWWKH$PHULFDQZDQWVIRUWKHLUUHTXLUHPHQW´LQWHUYLHZ Code: 26).  
 
,Q DQRWKHU FRQWH[W WKH SRUW RSHUDWRU H[SUHVVHG D VLPLODU IHHOLQJ ³DUH ZH UHDOO\
TXDOLILHGWRKDQGOHWKHUDGLRDFWLYHPDWHULDO"3RUWGRHVQ¶WKDYHWKDWNLQGRIHTXLSPHQW
to handle. I am not the owner of the Megaport. Even for the CSI, the Customs is 
relying on us. This is a problem now. If anything happens, it will be a problem. I am 
QRWDUDGLRDFWLYHSURRI>SRUW@´,QWHUYLHZ&RGH 
 
Moreover, the initiative also has implications of costs and other additional effort and 
resources. This will be discussed in the following chapter (Chapter Eight).   
 
7.8 Strategic Trade Act 2010 
 
Corresponding to the Megaport initiative compliance, the Malaysian government has 
committed the country to another form of legal regime at national level to enhance the 
non-proliferation of WMD. The regime is established by the Strategic Trade Act 2010 
(STA) or Act 708. The primary objective is to enforce border control which also 
includes ports. The Malaysian Parliament passed this legislation on 5 April 2010. 
However the full implementation of STA, Regulation and Orders only commenced 
IURP$SULO-DDIDU7KHDLPRI67$LV³WRSURYLGHIRUFRQWURORYHU
the export, transhipment, transit and brokering of strategic items, including arms and 
related material, and other activities that will or may facilitate the design, 
development and production of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery 
systems and to provide for other matters connected therewith, consistent with 
0DOD\VLD¶V QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV´ 6WUDWHJLF 7UDGH $FW
2010:7). 
 
 194 
7KH 0DOD\VLDQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ ZDV LQ WDQGHP ZLWK LWV HIIRUW WR FXUE DQ\
proliferation of WMD when there was a discovery of WMD substances in October 
2003. A Malaysian company ± Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn Bhd, was identified 
in manufacturing and shipped high-quality centrifuge components IRUXVHLQ/LE\D¶V
nuclear programme. The centrifuges, sophisticated machines that can be used to 
enrich WMD were seized under the US-led PSI by the US authority (Simon, n.d: 1). 
Although Malaysia denied the US accusation E\FODLPLQJWKDW³WKHSDUWVZHUHIRUWKH
oil and gas industries in Dubai and that it had no knowledge of the Libyan connection 
(Sodhy, 2007: 39), the incident apparently reminded Malaysia of the necessity in 
taking precautions and complying with the US protective measures.   
 
Ideally the act is meant to curb dual purpose items that could be used as WMD. The 
potential items in this category are products and materials commonly used in civilian 
applications such as electronics, computers and avionics and therefore classified as 
µVWUDWHJLFLWHPV¶Nonetheless these items are also raw materials for weapons and their 
delivery systems (The Star Online, 12 December 2010). 
 
When the Malaysian Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Najib Razak attended the Nuclear 
Summit in Washington and had a bilateral meeting with the US President, Mr Obama, 
LWZDVDUJXHGWKDWWKH67$ZDV³DSROLWLFDOROLYHEUDQFK´6WDURQOLQH6HSWHPEHU
2010).  
 
In contrast to other port security measures, the STA has been placed under the 
purview of the 0LQLVWU\RI,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDGHDQG,QGXVWU\0,7,EHFDXVHRI0,7,¶V
lead role in dealing with trade matters. Since the STA involves dual purpose trading 
items, it works closely with eleven other government agencies for effective 
enforcement purpose.  
 
According to a senior official from an enforcement agency, since the legislation 
passed in 2010, the responsible agency was still working on the Standard Operating 
Procedure (SOP) for effective implementation of this new law. There is evidence that 
the STA regime created some anxiety among the shipping agents and brokers because 
of the unprecedented statutory penalties as stipulated in subsection 9(4) of this act.  
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With the threat of the shortest imprisonment of five years to a penalty RM5 million 
(USD1.6 million) to a maximum level of capital punishment and RM30 million 
(USD9.7 million), STA is not welcomed by the port industry players. Asked whether 
the industry is in favour, the President of the Federation of Malaysian Freight 
Forwarders, who is also the acting President of Selangor Freight Forwarders & 
Logistics Association, he argued: 
 
%XWIRU6WUDWHJLF$FW>WKHDQVZHU@ LVQR«+HUHWKH$FW ORRNVOLNHJRLQJ WR
be very difficult for you to comply. You have to get approval and apply for 
permit. Malaysia is not a country manufacturing any nuclear or weapon 
parts. Then why are you wanted to implement this? Malaysia is not a 
terrorist country. If you look security per se, Malaysia is very safe. There is 
no big implication. Unless the Strategic Trade Act is implemented, it is too 
early for the industry to say the impact. We do not know how they want to 
put it in regulation too (interview Code: 26). 
 
 
Even a respondent from an enforcement agency responded in a similar tone:  
 
,WKLQNLWLVTXLWHGUDFRQLDQ$FWDQGZRUVHWKDQRWKHUDFW%XW,¶PQRWTXLWH
sure. The users are going to be scared. The export of dual purpose goods lets 
say caused death. So these fellows will also be punished with that. It is a 
capital punishment and the jail term is fifteen years. 
 
 
Although the legislation is considered too harsh by such users, it has proved a good 
instrument for the authorities. This was evidenced in an effort by the police in 2011 to 
interdict shipment of WMD materials. Upon receiving some information, the police 
managed to detain a ship from China bound for Iran anchored at Westport on 17 
March and seized two containers believed to contain weapon components. According 
to Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Ismail Omar, the investigations were carried 
out under the STA. (Star online, 17 March 2011). 
 
 7.9  Maritime Enforcement (Institutions) 
 
As has been shown, the introduction of the ISPS Code, CSI, Megaport and STA has 
added to the responsibilities of the various maritime agencies and created new roles.  
It has also added to the complexity of the Malaysian system of maritime governance, 
as shown in Table 7.11. The table generally signifies that there are many government 
agencies involved in the maritime enforcement duties based on the provisions of a 
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large number of legal instruments. Naturally such arrangements entail considerable 
amount of resources and coordination for effective security measures. But seemingly 
there are certain setbacks, elaborated further below.  
 
Table 7.11: Ordinances and Acts Enforceable by Various  
Maritime Enforcement Agencies 
Ordinances and 
Acts 
Navy Police Fisheries Marine 
Dept. 
Customs Dept. of 
Environment 
Police Act Yes - - - - - 
Penal Code Yes - - - - - 
Criminal Procedure 
Act 
Yes - - - - - 
Merchant Shipping 
Ordinance Act (Oil 
Pollution) 1994 
Yes - - - - - 
Merchant Shipping 
Ordinance Act 
1952 
Yes - - Yes - - 
Fisheries Act 1985 
(Amendment 1993) 
Yes Yes Yes - - - 
Exclusive 
Economic Zone 
Act 1984 
 
Yes Yes Yes - - - 
Petroleum Mining 
Act 1966 
Yes  - - - - 
Environmental 
Quality Act 1986 
Yes Yes - - - Yes 
Continental Shelf 
Act 1966 
Yes  - - - - 
Customs Act 1967 Yes - - - Yes - 
Immigration Act 
1959 (Amendment 
1963) 
Yes - - - - - 
Petroleum (Safety 
Measures) Act 
1984 
Yes - - Yes - - 
Telecommunication 
Act 
Yes - - - - - 
Dangerous Drugs 
Act 1952 
Yes - - - - - 
Explosive Act 1957 Yes - - - - - 
Protection Places 
Ordinance Act 
1959 
Yes - - - - - 
Internal Security 
Act 1960 
Yes - - - - - 
Firearms Act 1960 Yes  - - - - 
National Security 
Directive No.18 
Yes Yes - - - - 
Source: Kasmin, 2009: 36  
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It is helpful to explain the issue of maritime enforcement in view of its connection to 
the port security in a broader context. The existing enforcement system according to 
Kasmin (2009: 32) was GHVLJQHGSULRU WR0DOD\VLD¶V LQGHSHQGHQFHIURPWKH%ULWLVK
government. The British enacted those marine related acts and established various 
agencies similar to those in the UK to ensure control of maritime sector. This was 
then continued even after Malaysia gained independence in 1957. Critically however 
such arrangement has created some consequential effect to the port security measure.  
 
Since independence, Malaysia has extended its territorial waters from three nautical 
miles to twelve nautical miles and claimed continental shelf and exclusive economic 
zones. In response to protect the maritime sector from numerous kinds of threats as 
well as preserve the sovereignty of maritime zones, the government has enlarged its 
maritime enforcement agencies, giving additional task to its agencies and also 
established additional departments to carry out surveillance and monitoring in the 
maritime zones (Kasmin, 2009: 32).  
 
As a result of different institutional arrangements, the Royal Malaysian Navy thus 
undertook WKH QDWLRQ¶V GHIHQFH DW VHD ZKLOH WKH 0DULQH 3ROLFH FRQFHQWUDWHG RQ
prevention of criminal offences. However smuggling of goods is enforced by the 
RMC. Fisheries Department enforced federal laws on fisheries whereas mangrove 
swamps for sea creatures fall under the jurisdiction of the Forestry Department. 
Incident relating to oil pollution involves both the Marine Department and 
Department of Environment even to the extent State government can exercise 
jurisdiction if some protected marine animals affected by the oil spill (Ooi, 2007: 74-
75).  
 
These impediments incurred heavy expenses to the government in terms of budget 
allocation to each agency. Further, a lack of coordination among these agencies 
hampered effective enforcement measures. In 2005 the government amalgamated 
eleven different enforcement agencies under one roof by establishing the MMEA to 
reduce these problems and bolster the enforcement measures as briefly explained in 
Chapter Five (Ooi, 2007 :90).36  
                                                 
36
 The established of MMEA as a Coast Guard of Malaysian was approved by the Cabinet on 21 
August 2002. Following which a Nucleus Team was set up at initial stage on 16 April 2003. Upon the 
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Despite the MMEA now playing the key role in enforcing the costal surveillance, 
other agencies still carried out maritime related activities. One respondent from the 
PKA alluded to the implications of this complex enforcement system: 
 
In US it is very clear. Customs and Border patrol. They took the initiative. 
Whoever is there, they said they are looking after the land; they are looking 
after the port, they are looking after everything. They all come under one 
0LQLVWU\ +RPHODQG 6HFXULW\ WKDW¶V LW  +HUH LQ 0DOD\VLD &XVWRPV XQGHU
the Ministry of Finance, Police under the Home Ministry, ports under the 
Ministry of Transport, Immigration under the Home Ministry, Health is 
under the Health Ministry. The guy who brings disease, the Home Ministry 
is not in charge of it. The Health Ministry is still in charge. How they 
FRRUGLQDWH WKH ZRUN ZH GR QRW NQRZ« FRRUGLQDWLRQ DQG RYHUDOO
responsibility are some of the major problems (interview Code: 16).   
 
The MMEA itself faces some restrictions on effective enforcement. As the 
government decided to transform the MMEA into a sole law-enforcement agency by 
the end of 2011, it is expected to bear more cost for producing additional equipment. 
Some of its 130 vessels currently (2011) operational are in run-down conditions since 
acquired from other agencies. For government it is expected to incur heavy expenses 
for maintenance. In addition, the MMEA also faces inadequate personnel, equipment 
and airbase (Bernama, 8 June 2011) and all this may cause concerns about the 
maritime security.  
 
The motivation for the creation of the MMEA was not, however, reducing the 
complexity of the local maritime system of security per se. It involved issues of 
sovereignty. As a member of ASEAN, Malaysia subscribes to the key founding 
principals of this grouping that among others include mutual respect for each 
FRXQWU\¶V LQGHSHQGHQFH VRYHUHLJQW\ WHUULWRULDO LQWHJULW\ DQGQRQ-intervention in the 
internal affairs of another state (Teo: 2007: 548). These principles become one of a 
protective measure for safeguarding the regional waters from external forces. As a 
result, the proposed plan of Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) by the US 
in SOM pursuant to 9/11 sparked unhappiness among the ASEAN members. The 
announcement made by Thomas B. Fargo, former Commander of the U.S Pacific 
CoPPDQGRQ0DUFK³ZH¶UHORRNLQJDWWKLQJVOLNHKLJK-speed vessels, putting 
Special Operations Forces on high-speed vessels to conduct effective interdiction in, 
                                                                                                                                            
gazette of MMEA Act (Act 633) on July 2004, the MMEA was officially launched and undertook its 
operation on 30 October 2005 (Satria Maritim, 2009: 4).      
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once again, these sea lines of communication where terrorists are known to move 
DERXW «´Raymond and Morriën, 2009: 9) created enormous objections from the 
Malaysian and Indonesian authorities to another type of unilateral measure of the US, 
spreading their influence in the name of antiterrorism/piracy.  
 
Malaysia suspected that the US presencHZDVWRFRQWDLQ&KLQD¶VLQFUHDVLQJLQIOXHQFH
in the SOM by blowing up the terrorism threat in order to start an inspection regime 
WKDW ZLOO KDYH WKH HIIHFW RI OLPLWLQJ &KLQD¶V DFFHVV WR RLO RWKHU UDZ PDWHULDOV
technology and industrial equipment (Teo, 2007: 549). However the fundamental 
reason for keeping the US physically away from the Straits was to circumvent any 
religious backlash or sudden attacks as the region is surrounded by a large number of 
Muslim populations. In 2005 Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak when holding the Ministry 
RI'HIHQFHSRUWIROLRDVVHUWHGWKDW³WKHSUHVHQFHRIIRUHLJQWURRSVLQRXUZDWHUVZRXOG
WULJJHUSXEOLFDQJHUDQGEUHDWKHQHZOLIHLQWRWHUURULVWJURXSV´+RZHYHU0DOD\VLD is 
willing to extend collaboration and receive practical assistance involving training, 
technology transfer and supply of equipment as long as the development of foreign 
troops in the straits was not entailed (Teo, 2007: 549-550). One respondent involved 
in national security policies commented upon this aspect: 
 
Normally in terms of policy implication we are very careful. For example 
ZHGRQ¶WZDQWIRUHLJQFRXQWULHVWRWDNHFKDUJHLQWKH6WUDLWVRI0DODFFD:H
GRQ¶WZDQW WKHPWRFRPHKHUH OLNHZKDW WKH\GLG LQ6RPDOLD:HDUHYHU\
cautious that whatever we do, it doHVQ¶WPHDQ WKDWZH DUHRSHQLQJXS WKH
Straits of Malacca to foreign Navy. We are careful in that sense. This is 
more for the sovereignty issue (interview Code: 10).  
 
To heed the international calls for a security crackdown in this region while hindering 
any interference of the US in the SOM, the Malaysian government established the 
00($$OWKRXJKWKHREMHFWLYHRI00($ZDVWRFKDQJHIURPDµVHFWRUDO¶DSSURDFK
RIPDULWLPHHQIRUFHPHQWWRDµVLQJXODUGHGLFDWHGDJHQF\¶2RLDUJXHVWKDW
MMEA was predomLQDQWO\ D GLUHFW UHVXOW RI WKH 86 SUHVVXUH DQG ³E\-product of 
0DOD\VLD¶VSROLWLFDO UHDFWLRQ WR WKH WKUHDWRIDUPHG IRUFHV IURPDUJXDEO\RQHRI WKH
most formidable military powers on earth being stationed at strategic places along the 
Strait of Malacca, effectively taking away control of the Strait of Malacca from the 
OLWWRUDOVWDWHV´ 
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Arguably, looking at another ankle, as aQ µDGYDQFHG¶ developing nation with heavy 
dependency on international trade as well as adopting relatively a friendly foreign 
policy with regional member states and the US, Malaysia therefore is obligated to 
adopt certain measures to reflect its sincerity to fight against maritime crimes not only 
for the benefit of local needs but also for the regional and international demands.  
 
7.10 Security and Regional Co-operation Organisations  
 
Despite the issue of sovereignty is regarded sacrosanct among the regional member 
states, multilateral cooperation is sought as an additional method of resolving the 
shortcomings of any bilateral measures. When the IMO initially introduced the ISPS 
Code, the intention was to create an international framework applicable to all 
maritime fraternities across the board globally. Yet there were criticisms the Code 
does not provide a uniform global standards and clear guidelines due to different 
JRYHUQPHQWDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI WKH &RGH¶V UHTXLUHPHQWV (Anyanova, 2007: 28-30). 
Furthermore, certain geographical areas were identified as unable or unwilling to meet 
WKH &RGH¶V UHTXLUHPHQW WKDW UHVXOWHG WR GLIIHUHQW VWDQGDrd in different places. 
(Burmester, 2005: 193). In this connection, $]XK¶V   ILQGLQJ FORVHO\
corresponds to this argument: 
 
In some developing countries, the ISPS and its intentions were 
misinterpreted by some policy makers as the need for mobilisation and 
installation of equipment only. The most important aspects such as 
motivation of people, awareness, training, creation of legal infrastructure, 
auditing and documentation requirements were not properly addressed.  
 
 
A similar kind of ISPS Code interpretation exists even in developed nations as well. 
For example Wengelin (2006: 7) who studied port security in Swedish ports proves 
this matter by quoting two good practical expressions shared by the local port security 
officers. They said: 
 
We [PFSO] sat a whole day, and night, with this man [port inspector] and 
finally more or less GHFLGHG«ZHKDYHWRGRH[DFWO\ZKDWKHVD\VZHGRQ¶W
have a choice because he has made up his mind that we have to do what he 
says. And VRLWZDV« 
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And 
  
We [PFSO] sat here and discussed things, and we changed the 
plans according to how the inspector wanted it. That was how we 
got our FHUWLILFDWHKHUH« 
 
,QWKLVUHVSHFWORRNLQJDW3RUW.ODQJ¶Vcontext, the head of the ISPS Unit of Marine 
Department in Malaysia asserted when it involves regional understanding, there is 
noticeable disparity as compared to other parts of the world:  
 
Within our region there is no problem as we know each other. Why we take 
this region as one group because of our common culture and the pattern is 
DOPRVWWKHVDPH7KDWLVZK\ZHFDQQRWXVHWKH86PRGXOH:HGRQ¶WXVH
module from Europe because it is different. Their culture, character and 
condition are very different. Even their water and expose to risk are also 
different (Interview Cod: 08).   
 
In response to this kind of mentality, a regional approach has been adopted to 
strengthen the level of maritime security through the sharing of knowledge and 
expertise. Although, as noted earlier, Malaysia does not regard terrorism as a 
particular threat to itself, SEA is perceived to be a breeding ground, resulting in 
numerous terrorist groups with some form of relationship with the Al-Qaeda 
organisation. The evolving threats though look serious but still manageable (Ressa, 
2003 and Chalk at el, 2009). There is the fear that this group may resort to maritime 
terrorism as Raymond and Morrien (2009: 6) have pointed out. This forged 
cooperation among the ASEAN member states to safeguard the port and the shipping 
sector.   
 
Malaysia is an active participant in the ASEAN Port Association (APA).37 One of the 
respondents, Chairman of the working committee for APA, asserted that the issue of 
                                                 
37
 The ASEAN Port Authorities Association (APAA), now the ASEAN Ports Association (APA) was 
established in 1974. The APA was originally envisioned as an organization that could provide the 
proper forum for the achievement of the following broad objectives: exchange of information, 
harmonization of trade practices, and promotion/facilitation of trade among ASEAN ports. APA was 
conceived to provide a venue for port officials concerned to meet and share experiences that may lead 
to finding solutions to identified problem areas and emerging issues affecting the port sector. The 
forming of the Association represents the collective will of the member-ports to foster friendship, 
extend support and cooperation to promote the interests of ports. The Association is presently 
composed of regular and associate members collectively recognized as members by the Association. 
Regular members are those national port authorities and/or the country ports with the government 
retaining majority interest while the corporatised or privatised ports joined as associate members 
(ASEAN Ports Association, 2011).  
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port security was frequently discussed, and knowledge and experience shared. He said 
WKDW³ZKHQWKH,636ZDVUHDOO\DWLWVKHLght for ports to attain it, that was one of the 
subject matter discussed. We all shared our burden. In a sense that we wanted to be an 
,636FRPSOLDQW´,QWHUYLHZ&RGH 
 
Another fora where port security has been actively deliberated is the ASEAN 
Maritime Transport Working Group (MTWG). The working group provided a good 
platform to discuss various interrelated ISPS Code issues during the early period of 
implementation. The MOT plays a lead role on behalf of the Malaysian government 
and has been involved in several discussions on policy and practical issues concerning 
safety and security of the regional waters. An official involved directly on this matter 
KLJKOLJKWHG WKDW³VRPHFRXQWULHVDUHPRUHDGYDQFHG WKDQXVVR>EHQHILWHGIURP@ WKH
programme under the MTWG to help other less developed nations through exchange 
of expertise by conducting seminars or workshop, train the auditors whereby the 
auditors will come to a particular host county then they will conduct seminar and 
workshop on how to be an auditor (Interview Code: 01). 
 
At the littoral states level, the establishment of Tripartite Technical Experts Group 
(TTEG) for safety of navigation for the SOM that involves Malaysia, Singapore and 
Indonesia provided another platform for security consideration. The TTEG provides 
the option of burden sharing for member countries to buttress their safety of 
navigation and record of protection of the marine environment. A TTEG meeting in 
2005 outlined six main projects for implementation. One was related to security 
involving a demonstration project of Class B Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
transponder on small ships (Nik and Permal, 2008: 196). In subsequent meetings, 
according to an MOT official, the TTEG discussed matters concerning the ISPS Code 
as the Code directly relates to SOLAS and aids to navigation. Albeit the TTEG is 
mostly concerned with safety, occasionally the issue of security is deliberated because 
of the ISPS requirement for both port and shipping sector (Interview Code: 01).  
 
The Marine Department as a DA for Malaysia had a lead role in the port security 
DZDUHQHVVSURJUDPPHE\ SDUWLFLSDWLQJ LQ$3(&¶V$6($1 DQG -DSDQ3RUW6HFXULW\
Expert Meeting. Under this programme all DAs of ASEAN member states will join 
together in sharing and seeking information,  including that relating to the required 
training and technical expertise (Interview Code: 08). Malaysia conducted two 
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seminars in November 2008 and 2009 for the Asean-Japan Maritime Security Joint 
exercise. At the end of the seminar they had a round table discussion related to the 
ISPS implementation (Interview Code: 08).  
 
Interestingly, when the Marine Department initiated a specific programme for 
Malaysian ports involving various groups of participants, other ASEAN DAs also 
participated through a communication link. The programme was designed to provide a 
real time situation in the event of a terrorist attack on a port that might affect other 
member countries and to find ways to mitigate this effectively. The same respondent 
believed that through such communications they had managed to forge a close 
relationship among themselves+HVDLG³ZHKDYHGLUHFWOLQHQXPEHUVDQGHPDLO:H
can contact them directly. That is why during the Port Security Expert Meeting we 
always meet each other. We know each other. Within our region there is no problem 
as we know each other. That is why we take this region as one group because of our 
FRPPRQ FXOWXUH´ ,QWHUYLHZ &RGH  In this regard, the common culture of this 
region provides good basis to understand the common security threats in the regional 
water. Essentially such information can be very useful to strategise for better and well 
coordinated security initiatives along with other member states.   
 
7.11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to provide an account focusing on Port Klang in a range of 
port security measures, institutional and organisational arrangements. It also discussed  
the key organisations directed at the threat of terrorism implemented in Port Klang 
after 9/11. It has shown that although security threats at Malaysian waters are under 
control, due to strong sentiment in maintaining national security matters, the 
government is always cautious and tries to achieve protection by imposing strict 
security measures. The government utilised several key instruments, comprising the 
ISPS Code international regime, and other UN based agreements together with the 
US-led initiatives, the CSI and Megaport which were then transposed into national 
FRQWH[W7KHVHPHDVXUHV VXSSOHPHQWHG0DOD\VLD¶VRZQVHFXULW\ measures that were 
implemented before 9/11.   
 
Evidently the reason for the multitude of security measures is placement of port under 
the category of essential services which need protection. Being a contracting party to 
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the SOLAS 1974 Convention, Malaysia is obliged to implement the ISPS Code and 
also comply with the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 binding on all the UN 
members. ,QWKLVFRQWH[W0DOD\VLD¶VSUH-9/11 port security instrument, the Protected 
Areas and Protected Places Act 1959 (Act 298) provides a good platform to comply 
with the ISPS requirements rather smoothly. But evidences presented in this chapter 
clearly indicate that this was carried out according to local needs and enforced beyond 
the ship/port interface. Adding further to a practical point of view, the imposition of 
severe penalties was perhaps designed as a demonstration to a national and 
international audience of the strong commitment of the Malaysian government to 
counter-terrorist measures.  Though there were arguments to suggest that Malaysian 
waters are safe and free from terrorism, yet the government imposed various security 
regimes on the ground that enhanced port security was fundamental to sustainable 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUDGH ,Q D EURDGHU IRUHLJQ SROLF\ FRQWH[W IRU 0DOD\VLD¶V international 
HFRQRPLF DQG SROLWLFDO LQWHUHVW WKH FRXQWU\ LV QRW VHHQ LQ D ZD\ WR EH µVRIW¶ RQ
maritime terrorism. Analysing the same politico-economic perspective, Malaysia also 
needs to demonstrate a well balanced relationship with US particularly as there was 
an element of power-play between these countries. As such, Malaysia took the 
initiatives of complying with not only the international regimes but also the US-led 
measures, particularly the CSI and Megaport. Corresponding to this power-play, the 
Malaysian government also initiated its own legal instrument at national level, the 
STA, to curtail the movement of WMD. In addition to this, the establishment of 
MMEA as a single maritime enforcement agency was attributed as a result the US 
pressure.  
 
Holding the position as a premier port, the Port Klang particularly needs well 
balanced measures to maintain investor and user confidence in the level of port 
VHFXULW\$V&DQWVXJJHVWVWKHLVVXHRISRUWVHFXULW\³EHFRPHVDTXHVWLRQ
of image, a sigQLILFDQW FULWHULRQ IRU TXDOLW\ D VHOOLQJ DQG D EXVLQHVV TXDOLILHU´
nonetheless from the users point of view port security measures may be seen as 
excessive and causing a burden in many respects.  
 
From another perspective, in spite of different responses from different stakeholders, 
those security measures were influenced by issues of sovereignty. Being part of the 
ASEAN, Malaysia and the regional countries object to the principal of sovereignty of 
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their waters being undermined by the presence of any external forces. To preserve the 
sanctity of this principal and reciprocally enhance its security measures, the 
Malaysian government initiated a host of bilateral and multilateral measures in 
cooperation with the US and regional member states. Despite, however, the range of 
measures introduced to bolster the level of security in ports, the research has 
identified a number of practical problems and challenges encountered in 
implementing these as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
 
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS OF PORT 
SECURITY MEASURES 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter elaborated various security measures introduced after 9/11 at 
different levels and their institutional arrangements, as they applied to Malaysian 
ports in general and Port Klang in particular. This chapter looks now at the practical 
aspects of these port security regimes: the problems, challenges and implications. In 
this perspective, it takes into account economic cost, human factor and loopholes in 
the security system. 
 
8.2 Cost implications  
 
Several studies have highlighted the cost element as one of the adverse consequences 
of realising the full potential of security measures introduced since 9/11. As has been 
shown, a raft of regimes emerged as a result of 9/11, including the ISPS Code. A 
global study conducted by the OECD (2003), IAPH (2006) and UNCTAD (2007) in 
relation to ISPS Code implementation following its enforcement on July 2004 as 
mandated by the IMO provided some plausible evidence of various economic 
consequences and cost effects. The study initiated by the OECD (2003) in a global 
dimension on the risk of terrorist attacks and terrorist threat to the international 
merchant marine transport system and the cost implications of security measures to 
the users, estimated that the initial burden for ship operators would be at least 
USD1,270 million and USD730 million per year thereafter.  On the other hand, the 
UNCTAD (2007) estimated the global port related sector would  bear the cost in the 
range USD1.1 billion and USD 2.3 billion initially and approximately USD0.4 billion 
and USD0.9 billion annually thereafter. For the US alone based on its own 
assessment, the cost to its ports was estimated to reach USD1.1 billion for the first 
year and USD656 million each year up to 2012 (Bichou, 2004: 330). There were also 
further costs identified. Bichou (2004) examined the broader cost implications by 
integrating port and supply chain security.  Going beyond ports and shipping, Erera 
et.al (2003) provided an insight into various other costs incurred as a result of new 
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security measures for many of the users and providers of the international freight 
transportation system.  
 
The cost of the full implementation of the ISPS Code produced particular 
dissatisfaction among developing countries, which perceived themselves as less able 
to afford these than were industrialised nations (Khalid, 2005: 6-7). In that order, Ng 
DQG9DJJHODVFODLPWKDW³WKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIVHFXULW\UHJXOations requires 
substantial investments and thus creates additional barriers in the port industry, 
HVSHFLDOO\IRUVPDOOSRUWVDQGSRUWVORFDWHGLQSRRUFRXQWULHV´ 
 
In Malaysia, a survey conducted in the beginning period of the ISPS implementation 
in 2004, the total cost was estimated to be RM81 million (USD26 million) for the 
whole of Malaysian ports (Osnin, 2005: 22). Such estimates reflected the fact that 
there was no escape from the cost consequences of the technical and physical 
requirements of the ISPS Code, despite the fact that, as argued in Chapter Seven, the 
implementation of the ISPS Code was not such a serious problem for the Malaysian 
Federal ports due to the good security infrastructure and practice prior to 9/11. Most  
security regimes are technologically based and require investment for initial 
acquisition and also subsequent expenditure for maintenance to sustain functionality.   
 
In the early period of the implementation of the Code in July 2004, the Marine 
Department had made an estimation of RM16 million (USD5.2 million) for Port 
.ODQJDORQH -D¶DIDU$V WKHSUHPLHUSRUW LQDGHYHORSLQJFRXQWU\3RUW
Klang might have been expected to encounter financial difficulties in introducing the 
ISPS Code. While Port Klang was not exempt from some additional costs in terms of 
acquisition of technological devices and security training, these costs however, did 
not cause a major problem for security implementation, when looking at the overall 
process of port transformation. As has been shown, Port Klang had gone through a 
long process of development with privatisation that led to port modernisation at 
different levels in both terminals. This includes the security equipment installation. As 
the Malaysian Federal ports are secured under the Protected Areas and Protected 
Places Act 1959, this has paved the way for a rather smooth implementation of the 
Code due to certain technical similarities. An official from the Marine Department 
explained,  
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The implementation on the technical requirement [Protected Areas and 
Protected Places Act, 1959] is almost there. Every Federal port in Malaysia 
implemented it. In that sense, we are lucky. It is a standard and applies to all 
Federal ports in Malaysia. We have only involved in the documentation 
control. All the required physical structure is already available (Interview 
Code: 08).  
 
Asked whether the cost of the ISPS implementation has been a problem for Port 
Klang, the same respondent responded:  
 
They [Port Klang] did not face much cost. The only cost is for training. 
They have to upgrade their training in terms of safety and have to add the 
VHFXULW\HOHPHQW«6RIRUWKDWUHDVRQWKH\KDYHWRVHQG>SHUVRQQHO@IRUH[WUD
training. Last time, the security personnel check for the lighting which is 
safety but now more on security. We have to understand that. There is not 
much additional cost.   
 
While this government official saw costs of implementation as minimal, the terminal 
RSHUDWRUV¶YLHZZDVYHU\ GLIIHUHQW$FKLHI VHFXULW\RIILFLDO RIRQH WHUPLQDO DUJXHG
thDW³FRVWLQJLVWKHELJJHVWLPSDFWLWLQYROYHVDKXJHFDSLWDOH[SHQGLWXUH 38  We have 
to spend a lot for the protected area. Last time there was no CCTV, but now we have 
installed CCTV, grill and unbreakable glass. We spent almost a million. That is the 
ISPS requirement (interview Code: 21).  A respondent from the PKA also highlighted 
the expense to terminals, estimating that the amount these spent for the Code was 
approximately RM5 million (USD1.6 million) over the period 2005 to 2010. 
(Interview Code: 16).  Although the view of the terminal operator is contrary to the 
view of the government official, given the fact that the privatised company operates 
the port on commercial and profit interest, naturally any additionally expenditure is a 
matter of concern to them. Nonetheless, the terminals were managed to absorb those 
cost without much problem considering the proportion of security expenditure against 
the total revenue of the port is very minimal. For example, the total revenue of the 
Northport before taxation was RM158 million (USD50.9 million), RM188 million 
(USD60.6 million), RM144 million (USD46.4 million), RM148 million (USD47.7 
million) and RM171 million (USD55.2 million) in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 
respectively (NCB Holdings, 2010: 15). Hence, calculating on the basis of average 
total revenue for five years (RM162 million) (USD52.2 million) against the average 
                                                 
38
 7KH WHUP³WHUPLQDORSHUDWRU´DQG³SRUWRSHUDWRU´ LVXVHG LQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ WKURXJKRXW WKLVVWXG\ ,W
refers to same entity, that is, the private company which operates the port.  
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annual security expenditure (RM1 million) (USD322,580) for the same period, the 
DPRXQWVXJJHVWVWKHWHUPLQDO¶VDQQXDOH[SHQGLWXUHIRUsecurity need is very minimal, 
that is, approximately 0.62%.   
 
There was initially a major concern that the implementation of the ISPS Code would 
escalate port operation costs which would be transferred to end users ultimately. 
However the MOT - the policy making body of the Federal ports in Malaysia ± 
decided not to impose any security charges to users. /OR\G¶V /LVW (February 2004), 
UHSRUWHG ³0DOD\VLD¶V WZR PDLQ SRUWV .ODQJ DQG 7DQMXQJ 3HOHSDV ZLOO QRW EH
imposing a security surcharge. Whatever costs of installing and mobilising safety 
equipment will be borne by the individual terminals, namely Northport and 
:HVWSRUW´7KLVZDVYHULILHGZLWKWKHSHUVRQLQ-charge of security in PKA during my 
field trip in July 2010. He confirmed: 
 
They [terminal operators@GRQ¶WFKDUJH IURPWKHXVHUV7KHRQO\ WLPHWKH\
charge is when ship comes into the port and the captain requires for an 
additional security guard to be placed at the gangway. They will charge for 
that service. This is after 9/11. Prior to 9/11 there is no security charge for 
anything. Nobody wanted the security guard for the ship because the port is 
DOUHDG\FRQVLGHUHGDVD VDIHSODFH:HGRQ¶WJHWDQ\)HGHUDO IXQGDVZHOO
(interview Code: 15).    
 
The same respondent claimed that one particular reason for government not imposing 
any security charge was that the government has no intention of burdening the 
shipping community. The main argument was that ³ZHZDQWWREHDVFRPSHWLWLYHDV
possiblH´ ,QWHUYLHZ &RGH  Government would not wish to damage 
competitiveness by making its ports, especially the Port Klang, the main gateway for 
seaborne trade, expensive for users. Therefore the cost of the ISPS requirement was 
borne by the port operators. Furthermore, the government and terminal operators had 
made an arrangement earlier through the privatisation agreement that the cost of 
security is borne by the private operators as part of their operational costs (Interview 
Code: 02).  
  
At the same time there is plenty of evidence that the Malaysian government accepted 
the link between a strong security regime and competitiveness suggested by Khalid 
   ³1DWXUDOO\ LQ WKHVH VHFXULW\-conscious times, ports accorded with high 
ranking for security measures, such as those taken in line with the requirements of an 
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initiative like ISPS, would pull in more shipping lines than ports with poor security 
features or perceived to be unsafe. Therein lies a correlation between security features 
DWSRUWVDQGWKHLUFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV´Similarly, Ng and Vaggelas (2012: 676-677) hold 
WKH VDPH EHOLHI WKDW ³SRUW VHFXULW\ LQIOXHQFHV SRUW¶V HIILFLHQF\ DQG KHQFH
FRPSHWLWLYHQHVVZKLFKLQWXUQLQIOXHQFHVWKHFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVRIPRGHV´Charges for 
security by the terminal operators perhaps suggesting to shipping lines that there was 
a local problem might therefore also indirectly affect competiveness.  
 
Although in overall, the cost factor of the ISPS Code is under control for the purpose 
of maintaining the port competitiveness, in another dimension, fXOILOOLQJ WKH&RGH¶V
requirement for practice drill and exercise has indirectly burdened the PKA and the 
port operators. The objective of these, as it stipulates in the ISPS Code (2003: 98)³LV
to ensure that port facility personnel are proficient in all assigned security duties, at all 
security levels, and to identify any security-related deficiencies which need to be 
DGGUHVVHG´. However, expenditure on such training is considered a liability by both 
the PKA and the port operators. As one respondent in charge of the Security Unit of 
PKA explDLQHG ³WR WKHP SRUW RSHUDWRU PD\EH >WKH UHDVRQ LV@ PRQH\ %HFDXVH LI
they want to conduct full drill, it will cost about RM20,000 (USD6,500). So mostly 
they conduct the table talk only. The actual drill did not carry out. Because it cost 
PRQH\´,QWHUYLew Code: 17).   
 
What seems apparent in this context is that for cost reasons the drill and exercise 
requirement of the ISPS Code is merely fulfilled for a bureaucratic purpose, to be 
minimally compliant, rather than taking into account the actual rationality or reality in 
FRPEDWLQJPDULWLPHFULPHV$V0HWDSDUWLVXJJHVWV³,636LVEHLQJWUHDWHG
as a mandatory bureaucratic hurdle instead of a cRQWLQXRXV RSHUDWLRQDO SURFHVV´
Looking at a broader perspective, WKLVYLHZ LVGHPRQVWUDWHG LQ$]XK¶VVWXGy (2007: 
73-74). He quotes two good examples of developing nations reaction or 
dissatisfaction with regards to the ISPS compliance: 
 
Obviously they [terrorists] are not concerned because nothing is happening 
in Vanuatu and the question is why we should spend money when we do not 
have any threats. Nobody will come to Vanuatu to throw bombs. 
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And 
 
Compliance on paper was a lot easier, however whether the port facilities 
were in place, is a totally different matter. Come first July [2004], most third 
world countries including South Africa complied, more on paper than in real 
terms. 
 
In a closely related context, Ng and Gujar (2008: 271) shared a response of an 
interviewee from a major Asian port in their study: 
 
International terrorist attacks were mainly targeting the US and the 
:HVW«WKRVH PDULWLPH VHFXULW\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO JXLGHOLQHV ZHUH DFWXDOO\
HVWDEOLVKHGZLWK WKHFRUHREMHFWLYHVRISURWHFWLQJ WKHP«DQGZKDWZDV WKH
point for us commit such substantial financial obligations? It was simply the 
tactics of the West in shifting part of their burden [to Asian countries and 
regions] so as to protect their own interest.  
 
Hence, some Asian countries still considered port security as a problem to solve rather 
than making a firm stand that good security could be good business. As a result of 
this;  
 
The process of compliance had remained stagnant in many Asian countries, 
while for others the issue seemed to have quickly faded once the basic 
mandatory requirements had been fulfilled...The concept and focus of port 
security in Asia was significantly different from that of the western, 
developed countries and regions. Since 11 September, while the latter had 
put its security focus on fighting terrorism, it was certainly not the case in 
Asia, and the commitment to comply with the ISPS Code was of the half-
hearted, and the notion that higher security would enable ports an 
opportunity in creating additional values to shippers was simply overlooked 
(Ng and Gujar: 2008: 275). 
 
Notwithstanding the ISPS Code is perceived to be fulfilled for bureaucratic purpose 
that eventually created a sense of dissatisfaction amongst many developing nations, 
the Port Klang particularly managed this problem in relatively good manner without 
DIIHFWLQJ WKH &RGH¶V HIIHFWLYHQHVV. On the matter of cost implications, it is worth 
noting that there are different perspectives which may account for the differing 
assessments of the burden revealed in interviews. Although there is a cost element 
embedded in the ISPS Code due to its technical requirement, the cost appeared to be 
more obvious to the terminal operators as they are mandated to conduct regular 
training, as well as to install the required technology. But as stated above, the 
operators have managed this within their financial capabilities. On the other hand, the 
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regulatory duties of the port authority as the MTSO, do not require heavy expenditure. 
Their needs are more for the training and drill which in most cases can be carried out 
in collectively with the terminal operators and the DA to reduce the monetary costs 
(Interview Code: 17).    
 
In another spectrum, the Megaport initiative as explained in the previous chapter, 
prompted the Obama administration to appropriate USD2.5 billion in 2012 and 
USD14.2 billion for both national and international need over the next five years 
(National Nuclear Security Administration, 2011). 
 
This initiative essentially is equipment or technology based measure that naturally 
entails capital expenditure and subsequent maintenance. As such, the initiative comes 
with a cost. The US DOE supplied and installed the equipment free of charge and is 
committed to free maintenance for a period of only three years. Though it was free for 
Malaysia, the actual cost incurred by the US for this purpose was estimated in the 
region of RM50 million (USD16 million) (interview Code: 11). The cost that follows 
after three \HDUVLVQRQHWKHOHVVDPDWWHURIFRQFHUQIRUWKH50&LQ3RUW.ODQJ¶VFDVH
They have to bear costs of: 
a) routine maintenance such as cleaning up the equipment, replacement of 
parts/accessories etc;   
b) replacing aged/damaged equipment; 
c) replacing equipment due to technological changes; 
d) communication such as subscription fees for internet line to enable mirror cast to 
be sent to AELB (Heong, 2010: 6- 7).  
 
Further, in case of the secondary inspection where the container needs to be moved 
from the yard to the Secondary Inspection Station and back to the yard, there will be 
an Extra Movement Charges (EMC) imposed by the terminal operator to the shipper. 
7KHFKDUJHVDUH¶ container: RM65.00 (USD21) SHUPRYHDQGIRU¶FRQWDLQHU
RM100.00 (USD32) per move (Heong, 2010: 6- 7).  
 
In this sense, the inspection cost is borne by the shipping agent. One Customs official 
involved directly in this initiative asserted: 
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The cargo interest bears the cost. If you are unlucky, if they [Customs] scan the 
FRQWDLQHU\RXKDYHWREHDUWKHFRVW7KHUHZRQ¶WEHDQ\YROXQWDU\VFDQQLQJ.. 
They [shipping lines] did complain but the DG of Customs made a decision that 
LWLVDSUDFWLFHHOVHZKHUH«this is not a port tariff. This is an additional tariff, an 
DGGLWLRQDO FRVW >IRU WKH XVHUV@«7KLV KDV FDXVHG VRPH IRUP RI HFRQRPLF
implication (Interview Code: 11). 
 
Apart from the Megaport Initiative, there is a cost implication even for the CSI as 
stated in Chapter Seven that impacts on the users explained by another Customs 
respondent: 
 
/HWVVD\ZHWDNHODVW\HDU¶V>@VWDWLVWLFV one month average is about 50 
to 60 containers [scanned]. One container for extra movement would cost 
more or less about RM200.00[USD65]. So one month about RM10,000 
[USD3,200]. So it is not that deep. Eventually this amount paid by the 
owner of the container. They pay to the terminal operator. The shipping 
agent and Customs broker only pay on behalf of cargo owner. Subsequently 
they reimburse from the cargo owner (Interview Code: 10).   
 
Essentially, the key objective of the Megaport initiative is to detect radioactive 
materials that can be used for WMD and is intended to safeguard the US waters but 
such inspection appeared to burden the port users financially. A senior Customs 
official pointed out: ³RIFRXUVHWKHUHLVSURWHVWIURPWKHFRPPXQLW\VLGH>SRUWXVHUV@
7KH 86 LV QRW ZLOOLQJ WR EHDU WKH FRVW´ ,QWHUYLHZ &RGH  $QRWKHU &XVWRPV
official who for various reasons was often involved in dialogue with the port users 
UHSRUWHG WKDW ³WKH FRPPXQLW\ VD\V WKLV >0HJDSRUW ,QLWDLWLYH@ LV UXEELVK´ ,QWHUYLHZ
Code: 11). He considered that in practice the additional cost would ultimately be 
transferred to the HQGXVHUVVRWKDW³WKLVadditional cost would increase the cost of the 
FRQVXPHUSURGXFWV´7KHXVHU¶s dissatisfaction in this respect was itself noted in the 
previous chapter.   
 
It should be noted however, although the MOT decided that there should not be any 
security charges imposed by the terminal operators in Port Klang instead the charges 
should be absorbed as part of their port operational cost, there seemed an element of 
security charges exist for the CSI and Megaport Initiative. As explained by one of the 
officials of the PKA, ³this is not port tariff, this is the additional tariff, additional 
FRVW´ ,QWHUYLHZ &RGH  7KXV WKLV W\SH RI VHFXULW\ FKDUJHV LV FRQVLGHUHG
additional charges that are not controlled or imposed through official port tariff set by 
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the MOT. Since the port is operated by the private entities on a profit orientated basis, 
some minor charges were imposed to recover their operational cost.    
 
8.3 The human factor: problems of workload and attitudes   
 
Generally a vast number of human supports are involved in the maritime sector in 
various capacities. For ports and shipping sector particularly, human participation is 
increasingly pertinent not only for the purpose of operating the ports and shipping 
assets but also implementing the security measures (Albrecht 2004, Turnbull and 
Wass, 2007, Lord, 2008 and Manuel, 2011). In this sense, Korolija and Lundberg 
  EULHIO\ UHODWHV WKH KXPDQ IDFWRU DV WR KRZ WKH ³artifacts, equipments, 
communications, interactions, systems, working methods and procedures, and other 
processes involving people, facilitate human work and ± eventually ± save lives´. The 
KXPDQIDFWRUWKDW³SOD\VDVLJQLILFDQWUROHLQSRUWVDQGGRFNV´DVFODLPHGE\5DWQDP
(1975: 193), not only involves human error that leads to accidents in the port 
(Fabiano, et al, 2010: 980-981) but also takes into account of workload and attitudes 
of the workers in the port related activities (Ratnam, 1975: 193). 
 
In relation to security involving the port workers, the perception is that ISPS has 
increased the workload of shore-based as well as sea-going staff. A study conducted 
by Burmester (2005) based on the experience of some European countries found the 
HYLGHQFH RI WKLV ,Q 3RUW .ODQJ¶V VLWXDWLRQ WKH UHVSRQVHV IURP the port workers 
suggest a similar outcome:  
 
One member of a group of port labourers described the impact as follows:  
 
When we were imparted with the ISPS we have to learn about security, we 
have to do the security, we have to safeguard the safety and security; all 
these are problem for us. Things that we never involve we have to do it. 
Initially we complained. We protested. Why we should do this, in actual fact 
it is the responsibility of the port police. It became a burden to us (Interview 
Code: 24). 
 
One worker in another group expressed a similar view: 
 
The disadvantage is work pressure. It caused additional work. When we say 
about security, we are always in alert. Last time it was more relax but now 
the awareness has increased (Interview Code: 22). 
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Other problems emerged in tandem with the ISPS Code. Part A, Section 18, sets out 
the stringent training requirements:  
 
(i)  The port facility security officer and appropriate port facility security 
personnel shall have knowledge and have received training, taking into 
account the guidance given in Part B of this Code. 
 
(ii) Port facility personnel having specific security duties shall understand 
their duties and responsibilities for port facility security, as described in the 
port facility security plan, and shall have sufficient knowledge and ability to 
perform their assigned duties, taking into account the guidance given in part 
B of this Code. 
 
(iii) To ensure the effective implementation of the port facility security 
plan, drills shall be carried out at appropriate intervals, taking into account 
the types of operation of the port facility, port facility personnel changes, the 
type of ship the port facility is serving and other relevant circumstances, 
taking into accounts guidance given in part B of this Code. 
 
(iv) The port facility security officer shall ensure the effective coordination 
and implementation of the port facility security plan by participating in 
exercises at appropriate intervals, taking into account the guidance given in 
part B of this Code (ISPS Code, 2003 : 23).    
 
 
The DA observed that people who are involved in implementation of the above need 
to be updated regularly in terms of security awareness and knowledge. One 
respondent from the Marine DHSDUWPHQW JDYHHYLGHQFH WKDW ³ZKHQ WKH WLPHFRPHV
they [those on the ground] become very weak and reduce the awareness. When we 
conduct exercise then they are alert again. When it is normal situation, the awareness 
is very less. We take for granted because we are very safe and any kind of terrorism is 
UDUHO\KDSSHQVKHUH´,QWHUYLHw Code: 08).  
 
To run the required training and drill as part of its operational duties, the Marine 
Department seeks financial support from the Federal government. The level of the 
financial allocation does not allow for the size of Port Klang, the number of facilities 
that need to be audited and the training that has to be given (Appendix VI provides a 
complete list of all facilities under the purview of the Marine Department).  
According to a key ISPS official in the Marine Department, the allocation was only 
RM300,000 (USD97,000) far less from what was actually needed (Interview Code: 
09).  
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The US-led Megaport Initiative is also not exempt from manpower problems despite 
the fact that it is equipment based. A group interview of port workers revealed that 
they too faced hurdles. As one worker explained:  
 
They [port operator] introduced scanning machine. But do you know how 
difficult it is to go through the scanning machine. You can see on the bridge. 
It is very small and we have to struggle to adjust. But for us, it is very 
cumbersome and caused uneasiness. There was accident before hitting the 
scanning machine. We complain to our committee. There are cases we avoid 
the scanning machine and not to drive through (Interview Code: 22).     
 
In addition to this, requirement for all container drivers to drive through the RPM 
created a difficult problem for them. As described in the previous chapter, the 
equipment, placed in a narrow bridge between the container wharf and container yard, 
would occasionally cause accidents if the driver is not careful enough while driving 
through. In the event of an accident, the port penalises the driver for negligence. 
Consequently there appeared to be a tendency among some of the drivers to avoid 
RPM. Although the RMC could detect the number of prime movers and the driver 
who avoids the RPM, the effect is that this limits monitoring 100 percent of the 
container movement. Hence, a criticism can be made that to some extent the system 
encourages a rather lax attitude towards security in the host country despite the 
intention is to enhance security.     
 
8.3.1 Manpower issues  
 
The security arrangements in Port Klang described thus far reflected the fact that 
technological investment and port police requirements were passed down to terminal 
operators in which they shouldered some share of cost elements in their port 
operation. A part of the context here is the manpower requirement for government and 
port administration arising from the introduction of the ISPS regime.   
 
Away from the waterfront, at the institutional level, when the Marine Department 
took on the role of DA in 2003, one hurdle was that there was no dedicated 
departmental unit or section. The resulting problems were identified by one Marine 
Department respondent:  
 
 
 217 
FirstlyZHDUHQRWSUHSDUHGEHFDXVHLWZDVQHZ$QGWKHQZHGRQ¶WKDYHD
dedicated unit to look into port issues. We have the Ports Unit, but it deals 
more of barter trade issues. It does not involve big ports. So the Marine 
Department does not have connection with big ports like Westport, 
Northport, PTP and Penang. We did not have any [contact] with them. Even 
if it has, it only involves in terms of seminar occasionally, but in terms of 
VHFXULW\ ZH GRQ¶W KDYH DQ\ ZLWK WKHP 6R WKDW LV RXU FKDOOHQJH WR JHW D
relationship between the Marine Department and ports because before this 
ZH GRQ¶W KDYH DQ\ ZLWK ELJ SRUWV $QRWKHU FKDOOHQJH LV ZH GR QRW KDYH
specific officers to handle this security matters. Because all officers have 
their own duties in their respective units (Interview Code: 09). 
 
The Ports Units referred to by the respondent of the Marine Department in the above 
context essentially takes charge of the barter trading activities and minor ports that 
come under the purview of the Marine Department. This is different from the Ports 
Unit of the MOT as explained in Chapter Seven. Hence the limited capacity of the 
Ports Unit of Marine Department, that has no direct control of the Federal ports, 
created difficulties for it to establish security matters at Federal ports at the early stage 
of ISPS Code implementation.  
 
The requirements of the international regime imposed a burden on the PKA as well. 
The national Act A1316 assigned the port authority as the MTSO for taking charge of 
areas beyond port/ship interface. As the appointment by the Marine Department is of 
a named individual this has obviously caused some anxiety to the PKA security 
officer. As explained in the previous chapter, any breach of responsibility would 
result in a heavy financial penalty for the person concerned.     
 
With regard to staffing needs were confirmed by an official of the Marine 
Department. The respondent asserted: 
 
:HGRQ¶WKDYHDGHGLFDWHXQLW WR ORRN LQWRSRUW LVVXHVZHGRQRWKDYH
specific officers to handle this security matters because all officers have 
their own duties in their respective units. Like my self, I was handling the 
ISM Code [International Management Code for the Safe Operations of 
Ships] last time. So we concentrate on our duties. When this new Code  
[ISPS] came into force, we need to have officers to take charge for its 
implementation. That is why in the initial period we have only myself and 
few other officers involved to set up the ISPS Code in Malaysia. During 
that time I was doing the ISM, but I was seconded to do the ISPS...these 
are the main problems faced by the Marine Department. (Interview Code: 
09) 
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For the government agency, establishing a new unit and fulfilling the manpower 
requirement incurred cost in terms of salary and other bureaucratic needs. Similar ly, 
the PKA faced a shortage of personnel in view of its increased responsibilities under 
the ISPS requirement. This shortage was a reason why the PKA came to depend upon 
the terminal operators to manage and maintain the security forces in the port. (See 
table 6.5 for terminals port police strength). To this end, one respondent from the 
PKA asserted: 
 
 
,DPUHO\LQJPRUHRQ WHUPLQDORSHUDWRU ,GRQ¶WKDYHSDWUROOLQJERDW ,GRQ¶W
have the personnel. If I want to do the inspection, I rely on them. If they stop 
any vessels at the anchorage area, I need to go and need to get the logistical 
support from the terminal operator, either boat or personnel (Interview Code: 
17).  
 
The scale of the problem was described by a senior PKA official responsible for 
security: 
 
The only problem we [PKA] find is shortage of personnel. We need to 
recruit more personnel and train them as well. We are recruiting more 
security personnel now within the port authority itself to work together with 
the terminal operators. We are also the Duly Authorised Officers (DAO) 
who has been recognised by the Marine Department as DA. We have six 
officers, who have been given DAO powers. That means we can go on 
board the ship directly but having said that we are still lacking people for the 
first level of checking. Not so much on implementing the physical security 
DUUDQJHPHQWEXWPRUHRQWKHVKLS¶VSDUWZKHUHZHQHHGWRGRWKHYHWWLQJRI
WKHVKLS«ULJKWQRZRXUVWDIILVRYHUZRUNHG2IFRXUVHZHQHHGWRDGGUHVV
this. This is the part we are lacking now (Interview Code: 16). 
 
The CSI did not entail additional government staff as the US used its own officials in 
Port Klang but this was not the case with the Megaport initiative which, like the ISPS 
Code, required additional resources as one of the RMC officials explained: 
 
We put up additional man power. Even though it is new equipment, we have 
to put up our own team as well. To run Megaport in Port Klang we need 
thirty-two rank and file officers. And then we need about eight supervising 
officers. That will come about forty for Megaport Initiative. That will be our 
FRVW:HKDYHQ¶WJRWWKHIXOOQXPber. Our department has given twenty-two 
officers. But the Public Service Department has not approved the additional 
staff. This is a cost for the government (Interview Code: 10). 
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8.3.2 Loopholes in security  
 
The following discusses the loopholes identified in security from the attitudinal and 
the practical dimensions. 
 
8.3.2.1 Port Klang  
 
Although the study found that the system of security was reasonably strong in Port 
Klang before 9/11, security awareness seemed to be more obvious in the post 9/11 
era. One operator respondent stated: 
 
There are lot of difference in pre-9/11 and post 9/11 in the sense that of 
course people are more aware of security implementation and why security 
is more important. Pre-9/11 people were very relaxed. Even the police 
maybe relaxed during that time. If they do make mistake we just tell them 
GRQ¶W GR LW :H FDQ VRPHWLPHV GULYH WKURXJK $OWKRXJK WKLQJV DUH EHLQJ
checked, everybody was relaxed but then after the implementation, now 
there are two bodies checking on it. Of course we also started implementing 
so many strict measures (interview Code: 23).    
 
Similarly, one senior Customs respondent said:  
 
I believe the whole of port communities at least they are better in terms of 
awareness on cargo security. I think definitely there is improvement. They 
begin to realise the importance of cargo security. Not just Customs even 
those players in the port. So there is a difference between before and after 
9/11 in terms of security awareness. Now we are talking about cargo 
security more often as compared to before 9/11 (Interview Code: 10).  
 
In a wider dimension of the Port Klang, a senior PKA interviewee who was with the 
organisation for more than twenty years provided examples of stricter security: 
 
Previously we were screening people who are coming in, but after the ISPS, 
it is a bit more thorough in the sense that they open up their car boots. 
Previously they allowed groups just coming into the port, go and visit the 
port but now all these special screening is being done. You require a special 
SHUPLVVLRQ DQG ZH GRQ¶W JR RQERDUG RI WKH VKLS IRU VKLS YLVLW3UHYLRXVO\
when students came, we used to allow them. But now all these things are 
very restrictive. We simply not allow any civilian to go into the 
SRUW«3UHYLRXVO\VKLSFKDQGOHUVFDQFRPHLQDQGGHOLYHUWKHSURYLVLRQVIRU
the ship as long as they have gate pass, we let them in, but now stringent 
check. As soon as he comes, we open up the doors and check what they are 
taking into the port. So access control has been tightened up and of course 
more patrols around the wharf area to ensure no unauthorised personnel 
[around] (Interview Code: 15).  
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Even the terminal operators claimed that they monitor the human and vehicle access 
through port pass for security enhancement.  
 
Against this however, the DA believed that the awareness level in port was sometimes 
not sufficiently strong. This may relate to the findings reported in the preceding 
chapter that terrorism is not seen as a serious risk in the 3RUW.ODQJ¶VZDWHU7KHUHIRUH
a tendency to be lax may exist among port workers including security officials 
(Interview Code: 08).  
 
From WKHSRUWZRUNHUV¶SHUVSHFWLYH, the workers argued that there are many accidents 
and theft cases in the port originating from outsiders and foreigners which prompted 
WKH TXHVWLRQ ³ZK\ GLG WKH VHFXULW\ RIILFHUV QRW FKHFN WKHP"´ One member of the 
group mentioned:  
 
The haulier drivers are from outside. You can see in the terminal there are 
lot of foreigners here who do not have any driving licence.  What we have 
seen, normally for those drivers it is very easy for them to enter and exit the 
SRUW7KH\GRQ¶WQHHGDQ\SDVV(YHQIRUXVWKH\ZLOORQO\FKHFNWKRURXJKO\
when there is a case. If not, the security is not as tight as it should be. Even 
motorbike can get stolen in the port. How could it happen? How can they 
say the security is very good? Even not all cars exiting the gate will be 
checked and opened their bonnets (Interview Code: 22).   
 
 
The Head of Freight Forwarding Association also had criticisms: 
  
Today if I drive into our port, I can just go like that without my pass. I just 
UDLVH P\ KDQG DQG JR LQ« %XW QRZ >KLV REVHUYDWLRQ@ WKHUH LV QR SURSHU
control of security. Today you ask the Port Klang how many people are 
entering they cannot tell. Last year we went to see the GM [General 
Manager] of the PKA to do some investigation on security on dangerous 
goods [DG]. We just went in by raising our hands. We went to DG 
warehouse. We went there but nobody stopped us. Nobody came around. 
There is no security guard or any staff. We went and see the dangerous 
goods warehouse, nobody cares. If we were to take something and put it 
there, what will happen then? Who ever comes in must have proper pass. 
Irrespective whether you are GM or port authority, there must be a way of 
recording, especially in the dangerous goods area. How you secure the Port 
Klang that counts the most. The authority should put stricter rules, then 
there will be no problem (Interview Code: 26). 
 
 
Those two different view points suggest that, at one hand, the government and port 
operators claimed that the port is well secured with stricter security measures but on 
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the other hand the port workers and users felt that there are some weaknesses in the 
system. Despite the practical aspect of port security as a whole was strong, the 
weaknesses described in this context can be connected to attitudinal problem from 
certain number of enforcement officials. As noted earlier, the security awareness was 
generally obvious in post 9/11 period, however considering the danger of terrorism is 
not seen as intimidating for the port as agreed by one of the senior officials of the 
Marine Department, such perception could probably led to certain level of 
shortcomings in the actual practise of security measures.  
 
8.3.2.2 Porous borders  
 
However good the checks may or may not be within the Port Klang itself, the problem 
of security here cannot be isolated from the wider security context. Malaysian 
maritime waters are still porous, with piracy and other illicit activities a significant 
threat.   
 
One sign of this is the issue of human smuggling and human trafficking which took a 
centre stage as one of the crimes in Malaysian water in 2011.  There are no reported 
cases of these illicit activities affecting the Port Klang directly, but the crimes had 
drawn international attention and affected Australia to a greater extent since Malaysia 
has been treated as a transit point. According to the Anti-human Trafficking in 
Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Council, a total of 416 cases and 591 arrests 
were registered from 2008 to 2011 (The Star Online, 21 January 2012). For the first 
eight months of 2011 alone (January to August) a total of 136 people, including eight 
Malaysians were rescued in 53 similar cases (The Star Online, 30 September). The 
problem primarily originated from economically poor countries like Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar and war torn countries such as Sri 
Lanka and Afghanistan (Stanslas, 2010: 1).  
 
Seaborne human trafficking is perceived to be a complex maritime challenge in 
Malaysia. There are fears that transnational criminal syndicates could be used for 
terrorism using trawlers or ships loaded with ammunition (Stanslas, 2010: 1-4). Hence 
the United States Department of State retained Malaysia in Tier 2 Watch List status in 
the 2011 Trafficking in Persons report. Tier 2 includes countries that do not fully 
comply with the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act 2000 minimum standard but 
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are making significant efforts to eliminate trafficking in persons (The Star Online, 26 
August 2011).  
 
Since the matter was considered serious, the Malaysian Prime Minister made an 
agreement in principle with the Australian Prime Minister on 7 May 2011 to trade 
asylum-seekers under which 800 people who tried to get Australia by boat would be 
taken to Malaysia and in return Australia would take 4,000 genuine refugees from 
Malaysia over the next four years (The Star Online, 8 May 2011). An official 
agreement on this issue was finally signed by the Malaysian and Australian 
governments on 25 July 2011 (The Star Online, 25 July 2011). However the deal was 
not fully welcome by the Australian Parliament as the existing loopholes would be 
exploited by smugglers for more crimes (The Malaysian Insider, 1 August 2011). 
Therefore, the measure was eventually aborted on 13 October 2011, mainly because 
the ruling Australian government did not have the numbers to change migration laws 
to allow the refugee swap (The Star Online, 13 October 2011). 
 
From the Malaysian policy perspective, such a measure is regarded vital to restrict 
any exploitation of Malaysian waters. This is because, as one respondent stressed, 
³KXPDQVPXJJOHUVDUHDOVRLQYROYHGin the transnational crimes. That means [it leads 
WR@VPXJJOLQJRIZHDSRQVVPXJJOLQJRISHRSOHGUXJVDQGFRQWUDEDQGV´,QWHUYLHZ
Code: 14). If this problem goes unchecked, the maritime sector could potentially 
affect the national security in many ways. A senior security official of a terminal 
operator related a practical incident with illegal immigrants that had a direct 
connection with this issue:  
 
So far the illegal immigrants have certain landing points in the coastal areas. 
They do not choose Port Klang because they know the security is so tight. 
So they dare not come in this area. But we have a case, I think last year 
[2009] or the year before there was a boat full of illegal immigrants over 
loaded, going back to Ramadan festival. It sank just out side around two 
kilometres from here. We reacted very fast. We saved lot of them but twelve 
of them died. It was a major crisis but we reacted very fast. Their landing 
point is somewhere behind the Island. So they are taking and going [from 
there]. It is not a threat to the port. But illegal immigrants can be threat to a 
port (Interview Code: 23). 
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8.3.2.3 Problem of small boats  
 
The issue of small boats particularly barter trade boats is a matter of concern and 
posts challenges to port security in many respects. As stated earlier, a survey in 2008 
indicated there were about 2,000 barter trade vessels plying in the Malaysian waters. 
In a detailed account, statistics from the Marine Department and various port 
authorities from 2000 to 2009 registered 206,300 barter trade movements between 
Peninsular Malaysia and Sumatra Island, originating mainly from Port Klang, 
Malacca, Muar and Batu Pahat ports to jetties and ports in Sumatra (Shahryari and 
Arshad, 2011: 6) Even in the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia where Kuantan Port is 
located, where barter trade is considered particularly small, this was seen as a threat. 
The head of security commented: 
 
This [small vessel] is one of the problems that we do not have equipment to 
monitor the movement of the vessels. We only have system for the big 
vessel, 500 GT and above. We have the AIS receiver. We can detect any 
vessel 500 GT and above. There is a system for this. But those non 
compliance, small vessel we cannot see [through this system]. The smaller 
vessel is the threat because they use the smaller boat to ram into the big 
vessel. They can come strait into your ship or come into the berth without 
being detected. This is our problem. (Interview Code:18)    
 
In the case of Port Klang, the PKA is apparently aware of this problem but according 
to one senior security official, the issue is not resolved due to bureaucratic 
impediments: 
  
,¶PYHU\VHULRXVDERXWLW>EDUWHUWUDGHYHVVHOV@:HDOUHDG\WROGWKH0DULQH
'HSDUWPHQWDERXWWKHVHULRXVQHVV&XUUHQWO\WKH\GRQ¶WHYHn have VHF on 
board. So we told them to start off with VHF first, because they are coming 
right into the town in Southport. Because of this danger, we have already 
written to Marine Department. I had spoken to the Director General to do 
something about it.+HXQGHUVWDQGVWKHVLWXDWLRQEXWGRQ¶WNQRZKRZORQJLW
takes (interview Code: 15). 
 
 
The movement of barter trade vessels in addition to the heavy volume of merchant 
vessel traffic unequivocally is a high risk for the SOM. Responses elicited from the 
stakeholders, especially the policy makers and port authority are the reflection of this 
potential risk for both the SOM and Port Klang. There were twenty-seven accident 
cases registered from 2000 to 2010 (Shahryari and Arshad 2011: 6) but it cannot be 
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denied that the element of security risk is inherently embedded within the movement 
RIWUDQVLWWUDIILF$VSRLQWHGRXWE\6KDKU\DULDQG$UVKDGWKDW³DQ\LQFLGHQW
or accident however minor will not only carry the possibility of disrupting the flow of 
traffic, it would also adversely affect the rich ecosystem of the SOM and its role and 
LQ WKH OLIH VXSSRUW V\VWHP RI WKH UHJLRQ´ In relation to WKLV <DVLQ¶V 
argument as stated in Chapter Three is worth repeating at this point, that any damages 
to the ecosystem could possibly disrupt the livelihoods of coastal inhabitants. This 
would eventually force them to resort to maritime crime for survival.  
 
8.3.2.4 Corruption and political intervention 
 
There is an argument that executing preventive or mitigating measures at sea, as in the 
case of attack against a ship, yacht or boat or even port facilities in this respect, is 
quite a challenging task and therefore requires more effort than a comparable action 
ashore (Zec, Francic and Hlaca, 2010: 47). Similarly, port security in Malaysian ports 
generally faces a daunting task in respect of illegal fishing, piracy/armed robbery and 
illegal immigrants. The statistics of various offences handled by the MMEA as shown 
in Table 7.1 in Chapter Seven are proven a strong testimony that maritime security 
that has a close connection to port security needs considerable effort from all parties. 
However there is a strong accusation that corruption and abuse of power have 
permeated in many law enforcement agencies thus introducing another layer of 
impediment for effective enforcement.  
 
According to Bakashmar (2008: 483), one of the related agencies is the RMP Force in 
which the Marine Police is also part of the organisation. The finding of the Royal 
Commission initiated by the former Prime Minister of Malaysia Tun Abdullah 
%DGDZLVKRZV WKDW³WKHHQWLUHSROLFHIRUFH LV LQHIILFLHQWDQGFRUUXSW´&RQVHTXHQWO\
the pervasive corruption within the Malaysian police force is a significant problem 
WKDW ZHDNHQV WKH DXWKRULWLHV¶ FDSDEilities to combat crime. In the same vein, other 
enforcement agencies are no exception in practicing bribery hence bringing a 
damaging effect in the quality of service as oppose to what was envisaged by the 
government and the public.39 The arrest of more than sixty Customs officers in April 
                                                 
39
 The 2010 Transparency International corruption perceptions index reveals that Malaysia holds 56th 
position out of 178 nations with the score of 4.4 on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). 
In 2011, Malaysia scored 4.3 and declined further to 60 th position (The Star online, 1 December 2011). 
 225 
2011 by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission involving millions of Malaysian 
Ringgit in briberies is plausible evidence demonstrating the weakness of the 
enforcement agencies (The Star online, 2 April 2011).  
 
Another aspect is political interference influencing the release of the captured 
criminals where in many cases the enforcement agencies are obliged to follow what 
has been directed from the top authorities. For example one respondent who is 
responsible for port security in the Johor Port Authority asserted: 
 
Firstly we have to think from top down. There is still political interference. 
We do enforcement at the lower level, but the people at top if they overrule 
our duties, then what else can we do? So this has to overcome in total. 
1RUPDOO\RQO\ZKHQWKHUHLVDQ\LQFLGHQWWKHQWKHDFWLRQZLOOEHWDNHQ«LQ
fact the security decision is done by the politician, top down approach. We 
allocate security areas and gazetted it. When people enter and we catch, then 
there are political interferences, asking us to release this people. So how can 
we do our job? This is one of the problems in the implementation part 
(Interview Code: 19). 
 
Thus, effective security measures are clearly hampered by such interventions. 
 
8.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter examines various problems and challenges for port security in Port 
Klang as well as other Malaysian ports. Malaysia takes every effort in complying with 
the international convention of the ISPS Code as mandated by the IMO. Nonetheless 
the implementation at the national level was not as smooth as it was expected despite 
the fact port security measures had long been established before 9/11. The field trip 
interviews for this study revealed that in addition to cost being an issue for the 
terminal operators, the regime created an extra burden at several levels, from port 
workers to port officials and civil servants particularly the need for extra workforce 
and additional work. The issue of cost element and resistance to following the 
international requirements seen in this case also appeared in other developing 
countries, as shown in different studies. However, Port Klang has managed those 
problems reasonably effectively and terminal operators proved able to absorb a 
certain amount of security expenditure.   
                                                                                                                                            
For a nation that strives to be a developed nation by 2020, such a result is certainly not promising or 
encouraging in international context.   
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The application of the unilateral measures by the US to all its trading partners has led 
to increased costs for the port, including Malaysia. The Malaysian government was 
obliged to establish a special unit, with manpower and monetary support to 
materialise the policy decisions at the practical level. Furthermore, for the port users 
and labourers, it appears that the US regimes have unequivocally burdened them, 
leading to accusations that the US has pushed its problem towards others. Hence, the 
discernable fact is that the implementation of various security regimes has not come 
in free but incurred financial burden for users covertly hidden within the system. As 
far as private stakeholders are concerned, whatever cost come along in the business 
transaction, the costs will be transferred to end users ultimately. Although some extra 
burden is shown in economic cost as well as the workload and attitudinal problems in 
certain security practices, the crux of the matter is, security has not been comprised 
for the port and maritime sector as it is considered highly essential as required by the 
national jurisdiction as well as for international need. Looking in a holistic 
perspective of the Malaysian port security system, in the eagerness for not 
compromising security, this study found that there are still loopholes and other 
weaknesses that demand considerable attention from the government and other 
stakeholders. This is chiefly drawn from the fact that Malaysian maritime border is 
still porous that led to all kinds of illicit activities continue to flourish. In this respect, 
matters relating to human smuggling and human trafficking as well as problems of 
small boats need additional attention. For the international community, this raises 
question as to how the offences committed against ship and persons on board can be 
resolved effectively. Even within the port sector, there appeared to be loopholes in the 
existing system as claimed by port workers. The element of graft within the 
enforcement agencies is another issue that weakens the government machinery in 
producing effective security measures. In spite of those practical problems and 
challenges in the management of port security in the Malaysian context, the chapter 
highlighted the fact that security is considered a vital element in the maritime sector, 
therefore strong efforts were made not to compromise the required security, as 
mandated by the international organisations and the US. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The core of the thesis is port security measures in the pre and post 9/11 eras in a 
developing country, Malaysia. A central issue here was the contention in much of the 
literature that compliance with the international regulatory regime affecting ports 
introduced in response to 9/11 necessarily proved problematic for developing 
countries. By answering WKHNH\TXHVWLRQRI³KRZKDVWKHHYHQWRI9/11 affected port 
JRYHUQDQFH´focussing on the case of Port Klang in particular and the Malaysian port 
system in general, the study aimed to establish whether this assumption held true in 
this case. Subsidiary aims were to identify changes or otherwise in perception of 
threat as a consequence of 9/11; to examine security aspects and practices before and 
after 9/11; to look at changes in the institutional and legal arrangements for protecting 
the port and to consider what were the implications and challenges of implementing 
various initiatives in safeguarding the port. 
 
It has been shown in the early part of this study that the terrorist attacks on 11th 
SeptHPEHUDOWHUHGWKHPDULWLPHGRPDLQE\HVWDEOLVKLQJD³EHIRUH´DQG³DIWHU´
dividing line. The fundamental basis of this division was that 9/11 increased the 
SHUFHSWLRQRIWKHSRUWDQGVKLSSLQJVHFWRUDVµVRIWEHOO\¶SRWHQWLDOWDUJHWV WDNLQJLQWR
account their openness and vulnerabilities.  
 
The result was a raft of new compulsory security requirements for ports, some 
established by the IMO, some demanded of its trading partners by the US, others laid 
down by regional organisations. As a consequence, port security now had a dual 
dimension. Governments, port owners and operators faced not only the conventional 
and routine need to secure a port from any kinds of unlawful acts that might 
jeopardise operations but also the need to fulfil international security requirements 
which also include some of the unilateral measures of the US, whether willingly or 
unwillingly and whether their waters were prone to security threats or not. The latter 
seemingly raised particular issues for developing countries because of potential costs 
and the practical challenges posed by implementation. The general presumption was 
that the developing countries found it difficult to respond to new port security 
requirements in the post 9/11 period. However, the particular case studied here throws 
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doubt on this assumption. Despite elements of cost and other economic implications, 
the Malaysian port system, in particular Port Klang, in view of their advanced security 
arrangements much earlier than 9/11, managed reasonably well in handling the 
required measures. To a certain extent, the pre-independence threats, particularly 
communist terrorism (land-based terrorism) that posed considerable challenges to 
national security, provided a fundamental basis for stricter port security systems. 
These were then maintained, improved and subsequently intertwined with other 
measures required in the post 9/11 period.      
 
This study reached this conclusion by endeavouring to analyse how the event of 9/11 
affected port governance, corresponding to the above dualism, through a case study 
approach. Focusing on Port Klang -  one of the fastest growing ports among  
developing economies - it examined how this resulted in a change of attitude towards 
security as well as in the behaviour or practices and in institutional arrangements. 
While the research was essentially based on Port Klang, its findings have links to 
Malaysian ports in general since the international measures required a national level 
of compliance. For this purpose, for collecting primary source material, interviews 
were conducted with relevant players representing different segments of government 
and private agencies. These were then supplemented with a range of other sources 
such as government reports, legal instruments, newsletters and of course scholarly 
publications to substantiate the findings.  
 
Generally, as a complex matter, the study found that port security has been viewed in 
different contexts. There was paucity of literature in relation to port security before 
9/11 as highlighted in the introductory chapter. The overall approach during the 
period however was very much related to theft and pilferage, as security was regarded 
a subset of safety in port. Despite a record of terrorism and piracy/armed robbery in 
the Southeast Asia region where Malaysia is located, these threats were not perceived 
as particularly threatening or challenging to port operators or to policy makers. 
Viewed from different spatial levels; international, supra-national and national that 
formed a basic model for this study, port security regimes before 9/11 were apparently 
µORFDOLVHG¶ ,Q WKH V DQG WKH V NH\ DWWHQWLRQ ZDV ODUJHO\ GLUHFWHG WR SRUW
reformation and privatisation. The danger of maritime terrorism was possibly 
underestimated during this period, despite some measures against it, but seemingly a 
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risk-based approach was not a core issue in comparison to the measures initiated post 
9/11.  
 
However the aftermath of 9/11 altered the nature of port security. The perception of 
an element of threat to ports and shipping grew.  This was on the premise that the 
scale of atrocities landside might be shifted to the maritime sphere because of its 
inherent vulnerabilities. Hence a wide range of policy measures were introduced at 
various spatial levels across the globe. The US, in consequence of its victimisation in 
the 9/11 attacks, especially took the lead and played a crucial role in influencing 
international organizations, in particular the IMO, to introduce harsh measures. This 
gave birth to a number of new regulatory regimes, notably the ISPS Code, at 
international level. The US also introduced a raft of unilateral measures, but having a 
global effect. Many of those measures were imposed on its trading partners, with the 
effect of pushing its border beyond its legitimate water. Such regimes had an element 
of compulsion, since those who refused to comply with the US requirements would be 
subjected to trade restrictions. It also had a power relation dimension. In conforming 
to US requirements, Malaysia demonstrated its continued commitment to the success 
of an amicable foreign policy with the US.    
 
9/11 not only altered the physical landscape of ports but changed attitudes and 
practices affecting security in many respects. This was noticeable in terms of the 
speed and number of regimes introduced at different levels and the obligation to put 
these into practice, despite the fact that such measures faced considerable criticism 
from developing economies in relation to high cost and effectiveness. The ISPS case 
is the best example in that it was passed in fifteen months. It has been suggested that 
such a situation engendered security regimes implemented at different scales in 
GLIIHUHQW SDUWV RI WKH ZRUOG EDVHG RQ HDFK VWDWH¶V RZQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG WKDW WKHVH
regimes reflHFWHG D FRXQWU\¶V ORFDWLRQ JHRJUDSKLFDO VXUURXQGLQJ DQG LWV QDWLRQDO
OHJLVODWLYH UHTXLUHPHQW ,W KDV WKHUHIRUH EHHQ DUJXHG WKDW WKH ³RQH VL]H ILWV DOO
DSSURDFK´DVHVSRXVHGE\the IMO was not truly applicable because of this disparity. 
The Port Klang case study tested this claim by highlighting the Malaysian government 
approach.  
 
Since the government considered Malaysia as a maritime nation, considerable 
importance was given to sea trade for the national economy. This was reflected 
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especially in port development in which the government had striven to develop all 
Federal ports, in particular through the Five Year Development Plan. In this respect, 
the government took the initiative in privatising all Federal ports, starting off with 
Port Klang in 1986. The 3RUW.ODQJZDV LGHQWLILHG DV WKH µILUVW¶ SRUW LQ YLHZRI LWV
setting and significant contribution to national economy. This progress had a 
retrospective connection to the period of British rule when Port Klang had been 
earmarked as a strategic port for serving the port cities of Klang and Kuala Lumpur as 
well as for international purposes. Its impressive growth over time encouraged the 
government subsequently to declare it as the national load centre and regional 
transhipment hub.  
 
The expansion of Port Klang confirmed its role as a main gateway for both domestic 
DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUDGHQRWLFHDEOH LQ3RUW.ODQJ¶VSURJUHVVLYHJURZWKIURPLWVHDUO\
development until the present moment (2011). The study highlighted the fact that the 
Port Klang was not an open port. It was heavily protected under the Protected Areas 
DQG3URWHFWHG3ODFHV$FWDOHJDF\RI0DOD\VLD¶VHDUOLHUFRORQLDOregime that had 
introduced stringent rules. The Act basically defined all key ports as an essential 
service and therefore imposed restrictions prohibiting any unauthorized person from 
being present in the protected areas. This preventive law was primarily introduced to 
safeguard ports from any form of subversive attack or sabotage, with communist 
terrorism, seen as the main threat during the period of British colonial rule. From 
thereon the measure was continued to preserve the sanctity of key ports. It is 
significant that when the government privatised the port terminals, the authority 
(PKA) did not relinquish its responsibility for taking charge of security matters. The 
government had shown an extensive interest in safeguarding the port, although the 
private entities operated it on a commercial basis. 
 
Returning to the key question of how 9/11 affected the port governance, it is clear that 
even before this the Malaysian government had in fact established very advanced 
SURWHFWLYHPHDVXUHVLQDOOFRXQWU\¶VNH\SRUWV6XFKDSURDFWLYHDSSURDFKSURYLGHGD
relatively good foundation for the implementation of the ISPS Code owing to the fact 
that many of the basic requirements were already in place. Furthermore, in the interest 
of national security, in Malaysia the application of the ISPS Code was expanded 
beyond the port/ship interface, covering a bigger scope of port parameter. 
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In relation to the question of the perceived threats before and after 9/11, the study 
found that the security situation of Port Klang was similar to other ports in the world 
where thefts and pilferages were the common crimes. However, the element of 
terrorism which created much anxiety in the West, especially for the US, was shown 
not to be an issue at all for Port Klang or the Malaysian maritime sector in general. 
Nonetheless other illicit activities such as piracy/armed robbery, smuggling of 
weapons, humans and contraband are continuously taking place in SOM in which the 
Port Klang is located in the same vicinity. To overcome such menaces, several 
security measures were put in place. On the question of the scope of security 
measures before and after 9/11, the study found that the Malaysian government 
practiced advanced and strict measures even before the 9/11 incident. It was argued 
that this was a significant feature having a considerable impact on subsequent 
developments in Malaysian port security.   
 
As such, as noted earlier, Port Klang was heavily protected under the Protected Areas 
and Protected Places Act 1959. Further, apart from conforming to the ISPS Code  as 
mandated by the IMO, the Malaysian government demonstrated a strong commitment  
to several other measures, in particular the unilateral measures of the US in post 9/11 
era, in order to maintain the  power-play relationship with the US.  Hence, in the light 
of the significance of US-Malaysian trade, as well as supporting the US in fighting 
against the terrorism in the Southeast Asia region, Malaysia agreed to comply with 
and brought into force the CSI and the Megaport Initiative. Since Malaysia-US 
relations had been established from the 1970s covering a range of endeavours, the 
Malaysian government considered those security measures important for the benefit 
of the nation not only from an economic point of view, but also from a socio-political 
dimension. Malaysia also proved its commitment by establishing STA in a local 
context, in an attempt to enhance the non-proliferation of WMD.  
 
$OO WKHVH HIIRUWV ZHUH PDGH RQ WKH EDVLV RI µUHMHFWLQJ GRPLQDQFH HPEUDFLQJ
HQJDJHPHQW¶ZLWKWKH86,WLVQRWHZRUWK\KRZHYHUWKDWWKHVHDJUHHGPHDVXUHVKDG
cost and other consequences. Looking at this from a critical standpoint, by so 
extensively adopting the US measures in addition to complying with international 
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measures, places Malaysia in the zone of over-compliance with port security measures 
as a whole.    
 
In relation to institutional and legal arrangements, the study pointed out clearly that in 
view of national interest, the government considered security as a vital element for 
economic as well as socio-political survival. Thus, key agencies such as the MOT, 
NCS, Marine Department, Customs and MMEA have been playing fundamental roles 
at various capacities in terms of policy making and implementation. Concurrently, the 
terminal operators as private entities, though they run the port with a commercial 
purpose, are obliged to adhere to polices directed towards them. Essentially, the 
establishment of different agencies was to ensure that all legal instruments and polices 
made by the government on the aspect of port security are realised as effectively as 
possible for the interest of national security and socio-political development.  
 
On the question concerning the implications and financial consequences of 
implementing security measures, the study found that notwithstanding the fact that an 
advanced system of port security was not new to Port Klang or to other Malaysian 
ports, there was some element of additional cost resulting from the provision of 
specific units and training for the government in implementing the ISPS Code. 
Inadequate personnel were another issue at the start of implementation.  However, 
implementation cost was generally not a major issue in the Malaysian case as 
compared to the experience of other developing countries highlighted in studies like 
UNCTAD (2007), Azuh (2007) and Ng and Gujar (2008). The Malaysian port 
systems had managed well in this respect.  
 
While the study suggests that the cost was not a major factor for Malaysia, there were 
some challenges relating to ISPS Code implementation that should be noted in this 
FRQWH[W 7KHVH LQFOXGHG UHOXFWDQFH RU VRPH IRUP RI UHVLVWDQFH IURP WKH ZRUNHUV¶
perspective in the early stages. There was evidence also of some form of 
dissatisfaction or unhappiness about the 86 PHDVXUHV QRW RQO\ IURP WKH XVHU¶V
perspective but also from some policy makers. This type of reaction indicates that 
attitudinally not all stakeholders accepted the security changes brought by 9/11. 
However, this resistance appeared to be very minimal and temporary and did not 
hamper at all the practical aspects of the realisation of the policy measures decided by 
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the government. In other words, in spite of some resistance which seemingly was 
personal rather than general, the required port security measures have not been 
compromised.    
 
Another weakness revealed in relation to the implementation of the ISPS Code was 
that, notwithstanding that the Code was assigned to the Marine Department for the 
purpose of enforcement, the sectoral enforcement by the MMEA, Marine Police and 
Customs, Immigration and others occasionally produced ineffective results. This was 
mainly because, despite all of them wearing government uniforms, their focus was 
very narrow and self-centred. Such a bewildering combination of enforcement 
agencies made the coordination task arduous and complex. The situation also 
potentially hampered a quick response during any untoward incidents. These agencies 
were said to be unwilling or unable to exchange intelligence or sensitive sources of 
LQIRUPDWLRQ DPRQJ WKHP HIIHFWLYHO\ GXH DQ HOHPHQW RI µSURIHVVLRQDO MHDORXV\¶
(interview Code: 13). Furthermore in sectoral management, a government agency was 
independent in managing its administration, operation, budget allocation and assets 
within its given area of responsibility (Kasmin, 2009: 33). The sectoral institutional 
arrangements to some extent therefore contributed to a lack of reciprocal 
coordination.   
 
2QWKHLVVXHRIDUHJLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYH$6($1¶VSULQFLSDORIVRYHUHLJQty that binds 
each member state adversely affected the effort for extra-regional cooperation, 
promoted particularly by the US, to further strengthen maritime security, with a 
connection to the port sector. Suspicion of the real motives for the US presence and 
also fear of Islamic fundamentalist retaliation were among the perceived obstacles for 
establishing robust security measures. Generally, it has been argued, that in an 
µLQIRUPDWLRQDJH¶VHFXULW\OLHVQRWLQVHFUHF\EXW WUDQVSDUHQF\*RZDUG
,Q $6($1¶V FDVH KRZHYHU WKH QRWLRQ RI VRYHUHLJQW\ GLG QRW DOORZ IRU VXFK
transparency, but contributed to some element of cautious feeling within the member 
states when it came to any external influence or interference.    
 
,W VKRXOG EH QRWHG WKDW DFFRUGLQJ WR =HF )UDQFLF DQG +ODFD   ³LQ VRPH
cases, implementing effective security measures may be even more difficult or 
requires additional effort due to external influences i.e. that cannot be controlled by 
UHVSRQVLEOH DXWKRULWLHV´ $OWKRXJK LQ WKH FDVH RI 0DOD\VLDQ SRUW JRYHUQDQFH
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implementing the security requirements in total was not a major problem, the research 
identified a number of internal and external loopholes that could potentially affect the 
overall effectiveness of the implemented security system.  
 
In this connection, the study found that although Malaysian waters were perceived not 
to be a significant source of security threat, the rising number of other maritime 
crimes increasingly reminded the policy makers that there are others aspects to which 
the government needed to pay attention, apart from confining this to the port sector 
alone. The port sector was part of a larger component of the maritime sector and the 
other ungoverned water space, with many remote islands which could possibly 
provide a safe haven for nurturing various forms of illicit activities. Even so, despite 
the fact that terrorism was perceived to be non-existent particularly in PRUW.ODQJ¶V
water, in view of its close proximity to the SOM, other maritime crimes especially 
human trafficking and those associated with the un-regulated entry of small boats, 
were still a threat.  
 
The study revealed certain shortcomings in the system such as porous borders and 
problem of small boats that might be anticipated and which the Malaysian 
government may in future address. Remedies could include strengthening the 
cooperative mechanism with regional states, coordinated enforcing system within the 
enforcing agencies by establishing maritime domain awareness beyond port (Goward, 
2008: 521-524 and Rahman, 2010: 204) and effective sharing of intelligence.   
 
Overall, the research provides a picture of how complicated and complex the port 
security sysWHP 1J DQG 9DJJHODV   SDUDSKUDVHG WKLV DV ³SRUW VSDJKHWWL´ 
which in other words describes how closely the port system is intertwined or rather 
over loaded with host of security measures imposed by various parties at different 
levels. As compared to pre-9/11 period, the post 9/11 undoubtedly created a 
challenging scenario which required a high level of governance and responsibility, 
thought by some commentators to be particularly difficult for developing nations. It 
has been pointed out in the literature review that studies like OECD (2003), 
UNCTAD (2007) and Azuh (2007) considered that the post 9/11 security measures 
especially the ISPS Code caused a burden to developing countries. In relation to this, 
Ng and Gujar (2008: 275) arrived to a conclusion in the Asian perspective that ³D
number of them especially the developing countries and regions, found it difficult to 
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fully comply with the mandatory requirements, mainly due to the lack of information 
sharing, technical know-how, regional co-operation and the low priority of port 
security issue on the political agenda, not helped by the influence of various local and 
regional interest which could significantly jeopardise the effectiveness of 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ´ +RZHYHU the particular case of Port Klang and Malaysian port 
system proved otherwise. The study discovered that Malaysia stands as an exception 
to this generalisation partly on the ground that for historical reasons it had introduced 
quite sophisticated port security measures earlier than 9/11. Apart from this, as one of 
WKHµDGYDQFHG¶GHYHORSLQJQDWLRQV0DOD\VLDZDVLQDSRVLWLRQWRGHPRQVWUDWHWR WKH
international community its seriousness in conducting international trade in a safe 
environment. Since a port was seen as an essential service, its sanctity was well 
guarded from land and water based threats. Albeit there were some challenges, 
implementing the required measures successfully did not appear to be arduous task.  
 
Essentially the study filled a gap by providing a good example of how port 
governance treated effectively the various security regimes in response to 9/11. 
Within this scope, the study expanded the knowledge of port security covering the 
GLPHQVLRQRIµEHIRUH¶DQGµDIWHU¶$VWKHUHLVSDXFLW\RIOLWHUDWXUHSDUWLFXODUO\RQ
poUWVHFXULW\µEHIRUH¶WKHVWXG\WKHUHIRUHDGGHGVXFFHVVIXOSROLF\PHDVXUHVE\D
developing nation to the body of knowledge. By going into the dimension of post 9/11 
period, the study demonstrated how Malaysian ports in general and Port Klang in 
particular had been able to realise a number of security regimes, serving both national 
and international interests. To a certain extent, 0DOD\VLD¶V HIIRUWV PD\ HYHQ EH
perceived to be over-compliance with port security measures. This was primarily 
because Malaysia was not only in a position to safeguard its own national interest as 
required by the national jurisdiction, but being a responsible member of the IMO, 
0DOD\VLD ZDV DOVR REOLJHG WR KHHG WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FDOO 7KH QDWXUH RI 0DOD\VLD¶V
foreign policy also dictated acceptance of the unilateral measures of the US in order to 
sustain a well oriented trade and other arrangements between Malaysia and the US.  
 
Although this is a case study which represents only one developing country, 
theoretically and empirically the study shed the light that not all developing countries 
have endured difficulty in realising port security measures even in the post 9/11 
period where the measures appeared more complex and demanding. As the only study 
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to date to focus in detail on the experience of a developing country in implementing 
the pre and post 9/11 port security regiment, it revealed Malaysia to be a counter-
example to assumptions here, warning against generalisation based on insufficient 
evidence. As such, the study is a tHVWLPRQ\WRVXFFHVVIXOSROLF\PHDVXUHV0DOD\VLD¶V 
port governance, particularly for Port Klang proved sufficiently robust to establish 
good port security governance.  
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Research: Port Security in A Developing Country ± Pre and Post 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A 
Case Study of Port Klang in Malaysia.  
 
Investigator's name: Periasamy Gunasekaran 
To be completed by the participant  
 
 
1. I have read the information sheet about this study 
2. I have had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study 
3. I have received satisfactory answers to all my questions 
4. I have received enough information about this study 
5. I understand that I am free to withdraw from this study: 
x at any time 
x without giving a reason for withdrawing 
x without affecting my study or future with the University of Greenwich  
6. I agree to take part in this study  
7. I agree to be recorded in audio 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
 
Signed Date 
3DUWLFLSDQW¶V1DPHLQEORFNOHWWHUV 
 
Signature of researcher Date 
 
 
This Project is Supervised by: 
Contact Details (including telephone number): 
 
1. Dr. Minghua Zhao             Office Tel: 004420 8331 7661.      Email: m.zhao@gre.ac.uk 
 
2. Professor Sarah Palmer   Office Tel: 004420 8331 7689.      Email: S.R.Palmer@gre.ac.uk 
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PORT SECURITY MEASURES PRE- 9/11 
 
State/Organisation Level Risk 
  Cargo related Ship related Port related Worker/Seafarer related 
International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) 
International A. 897 (20) ± 
Prevention and 
suppression of the 
smuggling of drugs, 
psychotropic 
substances and 
precursor chemicals 
1. MSC/Cir.443 - Measures 
to Prevent Unlawful Acts 
Against Passengers and 
Crews on Board Ships. 
(1986) 
 
2. Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (SUA 
Convention) and 1988 SUA  
Protocol relating to Fixed 
Platform Located on the 
Continental Shelf. 
 
3. MSC/Circ.754 - Passenger 
ferry security, providing 
recommendations on security 
measures for passenger 
ferries on international 
voyages shorter than 24 hours 
& ports. 
 
4. A. 897 (20) ± Prevention 
and suppression of the 
smuggling of drugs, 
 
1. MSC/Cir.443 
 
2.SUA and Protocol, 
1988. 
 
3. MSC/Cir.754 
 
4. MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1 
 
5. MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 
APPENDIX IV 
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State/Organisation Level Risk 
psychotropic substances 
and precursor chemicals 
 
5. MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1 ± 
Recommendation to 
governments for preventing 
and suppressing piracy and 
armed robbery against ship.  
 
6. MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 ± 
Guidance to shipowners and 
ship operators, shipmasters 
and crews for preventing and 
suppressing piracy and armed 
robbery against ship.  
 
EU Supra-
national 
Trans-European 
Transport Networks 
(TEN-T) 
 Trans-European 
Transport Networks 
(TEN-T) 
 
ASEAN Supra-
national 
ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, 1997 
United States (US) National 1. Merchant Marine Act, 1936 
2. Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 1972 
United Kingdom (UK) National Aviation and Maritime Security Act, 1990 
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State/Organisation Level Risk 
  Cargo related Ship related Port related Worker/Seafarer 
related 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most national level 
security initiates 
around the world 
are centred on these 
listed security 
initiates 
United States (US)  
 
 
 
National 
Maritime Transportation 
Security Act (MTSA) 2002 
96 Hour Advance 
Notification of 
Arrival 
MTSA 2002 Abolition of crew list 
visa and individual 
visa requirement  
Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT) 
Proliferation 
Security Initiatives 
(PSI) 
 Detained on Board 
and Guard Service 
Orders 
Container Security 
Initiatives (CSI) 
  96 Hour Advance 
Notification of 
Arrival 
24 hour Rule    
International 
Maritime 
Organization (IMO) 
 
International 
 1. ISPS Code 
 
2. Protocol to SUA 
Convention 
ISPS Code   
International Labour 
Organization (ILO) 
 
International 
   1. International 
Seafarer 
Identification card 
2. Maritime Labour 
Convention (MLC) 
World Customs 
Organization (WCO) 
 SAFE Framework of 
Standards to secure and 
facilitate global trade  
   
European Union 
(EU) 
Supra-
national 
Authorized Economic 
Operator (AEO) 
Regulation 
725/2004 
 Regulation 
725/2004 
 
Directive 65/2005 
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ORGANISATIONAL CHART OF MALAYSIAN PORT SECURITY UNDER THE ISPS CODE           
 
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT 
 
                                                                                                                               ISPS CODE SECURITY COMMITTEE 
DESIGNATED AUTHORITY  
(DIRECTOR OF MARINE) 
MARINE DEPARTMENT MALAYSIA  
 
MARINE DEPARTMENT 
NORTHERN REGION 
LANGKAWI PORT OFFICE 
PENANG PORT 
COMMISSION(PPC)  
   PPC (PENANG) 
MARINE DEPARTMENT 
CENTRAL REGION 
     MELAKA PORT OFFICE 
PORT KLANG AUTHORITY JOHOR PORT AUTHORITY MARINE DEPARTMENT  
EASTERN  REGION 
         KERTEH PORT OFFICE 
      1. Star Cruise Jetty 
Langkawii  
2. Jeti Penumpang Kuah 
 
LUMUT PORT OFFICE 
3. Lekir Bulk Terminal Lumut 
4. Lumut Maritim Terminal 
5. Malayan Flour Mill Lumut 
 
 
 
 
 
  1. North Butterworth   
     Container Terminal 
 2. Butterworth Deep  
     Water Wharves 
 3. Prai Bulk Cargo Terminal 
 4. Chevron Malaysia Lmtd 
 5. Esso Bagan Luar 
 6. Shell Bagan Luar 
 7. Swettenham Pier 
 
 PPC(TELOK EWA) 
 8. Kedah Cement Jetty 
 9. Petronas Telok Ewa 
     1. Petronas Sungai  
         Udang Sdn. Bhd 
    
     PORT DICKSON OFFICE 
     2. CABOT (M) Bhd.  
     3. ESSO (M) Berhad 
     4. Shell Refining  
         Company Berhad 
     5. Syarikat Perak  
         Bumi Rel Sdn. Bhd 
     6. Jeti Jimah Energy            
Ventures Sdn Bhd  
     7. Jeti Penumpang 
    Port Dickson 
  1. Northport Berhad 
  2. Kapar Power Station 
  3. Westport Berhad 
  4. Pelabuhan Tg. Beruas 
  5. Star Cruise  Terminal 
1. Johor Port Berhad 
2. Pel. Tg. Pelepas 
3. MMHE Sdn. Bhd. 
4. Pel. Tg. Langsat 
5. Idemiitsu SM 
6. Jeti Tg. Belungkur 
7. Tg. Bin Power Plant 
Coal Unloading Jetty 
8. Jeti Penumpang 
Tanjung Pengelih 
9. The Zone Ferry 
Terminal 
       1. Kerteh Port Sdn.  Bhd. 
        
       2. *FPSO Bg. Kertas 
       3. *FPSO Perintis 
       4. *FSO PM 3 ² CAA 
            Bunga Raya Oil Field 
       5.* FSO Puteri Dulang 
       6. *FSO Puteri Cakrawala 
       7.* FSO Angsi 
       8. *FSO Cendor 
       9. * FSO Abu 
     10 * FSO Orkid. 
 
 
KEMAMAN PORT 
AUTHORITY 
 
1. Kemaman   
    Supply  Base 
2. Eksport Terminal   
    Tanjung Sulong 
3. Consortium  
    Pel. Kemaman 
4. West Wharves 
5. Kemaman Port  
   Liquid Chemical    
 MARINE DEPARTMENT           
SARAWAK 
KUCHING PORT OFFICE 
1. Hexachem Sarawak Port 
2. Pelabuhan Pending 
3. Pelabuhan Senari 
4. CMS Cement Sarawak 
5. Senari OGC Jetty 
    
MIRI PORT OFFICE 
6. Miri Crude Oil Terminal 
7. Miri Port Authority 
MARINE DEPARTMENT F.T 
LABUAN & SOUTH CHINA 
SEA 
 MARINE DEPARTMENT 
SABAH 
SANDAKAN PORT OFFICE 
1. Pelabuhan Sandakan 
2. SHELL Timur Sandakan 
3. Sg. Mowtas Oil Jetty 
    (SPA IOI Jetty) 
 
TAWAU PORT OFFICE 
4. Pelabuhan Tawau 
5. Tg Batu Oil Terminal 
 
BINTULU PORT 
AUTHORITY  
 
1. Bintulu Port Sdn. 
    Bhd 
2. SHELL MDS Sdn. 
    Bhd 
3. Bintulu 
    Integrated 
    Facility 
4. Bintulu Crude Oil 
    Terminal & SBM 1 
 
1. Asian Supply Base  
    Labuan 
2. Labuan Crude Oil  
    Terminal 
3. Petronas Menthanol  
    Labuan ²plant 1 
4. Sabah Flour & Feed  
    Mill Labuan 
5. Shell Timur Labuan 
6. Antarasteel Mill 
    Labuan 
7. New Liberty Wharf 
8. Petronas Methanol 
    Labuan-Plant 2 
 
9. *FSO Kikeh  
 
 
SABAH PORTS AUTHORITY 
 
 
1. Pel. Kota Kinabalu 
2. Pelabuhan  Sepangar  
    Bay Oil Terminal 
3. SFI Jeti Sipitang K. K. 
4. Cement Industries    
     Sabah K. Kinabalu 
5. Sepanggar Bay 
     Container Port 
6. Menumbok Ro-Ro Ferry  
    & Passenger Terminal 
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   Berth 
 
KUANTAN PORT 
AUTHORITY 
 
 
    
 
 
 
SIBU PORT OFFICE 
8. Lembaga Pel. Rajang 
9. Depoh Pukal 
    Petronas  Seduan Sibu 
10. Rajang Port Sg. Merah 
 
11. *FSO Caspian Sea 
 
 
LAHAD DATU PORT OFFICE 
6. Pel. Lahad Datu 
7. Kwantas Oil L. Datu 
8. Felda Sahabat Jeti 
9. Kunak Jeti   
 
 
      
MTSO = 20 
MFSO = 90 
*FSO / FPSO TO REPORT TO THE NEAREST MTSO 
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0DOD\VLD¶V0DMRU([SRUWDQG,PSRUW'HVWLQDWLRQVLQ 
(in billion US Dollars) 
 
Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry Malaysia (MITI), 2012. 
Note: 1RWH0,7,¶VILJXUHLQ5LQJJLWMalaysia was converted into USD with the currency 
rate: USD 1 = RM 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
  
Export 2011    Country 
  
Import 2011  
USD224 Share %   USD185.2 Share % 
China 29.3 13.1  China 24.4 13.2 
Singapore 28.4 12.7  Singapore 23.7 12.8 
Japan 25.7 11.5  Japan 21.1 11.4 
US 18.5 8.3  US 17.8 9.6 
Thailand 11.4 5.1  Indonesia 11.3 6.1 
Hong Kong 10.1 4.5  Thailand 11.1 6.0 
India 9.2 4.1  Taiwan 8.7 4.7 
Korea 8.3 3.7  Korea 7.4 4.0 
Australia 8.1 3.6  Germany 7.0 3.8 
Taiwan 7.4 3.3  Hong Kong 4.4 2.4 
Others  67.4 30.1   Others  47.9 25.9 
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